Hoskins v. Lane
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Peter Hoskins.Signed by Honorable Robert D. Mariani on 9/5/17. (jam)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER HOSKINS,
Petitioner
Civil No. 3: 17-cv-1232
(Judge Mariani)
v.
KATHY LANE,
Respondent
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner, Peter Hoskins ("Hoskins"), a Federal Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") inmate incarcerated at the Allenwood Low Federal Correctional Institution, White
Deer, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). Preliminary review of the petition has been undertaken, see
R. GOVERNING§ 2254 CASES R.41, and, for the reasons set forth below, the petition will be
dismissed without prejudice.
I.
Background
On July 13, 2016, Hoskins was sentenced in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania to a sixty (60) month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to
distribute and posses with intent to distribute methylone. (Doc. 1, p. 1; Doc. 1-1, p. 5);
United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:15-cr-179 (M.D. Pa.). Also on July 13, 2016, Hoskins was
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These rules are applicable to petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the discretion of the Court.
See R. GOVERNING§ 2254 CASES R.1(b).
sentenced in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a
forty-six (46) month term of imprisonment for a supervised release violation, to run
concurrent to the sentence imposed under docket number 3:15-cr-179. (Doc. 1, p. 1; Doc.
1-1, p. 5); United States v. Hoskins, No. 3:01-cr-266 (M.D. Pa.). His projected release date
is February 28, 2019. (Doc. 1-1, p. 4).
In February 2017, the BOP determined that Hoskins was precluded from early
release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e} 2 because his convictions contained a two-point
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Section 3621 (e) of Title 18 of the United States Code states in relevant part as follows:
(e) Substance abuse treatment.-(1) Phase-in.--ln order to carry out the requirement of the last sentence of subsection (b) of this
section, that every prisoner with a substance abuse problem have the opportunity to participate in
appropriate substance abuse treatment, the Bureau of Prisons shall, subject to the availability of
appropriations, provide residential substance abuse treatment (and make arrangements for
appropriate aftercare)-(A) for not less than 50 percent of eligible prisoners by the end of fiscal year 1995, with
priority for such treatment accorded based on an eligible prisoner's proximity to release
date;
(B) for not less than 75 percent of eligible prisoners by the end of fiscal year 1996, with
priority for such treatment accorded based on an eligible prisoner's proximity to release
date; and
(C) for all eligible prisoners by the end of fiscal year 1997 and thereafter, with priority for
such treatment accorded based on an eligible prisoner's proximity to release date.
(2) Incentive for prisoners' successful completion of treatment program.-(A) Generally.--Any prisoner who, in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
has successfully completed a program of residential substance abuse treatment provided
under paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall remain in the custody of the Bureau under
such conditions as the Bureau deems appropriate. If the conditions of confinement are
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special offense characteristic enhancement for possession of a firearm. (Doc. 1, p. 2; Doc.
1-1, p. 5; Doc. 1-2, p. 9).
The instant petition was filed on July 13, 2017. (Doc. 1). Hoskins challenges the
BOP's decision precluding him from early release under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3621 (e)(2)(B) which would have made him eligible to receive up to a one-year earlier
release if he completes the Residential Drug Abuse Program ("RDAP") program. (Doc. 1-1,
p. 1). Hoskins acknowledges that he did not complete the administrative remedy process
with respect to the claims in the instant habeas petition, and that he "is still awaiting the final
decision in the BOP's administrative remedy process." (Doc. 1-1, p. 5). He argues that it
would be futile to exhaust the administrative remedy process. (Doc. 1-1, p. 4). In support of
this argument, Hoskins asserts that if he received a one-year sentence reduction, his
projected release date would change to February 28, 2018. (Id.). He claims that he would
therefore need to be transferred to a residential reentry center ("RRC") by October 2017, at
least four months prior to his projected early release date of February 28, 2018. (Id.).
different from those the prisoner would have experienced absent the successful
completion of the treatment, the Bureau shall periodically test the prisoner for substance
abuse and discontinue such conditions on determining that substance abuse has
recurred.
(B) Period of custody.--The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in
custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau
of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner
must otherwise serve.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).
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Hoskins argues that if he waits for a final decision from the Office of the General Counsel,
his time to apply for placement in a RRC will be delayed and he may not be able to timely
complete the community-based component of the RDAP. (Id.).
II.
