Wolford v. Berryhill

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs appeal of the Acting Commissioners decision is properly denied. An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this Memorandum.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 12/15/17. (cc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAUREN WOLFORD,

:
:CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-983
Plaintiff,
:
:(JUDGE CONABOY)
v.
:
:
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
:
Acting Commissioner of
:
Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the Acting
Commissioner’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act.

(Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff

filed an application for benefits on August 2, 2013, alleging a
disability onset date of November 4, 2013.

(R. 60.)

After she

appealed the initial denial of the claim, Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Theodore Burock held a hearing on August 6, 2015.

(Id.)

With his Decision of November 9, 2015, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined in the Social
Security Act from August 15, 2012, through March 31, 2014, the date
last insured.

(R. 70-71.)

Plaintiff requested review of the

Decision by the Appeals Council (R. 55-56), and the Appeals Council
denied review on April 18, 2017 (R. 1-6).

With the Appeals Council

denial, the ALJ’s November 9, 2015, decision became the decision of
the Acting Commissioner.

(R. 1.)

Plaintiff filed this action on June 6, 2017.

(Doc. 1.)

In

her supporting brief, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred on the
following bases: 1) he erred in finding that Plaintiff had no
severe impairments at step two; 2) he failed to properly weigh
opinion evidence; 3) he erred at step three by finding Plaintiff
did not meet Listings 12.04 and 12.06; and 4) he erred in his
evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptoms.

(Doc. 12 at 1-2.)

After

careful review of the record and the parties’ filings, the Court
concludes this appeal is properly denied.1
I. Background
Plaintiff was thirty years old on the alleged disability onset
date.

(R. 96.)

She has a GED and past work including as a fast

food worker and shipping clerk.

(R. 176, 198.)

When applying for

benefits, Plaintiff claimed that the following conditions limited
her ability to work: bipolar disorder, borderline adult ADD, PTSD,
diabetes, tendonitis, and high blood pressure.
A. Medical Evidence

(R. 196.)

2

On July 2, 2013, Plaintiff was seen by her primary care

1

In Plaintiff’s Reply Brief (Doc. 14) filed on December 14,
2017, Plaintiff essentially reiterates arguments made in her
supporting brief. (See, e.g., Doc. 12 at 9-11, Doc. 14 at 1-2.)
Therefore, the Court primarily cites to Plaintiff’s supporting
brief in the Discussion section of the Memorandum.
2

The evidence review focuses on that relevant to Plaintiff’s
claimed errors during the time period at issue--August 15, 2012,
through March 31, 2014. It contains mainly records regarding
Plaintiff’s mental health because sufficiently articulated claims
of error relate to alleged mental health impairments. (See Doc. 12
at 7-22.)
2

provider, James E. Bruckart, M.D., because of urinary symptoms and
a vaginal discharge.

(R. 270.)

In the Assessment/Plan portion of

the office notes, Dr. Bruckart recorded “[s]he reports good mental
function at this time, will recommend evaluation by the
psychiatrist to decide if treatment for bipolar or other thought
disorder may be needed.”

(Id.)

Following a referral by Dr. Bruckhart for a psychiatry
evaluation (R. 279), Plaintiff was seen by Kawish Garg, M.D., on
August 13, 2013, at Keystone Behavioral Health.

(R. 312.)

Plaintiff reported that she had been previously diagnosed with
depression and bipolar disorder but had not been on any medication
for four or five years.

(R. 312-13.)

At the time of her visit,

Plaintiff said she wanted to go back on medication because she had
been experiencing depression.

(R. 313.)

Plaintiff also expressed

concerns about anxiety which she indicated had been going on since
childhood but panic symptoms were not as bad as they used to be.
(Id.)

Dr. Garg characterized Plaintiff’s memories of sexual abuse

by her mother’s boyfriend and babysitter to be more like bad
memories than PTSD, and he noted that she screened negative for
hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, or phobias.

(Id.)

