Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Gangoo
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 2/21/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-227
FEDERAL HOME LOAN
On February 7, 2017, plaintiff Ishmael Gangoo, “a foreign representative
for the United States Social Security Administration,” filed pro se a notice of
removal regarding a 2015 Pike County Court of Common Pleas mortgage
foreclosure action and a 2016 ejectment action, Case No. 154-2016, filed
against him by defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie
MAC”).1 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff paid the filing fee. Plaintiff also references his
bankruptcy petition he filed on October 11, 2016, in Middle District
Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 5:16-bk-42314, which is a Chapter
13 case pending before Chief Bankruptcy Judge Robert Opel. In his notice of
removal, plaintiff advises defendant that it must stay all proceedings in the
Pike County Court case, including his February 13, 2017 eviction ordered in
the case, as well as the February 10, 2017 Amended Order issued by the
Gangoo styled himself as the defendant in his notice and Freddie MAC
as the plaintiff since he is referring to the actions commenced against him in
county court. However, for present purposes, the court has captioned Gangoo
as the plaintiff and Freddie MAC as the defendant.
bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay and allowing for his eviction.
Plaintiff essentially alleges that the mortgage foreclosure action instituted
against him in county court was “fraudulent” for a myriad of reasons and that
the bankruptcy court’s order was based upon “a falsified oath.”2
Plaintiff indicates that his notice of removal is filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1441(a), Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution as well as the Papal
Bulls of Pope Nicholas V entitled “Inter Caetera, Dum Diversas, Rananus
Following his notice of removal, as indicated, the bankruptcy court
issued an Amended Order on February 10, 2017 lifting the automatic stay and
clearing the way for plaintiff’s February 13, 2017 eviction. Thus, plaintiff filed
an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on February
10, 2017, (Doc. 2), along with a brief in support, (Doc. 4), seeking this federal
court to prevent the Pike County Sheriff, on behalf of Freddie MAC, from
The court notes that plaintiff did not style his action as an appeal under
28 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) of the bankruptcy court’s February 10, 2017 Amended
Order granting Freddie MAC relief from the automatic stay. Even if he did file
this case as an appeal under §158(a), and even if the bankruptcy court’s
February 10, 2017 Order was a final order in his pending Chapter 13 case,
this court would still find that it lacks jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See In re Burchill, 591 Fed.Appx. 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2015)(Third
Circuit held that bankruptcy debtor’s appeal to the district court of a
bankruptcy court’s decision granting Wells Fargo Bank relief from the stay
was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since he was trying to collaterally
attack a state-court judgment entered in the bank’s ejectment action. The
Third Circuit stated that “[the debtor’s] attempt to thwart the foreclosure and
eviction process by having the federal courts review adverse state-court
judgments is improper.”).
After reviewing plaintiff’s filings, including his exhibits submitted with his
notice of removal, (Doc. 1-3), the court issued an Order on February 10, 2017
denying plaintiff’s emergency TRO motion. (Doc. 6). The court stated in its
Order that an appropriate memorandum would be issued at a later date more
fully explaining its rationale. This memorandum addresses the reasons why
plaintiff’s TRO motion was denied as well as why his case will be dismissed.
