Brown v. Berryhill et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) For the reasons cited above, Plaintiffs assignment of error is rejected and the decision of the Agency will be affirmed. The Court further determines that the Agencys decision was supported by substantial evidence. An Order consistent with this determination will be filed contemporaneously.Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/21/18. (cc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Joni L. Brown,
Plaintiff

No. 3:17-cv-02021

v.

(Judge Richard P. Conaboy)

Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM
I.

Procedural background.
We consider here the appeal of Plaintiff Joni Louise Brown

from an adverse decision of the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) or (“Agency”) on her application for Supplemental
Security Income Benefits (“SSI”). Plaintiff’s claim, initially
filed on April 23, 2014, was denied at the administrative level
on June 25, 2014. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and received such a hearing on
April 13, 2016. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August
22, 2016 which was affirmed by the Appeals Council on September
7, 2017. The Appeals Council’s affirmance constitutes a final
decision of the Agency and vests this Court with jurisdiction
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.

Testimony before the ALJ.

The Plaintiff testified at a hearing before ALJ Paula
Garrety on April 13, 2016. Also present were Charles Rosamilia,
Jr., her attorney, and Patricia Chilleri, a vocational expert
(“VE”). Plaintiff’s testimony may be summarized as follows.
Plaintiff was forty-five years of age on the date of her
hearing. She has three children all of whom have reached
adulthood. She lives with one of her daughters who she described
as “learning disabled”. The daughter receives SSI benefits and
receives these checks in her own right. Previously, Plaintiff
had been her daughter’s representative payee. (R. 117-118).
Plaintiff does not drive and has never had a driver’s
license. When she needs to leave the house she depends on her
mother for transportation. Plaintiff stated that she does not
leave the house often because being in public makes her anxious.
She last worked in 1997. She did try to go back to work briefly
in 2002 but could not sustain that employment. Since 2002, her
physical problems have gradually gotten worse despite several
surgeries. (R. 118-119).
Plaintiff completed the tenth grade and subsequently earned
a GED. She is five feet three inches tall and weighs
approximately two hundred and fifteen pounds. She formerly
weighed about 140 pounds and believes that her difficulty moving
around has contributed to her substantial weight gain. Before her
back symptomology she did “all sorts of stuff” such as

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photography, nature hikes, dancing, and shopping at flea markets.
She no longer does these things because she has difficulty
staying on her legs for more than thirty to forty-five minutes
before she becomes shaky and her legs begin to swell. She stated
that she can sit for forty-five minutes to an hour and then must
change position due to swelling in her legs. She believes the
swelling is related to her lower back problems. She was not able
to estimate how long she would be capable of sitting and standing
in an eight hour work day because she is on medications that make
her tired and sometimes cause her blood pressure to spike. Some
days are worse than others. She does not believe that she could
work even as much as five hours in an eight hour workday. (R.
119-120).
She has difficulty walking from her front door to the
sidewalk and back -- a distance of less than half a block. She
must sit down to rest afterward. She does not experience much of
a problem manipulating things with her hands but sometimes
experiences hand numbness. She stated that she had been assaulted
by a boyfriend in 1997 and that the damage incurred ultimately
made two back surgeries, one cervical and one lumbar, necessary.
Before the surgeries Plaintiff was experiencing extreme pain in
her lower back, hips, legs, neck, and down her arms into her
hands. Her neck surgery “made things a little better”. However
she still experiences pain in her left hand and some numbness in

