Dickson v. Berryhill

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes Plaintiffs appeal of the Acting Commissioners decision is properly denied. An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this MemorandumSigned by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/1/18. (cc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT DICKSON,

:
:CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-1586
Plaintiff,
:
:(JUDGE CONABOY)
v.
:
:
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
:
Acting Commissioner of
:
Social Security,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s appeal from the
Commissioner’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)
under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”).

(Doc. 1.)

Plaintiff protectively filed an application on October 2, 2014,
alleging disability beginning on April 22, 2010.

(R. 10.)

After

Plaintiff appealed the initial January 12, 2015, denial of the
claim, a hearing was held by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Daniel Balutis on October 20, 2016.

(Id.)

ALJ Balutis issued his

Decision on November 7, 2016, concluding that Plaintiff had not
been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act
(“Act”) through December 31, 2015, the date last insured.

(R. 22.)

Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision which the Appeals
Council denied on July 6, 2017.

(R. 1-6.)

In doing so, the ALJ’s

decision became the decision of the Acting Commissioner.
Plaintiff filed this action on September 6, 2017.

(R. 1.)

(Doc. 1.)

He asserts in his supporting brief that the Acting Commissioner’s

determination is error for the following reasons: 1) substantial
evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was
capable of sustained gainful employment; 2) the ALJ substituted his
own medical conclusions in that he failed to give proper weight to
the objective evidence and treating providers’ opinions; and 3) the
ALJ did not adequately explain or document his findings that the
Plaintiff’s testimony and that of his wife were not fully credible.
(Doc. 11 at 5.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court

concludes Plaintiff’s appeal is properly denied.
I. Background
Plaintiff was born on November 24, 1965.

(R. 21.)

He has a

high school education and past relevant work as a clamp truck
driver, truck loader/unloader, and delivery route driver.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleged that his inability to work was limited by lower
back, herniated disc, pinched nerve, nerve damage, anxiety, and
panic attacks.

(R. 198.)

In his supporting brief (Doc. 11), Plaintiff does not provide
a factual background with citation to medical evidence of record.
Rather, he references testimony presented at the ALJ hearing by
Plaintiff and his wife.

(Doc. 11 at 2-4.)

Thus, the Court will

provide a brief general background of the case and review relevant
evidence of record in the context of the arguments presented.
Plaintiff testified that he last worked on April 10, 2010.
(R. 70.)

He was hurt on the job when he bent down and rolled up a

2

rug.

(R. 70-71.)

Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim

and eventually settled the case.

(R. 70.)

He generally references

“objective evidence of the presence of pain generators in
Plaintiff’s lumbar, cervical and brain” (Doc. 11 at 3), and points
specifically to a disc herniation of the lumbar spine at L4-5, disc
herniations at C5-6 and C6-7 that led to cervical fusion surgery on
November 11, 2015, and the diagnosis of brain aneurysms in July
2015.

(Id.)

ALJ Balutis summarized Plaintiff’s claims as follows:
The claimant relates problems lifting,
squatting, bending, standing, reaching,
walking, sitting, kneeling, using his hands
and climbing stairs. He has sharp pain in
his left leg, back, left arm and shoulder.
The pain increases when he bends, sits or
stands for long periods of time. He can only
lift about five pounds. He is able to walk
fifty yards but then needs to rest for a
couple minutes. The claimant’s medication
makes him tired. The claimant tried using a
brace and attended physical therapy.
However, neither treatment modality was
effective in reducing his pain level. During
the day, the claimant prepares simple meals,
occasionally helps with the laundry, and goes
outside every day. He is able to drive a
car. He shops in the store a couple of times
a week for small items. The claimant watches
sports but can no longer participate in
playing sports or volunteer as a fire
fighter. (Exhibit 3E)
At the hearing, the claimant testified he had
an on the job accident and injured the left
side of his body, including his fingers, arm,
hip and leg. He states his pain is 8/10 on
the scale but medication reduces it to 6/10.
After surgery, the claimant said he could
walk about fifty feet or five to ten minutes
before he developed an increase in pain
forcing him to sit and rest for ten to
3

