Osadche v. Berryhill

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs appeal is properly granted and this matter is remanded to the Acting Commissioner for further consideration consistent with this Memorandum. An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this actionSigned by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 3/1/18. (cc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRISTIN N. OSADCHE,

:
:CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-850
Plaintiff,
:
:(JUDGE CONABOY)
v.
:
:
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
:
Acting Commissioner of
:
Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the
Commissioner’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security
Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI.

(Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff protectively

filed a DIB application on August 9, 2013; she filed for SSI on
September 15, 2013.

(R. 18.)

In both applications, Plaintiff

claimed disability beginning August 9, 2013.

(Id.)

After she

appealed the initial denial of the claims, a hearing was held on
June 5, 2015, and Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Frank Barletta
issued his Decision on September 24, 2015, concluding that
Plaintiff had not been under a disability during the relevant time
period.

(R. 31.)

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision

which the Appeals Council denied on June 5, 2017.

(R. 1-7, 57.)

In doing so, the ALJ’s decision became the decision of the Acting
Commissioner.

(R. 1.)

Plaintiff filed this action on May 12, 2017.

(Doc. 1.)

She

asserts in her supporting brief that the Acting Commissioner’s
determination is error for the following reasons: 1) the ALJ did
not consider crucial evidence of Plaintiff’s hospitalization for a
suicide attempt; 2) the ALJ erroneously assigned little weight to
the consulting psychologists’s assessments; 3) the ALJ made
erroneous credibility determinations; and 4) the ALJ failed to
present a hypothetical question to the VE containing all of
Plaintiff’s credibly established limitations.

(Doc. 12 at 3, 9.)

I. Background
Plaintiff was born on December 29, 1980, and was thirty-two
years old on the alleged disability onset date.

(R. 30.)

She has

a high school education as well as associates degree and reports
past relevant work as a kitchen helper, medical lab technician,
phlebotomist, and hostess.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that her

inability to work is limited by bipolar disorder type 1 mixed with
psychosis, anxiety, depression, chronic pain, and hypothyroidism.
(R. 188.)
A. Medical Evidence
Plaintiff’s claimed errors relate to specific evidence of
record.

The Court’s review will focus on that and evidence

Defendant relies upon in response.
Plaintiff has a long history of treatment for mental health
problems.

The record contains evidence of an eight-day admission

in 2004 based on suicidal ideation and statements.

2

(R. 290-96.)

Her discharge diagnosis included the following: major depression,
recurrent; generalized anxiety disorder; marijuana, Oxycontin,
Klonopin, and Xanax dependence.

(R. 290.)

hospitalized again in October 2006.

Plaintiff was

(R. 335-40.)

From 2010 through August 2013, Plaintiff participated in
outpatient psychiatric care with Uchenna Uzoukwu, M.D.
85.)

(R. 371-

Plaintiff’s diagnoses included bipolar disorder, generalized

anxiety disorder, social phobia, and borderline personality
disorder.

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s medications included Abilify,

Lithium, Zoloft, and Klonopin.

(Id.)

In January 2014, Plaintiff’s condition worsened and she was
admitted to Wilkes-Barre Behavioral Hospital for suicidal ideation
on January 3, 2014.

(R. 416-25.)

Her diagnoses were major

depressive disorder, borderline personality disorder, and cannabis
abuse.

(R. 416.)

She was discharged four days later at which time

she was no longer suicidal, her anxiety and mood had improved, and
her functioning had improved.

(R. 417.)

Through 2014 and 2015, Plaintiff was treated by a psychiatrist
and therapist at Community Counseling Services (“CCS”).
576.)

(R. 471-

She sometimes reported increased symptoms and also reported

that medications were helping.

(Id.)

With some exceptions (R.

496, 512), mental status examinations indicated euthymic or neutral
mood, normal thought content, average intellectual functioning, and
fair insight and judgment.

(Id.)

3

Plaintiff was also seen by the Lehigh Valley Physician Group
in 2014 and 2015 when she presented with physical and mental health
complaints.

(See R. 451-59, 620-23.)

In August 2014 she reported

anxiety, problems interacting with others, and an inability to
handle situations appropriately.

(R. 457.)