Dr. Garg

determined that Plaintiff had problems with depression in the
context of underlying bipolar disorder and she would benefit from
mood stabilizing medications.

(R. 314.)

He also advised that

Plaintiff cut down on her caffeine intake and return in two to

3

three weeks.

(R. 314.)

Mental Status examination showed the

following: appropriate appearance; orientation to person, place,
time and situation; unremarkable behavior; appropriate speech;
appropriate affect; depressed mood; intact memory; clear
consciousness sensorium; average intellect; cooperative attitude;
good attention; good reasoning; good impulse control; good judgment
and insight; realistic self-perception; logical thought processes;
unremarkable thought content; and no suicidal or homicidal
ideation.

(R. 314.)

Dr. Garg assessed bipolar disorder current

episode depressed and generalized anxiety disorder with panic
attacks.

(Id.)

At her visit with Dr. Garg on September 16, 2013, Plaintiff
reported that her depression was getting better but she was
noticing more irritability and anger.

(R. 309.)

She also talked

about some memory and focus problems, but she did not think they
were related to medication because they preceded her recent
prescription.

(Id.)

her August visit.

Plaintiff’s mental status was unchanged from

(R. 309-10, 314.)

P. Moskel, M.D., conducted a Disability Evaluation on October
7, 2013.

(R. 299-303.)

By history, Plaintiff reported to Dr.

Moskel that she had recently sought treatment for depression as
well as being forgetful and worrisome, symptoms for which she had
been treated many years before.

(R. 299.)

She said she did not

like to leave the house and was only comfortable with people she

4

knew well.

(R. 299-300.)

Plaintiff indicated she was able to do

all of her chores including cooking and shopping for food, and she
had not had treatment for many years until a few months before the
evaluation.

(R. 300.)

Plaintiff was not receiving any kind of

psychotherapy or counseling at the time of her evaluation.
301.)

(R.

Dr. Moskel made the folllowing Mental Status examination

findings: Plaintiff made good eye contact and had no increase or
decrease in psychomotor activity; her speech was appropriate in
rate, production, content, and spontaneity; her mood was euthymic
but with some degree of anxiety; her affect was fully appropriate;
her thought processes were logical and rational; her thought
content was within normal limits; she had no obvious obsessivecompulsive features, phobias, or unusual somatic preoccupations;
nothing suggested suicidal ideation; her attention and
concentration were good and she was oriented in all spheres; her
immediate, recent, and remote memories were all intact; her fund of
knowledge was well within normal limits; her abstract reasoning was
intact; her insight and judgment were quite good; her intelligence
was estimated to be at least average; and her impulse controls were
present.

(R. 301-02.)

Dr. Moskel diagnosed depressive disorder,

NOS with anxiety features and rule out PTSD.

(R. 302.)

Dr. Moskel

provided a Medical Source Statement which included the following
assessment:
Regarding the medical source statement
for work-related activities; based on today’s
5

examination and her current mental status
there is really no impairment in her ability
to understand instructions whether simple or
complex. She seems to be quite intelligence
[sic] and has actually a very good abstract
reasoning and very good insight. When it
comes to getting along with public
supervisors and coworkers, although she
states she had no trouble in the past most of
her jobs did not deal with people that much.
Clinically, she seems to be friendly and
cooperative in engaging, but by her history
it sounds as although [sic] she indeed has a
lot of anxiety out in public.
(R. 302.)
On October 14, 2013, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garg that her
depression was getting better, her mood was improving, and she had
better focus.

(R. 306.)

Plaintiff added that she still got

depressed but said it was “not near as bad as it was.”
only medication side effect reported was dry mouth.

(Id.)

(Id.)

The

Dr.

Garg’s Mental Status examination was the same as that recorded in
August and September except that her mood was euthymic rather than
depressed.

(R. 306, 309-10, 314.)

The next office visit notes of record are dated April 27,
2015–-over one year after the date last insured.

(R. 337.)

At

this visit, Dr. Garg noted that Plaintiff’s Mental Status
examination was unremarkable and he found Plaintiff’s mood to be
euthymic.