fifteen minutes. After standing five minutes
he would develop numbness and need to sit and
rest. He could sit for ten minutes and then
would need to change his position for ten to
fifteen minutes. The claimant ambulates with
a cane. He could lift five pounds but ten
pounds would cause burning in his shoulder
leg and arm. He is right hand dominant but
has difficultly using his left hand. While
he is able to grab objects like a pencil and
pen, he cannot hold a coffee cup. In
addition, he cannot pinch or turn a doorknob.
The claimant said that in December 2015 he
could bend, stoop and squat. He could climb
one flight of stairs but he would have pain
down his left side, especially in his hips.
As for his aneurysm, the claimant said he can
read ten minutes but then gets dizzy and
lightheaded. He watches a couple of hours of
television per day. The claimant said that
in 2015 he was attending church twice a year.
He got about three to four hours of sleep.
He took half an hour naps. The claimant
requested a cane because he had fallen.
(Testimony)
(R. 16.)
In his November 2017 Decision, ALJ Balutis determined that,
through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: chronic L5 radiculopathy; C5-C6, C6-C7 disc herniation
status post anterior discectomy with fusion and plating at C5
through C7; unruptured left middle cerebral artery aneurysm; status
post left fronto-temporal craniotomy, round right ICA bifurcation
aneurysm; and bilateral osteoarthritis of the knees.

(R. 12.)

The

ALJ concluded that additional impairments in the record were nonsevere including panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.
(Id.)

He concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
4

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments.

(R. 14.)

ALJ Balutis

found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
except the claimant should be afforded the
option to alternate to stand for five minutes
after thirty minutes of sitting and sit for
five minutes after thirty minutes of standing
or walking. He could frequently reach
overhead bilaterally and in all other
directions, and frequently finger and feel
with his left, non-dominant hand. The
claimant could occasionally climb ramps and
stairs, balance, kneel, stoop, and crouch.
He should never crawl or climb ladders, ropes
and scaffolds. The claimant is limited to
reading ordinary newspaper or book print. He
should avoid exposure to unprotected heights
or moving, mechanical parts.
(R. 15.)

With this RFC, ALJ Balutis concluded that Plaintiff could

not perform his past relevant work but jobs existed in significant
numbers in the national economy which he could perform.
21.)

(R. 20-

On this basis, he determined Plaintiff had not been under a

disability as defined in the Act from April 22, 2010, through
December 31, 2015, the date last insured.

(R. 22.)

II. Disability Determination Process
The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to
determine whether a claimant is disabled.1

1

It is necessary for the

“Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C.
5

Commissioner to ascertain: 1) whether the applicant is engaged in a
substantial activity; 2) whether the applicant is severely
impaired; 3) whether the impairment matches or is equal to the
requirements of one of the listed impairments, whereby he qualifies
for benefits without further inquiry; 4) whether the claimant can
perform his past work; 5) whether the claimant’s impairment
together with his age, education, and past work experiences
preclude him from doing any other sort of work.

20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(b)-(g), 416.920(b)-(g); see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S.
521, 110 S. Ct. 885, 888-89 (1990).
If the impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment,
the ALJ makes a finding about the claimant’s residual functional
capacity based on all the relevant medical evidence and other
evidence in the case record.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 416.920(e).

The residual functional capacity assessment is then used at the

§ 423(d)(1)(A).
disabled

The Act further provides that an individual is

only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists
for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
6

fourth and fifth steps of the evaluation process.

Id.

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of
proof.

The initial burden rests with the claimant to demonstrate

that he or she is unable to engage in his or her past relevant
work.

If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner

must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person
with the claimant’s abilities, age, education, and work experience
can perform.

Mason v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).

As set out above, the instant decision was decided at step
five of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ found that
jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy which
Plaintiff could perform.

(R. 21.)

III. Standard of Review
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s final decision is
limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner’s decision.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hartranft

v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
means “more than a mere scintilla.