On February 10, 2017, plaintiff filed his emergency TRO motion with this
federal court in which he requested an injunction preventing the Pike County
Sheriff from evicting him from his real property located at 104 Merlin Road,
Greeley, Blooming Grove Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania and
challenging a 2015 foreclosure sale of his property. (Doc. 2). In particular,
(Doc. 1-3, pp. 1-8), plaintiff claims that he did not sign either the Wells Fargo
Bank Home Loan Mortgage, which was dated December 24, 2011 and
recorded in the Pike County Recorder of Deeds on January 5, 2012, (Doc. 13, Ex. C), or the December 30, 2011 Note, (Doc. 1-3, Exs. D & E), in the
amount of $82,852.42, ostensibly to refinance his Pike County property.3
Plaintiff indicates that Freddie MAC is a “derivative made up entity”
which obtained the order from the bankruptcy court lifting the automatic stay
and that Freddie MAC is not even a party to his action and “appears
Plaintiff contends that based on these loan documents with his forged
signatures, Freddie MAC obtained a mortgage foreclosure judgment against
him in Pike County Court in 2015 and, on February 10, 2017, the order lifting
the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. Plaintiff also states that Freddie
MAC obtained a judgment of ejectment against him on October 5, 2016,
based on fraudulent loan documents, after it filed a motion for summary
judgment in the Pike County Court. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. B). The Pike County Court
ordered that Gangoo be ejected from the above stated property within five
days. Plaintiff also states that the Pike County Court’s judgment of ejectment
was entered by the Pike County Prothonotary in violation of the automatic
bankruptcy stay, 11 U.S.C. §362, on October 14, 2016. However, the Pike
County Court’s ejectment Order was issued prior to the filing of Gangoo’s
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on October 11, 2016.
On October 27, 2016, Freddie MAC filed a motion for relief from the
automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. A notice was issued indicating that
Gangoo had until November 13, 2016 to file an objection/response to the
motion. The notice also indicated that a hearing before the court was
scheduled for December 15, 2016. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. G). The motion stated that
Freddie MAC became the owner of the subject “premises as a result of the
foreclosure and judicial sale by the Sheriff of Pike County, on November 18,
2015, as evidenced by the Sheriff's Deed recorded [on] December 21, 2015
in the Office of the Recorder of Pike County.” The motion also stated that
Freddie MAC was seeking to institute eviction proceedings for the purpose of
obtaining possession of the subject premises and noted that Gangoo had filed
two bankruptcy cases, the first was a Chapter 7 case filed on March 18, 2014,
No. 5:14-01193, in which he received a discharge on September 17, 2014,
and the second was his instant Chapter 13 case filed on October 11, 2016.
Freddie MAC filed the motion to obtain relief from the stay to allow it to
enforce its ejectment rights and evict Gangoo from the property and, it
indicated that the property was not part of the bankruptcy estate since
Gangoo only had a possessory interest in the property as opposed to a legal
On December 15, 2016, the bankruptcy court initially granted Freddie
MAC relief from the automatic stay.4 Plaintiff then states that the Pike County
Court issued a writ of possession which was based upon a “void Judgment of
The court notes that it obtained a copy of the docket for plaintiff’s
pending Chapter 13 case, 5:16-bk-4214, filed on October 11, 2016. (See also
Doc. 1-3, Ex. A). The docket indicates that after a hearing on December 15,
2016, the bankruptcy court issued an order granting Freddie MAC’s relief from
stay motion and lifting the automatic stay. (See also Doc. 1-3, Ex. G). Plaintiff
then filed objections to the order on January 13, 2017 and the court
scheduled a status conference/hearing for February 9, 2017 regarding the
objections. (See also Doc. 1-3, Ex. H). The bankruptcy court then held a
hearing on February 9, 2017, and ordered that Freddie MAC submit an
Amended Order for relief from the automatic stay setting forth the correct
spelling of Gangoo’s name. Freddie MAC then submitted an Amended Order.
On February 10, 2017, the bankruptcy court issued the Amended Order
granting Freddie MAC’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. The court
takes judicial notice of the bankruptcy court’s docket for plaintiff’s pending
Chapter 13 case.
Ejectment and the fraudulent order for relief from automatic stay.” Plaintiff
alleges that the orders of the Pike County Court as well as the orders of the
bankruptcy court were based upon fabricated loan documents, including the
mortgage and the note.
Plaintiff indicates that Freddie MAC’s attorneys, the law firm of Phelan
Hallinan Diamond & Jones, LLP, were the bidders on his property and
obtained a “knock down” of his property, “abrogating the auction and public
bidding, thereby enabling the attorneys to take [his] property for nuisance
value” despite the fact that the property had a fair market value of $132,000.