(R. 338.)

Dr. Garg also noted that Plaintiff was taking

medications without side effects.

(R. 337.)

B. Opinion Evidence
State agency reviewer Thomas Fink, Ph.D., reviewed records and
6

provided information concerning Medically Determinable Impairments
and Severity (MDI) on November 1, 2013.

(R. 99-100.)

He opined

that Plaintiff’s impairments of Diabetes Mellitus and Affective
Disorders where non severe and she did not have a combination of
impairments that was severe.

(R. 99.)

In the Psychiatric Review

Technique (PRT), Dr. Fink reviewed Listing 12.04 for Affective
Disorders and Listing 12.06 for Anxiety-Related Disorders and found
that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in her activities of daily
living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and
no repeated episodes of decompensation each of extended duration.
(R. 99.)

Dr. Fink additionally noted that Plaintiff had only

initiated mental health treatment in August 2013 and at recent
contacts had improved, and her ADL functioning remained mentally
intact.

(R. 100.)

Dr. Garg completed a Mental Impairment Questionnaire on July
16, 2015.

(R. 350-55.)

Because the opinion was rendered over one

year after the date last insured, this opinion is not deemed
relevant to the time period at issue, particularly in light of the
gap in records noted above.
C.

Hearing Testimony
At the August 6, 2015, ALJ hearing Plaintiff and her attorney

appeared as did a Vocational Expert.

(R. 76.)

Plaintiff verified

that she had not worked since her alleged disability onset date of

7

August 15, 2012.

(R. 81-82.)

She explained her symptoms related

to bipolar disorder: when she was in the depression phase, which
could last three to four days, she did not get out of bed and then
she would go into the manic phase where she got hyper.

(R. 83.)

Plaintiff said her ADHD symptoms included difficulty focusing and
remembering.

(R. 84.)

Plaintiff testified that medication helped

a bit but she had side effects of dry mouth and difficulty waking.
(R. 84-85.)
When questioned about her past jobs, Plaintiff said that they
usually lasted about three months and then she quit because she
either had depression or mania.

(R. 90.)

She did not know why she

did not look for another job after she quit the last job she had in
2012.
D.

(R. 90-91.)

ALJ Decision
In his November 9, 2015, ALJ Burock determined that Plaintiff

had the medically determinable impairments of high blood pressure,
diabetes mellitus, obesity, minimal degenerative changes of the
lumbar spine, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder.

(R. 62.)

He further determined that, “[t]hrough the date last insured, the
claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that significantly limited the ability to perform basic workrelated activities for 12 consecutive months; therefore, the
claimant did not have a severe impairment or combination of
impairments.”

(Id.)

ALJ Burock provided a detailed explanation

8

for his findings and extensively reviewed medical records,
Plaintiff’s testimony, function reports, and

opinion evidence.

(R. 63-70.)
Regarding opinion evidence, ALJ Burock accorded significant
weight to the opinion of Dr. Fink that Plaintiff’s mental
impairments were not severe and that they resulted in mild
restrictions and difficulties in the areas identified.

(R. 68.)

He assigned some weight to Dr. Moskel’s opinion that there was no
impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to understand instructions, and
she had no trouble getting along with coworkers, supervisors, and
the public in her past jobs; he assigned limited weight to Dr.
Moskel’s opinion that Plaintiff had a lot of anxietiy in public as
it was based totally on Plaintiff’s subjective allegations.
69.)

(R.

ALJ Burock assigned limited weight to Dr. Garg’s opinion

because the assessment was rendered quite some time after the
period at issue, it was not consistent with clinical findings in
the record, and it was not consistent with the conservative nature
of treatment.

(R. 69.)

Based on his determinations that Plaintiff did not have a
severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly
limited her ability to perform basic work activities, ALJ Burock
concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability from the
alleged onset date of August 15, 2012, through March 31, 2014.
70.)

9

(R.