Substantial evidence

It means such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see

also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals further explained this standard in Kent v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983).
This oft-cited language is not . . . a
7

talismanic or self-executing formula for
adjudication; rather, our decisions make
clear that determination of the existence vel
non of substantial evidence is not merely a
quantitative exercise. A single piece of
evidence will not satisfy the substantiality
test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to
resolve, a conflict created by countervailing
evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it
is overwhelmed by other evidence–particularly certain types of evidence (e.g.,
that offered by treating physicians)–-or if
it really constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion. See [Cotter, 642 F.2d] at 706
(“‘Substantial evidence’ can only be
considered as supporting evidence in
relationship to all the other evidence in the
record.”) (footnote omitted). The search for
substantial evidence is thus a qualitative
exercise without which our review of social
security disability cases ceases to be merely
deferential and becomes instead a sham.
Kent, 710 F.2d at 114.
This guidance makes clear it is necessary for the ALJ to
analyze all probative evidence and set out the reasons for his
decision.

Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

If he has not done so and has not

sufficiently explained the weight given to all probative exhibits,
“to say that [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence
approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to scrutinize the
record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.”
1979).

Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir.

In Cotter, the Circuit Court clarified that the ALJ must

not only state the evidence considered which supports the result
but also indicate what evidence was rejected: “Since it is apparent
8

that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong
reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative
evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court
can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.”
Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07.

However, the ALJ need not undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all the evidence.

See, e.g., Knepp v.

Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).
A reviewing court may not set aside the Commissioner’s final
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the
court would have reached different factual conclusions.

Hartranft,

181 F.3d at 360 (citing Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d
1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings
of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .”).

“However,

even if the Secretary’s factual findings are supported by
substantial evidence, [a court] may review whether the Secretary,
in making his findings, applied the correct legal standards to the
facts presented.”

Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d

Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted).

Where a claimed error

would not affect the outcome of a case, remand is not required.
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005).

Finally,

an ALJ’s decision can only be reviewed by a court based on the
evidence that was before the ALJ at the time he or she made his or
her decision.

Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).
9

IV. Discussion
As set out above, Plaintiff asserts the Acting Commissioner’s
determination is error for the following reasons:

1) substantial

evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff was
capable of sustained gainful employment; 2) the ALJ substituted his
own medical conclusions in that he failed to give proper weight to
the objective evidence and treating providers’ opinions; and 3) the
ALJ did not adequately explain or document his findings that the
Plaintiff’s testimony and that of his wife were not fully credible.
(Doc. 11 at 5.)
A.

Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff maintains the ALJ erred in determining that

Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of light duty work,
specifically pointing to his reaching difficulties, his use of a
cane, and difficulties experienced as a result of aneurysms.
11 at 6-8.)

(Doc.

Defendant responds that the ALJ’s assessment for a

reduced range of light duty work captured Plaintiff’s physical
limitations.

(Doc. 12 at 17.)

For the reasons discussed below,

the Court concludes Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of
showing that the claimed error is cause for reversal or remand.
In a Social Security appeal, the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that a claimed ALJ error was harmful.

“The burden of

showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party
attacking the agency’s determination.”

10

Shineski v, Sanders, 556

U.S. 396, 409 (1969); Woodson v. Comm’r of Social Security, 661 F.
App’x 762, 766 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Shineski, 556 U.S. at 409) (a
plaintiff must point to specific evidence that demonstrates his
claimed error caused harm); Holloman v. Comm’r of Social Security,
639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Shineski, 556 U.S. At
409) (a plaintiff must show how the claimed error made a difference
beyond a mere assertion that it did so).
Regarding reaching limitations, Plaintiff acknowledges that
the ALJ included the “ability to frequently reach with his arms
overhead bilaterally and in all other directions” but states that
the ALJ “fails to place reaching limitations of the upper
extremities.”

(Doc. 11 at 6.)

Limiting Plaintiff to “frequent”

lifting is a limitation set out in the RFC (R. 15) which the ALJ
specifically explained (R. 18).

Plaintiff conclusorily states that

his cervical discectomy in November 2015 and symptomatology which
led to the surgery (arm pain and numbness down to the hand) would
prevent him from performing the light duty position as described in
the RFC.