Plaintiff states that the Freddie MAC’s law firm had a winning bid of $1,297.57
for the property.
On November 18, 2015, the stated law firm sent a letter to the Pike
County Sheriff requesting that the Sheriff assign the bid on the subject
property, “which was knocked-down to the law firm [ ] as ‘attorney-on-the-writ’,
to [Freddie MAC]” and to issue the Sheriff Deed which was enclosed. Plainitff
states that the Pike County Sheriff then issued a Sheriff Deed on December
17, 2015 to “assign the bid” on the property to Freddie MAC’s attorneys as
“attorney-on-the-writ” on behalf of Freddie MAC. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. J). As such,
plaintiff claims that Freddie MAC’s attorneys “usurped the public auction,
violating [his] due process rights, and obtained a secret private bid for their
law firm, prepared their own deed, with the bid amount they chose, and told
the Sheriff to sign off, which the Sheriff did.” Consequently, plaintiff states that
due to the fraud of Freddie MAC ’s attorneys, they have taken possession of
his property, in which he had over $40,000 in equity, for about $1,300.00.
Thus, plaintiff appears to claim that his constitutional rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the taking of his property
without due process.5
After the initial order granting Freddie MAC relief from the stay was
issued, plaintiff filed objections to it and the bankruptcy court held a status
conference on February 9, 2017. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. H). Plaintiff states that on
February 9, 2017 the bankruptcy court issued an Order directing attorneys for
Freddie MAC to correct the names on the December 15, 2016 Order granting
Freddie MAC relief from the automatic stay and nullifying the Order lifting the
stay until an Amended Order was issued. Plaintiff states despite the
bankruptcy court’s Order nullifying the relief from the automatic stay it
previously granted Freddie MAC and despite his removal of the Pike County
foreclosure case to this federal court, Pike County Sheriff Deputies advised
him that he would be evicted from the subject property on February 13, 2017.
Thus, plaintiff filed his emergency TRO motion with this court on February 10,
“The seizure of property implicates two explicit textual sources of
constitutional protection, the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth.” U.S. v. James
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 50, 114 S.Ct. 492 (1993) (the court
noted that the Fourth Amendment applied to the seizure of a four-acre parcel
of land with a house); Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois, 506 U.S. 56, 70, 113
S.Ct. 538 (1992) (court held that a “seizure ... occurs when ‘there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that
property’”). Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment are applicable to
the actions of the state via the Fourteenth Amendment.
2017. (Doc. 2). As noted above, the bankruptcy court actually issued an
Amended Order on February 10, 2017, granting Freddie MAC’s motion for
relief from the automatic stay.
On February 10, 2017, this court denied plaintiff’s emergency TRO
motion. (Doc. 6).
In his TRO motion and related documents, plaintiff challenges the
decisions and orders of the Pike County Court and contends that they were
largely based on the “serial fraudulent actions and claims” made by Freddie
MAC and its attorneys. He argues that his alleged obligation to Freddie MAC
in the mortgage foreclosure action was based on forged loan documents and
that there was no legal authority to support Freddie MAC’s summary judgment
motion in the 2015 foreclosure action which the court granted and permitted
Freddie MAC to foreclose on the “defective” mortgage which was not valid to
secure his property. He also contends that the Pike County Court’s judgment
in the 2016 ejectment action was unlawful since it violated the automatic stay
and since it was issued in favor and against entities who are not parties to the
Plaintiff also challenges the assignment of the alleged mortgage on his
property from Wells Fargo Bank to Freddie MAC which he states was in
December 2009, two years before the mortgage at issue was recorded.
Under 28 U.S.C. §1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States." Thus,
a defendant may remove from state court to federal court any civil case
arising under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §1441(b).