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her right hand. Also, she began to experience headaches after her
neck surgery. These headaches are severe enough that she does not
do much around the house and depends on her daughter and her
boyfriend to do such things as take out the trash, do the
laundry, make the beds, and shop for groceries. (R. 120-122).
Lower back surgery in 2013 actually made her low back and
leg symptomology worse and further impaired her ability to
function. She does not get much sleep. She naps downstairs in the
afternoon and early evening and then her daughter helps her get
up to her third floor bedroom. She sleeps sporadically and
generally wakes up before 5:00 a.m. and, as a result, she is
tired all day. This fatigue and her social anxiety are such that
she rarely leaves the house. Her back pain also limits her and
she finds that even minimal physical activity exacerbates back
pain that radiates down her legs. R. 123-125).
Plaintiff also relates that she feels depressed and believes
that her depression stems from the assault she suffered years
ago. She had gone for a time for mental health therapy and, while
in therapy, was prescribed medication for her anxiety. She was
told by a therapist that she did not need to go back to therapy
as long as she stayed on her medication. Plaintiff also alluded
to osteoarthritis which affects her knees, fingers, wrists,
elbows, shoulders, and hips. When this condition is exacerbated
she goes to the hospital for an injection to deal with the

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inflammation. She also uses heat and ice to alleviate her
symptoms of osteoarthritis. (R. 125-126).
Also testifying was VE Patricia Chilleri. Ms. Chilleri
testified that she was familiar with the rules and regulations
governing disability under the Social Security Act and that she
had reviewed the exhibits that had been introduced and also heard
Plaintiff’s testimony. Her vocational testimony was entered
without objection from Plaintiff’s attorney.
The ALJ phrased a hypothetical question to Ms. Chilleri in
which she was asked to assume a person of Plaintiff’s age,
education, and work-history who was able to perform sedentary or
light work that did not involve detailed or complex instructions
and was confined to routine, competitive tasks and no more than
occasional contact with the public. Under these assumptions, Ms.
Chilleri identified sedentary occupations (including document
preparer, sorter, sampler, tester, inspector, and bench worker)
and light exertional occupations (including hand packer and
laundry worker/folder) that would be within the hypothetical
claimant’s functional capacities. (R. 128-129).
Upon questioning by the Plaintiff’s attorney, Ms. Chilleri
stated that if the claimant was unable to sit, stand, or walk for
more than two hours in an eight hour day and could lift no more
than five pounds, she would be unable to perform any of the jobs
that had been identified. When Plaintiff’s attorney asked whether

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marked limitations in understanding and carrying out simple
instructions coupled with agoraphobia and panic attacks as
described by Plaintiff’s doctor would preclude Plaintiff from
performing any of the jobs the VE had identified, Ms. Chilleri
responded that, if the Plaintiff was unable to maintain
consistency and persistence for at least twenty percent of an
eight hour work day, she would be unemployable. (R. 129-130).
Medical Evidence.1

III.

a. Clinton Medical Associates.
Dr. Greenberg of Clinton Medical Associates saw Plaintiff on
four occasions between March 4, 2014 and May 20, 2014. On March
4, 2014 Dr. Greenberg’s office note refers to low back pain at
L5-S1 and headaches. He recorded Plaintiff’s weight at 188 pounds
and her blood pressure at 122/74. He noted that he would follow
up with Plaintiff after surgery. (R. 565).
On March 7, 2014, Plaintiff called Dr. Greenberg with
complaints of cold symptoms and back pain. Dr. Greenberg
prescribed Hydrocodone and a cough medication. (R. 564).
On April 4, 2014, Plaintiff presented with complaints of
chest tightness, anxiety, and low back pain post-status lumbar

1

Plaintiff had previously requested a closed period of disability from September 7, 2006
through February 6, 2014. Claimant had thereafter acknowledged that she was capable of working as
of February 6, 2014. Accordingly, the only relevant medical evidence is that which postdates
February 6, 2014.