(Doc. 11 at 6-7.)

This type of broad assertion cannot

satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of showing error.

Shineski, 556 U.S. at

409; Woodson, 661 F. App’x at 766; Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814.
More specifically, Plaintiff does not show how functional
limitations related to his neck impairment which had lasted or were
expected to last twelve months prevented him from frequently
reaching overhead bilaterally and in all directions.

11

42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A).

Importantly, the surgery and pre-surgery symptoms

referenced in Plaintiff’s brief do not suffice in that the mere
fact of a surgery and identification of symptoms preceding it do
not establish functional limitations meeting the durational
requirement.2

See, e.g., Walker v. Barnhart, 172 F. App’x 423, 426

(3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential).
Plaintiff’s reference to the use of a cane is also unavailing
because he does not address the ALJ’s determination that the record
did not support Plaintiff’s allegations that he needed a cane.
(See Doc. 11 at 6.)

Although ALJ Balutis acknowledged that

Plaintiff’s doctor had prescribed a cane after Plaintiff requested
it in October 2015 (R. 67), he cited specific reasons why he
concluded the record did not support Plaintiff’s ambulation
allegations: records show that Plaintiff ambulated unassisted and
had a normal gait in December 2014 (R. 385); and he had a normal
gait and independent mobility in January 2016 (R. 612).

(R. 18.)

Further, in responding to Plaintiff’s assertion, Defendant pointed
to the evidence postdating Plaintiff’s cane request and Plaintiff
did not file a reply brief refuting the argument.

For all of these

reasons, Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing harmful

2

In a surgical post-operative visit on January 13, 2016,
Plaintiff reported that his left arm pain had resolved since
surgery but he still had some numbness in his left fourth and fifth
fingers and intermittent poking sensation in his first and third
fingertips. (R. 612.) At the office visit, Plaintiff reported
“soreness” between shoulder blades, left greater than right, which
was worse in the morning and just before going to sleep. (Id.)
12

error related to his use of a cane.
Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did not give sufficient
weight to the difficulties he experienced as a result of the
aneurysm is deficient for similar reasons.

Without citation to the

record, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions and states that the
ALJ cited to a pre-surgery “failed diagnosis of myopia” and ignores
evidence subsequent to his date last insured “which would obviously
support the Plaintiff’s difficulties with vision due to brain
aneurysms.”

(Doc. 11 at 8.)

Plaintiff also states “[a]ccording to

the Vocational Expert, his vision difficulties would have taken him
off task while changes [sic] position between sitting and standing
(RR 132).

The light duty jobs identified and relied upon by the

ALJ would not be available.”

(Doc. 11 at 8.)

Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegation, ALJ Balutis specifically
considered evidence postdating the date last insured, including
surgeries for the clipping of aneurysms, noting that the record
contains no evidence of cognitive symptoms as a result of the
aneurysms but Plaintiff did have visual limitations for which the
RFC accounted.

(R. 19.)

Plaintiff also mischaracterizes the

record with the single citation found in the one-paragraph argument
supporting aneurysm-related difficulties.
132).)

(Doc. 11 at 8 (citing R.

The record shows the VE made the statement cited in

response to Plaintiff’s attorney’s question of whether the
hypothetical individual who “would not be able to see at a distance

13

from a sitting position or a standing position to a tabletop, and
would have to place objects close to his face in order to read”
would be unable to perform the light duty jobs previously
identified.

(R. 131.)

Thus, when viewed in context, the VE did

not opine that Plaintiff’s established vision difficulties would
render him unable to perform the jobs identified.

Although

Plaintiff testified that toward the end of 2015 he was able to read
but he would have to bring the material within a few inches of his
face (R. 102), he points to no medical evidence verifying the
limitation and no evidence establishing the required longitudinal
reading difficulty alleged.

Because the ALJ is obligated to

include only credibly established limitations in the RFC,
Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554, and Plaintiff does not adequately
develop his argument that the ALJ erred on the basis alleged,
Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing that the claimed
error is cause for reversal or remand.3
B.