Standard of Review· Screening
Habeas corpus petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must be promptly
screened and are subject to summary dismissal "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and
any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; Patton v.
Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 156, 158 (M.D. Pa. 1979). "A petition may be dismissed without
review of an answer 'when the petition is frivolous, or obviously lacking in merit, or where ..
. the necessary facts can be determined from the petition itself .... "' Belt v. Scism, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97052, *2-3 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970)).
Ill.
Discussion
Despite the absence of a statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241,
courts have consistently required a petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing a habeas claim under § 2241. Cal/wood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000);
Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion is
required "for three reasons: (1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record
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and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant the relief
requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the opportunity to
correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy." Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62
(citing Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)). Nevertheless,
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where exhaustion would not promote
these goals. See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion
not required where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202,
205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may be excused where it "would be futile, if the actions of
the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the
administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm");
Carling v. Peters, No. 00-2958, 2000 WL 1022959, at *2 (E. D.Pa. July 10, 2000)
(exhaustion not required where delay would subject petitioner to "irreparable injury"). The
exhaustion requirement has been applied to claims regarding a prisoner's eligibility to
receive a sentence reduction under the RDAP in 18 U.S.C. § 3621. See Campbell v. Yost,
No. 07-0168, 2008 WL 2316556, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008) (citing Beckley v. Miner, 125
F. App'x 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2005); Rosenfeld v. Samuels, No. 07-2907, 2008 WL 819630, at
*1 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2008)).
In general, the BOP's Administrative Remedy Program is a multi-tier process that is
available to inmates confined in institutions operated by the BOP for "review of an issue
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which relates to any aspect of their confinement." 28 C.F .R. §§ 542.10-542.19. The inmate
first must attempt to informally resolve his issue with the institutional staff. 28 C.F.R. §
542.13(a). If informal resolution fails or is waived, the inmate then may submit a formal
Administrative Remedy Request on the appropriate BP-9 form within twenty calendar days
following the date for which the basis for the request occurred. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a). If
the inmate is not satisfied with the warden's response to his Administrative Remedy
Request, he may submit an appeal on the BP-10 form to the appropriate Regional Director
within twenty calendar days of the date the warden signed the response. 28 C.F .R. §
542.15(a). If dissatisfied with the Regional Director's response, a Central Office Appeal
may then be filed with the BOP's Office of General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). This is
the inmate's final available administrative appeal.
In the matter sub judice, Hoskins admits that he did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. Hoskins filed an appeal to the Regional Director, and was unsuccessful at the
Regional Level. Hoskins then filed an appeal with the Office of General Counsel. The
appeal remains pending. Rather than comply with the BOP's Administrative Remedy
Program and await a decision from the Central Office, he then filed the instant petition. It is
clear that Hoskins' petition is premature under the standards set forth in Moscato. Further,
he has not alleged facts that would permit this Court to find that exhaustion would have
been futile, or that exhaustion should be excused. Hoskins argues that exhaustion would
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be futile because a response from the Office of General Counsel may take "months," and
delay his application for placement in a RRC. However, the record, as provided by Hoskins,
demonstrates timely responses to his requests for administrative review. Exhaustion is not
rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his
administrative appeals and will delay his eligibility for placement in a RRC. See, e.g.,
Romero v. Meeks, No. 14-11, 2014 WL 4796579, *5 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2014) (quoting
Amirnazmi v. Scism, 2011 WL 5854579, *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2011) ("Petitioner's
argument that exhaustion would be futile or cause irreparable injury also fails. Courts in this
District have repeatedly held that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not rendered
futile simply because a prisoner anticipates that he will be unsuccessful in his administrative
appeals before" the date he believes he should be released to a halfway house) (citations
and internal quotations omitted)); Ross v. Martinez, 2009 WL 4573686, *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec.1,
2009) (same). See also Campbell, 2008 WL 2316556, at *3 (denying habeas petition where
petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on claim that petitioner was
erroneously denied eligibility to receive a sentence reduction under RDAP). Additionally,
there is no indication that requiring Hoskins to properly utilize the administrative review
process would cause him irreparable harm. The BOP is not presently holding Hoskins
beyond the term of imprisonment imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. His projected release date is February 28, 2019 and he is
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currently serving his judicially imposed sentence.
Accordingly, the petition is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine by
allowing prisoners to invoke the judicial process before completing administrative review.
A separate Order shall issue.
Dated:
September~' 2017
Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge
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