Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Pieczynski

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION - For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, (Doc. 24). A separate Order follows.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 4/3/17. (jfg)

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL PIECZYNSKI,

Plaintiff,

v.

3:16·MC·339
(JUDGE MARIANI)

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,

Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Reconsideration, (Doc. 24), filed by pro se
Plaintiff, Paul Pieczynski. The Motion asks the Court to reconsider its Order of February 28,
2017, in which the Court dismissed Plaintiff's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For
the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above captioned miscellaneous case began on August 31,2016, when Plaintiff,
Paul Pieczynski, filed an "Emergency Motion to Vacate Final Judgment and to Vacate
Sheriff Sale Based upon Fraud on the Court and No Constitutional Authority." (Doc. 1).
The Motion named Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as the opposing party and sought to vacate a
Pennsylvania state court decision involving the foreclosure of Plaintiff's house. (Doc. 1at
1). On December 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment against Wells Fargo.
(Doc. 5). On January 6,2017, this Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why his action was

not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. 8). That same day, the Court ordered

Wells Fargo to respond to Plaintiff's Motion. Both parties submitted filings outlining their
positions. (Docs. 11, 14, &16).
On February 28,2017, this Court issued an Opinion and accompanying Order in
which the Court found that this "case present[ed] a hornbook example of the type of action
that is barred by Rooker-Feldman," (Doc. 21 at 6), and dismissed it for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, (Doc. 22). On March 13,2017, Plaintiff submitted the present Motion for
Reconsideration. (Doc. 24).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or
fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909
(3d Cir. 1985). Specifically, the motion is generally permitted only if (1) there is an
intervening change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence becomes available that was not
previously available at the time the Court issued its decision; or (3) to correct clear errors of
law or fact or prevent manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe ex reI. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,677 (3d Cir. 1999). Moreover, "motions for reconsideration should
not be used to put forward arguments which the movant ... could have made but neglected
to make before judgment." United States v. Jasin, 292 F. Supp. 2d 670,677 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Compton, 834 F.
Supp. 2d 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1993) rev'd in pari and aff'd in pari on other grounds, 57 F.3d
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270 (3d Cir. 1995)). Nor should they "be used as a means to reargue matters already

argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the
Court and the litigant." Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2012)
(quoting Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)).

IV. ANALYSIS
In Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, (Doc. 24), and amendment thereto, (Doc.
26), Plaintiff does not identify any intervening change in the controlling law or any new
evidence. Thus, it appears Plaintiff is seeking reconsideration solely on the basis of clear
errors of law and fact. Much of Plaintiffs briefs on the Motion reassert arguments regarding
what took place in state court. Stripped of the arguments which concern the merits of his
case, Plaintiffs filings raise three issues that the Court will address.
Initially, Plaintiff takes issue with the following passage from the Court's Opinion:
"Although Plaintiff maintains the judgment was entered on October 1, 2015, it appears it
may have been entered on October 2,2015. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL
4709060. Nevertheless, this difference is immaterial to the Court's analysis." (Doc. 21 at
6). Plaintiff maintains that this difference is very material to his case. (Doc. 24 at 3). In so
arguing, however, Plaintiff ignores the very next line of the passage which reads: "the Court
will assume that the judgment was entered on the date that Plaintiff asserts." (Doc. 21 at 6).
Thus, even if the date is material, the Court assumed that Plaintiff's date was correct and
still found the Court lacked jurisdiction.
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Next, Plaintiff argues that, because of factual assertions that Plaintiff believes this
Court failed to consider, the state court lacked jurisdiction in the original case and therefore
the state decision is void. (Doc. 24 at 4-7). This argument is nearly identical to one raised
in Reardon v. Leason, 408 F. App'x 551 (3d CiL 2010). There, Plaintiff "sought an order
from the District Court directing the state court to void his conviction because the state court
allegedly lacked jurisdiction over his case." Id. at 533. The Third Circuit affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's action because, among other reasons, Plaintiff was
Ueffectively asking the District Court to void a state court conviction" and was ubarred from
doing so under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." Id. at 533 n.3. Accordingly, this Court finds
no clear error on this basis.
Finally, in his amendment to his motion, Plaintiff cites authority he contends
demonstrates that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his case. (Doc. 26 at 4­
5). Plaintiff cites two cases that concern the application of Rooker-Feldman: Kougasian v.

TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th CiL 2004). and Hampton v. Segura, 2007 WL 2001640
(N.D. Miss. 2007). Plaintiff's reliance on these cases is misplaced. First, these cases are
not binding on this Court. Second, citation to these cases does not demonstrate that this
Court committed a clear error in its application of binding precedent from this circuit.
Instead, it is simply an attempt to "relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court and
the litigant." Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F. Supp. 2d 212,226 (M.D. Pa. 2012).

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In sum, Plaintiff has shown no grounds upon which this Court should reconsider its
prior Opinion.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration,
(Doc. 24). A separate Order follows.

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