Medical Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff points to several alleged inadequacies in support of

his assertion that the ALJ erred in his treatment of medical
opinions and office records.

(Doc. 11 at 8-10.)

3

Defendant

Plaintiff’s reference to the grid rules which would apply at
a sedentary level at age 50 (Doc. 11 at 7) requires no discussion
because it is merely a statement which is not relevant to his case.
In that Defendant pointed out that the statement was without merit
(Doc. 12 at 18) and Plaintiff did not reply, no further
consideration of the issue is warranted.
14

responds that the ALJ gave appropriate weight to opinion evidence.
(Doc. 12 at 20.)

For the reasons discussed below, the Court

concludes Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of showing that
the claimed error is cause for reversal or remand.
First, Plaintiff notes the opinions of PA-C’s Kaitlen Jones,
Joseph Andel, Jessica Doornbos, and Alan Russell Vannan were
treated as non-medical sources.

(Doc. 11 at 9.)

It is true that

ALJ Balutis stated that these individuals were “treating nonmedical sources.”

(R. 19.)

However, this statement does not

indicate error: for claims filed prior to March 27, 2017, PA-Cs
were not included in the definition of “acceptable medical source”;
for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the definition of
“acceptable medical source” included a “Licensed Physician
Assistant for impairments within his or her licensed scope of
practice.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(8).

Nonetheless, before the

definitional change, opinions from “medical sources who are not
technically deemed ‘acceptable medical sources’ . . . are important
and should be evaluated on key issues such as impairment severity
and functional effects.”

SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *3.

Here, ALJ Balutis specifically stated that he considered the
opinions of the physicians’ assistants.

(R. 19.)

He did not give

them little weight because of the status of the providers but for
substantive reasons.

(R. 20.)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s inference

that the opinions were not properly considered because of the

15

status of the providers (Doc. 11 at 8-9) is without merit.
Plaintiff also takes issue with ALJ Balutis’s substantive
reason for assigning the opinions little weight.

(Doc. 11 at 9.)

ALJ Balutis recognized the functional limitations found in office
records from post-operative visits but gave the limitations little
weight “because they were issued in the context of the claimant’s
recovery from surgery and not intended to be permanent
restrictions.

Thus, they contribute little to the longer, twelve-

month period the Social Security regulations require we contemplate
in evaluating disability.”

(R. 20.)

Plaintiff states “[t]his is

inconsistent in light of the duration of medical treatment and the
credibility of the Plaintiff’s testimony and the testimony of his
wife.

The Plaintiff’s complaints are supported by the majority of

the office records since he stopped working in 2010.”

(Doc. 11 at

9.)
Plaintiff does not dispute that the limitations set out by the
PA-Cs were indicated in post-operative visits.
668.)

(See R. 596, 658,

The contextual significance is apparent in the notes

themselves in that some limitations include planned incremental
increases in the activity and other activities may be engaged in
“as tolerated.”

(Id.)

In each instance, follow-up was planned and

no long-term limitations were suggested.

(Id.)

Further,

Plaintiff’s averred inconsistencies are not accompanied by a single
citation to the record.

As noted above, this type of broad-brush

16

argument is inadequate.

Shineski, 556 U.S. at 409; Woodson, 661 F.

App’x at 766; Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814.
Plaintiff next references the field of specialization of
consulting examiner Jay Wilner, M.D., noting that he is a
gynecologist and not a physician who practices in the filed of
physical or orthopedic medicine.

(Doc. 11 at 9.)

This statement

points to no specific error based on Dr. Wilner’s medical specialty
or his assessment of Plaintiff’s functional limitations.
Therefore, Plaintiff presents no basis for the Court to find
related error.
Plaintiff also points to Dr. Jolly Ombao’s finding in February
2016 that Plaintiff’s gait was intact and he could stand and heel
and toe walk, stating that the finding cannot support the ALJ’s
light duty functional capacities evaluation prior to his date last
insured.

(Doc. 11 at 9.)