Other relevant portions of the ALJ’s Decision will be
referenced in the Discussion section of this Memorandum.
II. Disability Determination Process
The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to
determine whether a claimant is disabled.3

It is necessary for the

Commissioner to ascertain: 1) whether the applicant is engaged in a
substantial activity; 2) whether the applicant is severely
impaired; 3) whether the impairment matches or is equal to the
requirements of one of the listed impairments, whereby he qualifies
for benefits without further inquiry; 4) whether the claimant can
perform his past work; 5) whether the claimant’s impairment
together with his age, education, and past work experiences
preclude him from doing any other sort of work.

20 C.F.R. §§

3

“Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that an individual is
disabled
only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
10

404.1520(b)-(g), 416.920(b)-(g); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.
521, 110 S. Ct. 885, 888-89 (1990).
If the impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment,
the ALJ makes a finding about the claimant’s residual functional
capacity based on all the relevant medical evidence and other
evidence in the case record.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 416.920(e).

The residual functional capacity assessment is then used at the
fourth and fifth steps of the evaluation process.

Id.

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of
proof.

The initial burden rests with the claimant to demonstrate

that he or she is unable to engage in his or her past relevant
work.

If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner

must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person
with the claimant’s abilities, age, education, and work experience
can perform.

Mason v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).

As set out above, the instant decision was decided at step two
of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ found that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that significantly limited his ability to perform basic work
activities and she therefore did not have a severe impairment or
combination of impairments.

(R. 62.)

III. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is
limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to

11

support the Commissioner’s decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
means “more than a mere scintilla.

Substantial evidence

It means such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see

also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals further explained this standard in Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983).
This oft-cited language is not . . . a
talismanic or self-executing formula for
adjudication; rather, our decisions make
clear that determination of the existence vel
non of substantial evidence is not merely a
quantitative exercise. A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality
test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to
resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it
is overwhelmed by other evidence–particularly certain types of evidence (e.g.,
that offered by treating physicians)–-or if
it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion. See [Cotter, 642 F.2d] at 706
(“‘Substantial evidence’ can only be
considered as supporting evidence in
relationship to all the other evidence in the
record.”) (footnote omitted). The search for
substantial evidence is thus a qualitative
exercise without which our review of social
security disability cases ceases to be merely
deferential and becomes instead a sham.
Kent, 710 F.2d at 114.
This guidance makes clear it is necessary for the ALJ to
analyze all probative evidence and set out the reasons for his
decision.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d
12

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

If he has not done so and has not

sufficiently explained the weight given to all probative exhibits,
“to say that [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence
approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to scrutinize the
record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.”
1979).

Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.

In Cotter, the Circuit Court clarified that the ALJ must

not only state the evidence considered which supports the result
but also indicate what evidence was rejected: “Since it is apparent
that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong
reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative
evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court
can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.”
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07.

However, the ALJ need not undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all the evidence.

See, e.g., Knepp v.

Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
A reviewing court may not set aside the Commissioner’s final
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the
court would have reached different factual conclusions.

Hartranft,

181 F.3d at 360 (citing Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d
1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings
of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”).

“However,

even if the Secretary’s factual findings are supported by
13

substantial evidence, [a court] may review whether the Secretary,
in making his findings, applied the correct legal standards to the
facts presented.”

Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d

Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted).

Where a claimed error

would not affect the outcome of a case, remand is not required.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005).

Finally,

an ALJ’s decision can only be reviewed by a court based on the
evidence that was before the ALJ at the time he or she made his or
her decision.

Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).
IV. Discussion

In her supporting brief, Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred on
the following bases: 1) he erred in finding that Plaintiff had no
severe impairments at step two; 2) he failed to properly weigh
opinion evidence; 3) he erred at step three by finding Plaintiff
did not meet Listings 12.04 and 12.06; and 4) he erred in his
evaluation of Plaintiff’s symptoms.
A.

(Doc. 12 at 1-2.)