Upon a motion to remand a removed action, the removing party bears
the burden of demonstrating that removal was proper. Scanlin v. Utica First
Ins. Co., 426 F. Supp. 2d 243, 246 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Boyer v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)). "The party asserting
jurisdiction bears the burden of showing the action is properly before the
federal court." Id.
The notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the defendant’s
receipt of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief. 28 U.S.C.
§1446(b). The court does not have discretion to extent this thirty (30) day
period. Crawford v. Fargo, 341 F.Supp. 762, 763 (M.D. Fla. 1972), citing Peter
Holding Co. v. Leroy Foods, Inc., 107 F.Supp. 56 (D.C.N.J. 1942).
Moreover, ruling on the removal of any action is the prerogative of the
federal courts. Id. (citing Harrison v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 232 U.S. 318, 329
(1914) (“as the right given to remove by the United States law is paramount,
it results that it is also of the essence of the right to remove, that when an
issue of whether a prayer for removal was rightfully asked arises, a Federal
Question results which is determinable by the courts of the United States free
from limitation or interference arising from an exertion of state power”)).
Injunctions may issue in only exceptional and extraordinary
circumstances. Parent v. Whinston, 347 F. Supp. 471, 472 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(citing Miller v. Standard Nut Margarin Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932)). The grant
or denial of a motion for injunctive relief is within the sound discretion of the
district judge. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982)
(citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d
120, 136 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980). Injunctive relief
is not granted as a matter of right. Id.
In order to obtain injunctive relief, the moving party must demonstrate:
(1) the likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the party will suffer
irreparable harm by the denial of the injunction; (3) that granting the relief will
not result in even greater harm to the other interested party; and (4) the public
interest will not be adversely affected by the granting of relief. Ecri v.
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987); In Re Arthur Treacher’s
Franchise Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] failure to show
a likelihood of success or a failure to demonstrate irreparable injury must
necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction.” Arthur Treacher’s,
689 F.2d at 1143.
As discussed above, the facts clearly necessitate this court to decline
the removal of this case from the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County in
light of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the 30 day requirement of 28
U.S.C. 1446(b). Freddie MAC filed the mortgage foreclosure action in 2015
and the ejectment action in 2016 in Pike County Court. The Pike County Court
issued its Order granting Freddie MAC’s summary judgment motion for
ejectment on October 5, 2016. (Doc. 1-3, Ex. B). In 2015, Freddie MAC
obtained a mortgage foreclosure judgment against plaintiff in Pike County
Court. The filing of the notice of removal by plaintiff in the instant case was on
February 7, 2017. (Doc. 1). As mentioned above, a notice of removal had to
be filed within thirty days of plaintiff’s receipt of the initial pleading setting forth
the claim for relief. It is clear that plaintiff has not met the removal requirement
time limit. Accordingly, this court will remand the proceedings from the Pike
County Court based on plaintiff’s defective removal. See Jung Yun v. Bank of
America, N.A., 2016 WL 7324554 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 16, 2016).
Moreover, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order barring
his eviction from his Pike County property by the Sheriff. As stated, the
eviction of plaintiff was allegedly scheduled for February 13, 2017.
The court finds that plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on
the merits since he had adequate state court remedies to challenge the 2015
foreclosure judgment and the Writ of Ejectment issued on October 5, 2016 by
the Pike County Court as well as the prior foreclosure sale of his property held
in 2015. Plaintiff also had remedies in state court to challenge the Pike
County Sheriff’s Deed dated December 17, 2015. (See Doc. 1-3, Ex. J).
Plaintiff could have filed motions in state court to set aside the Sheriff’s sale
and to strike the Sheriff’s Deed conveying his property to Freddie MAC. See
Jung Yun, 2016 WL 7324554. He could have also appealed the foreclosure
judgment entered by the county court as well as the order granting his
ejectment entered on October 5, 2016 to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Id.
