STURGIS v. 61 PA. STATE 331.21 (1941)

Filing 22

ORDER: 1. MJ Carlsons Report and Recommendation 20 is ADOPTED in part;2. Dfts mtn to dismiss 17 is GRANTED;3. The amended complaint 7 is DISMISSED;4. Sturgis request for counsel is DENIED as moot;5. Any appeal taken from this order is deemed frivolous and not in goodfaith; and6. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 3/18/19. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LARRY STURGIS,

No. 3:18-cv-00090

Plaintiff,

(Senior Judge Rambo)

v.

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

61 PA. STATE 331.21 (1941),
TOM WOLF,
JOSHUA SHAPIOR, and
DIRECTOR LEO L. DUNN,
Defendants.
ORDER
MARCH 18, 2019
Larry Sturgis, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint—which he later amended—alleging that Defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying his application for parole.1 (ECF Nos. 1,
7). On January 14, 2019, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that this Court grant a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendants on the grounds that (1) Sturgis failed to respond to the motion to dismiss

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Sturgis was convicted in 1987 of First Degree Murder and was sentenced to
life imprisonment. (ECF No. 18, Doc. 1 at 1). In July 2017, Sturgis filed an
application for parole, which the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
(“Parole Board”) denied on the ground that Sturgis is serving a life sentence and is
therefore statutorily ineligible for parole. (ECF No. 7, Ex. A).

and failed to prosecute this matter and (2) Sturgis’ claims fail on the merits. (ECF
No. 20). Sturgis filed timely objections,2 asserting that he did not respond to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss because he believed his amended complaint was
sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 21).
Where no objection is made to a report and recommendation, this Court will
review the recommendation only for clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), advisory
committee notes; see Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining that court should in some manner review recommendations regardless
of whether objections were filed). Conversely, “[i]f a party objects timely to a
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court must ‘make a de
novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.’” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n
v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)). Regardless of whether timely objections are made, district courts may
accept, reject, or modify—in whole or in part—the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Rule 72.31.

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The Court assumes for the purposes of this Order that Sturgis placed, and
therefore filed, his objections in the prison mail system on the date that he signed the
objections. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988) (noting that prisoner
documents are deemed filed when deposited in prison mail system).
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Because Sturgis objected to the recommendation that his complaint be
dismissed for failure to prosecute or respond to the motion to dismiss, that portion
of the recommendation is subject to de novo review. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d
at 99. Sturgis did not, however, object to the recommendation that his claims are
without merit, and that recommendation is therefore reviewed only for clear error.
See Snyder v. Bender, 548 F. App’x 767, 771 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that district
courts need not conduct de novo review of portions of recommendation to which no
party files specific objections).
Based on Sturgis’ objections, it appears that he did not intentionally fail to
respond to the motion to dismiss or intend to abandon this action. Although
dismissal may be warranted based on Sturgis’ failure to respond to Defendants’
motion to dismiss, in light of Sturgis’ pro se status, the Court will examine the
underlying claims. Even a brief review of Sturgis’ amended complaint makes clear,
however, that his claims are barred by fundamental and well-established principles.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a prisoner “has no cause of action
under § 1983 unless and until [his underlying] conviction or sentence is reversed,
expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has extended this rule to § 1983 claims that challenge the denial of
parole. See Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (extending Heck
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to § 1983 claims that “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the Parole
Board’s decision”). Because Sturgis challenges the Parole Board’s still-valid order
denying his parole application, and because any order from this Court would
necessarily invalidate the Parole Board’s order, Sturgis’ “sole federal remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action,” id., and his claims fail on that basis.
Moreover, even reviewing the merits of Sturgis’ § 1983 claims, the Court
finds no error—clear or otherwise—in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that
Sturgis’ Due Process claim is without merit. To the extent that Sturgis attempts to
raise a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim asserting that he is being
treated differently than juveniles who are subject to a life sentence, he must
demonstrate that “he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates,
and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on
his membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286,
305 (3d Cir. 2016). Sturgis’ status as an adult inmate does not place him in a
protected class and he has no fundamental right to parole, Bd. of Pardons v. Allen,
482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987), and his claim is thus subject to rational basis review. See
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification
trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the

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constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the
classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, its jurisprudence “establish[es] that
children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.
Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, . . .
they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.” Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the reasoned
distinctions between juveniles and adults that have been outlined by the Supreme
Court, id. at 471-74, it cannot be said that Sturgis is similarly situated to juvenile
prisoners who are serving life sentences, or that Pennsylvania does not have a
rational basis for treating juveniles and adults dissimilarly.
In sum, Sturgis has failed to state any cognizable claim under § 1983.
Consequently, it is hereby ordered that:
1.

Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson’s Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 20) is ADOPTED in part;

2.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED;

3.

The amended complaint (ECF No. 7) is DISMISSED;

4.

Sturgis’ request for counsel is DENIED as moot;

5.

Any appeal taken from this order is deemed frivolous and not in good
faith; and
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6.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Sylvia H. Rambo
Sylvia H. Rambo
Senior United States District Judge

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