Scott v. Saw Creek Estate Community Association, Inc. et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 7/11/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TONIA SCOTT,
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
SAW CREEK ESTATE
COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-0472
(JUDGE MANNION)
:
:
Defendants
:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court is the report of Chief Magistrate Judge Susan
E. Schwab, which recommends that the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, (Doc. 1), be granted and her complaint, (Doc. 2), be dismissed.
(Doc. 6). Upon review, the report of Judge Schwab will be adopted in its
entirety.
By way of relevant background, on March 7, 2017, the plaintiff filed the
instant action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, in which she alleges a real property dispute. (Doc. 2). By order
dated March 8, 2017, the action was transferred to this court citing improper
venue in the Southern District of New York. (Doc. 4).
Upon receipt in this district, the case was assigned to the undersigned
and referred to Judge Schwab for all pre-trial matters. On May 16, 2017,
Judge Schwab screened the plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the provisions
of 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). In doing so, Judge Schwab recommends that the
plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 1), be granted, and that
her complaint, (Doc. 2), be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. (Doc. 6). Judge Schwab provides the following synopsis
of the plaintiff’s complaint:
Scott alleges that she filed a Declaration of Ownership
Affidavit in accordance with her Aboriginal Title and the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People for Saw
Creek on October 11, 2016, with the Pike County recorder of
deeds. According to Scott, Saw Creek Estate Community
Association, Inc. (“Saw Creek”) was informed of this filing on
October 22, 2016, as a result of her conversation with Saw
Creek’s Director of Member Services via telephone. Scott also
faxed a Declaration of Ownership Affidavit to Saw Creek. Scott
claims that to retaliate against the filing of Declaration of
Ownership, Saw Creek hired additionally (sic) security staff to
“hostilely and forcefully eject” her and her sister off of the
property/land on November 2, 2016. Scott alleges that this
incident was recorded on video. After Scott was informed that
Saw Creek retained counsel Nick Haros, she faxed Attorney
Haros the Declaration of Ownership Affidavit on November 4,
2016, so that she could confirm her authority over the land and
complain about the treatment of both her and her sister.
Scott alleges that she began interviewing possible
candidates to replace Saw Creek’s property manager and its staff.
She faxed a notice to Saw Creek on January 11, 2017, indicating
that the newly hired property manager would be surveying the
land within three days. Scott claims that the new property
manager and staff were denied access to the property by the Saw
Creek staff. On January 17, 2017, Scott complained to Saw Creek
and its staff via email and fax that they were trespassing and their
services on Scott’s land were terminated. Scott claims that after
contacting them, Saw Creek hired additional security in order to
intimidate her and her authorized personnel.
Scott complains that Saw Creek continues to collect and
steal dues from the Saw Creek residents and that Saw Creek fails
to inform the residents of Scott’s ownership. She also complains
that she is denied access to her property so that she is
discouraged from informing the residents about her ownership
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and from discussing lot lease agreements with them. Claiming
that Saw Creek has taken hostile, deceptive, and aggressive
actions against her, Scott requests the ejectment of Saw Creek
and various thirty-party trespassers who are Saw Creek
employees or those that are domiciled on the land. She also
requests that Saw Creek pay her all rents, issues, and profits
derived from the leasing, renting, or use of the lands beginning
from October 11, 2016, until the date of ejectment. Scott wishes
to recover damages at a rate of $125,000 per month with a 10%
interest imposed for Saw Creek’s personal and professional use
of the land.
(Doc. 6, pp. 2-4).
In screening the plaintiff’s complaint, Judge Schwab noted that the
complaint does not contain the grounds upon which the plaintiff’s claims rest
against Saw Creek and the other named defendants. However, to the extent
that the plaintiff is seeking the ejectment of the defendants from the land,
Judge Schwab indicated that it appears that the plaintiff is trying to bring an
action to quiet title. The plaintiff does not, however, allege sufficient facts
regarding her aboriginal title to obtain relief against the defendants. Judge
Schwab further observed that, although the plaintiff alleges that her bloodline
gives her ownership authority, she does not establish her bloodline, nor does
she allege how that possible bloodline warrants ownership over the land in
question. Further, based upon Third Circuit law, see Delaware Nation v.
Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2006), Judge Schwab found that
the plaintiff failed to state a judicially determinable issue regarding her claim
of aboriginal title to the defendants’ land. For these reasons, Judge Schwab
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recommends that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Given that the plaintiff has filed
numerous complaints here in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, as well as
in the Southern District of New York, which contain almost identical
allegations against other defendants, and which have been dismissed without
leave to amend1, Judge Schwab has recommended that the plaintiff not be
given leave to amend, as such would be futile.
Rather than filing objections to Judge Schwab’s report, on May 18,
2017, the plaintiff filed a letter, docketed as a “Motion for Leave to File Out of
Time/Motion to Remand”. (Doc. 7). Citing to the above-captioned action, as
well as another action filed by the plaintiff in the Southern District of New York
and transferred to this district, Scott v. Pine Ridge Cmty. Ass’n, 3:17-0668
(Caputo, J.), the plaintiff states that “[she] never wanted [her] cases
transferred to Pennsylvania . . .” where she claims “. . . there is a history in
(sic) which appears to devalue [her] Aboriginal/Indigenous/Native status . . .”
The plaintiff proceeds to challenge several aspects of the report and
1
See e.g., Scott v. Reinhard, 3:16-0334 (M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v.
Alexander, 3:16-0335 (M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v. Pulos, 3:16-0336 (M.D.Pa.
2016); Scott v. McCarthy, 3:16-0337 (M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v. Cox, 3:16-0338
(M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v. Martin, 3:16-0339 (M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v. Gehris,
3:16-0340 (M.D.Pa. 2016); Scott v. Hartman, 3:16-0341 (M.D.Pa. 2016). See
also Scott v. Pine Ridge Cmty. Ass’n, 17-1682 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); Scott v.
Kaskel, 17-1683 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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recommendation and subsequent memorandum and order adopting the report
in the Scott v. Pine Ridge case. She raises no substantive objection to Judge
Schwab’s report in this case. The plaintiff requests, however, that both cases
be remanded to the Southern District of New York.
When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of
a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of
the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Brown v.
Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard is de novo,
the extent of review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge,
and the court may rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the
extent it deems proper. Rieder v. Apfel, 115 F.Supp.2d 496, 499 (M.D.Pa.
2000) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).
For those sections of the report and recommendation to which no
objection is made, the court should, as a matter of good practice, “satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory committee notes; see also
Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 469 (M.D.Pa.
2010) (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining judges should give some review to every report and
recommendation)). Nevertheless, whether timely objections are made or not,
the district court may accept, not accept, or modify, in whole or in part, the
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findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C.
§636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to file any substantive objections to
Judge Schwab’s report. She instead requests that the court remand her case
back to the Southern District of New York. To the extent that the plaintiff
requests remand, her request will be denied, as it is clear that transfer to this
district on the basis of venue was proper. Moreover, with respect to Judge
Schwab’s report, the court has reviewed the reasons presented by Judge
Schwab for recommending that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.
Because the court agrees with the sound reasoning that led Judge Schwab
to the conclusions in her report and finds no clear error on the face of the
record, the court will adopt the report in its entirety. An appropriate order shall
issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: July 11, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2017 MEMORANDA\17-0472-01.wpd
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