Step Two
Plaintiff first claims the ALJ erred by finding she had no

severe impairments, asserting that “the extensive medical evidence
demonstrates” that the medically determinable impairments of high
blood pressure, diabetes mellitus, obesity, minimal degenerative
changes of the lumbar spine, affective disorder, and anxiety
disorder “individually are significant enough to affect Wolford’s
ability to perform basic work activities.”
14

(Doc. 12 at 7, 9.)

Defendant responds that the ALJ correctly determined the evidence
Plaintiff submitted does not show that she had any severe
impairment during the relevant time period.

(Doc. 13 at 10.)

The

Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown the ALJ erred on the basis
alleged.
The regulatory provision governing the step two determination
provides the following: “If you do not have any impairment or
combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that
you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not
disabled.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

It is the plaintiff’s burden

to produce evidence showing that her impairments affect her ability
to work.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).

In support of her assertion of error, Plaintiff’s presents no
argument regarding her physical medically determinable impairments:
she merely mentions that she was treated for diabetes at Keystone
Family Medicine.

(Doc. 12 at 9.)

Plaintiff’s conclusory statement

does not warrant further discussion.

As noted previously, the only

sufficiently articulated claim of error relates to Plaintiff’s
alleged mental health impairments.

(See supra p.2 n.1 (citing Doc.

12 at 7-22).)
Regarding her medically determinable mental health
impairments, Plaintiff cites diagnoses and symptoms found in
medical evidence of record.

(Doc. 12 at 9-12 (citing R. 302, 306-

15

11, 312, 314, 351.)

The evidence relied upon does not provide the

suggested support for several reasons.
First, the mere existence of a diagnosis does not establish
severity because the central consideration is the functional
limitation caused by the impairment.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522;

Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s citations to Dr. Garg’s bipolar and general anxiety
disorders ((Doc. 12 at 10 (citing R. 314)) and Dr. Moskel’s
diagnosis of depressive disorder, NOS with anxiety features, and
rule out PTSD (id. at 11 (citing R. 302)) are unavailing.
Second, Plaintiff’s reference to symptoms found in the record
do not establish that the symptoms relate to the relevant time
period.

The depressive and bipolar symptoms set out in Plaintiff’s

brief (Doc. 12 at 9-10 (citing R. 312)) reference the subjective
history Plaintiff provided at her first visit with Dr. Garg on
August 13, 2013.

Her discussion of depression symptoms related to

some unspecified time after age eighteen; the bipolar symptoms
related to an unspecified time after age twenty-five and she stated
that she was not experiencing those bipolar symptoms at the time of
her visit.

(R. 312-13.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on symptoms

identified in Dr. Garg’s July 2015 questionnaire (Doc. 12 at 10
(citing R. 351)) is misplaced because the questionnaire was
completed over one year after the close of the relevant time period
and no records adequately bridge records preceding the date last

16

insured of March 31, 2014, and the July 16, 2015, questionnaire.
As set out in the Background section above, there is a record gap
from October 2013 to April 2015 which is over one year after the
March 2014 date last insured.

(R. 306, 337.)

At the October 2013

office visit, Plaintiff reported to Dr. Garg that her depression
was getting better, her mood was improving, and she had better
focus (R. 306); at the April 2015 visit, Dr. Garg noted that
Plaintiff was taking medications without side effects and Plaintiff
said she was “pretty good” and was stressed by some household
issues but was handling them “ok” (R. 337).

Importantly, at both

the October 2013 and April 2015 visits, Dr. Garg recorded
unremarkable Mental Status examinations which included the finding
that Plaintiff’s mood was euthymic.

(R. 306, 338.)

Finally, Plaintiff’s averment that more was required of the
ALJ because the State agency doctors did not review all the
evidence (Doc. 12 at 11) fails.

Asserting that “‘an ALJ must call

on a medical expert for an updated opinion on medical equivalence
when additional evidence may change the earlier opinion by state
agency reviewers,’” (Doc. 12 at 11 (quoting SSR 96-6p)), Plaintiff
cites no evidence during the relevant time period not considered by
ALJ Burock (see id.).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s inference that Dr.