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fusion. Plaintiff’s weight was recorded as 184.8 pounds and her
blood pressure was measured at 132/78. (R. 563).
Between April 15, 2014 and April 23, 2014 Plaintiff called
Dr. Greenberg on three occasions to discuss her dosage of Adidex
(a weight control medication), to complain of feeling odd and
experiencing back pressure, and to report that she felt better
after taking Ativan (a sedative for anxiety). (R. 562).
On April 28, 2014, Plaintiff called to complain about an
appointment being cancelled and demanded that her medications be
refilled and x-rays of her back be arranged. (R. 561).
On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff was seen in Dr. Greenberg’s
office and complained of constipation and concern about the
hardware in her back. (R. 560). Finally, on May 20, 2014, Dr.
Greenberg saw Plaintiff for the last time that is documented in
the record. His office notes of that day are largely illegible
but do indicate that Plaintiff was status post L5-S1 fusion with
complaints of a burning feeling on the left side of her back. Dr.
Greenberg also indicated that she could not lift more than five
pounds on a repetitive basis.(R. 558).
Dr. Greenberg executed two identical letters dated August 6,
2015 and July 1, 2016 (R. at 793 and 824 respectively) in which
he characterized Plaintiff as “totally disabled”. The record also
includes a functional capacities form completed by a Dr. Herberg,
an associate of Dr. Greenberg, which assesses that Plaintiff:

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could not sit, stand, or walk for more than a total of three
hours in an eight hour workday; could occasionally lift up to
five pounds and never lift more than five pounds; and that
Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to carry out
complex instructions and in her ability to interact with the
general public, co-workers, and supervisors. These behavioral
limitations were attributed to agoraphobia and panic attacks. (R.
806-808). There is no indication in the record that Dr. Herberg
actually examined the Plaintiff or performed any clinical tests.
b. Dr. John Sefter.
Dr. Sefter followed Plaintiff after she underwent cervical
surgery on April 13, 2015. This surgery was performed to address
nerve root irritation and degenerative changes at C5-C6. (R.
795). On April 20, 2015. Dr. Sefter characterized Plaintiff as
totally disabled but stated that “given her history and the type
of surgery she had performed, she may be restricted in her
activities of daily living for to six months.” (R. 791). On April
24, 2015, Dr. Sefter saw Plaintiff on follow-up and noted that
she was doing well, that her wound was clean and dry, that she
had 5/5 strength with good sensation and motor ability, that her
x-rays were excellent, and that she was experiencing a “perfect
recovery thus far.” (R. 794). Despite these positive
observations, as of April 24, 2015, Dr. Sefter characterized
Plaintiff as disabled. This characterization was not surprising

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inasmuch as his progress note from four days earlier had
indicated that he anticipated she would require a six month
recovery period. The record contains no further comment from Dr.
Sefter after April 24, 2015.
c. Dr. Justine Magurno.
Dr. Magurno saw Plaintiff on June 10, 2016 and performed an
independent medical examination at the request of the Bureau of
Disability Determination. Plaintiff complained of pain in her
lower back, hips, legs, neck, left shoulder, and the outsides of
her arms. She presented with a cane and reported that she had had
two spinal surgeries, one on her lower back and one on her neck.
She related that her neck had improved since her cervical surgery
but that she still had pain to touch on her arms. This pain was
worse on the left that on the right. (R. 811).
Dr. Magurno observed that Plaintiff was not in acute
distress. He characterized her gait as normal and noted that she
could toe walk with difficulty, stand on her right heel, fully
squat, that her stance was normal, and that she was not in need
of any help getting on or off the examination table and able to
rise from her chair with no difficulty. (R. 812-13). Dr.
Magurno’s physical examination revealed that straight leg-raising
was positive on the right at sixty degrees, but that a seated
straight leg-raising test was negative. Dr. Magurno noted no
joint deformity, that her joints were non tender, that her deep