The Plan indicated

that her psychiatrist’s office would be contacted to let them know
of Plaintiff’s suicidal thoughts and the need for close follow up.
(R. 458.)
Notes from Plaintiff’s February 19, 2015, Lehigh Valley visit
state that Plaintiff had two suicide attempts in January and
February and she also reported a manic episode.

(R. 453.)

Details

of one attempt were provided as well as a notation that she had
looked online for different ways to kill herself.

(Id.)

Plaintiff

also reported that she was trying to get disability because she did
not feel that she could work more than four hours per day.

(Id.)

At a Lehigh Valley follow up visit on June 22, 2015, Plaintiff
reported that she was not doing well, she still had a lot of
suicidal thoughts, and she was having symptoms despite taking her
medications.

(R. 622.)

Notes indicated that the provider spoke

with a crisis intervention worker at CCS who recommended that
Plaintiff go to the ER for crisis evaluation.

(R. 623.)

On July 14, 2015, after Plaintiff’s father found her with a
plastic bag over her head, Plaintiff was admitted to the Horsham
Clinic due to an increase in depressed mood and suicidal ideation.

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(R. 624.)

History notes state that Plaintiff had multiple previous

hospitalizations.

(Id.)

Hospital Course notes indicate that

Plaintiff did not want to be in the hospital and she was discharged
on July 17, 2015, when her 72-hour notice to leave the hospital was
up.

(R. 625.)

Discharge condition notes included the conclusion

that there was no indication for continued hospitalization in the
inpatient unit and her prognosis was good.

(R. 626.)

B. Opinion Evidence
1.

Examining Consultant Opinions
On April 21, 2011, Plaintiff saw David F. O’Connell, Ph.D.,

for a consultative psychological examination.

(R. 362-67.)

Dr.

O’Connell noted that Plaintiff found her job as a medical lab
technician very stressful and she was fired from her last job for
making mistakes.

(R. 363.)

He recorded that she had a history of

suicidal attempts by overdose and hanging herself but she did not
have suicidal thoughts or plans at the time of the evaluation.
(Id.)

Mental status exam findings included affect appropriate to

ideation with mildly constricted range and moderately anxious mood.
(Id.)

Dr. O’Connell diagnosed bipolar I disorder, mixed with a

history of psychosis, and anxiety disorder, not otherwise
specified.

(R. 364.)

He assessed a GAF score of 39.

(Id.)

Regarding the effects of her impairments on functioning, Dr.
O’Connell noted the following: activities of daily living included
the ability to do household chores, lift light to moderate weight,
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cook a meal, and take care of personal hygiene; in the social
functioning sphere, Plaintiff was able to conduct herself
appropriately with family, friends, neighbors, the general public,
and with past coworkers and supervisors since she had been on mood
stabilizing, antipsychotic, and antidepressant medications; her
concentration, persistence and pace included the ability to “listen
to Radio Life Style” and read the newspaper.

(Id.)

In a check-

the-box form, Dr. O’Connell found that Plaintiff was moderately
limited in her ability to carry out detailed instructions and make
judgments on simple work-related decisions.

(R. 366.)

He found

she had marked limitations in her ability to respond appropriately
to work pressures in a routine work setting and respond
appropriately to changes in a routine work setting.

(Id.)

Plaintiff had another consultative psychological evaluation on
December 20, 2013.

(R. 402-13.)

Sarah Hasker, Psy.D., recorded

that Plaintiff felt depressed along with anhedonia, she reported
frequent panic attacks, chronic suicidal ideation, and a history of
manic symptoms.

(R. 404.)

Mental status exam included the

findings that Plaintiff demonstrated psychomotor agitation,
dysphoric mood, and labile affect.

(R. 405.)

Dr. Hasker noted

that Plaintiff appeared to have deficient coping skills with poor
impulse control, her judgment appeared to be impaired, her
comprehension and insight appeared to be limited, and she was aware
of her need for treatment.

(R. 405.)

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Dr. Hasker’s diagnostic

assessment included the following: bipolar disorder type 1, current
depressed; history of psychosis; anxiety disorder, not otherwise
specified; and a GAF score of 40.

(Id.)

Concluding that

Plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded, Dr. Hasker added that Plaintiff
would benefit from psychological and psychiatric treatment.
406.)

(R.

