Mears v. Kauffman et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Given Plaintiffs contention that Cousins deferred any involvement and failed to initiate post incident corrective measures because the matter was being addressed by other prison staff members, Mea rs claims against Cousins, even if true, did not constitute deliberate indifference to a serious safety risk. Pursuant to the above discussion, Defendant Cousins motion to dismiss will be granted. An appropriate Order will enter. Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 8/22/18. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICOLAS MEARS,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
SUPERINTENDENT KAUFFMAN, ET AL., :
:
Defendants
:

CIVIL NO. 3:CV-17-1463
(Judge Conaboy)

_________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
Nicholas Mears filed this pro se complaint raising civil
rights and state tort claims in the Huntingdon County Court of
Common Pleas.

Plaintiff’s allegations stem from his confinement at

the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania (SCIHuntingdon).

Defendant Jessica Cousins, PA-C filed a notice of

removal of Plaintiff’s action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1441.

See Doc. 1, p. 1.
By Memorandum and Order dated July 26, 2018, a motion to

dismiss the complaint filed by Corrections Defendants Chief
Grievance Officer Dorina Varner, Superintendent Kevin Kauffman,
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Coordinator Mandy Sipple,
Lieutenant Daniel Wendle; and Psychologist Christina Neri was
granted.

See Doc. 19.

A pro se motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Chaplain Burks was deemed withdrawn on August 7, 2018.
See Doc. 21.
Presently pending is a motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) by
Defendant Cousins, a psychiatric physician’s assistant who was
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previously described by the Corrections Defendants as being an
independent contractor who works at SCI-Huntingdon.
5.

See Doc. 8, p.

The opposed motion is ripe for consideration.
As discussed by this Court’s earlier rulings in this matter,

Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to verbal harassment by Chaplain
Burks during a religious service in the SCI-Huntingdon chapel on
January 1, 2017.

Burks purportedly singled out the Plaintiff and

another prisoner in front of a large gathering of prisoners by
insinuating that they were engaged in homosexual activity.

Upon

the conclusion of the service, Burks purportedly apologized in
private to the Plaintiff and invited him back to attend services
the following week.

Four (4) days later, Mears filed an

institutional grievance against Burks.
Upon arriving at the next religious service conducted by
Burks on January 8, 2017, the Plaintiff and the other prisoner were
immediately removed from the chapel at the direction of the
Chaplain allegedly in retaliation for the filing of the
aforementioned grievance.
It is alleged that Defendant Cousins was deliberately
indifferent to Burks’ actions by failing to end the abuse of her
client Plaintiff; deciding it was a PREA matter; and not taking any
corrective measures.

See Doc. 2, ¶ 6.
Discussion

Defendant Cousins’ pending motion
dismissal on the grounds: (1)

claims entitlement to

a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim

is not alleged; (2) there is no basis for recovery of punitive

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damages; and (3) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies.1

See Doc. 12, p. 3.

Standard of Review
As previously discussed by this Court, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of complaints that
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A court in

addressing a motion to dismiss must “accept as true all factual
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.”

Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir.

2007)(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)).
A complaint must set forth facts that, if true, demonstrate
a plausible right to relief.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(stating that

the complaint should include “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

This requirement

“calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of” the necessary elements of the
plaintiff’s cause of action.

Id. at 556.

A complaint must contain

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id.

Legal

conclusions must be supported by factual allegations and the

1. Pursuant to the standards recently announced in Paladino v.
Newsome, 885 F. 3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018), the pending non-exhaustion
argument is more properly asserted via a summary judgment motion.
Howeever, disposition of the pending motion to dismiss may be
reached without consideration of the non-exhaustion argument.
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complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.

See id. at

679.2
The reviewing court must determine whether the complaint
“contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some
viable legal theory.”

Id. at 562; see also Phillips v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008)(in order to survive a
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege in his complaint “enough
facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element[s]” of a particular cause of
action).

Finally, it is noted that pro se pleadings must be

afforded liberal construction.

See

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972).
Punitive Damages
The Moving Defendant argues in part that the Complaint has
failed to make the requisite showing to warrant an award of
punitive damages.

See Doc. 12, p. 8.

An award of punitive damages under § 1983 is appropriate
when a defendant’s conduct was shown to be motivated by evil motive
or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others.

Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d

1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56
(1983).