Since plaintiff had available state court remedies to challenge the
foreclosure sale of his property as well as his ejectment, by filing an appeal,
he fails to state a Fourth Amendment due process claim. See Jung Yun, 2016
As discussed below, the court also finds it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s case and that Pennsylvania’s claim preclusion
doctrine bars his claims which further demonstrate that plaintiff does not have
a likelihood of success on the merits.
Additionally, plaintiff has not shown immediate irreparable harm since
monetary damages would be adequate to compensate him if, for some
reason, the foreclosure sale of his property was invalidated.
Thus, plaintiff’s motion for an emergency TRO, (Doc. 2), will be
Additionally, the court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s case that was removed from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1331. The court can raise sua sponte subject matter jurisdiction issues. See
Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc. 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s
claims clearly relate to the foreclosure action Freddie MAC filed as well as the
judgment entered against him and the order granting his ejectment issued by
the Pike County Court. Essentially, he invites this court to conduct appellate
review of the Orders, Writs and Judgment issued against him in the Pike
County Court of Common Pleas. This court, a federal district court, does not
have jurisdiction to review state court final actions under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Jung Yun, 2016 WL 7324554. The court finds that the doctrine
applies since plaintiff is seeking redress for injuries caused by the state court
judgments and his claims stem directly from the Pike County Court’s
foreclosure judgment and judgment in the ejectment action. Thus, this court
would have to determine that the Pike County Court’s judgments were
erroneously entered in order to grant plaintiff the relief he seeks and it would
have to take an action that would negate these judgments.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is a judicially-created doctrine that bars
lower federal courts from reviewing certain state court actions.” Goodson v.
Maggi, 797 F.Supp.2d 587, 597 (W.D.Pa.2011). The doctrine arose in the
wake of two Supreme Court Cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), and stands for the proposition that
a United States District Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to
review final judgments of a state court, because only the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to review state court judgments under 28
U.S.C. §1257. Goodson, 797 F.Supp.2d at 597 (citing Feldman,
460 U.S. at 482). . . . “This doctrine applies even where the
challenges to the state court judgment allege that the state court’s
action was unconstitutional, such as a deprivation of due process
and equal protection rights.” Goodson, 797 F.Supp.2d at 597
(citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted)).
Conklin v. Anthou, No. 1:10-CV-2501, 2012 WL 124989, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan.
17, 2012), aff'd, 495 F. Appx. 257 (3d Cir. 2012). There are four factors that
must be satisfied for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:
the federal plaintiff lost in state court;
the plaintiff “complain[s] of injuries caused by [the]
those judgments were rendered before the federal
suit was filed; and
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments.
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005)).
Here, the plaintiff complains about an adverse foreclosure judgment
from state court, as well as the Writ of Ejectment, the Sheriff’s sale of his
property, and his ejectment from the property. Next, the motion for an
emergency injunction clearly qualifies as a complaint about the potential
“irreparable” injury that the state court decisions and orders will cause. The
Sheriff’s Deed was dated December 17, 2015 transferring the property to
Freedie MAC and the Writ of Ejectment regarding the foreclosure judgment
Freddie MAC obtained against plaintiff was issued on October 5, 2016 by the
Pike County Court. Plainitff claims that these state court proceedings were all
invalid. All the requirements for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied,
and this court, therefore, does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s claims. See Kawh v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2016 WL 7163086
(E.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 2016) (“[The court] may not revisit the state court
determinations underlying Plaintiff’s instant Complaint nor may [it] interfere
with Plaintiff’s pending state court appeals.”)(citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp.
Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]f a plaintiff’s claim in
federal court is inextricably intertwined with a previous state court
adjudication, the district court lacks jurisdiction over the claim even if it was
not raised in the state court.”); Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.,
275 Fed.Appx. 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o the extent that [Plaintiff] seeks
to ‘appeal from’ the state court’s foreclosure judgment, the District Court
correctly dismissed the claim under Rooker-Feldman.”); Reiter v. Washington
Mut. Bank, 2011 WL 2670949 (E.D.Pa. July 5, 2011), aff’d 455 Fed.Appx. 188
(3d Cir. 2011)(“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.’”)(citations omitted); Jung Yun, 2016 WL 7324554.