The reported effects of Plaintiff’s impairment on activities

of daily living included difficulty managing finances, periodic
difficulty maintaining grooming and hygiene, and she often forgot
to take her medications regularly.

(Id.)

In the social

functioning sphere, Plaintiff reported that it was difficult for
her to get along with others, she had a tendency to argue and fight
with a hitory of intense verbal and physical altercations with
family, friends, and strangers, and she had difficulty interacting
with persons in authority.

(Id.)

Plaintiff also described

difficulty with concentration, persistence, and pace, stating that
she needed assistance in carrying out instructions, she was easily
distracted when trying to complete a task (as evidenced by her
mistakes when working as a lab technician), she tended to be
impulsive in her decision making, and she performed at a slow pace.
(Id.)
In a Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related
Activities (Mental) dated December 20, 2013, Dr. Hasker opined that
Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to make judgments
on simple work-related decisions, understand and remember complex

7

instructions, carry out complex instructions, make judgments on
complex work-related decisions, interact appropriately with
supervisors, interact appropriately with coworkers, and respond
appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine
work setting.

(R. 411-12.)

Dr. Hasker noted that these

determinations were based on Plaintiff’s reports and clinical
observation.
2.

(Id.)

State Agency Opinion
State agency consultant James Vizza, Psy.D., completed a

Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment on January 28, 2014.
(R. 114-117.)

He opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in

some understanding and memory categories; she had moderate
limitations in some concentration and persistence categories; she
had moderate limitations in some social functioning categories; and
she had moderate limitations in some adaptation categories.
115-16.)

(R.

Dr. Vizza concluded that Plaintiff was able to meet the

basic demands of competitive work on a sustained basis despite the
limitations resulting from her impairment.
C.

(R. 116.)

ALJ Decision
In his September 24, 2015, Decision, ALJ Frank Barletta

concluded Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
depression, bipolar disorder, PTSD, social phobia, borderline
personality disorder, a substance use disorder, and degenerative
disc disease of the lumbar spine.

(R. 21.)

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He further concluded

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or equaled a listed impairment.

(Id.)

He determined that

Plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living,
moderate difficulties in social functioning, moderate difficulties
in concentration, persistence, and pace, and no episodes of
decompensation which had been of extended duration.

(R. 22.)

ALJ Barletta assessed Plaintiff to have the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) for light work, except that she
could occasionally lift and carry up to 20
pounds and frequently lift and carry up to 10
pounds; could sit and stand/walk for up to 6
hours, each, in an 8-hour workday; could push
and pull under the same lifting/carrying
restrictions; could occasionally reach
overhead with her bilateral upper
extremities; could occasionally climb ramps
and stairs; could never climb ladders, ropes,
and scaffolds; could occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; must avoid
exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous
moving machinery; could have occasional
contact with humidity, wetness, and
vibrations; could perform simple and routine
tasks and make simple work-related decisions;
could have occasional contact with
supervisors, coworkers, and the public; and
could have occasional changes in the work
setting.
(R. 23.)
Regarding opinion evidence from mental health professionals,
ALJ Barletta assigned little weight to the opinions of Dr.
O’Connell and Dr. Hasker.
to Dr. Vizza’s opinion.

(R. 26.)

He assigned significant weight

(R. 28.)

After finding that Plaintiff was not able to perform her past
9

relevant work, the ALJ determined that jobs existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
30-31.)

(R.

Therefore, ALJ Barletta concluded Plaintiff had not been

under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act at any
time from August 9, 2013, through the date of the decision

(R.

31.)
II. Disability Determination Process
The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to
determine whether a claimant is disabled.1

It is necessary for the

Commissioner to ascertain: 1) whether the applicant is engaged in a
substantial activity; 2) whether the applicant is severely
impaired; 3) whether the impairment matches or is equal to the
requirements of one of the listed impairments, whereby he qualifies

1

“Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that an individual is
disabled
only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
10

for benefits without further inquiry; 4) whether the claimant can
perform his past work; 5) whether the claimant’s impairment
together with his age, education, and past work experiences
preclude him from doing any other sort of work.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(b)-(g), 416.920(b)-(g); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.
521, 110 S. Ct. 885, 888-89 (1990).
If the impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment,
the ALJ makes a finding about the claimant’s residual functional
capacity based on all the relevant medical evidence and other
evidence in the case record.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 416.920(e).