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tendon reflexes were equal in all extremities, and that Plaintiff
had no sensory deficits. Testing for upper extremity strength
indicated that Plaintiff had bicep strength 5/5, triceps strength
4/5, wrist strength 5/5 and that lower extremity strength was 5/5
bilaterally. No muscle atrophy was present and Plaintiff’s hand
and finger dexterity was intact, her grip strength was 5/5
bilaterally, and she was able to tie a bow normally. Testing for
upper extremity strength revealed normal right shoulder abduction
and an inability to test on the left due to anticipated pain in
Plaintiff’s left arm. (R. 813-14). Dr. Magurno completed a
Functional Capacities Report assessing Plaintiff’s ability to do
work-related activities. Dr. Magurno estimated that Plaintiff
could lift up to fifty pounds occasionally, carry up to twenty
pounds frequently and could sit for a total of six hours in an
eight hour workday, stand for a total of six hours in an eight
hour workday, and walk for a total of six hours in an eight hour
workday. (R. 815-16). Dr. Magurno assessed that Plaintiff was
capable of climbing stairs and ramps frequently, should never
climb ladders or scaffolds, could balance and crouch
occasionally, could stoop, kneel, and crawl frequently, could
tolerate no exposure to unprotected heights or vibration, could
tolerate exposure to moving mechanical parts frequently, could
operate a motor vehicle continuously, and that Plaintiff could
tolerate exposure to humidity, dust, odors, pulmonary irritants,

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extreme cold and heat, and noise. (R. 818-19). Dr. Magurno also
assessed that Plaintiff could successively perform activities
such as shopping, traveling without a companion, ambulating
without use of an assisted device, walking one block at a
reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, using public
transportation, climbing a few steps at a reasonable pace with
the use of a single hand rail, preparing simple meals, and caring
for her own hygiene. (R. 820).
IV.

ALJ Decision:

The ALJ’s decision (Doc. 12-1) was unfavorable to Plaintiff. It
included the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The claimant has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since April
23, 2014, the date the instant
application was filed.
2. The claimant has the following severe
impairments: cervical and lumbar
degenerative disc disease, status post
lumbar and cervical surgeries, bilateral
knee degenerative joint disease, ADHD,
generalized anxiety disorder, and
depression.
3. The claimant does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets

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or medical equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (20 C.F.R.
416.920(d). 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire
record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform both sedentary and
light work as defined in 20 C.F.R.
416.967(b)except that she is unable to
perform work involving detailed or
complex instructions. She is limited to
performing work involving routine and
repetitive tasks with few work changes
and no more than occasional interaction
with the public.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work.
6. The claimant was born on November 21,
1970 and was forty-three years old, which
is defined as a younger individual age
18-49, on the date the application was
filed.

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7. The claimant has at least a high school
education and is able to communicate in
English.
8. Transferability of job skills is not an
issue because the claimant does not have
past relevant work.
9. Considering the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can
perform.
10. The claimant has not been under a
disability, as defined in the Social
Security Act, since April 23, 2014, the
date the application was filed.
V.

Disability Determination Process.
The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to

determine whether a claimant is disabled.2

It is necessary for

2

ADisability@ is defined as the Ainability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months . . . .@ 42 U.S.C. ' 423(d)(1)(A). The Act further provides that an individual is disabled
(footnote continued on next page)
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the Commissioner to ascertain: 1) whether the applicant is
engaged in a substantial activity; 2) whether the applicant is
severely impaired; 3) whether the impairment matches or is equal
to the requirements of one of the listed impairments, whereby he
qualifies for benefits without further inquiry; 4) whether the
claimant can perform his past work; 5) whether the claimant=s
impairment together with his age, education, and past work
experiences preclude him from doing any other sort of work.

20

CFR '' 404.1520(b)-(g), 416.920(b)-(g); see Sullivan v. Zebley,
493 U.S. 521, 110 S. Ct. 885, 888-89 (1990).
The disability determination involves shifting burdens of
proof.

The initial burden rests with the claimant to

demonstrate that he or she is unable to engage in his or her
past relevant work.

If the claimant satisfies this burden, then

the Commissioner must show that jobs exist in the national
economy that a person with the claimant=s abilities, age,

only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. ' 423(d)(2)(A).

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education, and work experience can perform.

Mason v. Shalala,

993 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
As set out above, the instant decision was decided at the
fifth step of the process when the ALJ found there are jobs that
exist in the national economy that Plaintiff is able to perform.
(Doc. 12-1 at 12).
VI.