Fink did not review relevant evidence, Dr. Fink reviewed Dr. Garg’s
records through October 2013 and Dr. Moskel’s October 2013
evaluation.

(See R. 97-98.)

Any suggestion that other evidence

17

existed between the November 1, 2013, State agency opinion and the
March 31, 2014, date last insured which “may have changed the
earlier opinion” of the State agency reviewer (Doc. 12 at 11) is
simply error because the record contains no such evidence.
265-358.)

(See R.

Thus, this claimed basis for error is disingenuous at

best.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has not satisfied her
burden of showing the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s impairments
were not severe is not based on substantial evidence.

Therefore,

reversal or remand is not required on the basis alleged.
With this determination, detailed consideration of Plaintiff’s
remaining claimed errors is not warranted.

However, the Court will

briefly review the remaining errors asserted in Plaintiff’s
supporting brief.
B.

(Doc. 12 at 2.)

Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff’s assertion that substantial evidence does not

support ALJ Burock’s evaluation of opinion evidence (Doc. 12 at 11)
is without merit because the claimed error relates to Dr. Garg’s
July 2015 opinion.

(Doc. 12 at 13.)

Plaintiff downplays the

salient facts that the opinion was rendered more than one year
after the close of the relevant time period and no records during
the relevant time period are consistent with the limitations later
assessed.

This was the basis for ALJ Burock’s assessment of the

18

opinion and Plaintiff presents no evidence which shows error.4
C.

Step Three
With the finding that the ALJ did not err at step two of the

sequential evaluation process, ALJ Burock’s conclusion that
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act is consistent with the demands of the sequential
evaluation process.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

Therefore, the

Court will not further consider this claimed error.
D.

Symptom Evaluation
Plaintiff’s final claimed error is that the ALJ did not

properly evaluate her symptoms.

(Doc. 12 at 18.)

Defendant

responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s subjective
complaint analysis.

The Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown

that the ALJ erred on the basis alleged.
Extensive discussion of this claimed error is not warranted in
4

In her reply brief, Plaintiff expands upon the assertion
made in her supporting brief that the ALJ incorrectly found that
Dr. Garg’s opinion was not supported by clinical findings during
the relevant time period. (Doc. 12 at 14; Doc. 14 at 3-4.) The
expanded argument is without merit in that the “clinical findings
at the period at issue” cited in Plaintiff’s reply brief are
basically the same as those cited in support of the claimed step
two error. (Doc. 12 at 9-11; Doc. 14 at 1-2; Doc. 14 at 4.) As
previously discussed, the records cited do not establish that the
symptoms relate to the relevant time period. See supra pp. 16-17.
The additional information cited in the reply brief–-that Dr.
Moskel “identified” Plaintiff’s “symptoms of forgetfulness and
nervousness around people” (Doc. 14 at 4)-–does not change the
Court’s conclusion that cited records do not show error in that Dr.
Moskel “identified” (id.) these symptoms based on Plaintiff’s
subjective reporting rather than observed objective clinical
findings (see R. 299, 302).
19

that Plaintiff cites Social Security Rulings and caselaw in support
of her asserted error (Doc. 12 at 18-22 (citations omitted)) but
the conclusory presentation of potentially applicable provisions
and decisions falls far short of Plaintiff’s burden of showing
error on the claimed bases.

In this section of her brief,

Plaintiff provides five citations to summary sentences contained in
the ALJ’s Decision.

(Doc. 12 at 18-22 (citing R. 54, 66, 68).)

However, she does not provide any citation to record evidence.
(Id.)

Such generic claims of error fall far short of Plaintiff’s

burden of showing error on the bases claimed.

Therefore, Plaintiff

has provided no basis for the Court to reverse or remand this
matter.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s appeal of the Acting Commissioner’s decision is
properly denied.

An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with

this Memorandum.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: December 15, 2017

20