The residual functional capacity assessment is then used at the
fourth and fifth steps of the evaluation process.

Id.

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of
proof.

The initial burden rests with the claimant to demonstrate

that he or she is unable to engage in his or her past relevant
work.

If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner

must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person
with the claimant’s abilities, age, education, and work experience
can perform.

Mason v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).

As set out above, the instant decision was decided at step
five of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ found that
Plaintiff could perform jobs that existed in significant numbers in
the national economy.

(R. 30-31.)

11

III. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is
limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner’s decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
means “more than a mere scintilla.

Substantial evidence

It means such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see

also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals further explained this standard in Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983).
This oft-cited language is not . . . a
talismanic or self-executing formula for
adjudication; rather, our decisions make
clear that determination of the existence vel
non of substantial evidence is not merely a
quantitative exercise. A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality
test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to
resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it
is overwhelmed by other evidence–particularly certain types of evidence (e.g.,
that offered by treating physicians)–-or if
it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion. See [Cotter, 642 F.2d] at 706
(“‘Substantial evidence’ can only be
considered as supporting evidence in
relationship to all the other evidence in the
record.”) (footnote omitted). The search for
substantial evidence is thus a qualitative
exercise without which our review of social
security disability cases ceases to be merely
deferential and becomes instead a sham.
Kent, 710 F.2d at 114.
12

This guidance makes clear it is necessary for the ALJ to
analyze all probative evidence and set out the reasons for his
decision.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

If he has not done so and has not

sufficiently explained the weight given to all probative exhibits,
“to say that [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence
approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to scrutinize the
record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.”
1979).

Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.

In Cotter, the Circuit Court clarified that the ALJ must

not only state the evidence considered which supports the result
but also indicate what evidence was rejected: “Since it is apparent
that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong
reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative
evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court
can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.”
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07.

However, the ALJ need not undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all the evidence.

See, e.g., Knepp v.

Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
A reviewing court may not set aside the Commissioner’s final
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the
court would have reached different factual conclusions.

Hartranft,

181 F.3d at 360 (citing Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d
1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings
13

of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”).

“However,

even if the Secretary’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, [a court] may review whether the Secretary,
in making his findings, applied the correct legal standards to the
facts presented.”

Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d

Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted).

Where a claimed error

would not affect the outcome of a case, remand is not required.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005).

Finally,

an ALJ’s decision can only be reviewed by a court based on the
evidence that was before the ALJ at the time he or she made his or
her decision.

Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV. Discussion

As set out above, Plaintiff asserts the Acting Commissioner’s
determination is error for the following reasons: 1) the ALJ did
not consider crucial evidence of Plaintiff’s hospitalization for a
suicide attempt; 2) the ALJ erroneously assigned little weight to
the consulting psychologists’s assessments; 3) the ALJ made
erroneous credibility determinations; and 4) the ALJ failed to
present a hypothetical question to the VE containing all of
Plaintiff’s credibly established limitations.
A.

(Doc. 12 at 3, 9.)

Post-Hearing Evidence
Plaintiff first maintains the ALJ did not consider significant

medical evidence including her July 2015 hospitalization for a
14

suicide attempt.

(Doc. 12 at 4 (citing R. 624-26).)

Defendant

acknowledges that the evidence was part of the record before the
ALJ and the ALJ did not directly consider it, but Defendant argues
the evidence did not undermine the ALJ’s findings.
17.)

(Doc. 15 at 14-

The Court concludes that this claimed error is cause for

remand.
As set out above, the ALJ was obligated to analyze all
probative evidence and explain his consideration of probative
exhibits.
406.

Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at

Defendant does not argue that the evidence was not probative,

but states that the ALJ’s failure to address the evidence does not
mean he did not consider it.

(Doc. 15 at 14.)

Defendant

inferentially suggests that, if error, the failure to address the
evidence was harmless because the July suicide attempt and
hospitalization represent another intermittent period of
exacerbated symptoms recognized by the ALJ.

(Doc. 15 at 14 (citing

R. 28, 29).)
The Court cannot agree with Defendant’s assessment because the
July 2015 exacerbation and hospitalization undermine ALJ Barletta’s
reasons for discounting the severity of the limitations alleged by
Plaintiff.