To the extent plaintiff is also deemed as seeking to relitigate the
foreclosure action instituted against him in Pike County Court by Freddie MAC
alleging, in part, that the mortgage and note were not signed by him and that
the orders of the Pike County Court were based upon fabricated loan
documents, and that the assignment by Wells Fargo Bank to Freddie MAC
was improper, these claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman but they are
prohibited by Pennsylvania’s preclusion doctrine. See Moncrief, 275
Fed.Appx. at 153. “Federal courts are required to give state court judgments
the same preclusive effect that the issuing state courts would give them.” Id.
(citation omitted); Easley v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 394 Fed.Appx. 946,
948 (3d Cir. 2010)(“In Pennsylvania, res judicata bars ‘claims that were or
could have been raised’”)(citation omitted)(emphasis original). In Easley,394
Fed.Appx. at 948, the Third Circuit held that plaintiff’s claim was “based on
allegations related to her mortgage, including events leading up to its
execution, and events leading up to and including the foreclosure” and that
it was barred under res judicata. As the Third Circuit stated in Moncrief, 275
Fed.Appx. at 153, Pennsylvania’s claim preclusion is:
a doctrine by which a former adjudication bars a later action on all
or part of the claim which was the subject of the first action. Any
final, valid judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties or their
privies on the same cause of action. [Claim preclusion] applies
not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which could
have been litigated during the first proceeding if they were part of
the same cause of action. (citation omitted).
As in Moncrief, Gangoo’s claims regarding the legality of the Pike
County foreclosure, as detailed above, “are predicated on the same
underlying transaction (the mortgage agreement) that was the basis of the
foreclosure action” as well as the ejectment action. Id. (citation omitted).
Further, “[e]ven if [Gangoo] had no reason to know of facts underlying a fraud
claim before the foreclosure action was commenced, the foreclosure action
itself would have put [him] on notice that something was amiss with [his]
mortgage.” Id. (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1147). Thus, Gangoo’s claim that the
foreclosure was illegal, as specified above, “is precluded because it is based
on the same transaction as the foreclosure action, and [he] could have raised
it in that action.” Id. at 154(citation omitted). Gangoo is also precluded under
res judicata from raising his stated claims since he could have raised them in
the bankruptcy proceeding. Easley,394 Fed.Appx. at 949.
Additionally, Gangoo’s claim that the assignment of the mortgage and
note to Freddie MAC were not proper “is also precluded because [he] could
have raised this issue as a defense to, or ‘new matter’ in, the foreclosure
action.” Moncrief, 275 Fed.Appx. at 154.
Moreover, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283, also applies and
precludes the court from granting injunctive relief in this case. See Jung Yun,
2016 WL 7324554. The Anti-Injunction Act deprives federal district courts the
ability to “grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court.” §2283.
There are three narrow exceptions that allow a federal court to grant equitable
relief, but the court finds that all three are inapplicable to the present case.
See Reiter, supra. Because the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s
claims and also lacks authority to grant the relief that the plaintiff requests,
this case must be dismissed.
Therefore, the plaintiff’s motion for an emergency TRO, (Doc. 2), will be
denied and the plaintiff’s action, (Doc. 1), will be dismissed because the court
lacks jurisdiction and authority to provide relief. An appropriate order shall
In light of the above, the plaintiff’s motion for an emergency TRO, (Doc.
2), is DENIED. Plaintiff’s case, (Doc. 1), is DISMISSED for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and since it is barred by Pennsylvania’s preclusion doctrine.
An appropriate order will issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: February 21, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2017 MEMORANDA\17-227-01.wpd
The court notes that even though it issued an Order on February 10,
2017 denying plaintiff’s TRO motion, (Doc. 6), it will issue another Order with
this Memorandum since plaintiff’s case is now also being dismissed.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?