The Court of Appeals in Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419,

430 (3d Cir. 2000) added that punitive damages may be awarded in a

2. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Twombly, at 555.
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civil rights case where a jury finds a civil rights violation even
if it has not awarded compensatory or nominal damages.
Pursuant to the Court’s discussion, herein, Plaintiff has
not sufficiently set forth a claim of reckless or callous
indifference to his constitutional rights against Defendant
Cousins.

Accordingly, this Court agrees that there is no basis for

an award of punitive damages.
Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff alleges that Cousins was responsible for all
inmates under her care and had a duty to report as well as put to
an end any abuse of her clients.

See Doc. 2, ¶ 6.

According to

the Complaint, rather than becoming involved in the situation
involving the Plaintiff and Chaplain Burks, Cousins decided that it
was a PREA matter.

It is also asserted that Cousins failed to take

action to protect her client’s safety because of concern for her
job security. See id.
Cousins properly characterizes the claim against her as
seeking relief under the Eighth Amendment.

See Doc. 12, p. 7.

The

Moving defendant argues that entry of dismissal is appropriate
because there are no facts alleged showing that she acted with
deliberate indifference or subjected Mears to an excessive risk to
his health or safety.

Moreover, Cousin’s alleged statement that

she was deferring to the PREA does not show deliberate
indifference.
Mears’ opposing brief states that Cousins stood back and
remained neutral despite knowing that the Plaintiff was a mental
health patient under her care.

See Doc. 16, p. 2.

Plaintiff adds

Cousins had a responsibility to intervene on his behalf but rather
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elected to allow the other Defendants to “deal with the issue.”
Id. at p. 4.
A plaintiff, in order to state an actionable civil rights
claim, must plead two essential elements: (1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law,
and (2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.

Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638

(3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 114142 (3d Cir. 1990).
Prisoners have no constitutionally protected right to a
grievance procedure.

See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor

Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 137-38 (1977)(Burger, C.J., concurring)
(“I do not suggest that the [grievance] procedures are
constitutionally mandated.”); Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 2008 WL
2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir. Jun 30, 2008)(citing Massey v. Helman, 259
F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)(“[T]he existence of a prison
grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”)
While prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek
redress of their grievances from the government, that right is the
right of access to the courts which is not compromised by the
failure of prison officials to address an inmate’s grievance.

See

Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (federal grievance
regulations providing for administrative remedy procedure do not
create liberty interest in access to that procedure).

Pursuant to

the above standards, any attempt by Plaintiff to establish
liability against Cousins based on the Defendant’s alleged failure

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to take action in response to an institutional grievance or
complaint is insufficient to establish § 1983 liability.
Moreover, the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
imposes duties on prison officials to provide prisoners with the
basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care and personal safety.

See Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 31 (1993).

An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official

must meet two requirements:

(1) “the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official
must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
at 834 (1994).

Farmer, 511 U.S.

In prison conditions cases, “that state of mind is

one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.”

Id.

Under Farmer, deliberate indifference is a subjective
standard in that the prison official must actually have known or
been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.
v. Whetzel, 256 F. 3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).

Beers-Capitol

This requirement of

actual knowledge means that “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Based upon an application of the above standards, this Court
agrees that the allegation that Cousins failed to take action in
response to a post-incident complaint by the Plaintiff does not
rise to the level of a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

It is noted

that Cousins was not employed by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, rather, she was a psychiatric physician’s assistant
who contracted with the DOC to provide mentsl health treatment to
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SCI-Huntingdon inmates.

As such, there is no discernible

indication that the Moving Defendant’s duties included the training
or supervision of prison ministry staff such as Chaplain Burks.
This is was also not a situation where information of
potential inmate abuse received by Cousins went unreported to
prison officials.

On the contrary, Plaintiff acknowledges that

Cousins did not involve herself in the situation because
Plaintiff’s complaints were already being handled by correctional
staff, specifically, the PREA Coordinator.
Given Plaintiff’s contention that Cousins deferred any
involvement and failed to initiate post incident corrective
measures

because the matter was being addressed by other prison

staff members, Mears’ claims against Cousins, even if true, did not
constitute deliberate indifference to a serious safety risk.
Pursuant to the above discussion, Defendant Cousins’ motion
to dismiss will be granted.

An appropriate Order will enter.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
Richard P. Conaboy
United States District Judge

DATED: AUGUST 22, 2018

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