Plaintiff adds “[i]t is also critical

that the ALJ would not consider the Plaintiff’s aneurysm surgeries
subsequent to the date last insured but will take into account
computer generated findings from a pain doctor who is treating a
cervical condition after his date of last insured (12/31/15).”
(Id. at 9-10.)

The Court’s review of the ALJ’s explanation of his

RFC assessment shows that his decision was based on a thorough
review of the evidence which included evidence postdating the date
last insured–-2016 records related to both pain management and
Plaintiff’s anuerysms were specifically reviewed.

17

(R. 16-21.)

The

ALJ appropriately stressed the twelve-month evaluation period
required under the Social Security Act and regulations.

(R. 20.)

As noted above, disability under the Act is not based on a
diagnosis, the mere fact of a surgery, or identification of
symptoms preceding it–-disability is established by showing
functional limitations which meet the durational requirement.

See,

e.g., Walker v. Barnhart, 172 F. App’x 423, 426 (3d Cir. 2006) (not
precedential).

Thus, aneurysm surgeries themselves do not support

functional limitations, but, to the extent the pain doctor’s
findings relate to functional limitations in the context of the
longitudinal requirements of the Act, they are properly considered.
C.

Credibility
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because he did not adequately

explain or properly document his findings that Plaintiff’s and his
wife’s testimony were not fully credible.

(Doc. 11 at 5.)

Defendant maintains the ALJ reasonably assessed Plaintiff’s
credibility.

(Doc. 12 at 22.)

The Court concludes Plaintiff has

not satisfied his burden of showing that the claimed error is cause
for reversal or remand.
ALJ Balutis found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were
not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence of record.

(R. 16.)

In his analysis, the ALJ cited

specific examples of inconsistencies and explained how his RFC

18

accounted for credibly established limitations.

(See, e.g., R.

18.)
In support of his credibility argument, Plaintiff does not
refute specific ALJ findings but first points to his twenty-six
year work history and his failure to return to work as evidence of
his credibility.

(Doc. 11 at 10.)

Citing to Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d

at 409, Plaintiff notes that Mr. Dobrowolsky had twenty-nine years
of continuous work and was found to be entitled to substantial
credibility.

(Id.)

As stated in Maher v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 08-

156J, 2009 WL 3152467 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009):
Plaintiff is correct that the testimony of a
claimant with a long, productive work history
will be given substantial credibility
concerning his work-related limitations,
assuming those limitations also are supported
by competent medical evidence. See
Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409
(3d Cir. 1979). And although a claimant’s
work history is one of many factors the ALJ
is to consider in assessing an individual’s
subjective complaints, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3), the ALJ is not required to
equate a long work history with credibility.
See Christi v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4425817, at
*12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008). Thus, a
claimant’s work history alone is not
dispositive of the issue of credibility.
2009 WL 3152467, at *3; see also Corley v. Barnhart, 102 F. App’x
752, 755 (3d Cir. 2004).

Although Plaintiff states that

“[a]rguably, [his] testimony of his difficulties standing, walking,
sitting were given little credibility in light of the ALJ’s finding
that he was capable of light duty work” (Doc. 11 at 10), he does

19

not point to “competent medical evidence,”

contradicting the ALJ’s

assessment of his standing, walking, and sitting difficulties as
required by Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 409, and relevant regulations.
Finally, with his statement of errors Plaintiff generally
avers that the ALJ did not properly explain or document his
findings regarding Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony.

(Doc. 11 at 5.)

However, Plaintiff does not discuss this aspect of his claimed
error in the related Argument section of his brief.

(Id. at 10.)

In addition to the inadequate development of the claimed error, the
Court finds the assertion without merit in that ALJ Balutis
reviewed Ms. Dickson’s statements and October 2016 hearing
testimony and noted that she testified she “was unable to recall
exactly how limited the claimant was prior to his date last insured
and indicated his condition had become worse more recently.”
20.)

(R.

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown that the

claimed error is cause for reversal or remand.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes
Plaintiff’s appeal of the Acting Commissioner’s decision is
properly denied.

An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with

this Memorandum.

S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge
DATED: June 1, 2018
20