For example, ALJ Barletta concluded that Plaintiff’s

“symptoms during the period of review were not acute or extreme”
and her symptoms “remained moderate in degree” after her
hospitalization in January 2014.

(R. 29.)

15

He also assigned little

weight to GAF scores below 50 and significant weight to higher GAF
scores based on Plaintiff’s “only intermittent and very infrequent
period of exacerbated symptomatology.”

(R. 28.)

Similarly, he

assigned significant weight to Dr. Vizza’s opinion that Plaintiff
could meet the basic demands of competitive work on a sustained
basis despite limitations resulting from her mental impairment
because the “evidence of record confirms that the claimant suffers
from more moderate symptomatology, controlled by medication
management.”

(R. 28.)

Contrary to these assessments, clearly

Plaintiff’s July 2015 suicide attempt and hospitalization show that
she experienced more acute or extreme symptoms after her January
2014 hospitalization and that symptoms were not consistently
controlled by medication management during the relevant time
period.
Because ALJ Barletta failed to discuss probative evidence and
the failure was not harmless, the Court cannot say his findings are
supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, this matter must be

remanded to the Acting Commissioner for further consideration.
B.

Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff avers that the ALJ erred in assigning limited weight

to the consulting psychologists’ opinions.

(Doc. 12 at 6.)

Defendant responds that the ALJ did not err on this basis and, read
as a whole, the record shows the ALJ sufficiently explained his
conclusions regarding the opinions at issue.

16

(Doc. 15 at 18-20.)

Because the matter must be remanded for the reasons discussed
above, the Court concludes that reconsideration of the weight
assigned opinion evidence is also warranted.

In doing so, the ALJ

is directed to provide a detailed explanation for the weight
assigned opinion evidence in the context of each opinion.

The ALJ

is also directed to be cognizant of the guidance provided in
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000): “[t]he principle
that an ALJ should not substitute his lay opinion for the medical
opinion of experts is especially profound in a case involving
mental disability.”

Id. at 319.

Furthermore, in the case of

mental health impairments, it is recognized that a medical source’s
opinion which relies on subjective complaints should not
necessarily be undermined because psychological and psychiatric
conditions are necessarily and largely diagnosed on the basis of a
patient’s subjective complaints.

Schickel v. Colvin, No. 14 C

5763, 2015 WL 8481964, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2015); Hall v.
Astrue, 882 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (D. Del. 2012).
C.

Credibility Determinations
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erroneously found Plaintiff’s

testimony not credible and failed to make a credibility finding
with regard to the statements of her witnesses.

(Doc. 12 at 9.)

Defendant responds that the ALJ’s subjective symptom evaluation is
supported by substantial evidence.

(Doc. 15 at 20.)

The Court

concludes that the other matters requiring remand indicate that a
17

reevaluation of subjective symptom evaluation is warranted.

The

ALJ’s overall explanation that the medical evidence did not support
the severity of her claims (R. 29) is inadequate given the
importance of subjective complaints in mental health cases in
general, see Morales, 225 F.3d at 319, and the specific problem
here that the ALJ did not properly evaluate evidence of record.
Furthermore, reconsideration of third party evidence is required
because the reasons provided by ALJ Barletta for discounting the
report of Plaintiff’s boyfriend, Brent Light (see R. 27), are
inconsistent with the persuasive guidance set out in Maelllaro v.
Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-1560, 2014 WL 2770717, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June
18, 2014): to reject third party evidence because it is from a lay
third party associated with the plaintiff defeats the purpose of
submitting third party statements and runs contrary to express
rulings including SSR 96-7p.
D.

Vocational Expert Hypothetical
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to include all of her

credibly established limitations in the hypothetical question posed
to the vocational expert (“VE”).

(Doc. 12 at 15.)

Plaintiff

specifically points to the limitations assessed by Dr. O’Connell
and Dr. Hasker and those described by Mr. Light.

(Id.)

Based on

the need for reconsideration of the evidence and subjective symptom
evaluation, the Court cannot conclude that the VE’s answer to the
hypothetical question posed by ALJ Barletta constituted substantial
18

evidence in support of the ALJ’s decision.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s appeal is
properly granted and this matter is remanded to the Acting
Commissioner for further consideration consistent with this
Memorandum.

An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this

action.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: March 1, 2018

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