Standard of Review.
This Court’s review of the Commissioner=s final decision is

limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Commissioner=s decision.

42 U.S.C. ' 405(g);

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
Substantial evidence means Amore than a mere scintilla”.

It

means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.@

Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700,
704 (3d Cir. 1981).

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further

explained this standard in Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d
Cir. 1983).
This oft-cited language is not . . . a
talismanic or self-executing formula for
adjudication; rather, our decisions make
clear that determination of the existence
vel non of substantial evidence is not
merely a quantitative exercise. A single
piece of evidence will not satisfy the
substantiality test if the Secretary
ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict
created by countervailing evidence. Nor is
evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed

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by other evidenceB-particularly certain
types of evidence (e.g., that offered by
treating physicians)B-or if it really
constitutes not evidence but mere
conclusion. See Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706
(ASubstantial evidence@ can only be
considered as supporting evidence in
relationship to all the other evidence in
the record.@) (footnote omitted). The
search for substantial evidence is thus a
qualitative exercise without which our
review of social security disability cases
ceases to be merely deferential and becomes
instead a sham.
710 F.2d at 114.
This guidance makes clear it is necessary for the Secretary
to analyze all evidence.

If she has not done so and has not

sufficiently explained the weight given to all probative
exhibits, Ato say that [the] decision is supported by
substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court=s
duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether
the conclusions reached are rational.@
606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979).

Dobrowolsky v. Califano,

In Cotter, the Circuit Court

clarified that the ALJ must not only state the evidence
considered which supports the result but also indicate what
evidence was rejected: ASince it is apparent that the ALJ cannot
reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason, an
explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence
has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can
determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper.@

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Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07.

However, the ALJ need not undertake

an exhaustive discussion of all the evidence.
v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

See, e.g., Knepp

AThere is no

requirement that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of
evidence included in the record.@
130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).

Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App=x

A[W]here [a reviewing court] can

determine that there is substantial evidence supporting the
Commissioner=s decision, . . .
implicated.@

the Cotter doctrine is not

Hernandez v. Commissioner of Social Security, 89

Fed. Appx. 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2004) (not precedential).
A reviewing court may not set aside the Commissioner=s final
decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the
court would have reached different factual conclusions.
Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360 (citing Monsour Medical Center v.
Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. '
405(g) (A[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . .@). AHowever, even if the Secretary=s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, [a court] may
review whether the Secretary, in making his findings, applied
the correct legal standards to the facts presented.@

Friedberg

v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983) (internal
quotation omitted).

Where the ALJ=s decision is explained in

sufficient detail to allow meaningful judicial review and the

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decision is supported by substantial evidence, a claimed error
may be deemed harmless.

See, e.g., Albury v. Commissioner of

Social Security, 116 F. App=x 328, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) (not
precedential) (citing Burnett v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112 (3d
Cir. 2000) (A[O]ur primary concern has always been the ability to
conduct meaningful judicial review.@). Finally, an ALJ=s decision
can only be reviewed by a court based on the evidence that was
before the ALJ at the time he or she made his or her decision.
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).
VII. Discussion
A. General Considerations
At the outset of our review of whether the ALJ has met the
substantial evidence standard regarding the matters at issue
here, we note the Third Circuit has repeatedly emphasized the
special nature of proceedings for disability benefits.
Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406.

See

Social Security proceedings are

not strictly adversarial, but rather the Social Security
Administration provides an applicant with assistance to prove
his claim.

Id.

AThese proceedings are extremely important to

the claimants, who are in real need in most instances and who
claim not charity but that which is rightfully due as provided
for in Chapter 7, Subchapter II, of the Social Security Act.@
Hess v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 497 F. 2d
837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974).

As such, the agency must take extra

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care in developing an administrative record and in explicitly
weighing all evidence.

Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 406.

