Castanos v. ICE
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 10/30/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAUREL CASTAÑOS
Plaintiff
v.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-1927
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
On October 23, 2017, the plaintiff, Laurel Castaños, filed the instant pro
se civil complaint. (Doc. 1). Along with her complaint, the plaintiff filed a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). Since the plaintiff is proceeding
in forma pauperis, the court will accordingly give the plaintiff’s complaint
preliminary consideration under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).1 Based on its
preliminary consideration of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court will DISMISS
the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
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28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) directs the court to “dismiss the case . . . if
the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious
(ii), fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on October 20, 2017 federal
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested her domestic
partner, Jose Rodriguez, without a warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. (Doc. 1). According to the complaint, the ICE agents informed
the plaintiff that they were transporting Mr. Rodriguez to the Pike County
Correctional Facility due to his 2008 guilty pleas and convictions for
unspecified crimes. (Id.). The plaintiff further maintains that she suffers from
an unspecified “auto-immune disease” that tends to flare up during stressful
situations, such as her domestic partner’s arrest. (Id.). As relief, the plaintiff
requests that Mr. Rodriguez be released from his detention with ICE. (Id.).
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
elements.” E.g. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is concrete, particularized,
and imminent, as opposed to merely conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560.
Second, there must be a “causal connection” that is “fairly traceable” from the
alleged injury to the legal violation complained of. Id. Finally, it must be “likely,”
as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a
favorable decision.” Id. at 561.
“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ test . . . requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
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(1972). “Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114
(1976) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). Here, the pro se
plaintiff does precisely this. Rather than asserting that her own rights were
violated by the government’s actions and requesting relief on behalf of her
own personal injuries, the plaintiff instead asserts that a third party’s rights
were violated and requests relief on behalf of this outside person. (Doc. 1).
“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133 (1978) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)). Moreover, the plaintiff’s alleged auto-immune disease presumably
existed long before Mr. Rodriguez’s arrest. As such, any attempt by the
plaintiff to assert that she was injured due to flare ups of her auto-immune
disease is still insufficient to confer standing, as it is not fairly traceable to the
alleged legal violation. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Finally, the plaintiff cannot file the instant complaint on Mr. Rodriguez’s
behalf as his legal representative. “The rule that a non-lawyer may not
represent another person in court is a venerable common law rule.” Collinsgru
v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998). Federal courts
have consistently rejected attempts at third-party lay representation of this
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nature. See, e.g., Leyfert v. Commonwealth of Pa. House of Representatives,
2005 WL 3433995, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005). Accordingly, only Mr.
Rodriguez (or an attorney acting on his behalf) could bring a lawsuit with
proper standing to challenge his detention on constitutional grounds. The
plaintiff here has no such ability. The appropriate avenue for relief would be a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not a civil complaint.
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s complaint will be DISMISSED
under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted. A separate order shall issue.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: October 30, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2017 MEMORANDA\17-1927-01.docx
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