Further,

the court in Dobrowolsky noted Athe cases demonstrate that,
consistent with the legislative purpose, courts have mandated
that leniency be shown in establishing the claimant=s disability,
and that the Secretary=s responsibility to rebut it be strictly
construed.@

Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Error.
1. Whether the ALJ failed to accord appropriate deference
to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician?
Plaintiff correctly asserts that the opinion of a treating
physician is generally entitled to great deference under the
Agency’s own rules and the caselaw of the Third Circuit. This is
more particularly true when there is a long, longitudinal record
created by the treating physician that documents his treatment
of the patient. Morales Apfel, 225 F. 3d 310,317 (3d Cir. 2000).
Indeed, when a treating physician’s opinion regarding the
severity of a claimant’s impairments “is well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in the case record, we (the SSA) will give it
controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 401.1527(c)(2). Yet, it is also
the case that, where competing medical evidence exists, it is
within the ALJ’s authority to choose which medical evidence to

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credit and which to reject as long as there is a rational basis
for the decision. Plummer v. Atfel 186 F3d 422,429 (3d Cir.
1999). The ALJ may even elevate the opinion of a non-treating,
non-examining physician or non-medical source over that of a
treating physician in an appropriate case. Morales, supra, at
317; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(1).
In this case, Dr. Greenberg, a treating physician upon whom
Plaintiff places her principal reliance, saw Plaintiff on only
four occasions after February 7, 2014, her alleged onset of
disability date. On these occasions Dr. Greenberg’s office notes
are abbreviated, lacking in detail, and, to a significant extent,
illegible. The Court finds no evidence in the record, and
Plaintiff’s counsel certainly does not direct the Court’s
attention to any, that Dr. Greenberg saw Plaintiff after May 20,
2014. Yet, on August 6, 2015, some fourteen months after he last
examined Plaintiff, Dr. Greenberg provided a cryptic letter
describing Plaintiff as “totally disabled”. (R. 793). In July of
2016, some twenty-five months after he last saw Plaintiff, Dr.
Greenberg forwarded the same letter verbatim with a revised date.
(R. 824). Significantly, the first of these letters preceded
Plaintiff’s cervical surgery in May of 2015. Dr. Sefter noted that
that surgery had produced positive results with an estimated six
month recovery period during which Plaintiff would be disabled.
(R. 791-794).

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Given the fact that Dr. Greenberg’s treatment of Plaintiff
did not extend for more than three months into her alleged period
of disability, and given the fact that his office notes of his
sessions with Plaintiff from February through May of 2014 lacked
detail and include no mention of “clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques”, the ALJ reasonably concluded that his
opinion was not entitled to controlling weight. (ALJ Decision,
Doc. 12-1 at 11; see also 20 C.F.R. § 401.1527(c)(2)).
The ALJ elected to attach great weight to a medical report
prepared by Dr. Justine Magurno on June 10, 2016 (R. 811-814). Dr.
Magurno took a history from Plaintiff and physically examined her
at that time. On the basis of this examination, Dr. Magurno
completed a Medical Source Statement that assessed Plaintiff’s
physical ability to do work-related activities and a range of
motion assessment. (R. 815-823). In short, Dr. Magurno’s
assessment easily supports the ALJ’s conclusion (Doc. 12-1 at 6)
that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform
both sedentary and light work with further limitation as described
by the ALJ and approved by the vocational expert.
Due to the above-referenced shortcomings of the medical
evidence upon which Plaintiff relies, this Court cannot conclude
that the ALJ unreasonably subordinated it to what must be regarded
as substantial evidence provided by Dr. Magurno’s more detailed

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and more recent assessment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s assignment of
error on this point must be rejected.
VIII. Conclusion.
For the reasons cited above, Plaintiff’s assignment of error is
rejected and the decision of the Agency will be affirmed. The Court
further determines that the Agency’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence. An Order consistent with this determination
will be filed contemporaneously.
BY THE COURT,

S/Richard P. Conaboy
Richard P. Conaboy
United States District Judge
Dated: June 21, 2018

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