Matthews v. Barbour et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Plaintiff has not affirmatively alleged that he was held past his proper release date. He admits he is unsure how much time he was credited at his resentencing held on 2/2/2016, and therefore can not know whether he was released at the proper time. Plaintiff provides no facts that would permit me to conclude that any Defendants knew of a risk of prolonged incarceration or that any Defendant failed to prevent prolonged incarceration. Plaintiff has simply raised the possibility that he was perhaps held past an unknown release date. This is not enough to state a claim under Rule 8 or 12(b)(6), which require not only that allegations be possible, but plausible. Without sentencing records or at least an allegation that he was in fact held past his release date, this standard is not met. An appropriate Order will follow. Signed by Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle on 11/27/18. (ch1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TAMENEND MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff
v.
SHERRY BARBOUR, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:18-cv-0515
(MARIANI, D.J.)
(ARBUCKLE, M.J.)

MEMORANDUM
On March 5, 2018, Plaintiff Tamenend Matthews (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) initiated
this pro se action against the following Defendants: (1) Sherry Barbour, Records
Supervisor at SCI Camp Hill; (2) Diane Yale, Records Supervisor at SCI Dallas; (3)
Lawrence Mahally, Superintendent at SCI Dallas; and (4) Justin Adams, Counselor at SCI
Dallas. Matthews v. Barbour, 3:18-cv-00515 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2018), (Doc. 1). Along
with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting leave of court to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 2).
Based on the information provided it appears that that Plaintiff’s Motion requesting
leave of court to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted. When granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e). See Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App’x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he screening
procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply to in forma pauperis complaints filed by
prisoners and non-prisoners alike.”). Under this statute, the Court is required to dismiss
any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[T]here
is no constitutional right to the expenditure of public funds and the valuable time of federal
courts to prosecute an action which is totally without merit.”).
After reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint, I conclude that it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint, as written, would typically
be subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), I will grant Plaintiff an
opportunity to cure the deficiencies noted herein before making a recommendation to the
District Court.
I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PRODEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s

Complaint alleges that he was possibly detained in SCI Dallas longer than the sentences
imposed by the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas in violation of his Eighth
Amendment right under the Constitution of the United States. See id.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2016, he was incarcerated at SCI Dallas, serving
a parole violation sentence of twenty four (24) months and twenty eight (28) days. Id. He
claims that this parole violation sentence had a “controlling maximum date of February 5,
2016.” Id.
On February 2, 2016, the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas
“resentenced” Plaintiff to nine (9) to twenty-four (24) months for possession with intent to
deliver followed by three years of probation for criminal use of a communication facility.
See id. Plaintiff states that he was not informed how much time served he was credited at
his resentencing. Id.
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On or around February 4, 2016, Plaintiff met with an unnamed parole staff member
at SCI Dallas. Id. The unnamed staff member allegedly presented Plaintiff with a Probation
Agreement Form reflecting a five year probation sentence. Id. Plaintiff refused to sign and
explained to the unnamed staff member that on February 2, 2016, he had been resentenced
to only three years of probation with respect to his criminal use of a communication facility
conviction. Id. Plaintiff claims the unnamed staff member responded by saying, “I have
nothing reflecting that,” and indicated that she would look into it. Id.
On February 5, 2016, the day he alleges his parole violation sentence expired,
Plaintiff wrote a request to the Records Department at SCI Dallas, supervised by Defendant
Diane Yale, to inquire about his new sentence and whether his time served had been
credited. Id. On or around February 24, 2016, an unnamed records specialist informed
Plaintiff that “nothing is showing in the system,” and that he must “wait on records at SCI
Camp Hill to update the system.” Id.
On or around February 28, 2016, Plaintiff wrote a request to Defendant Justin
Adams, Plaintiff’s Institutional Block Counselor at SCI Dallas, inquiring about his new
sentence. Id. Plaintiff alleges he informed Mr. Adams that Plaintiff, by his own calculation,
“was approaching [his] parole minimum” in connection to his new convictions. He also
informed Mr. Adams that he should be meeting with parole staff. Id. On or about March 1,
2016, Mr. Adams responded by informing Plaintiff that “when parole wants to see you they
will let you know.” Id.

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On March 27, 2016, an Officer Ferrera told Plaintiff that he “wasn’t supposed to be
there” and that Plaintiff should pack his things. Id. Mr. Adams informed Plaintiff that he
was going home. Id. Plaintiff was released that same day. Id.
The next day, March 28, 2016, Plaintiff met with an unnamed Lackawanna County
Adult Probation Supervisor who showed Plaintiff “a court order from [Plaintiff’s]
resentencing on February 2, 2016, that credited [Plaintiff] with about seven-hundred and
ten (710) days on [his sentence]” in the “underlying criminal matter.” Id. Plaintiff asserts
that he was never given a copy of this order and that he does not know the exact number
of days he was credited. Id.
Plaintiff provides no documentation of any sentencing orders for any of his criminal
charges or resentencing hearings. However, Plaintiff notes that he is filing pro se and that
he seeks assistance in procuring documents from the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections and the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas. Id.
Plaintiff includes with his Complaint a copy of a “DC-16E Status Summary,” which
he later received upon being committed to SCI Camp Hill for an unrelated matter. This
form indicates that Plaintiff has no active detainers and that since Plaintiff’s last DC16, one
detainer was deleted on February 22, 2016. Id. In the “Remarks” section of this form is
typed “Re-entry.” Plaintiff claims that this “Re-entry” was “done by Jane Doe Record
Specialist at SCI Camp Hill upon receipt of the sentencing order received from February
2, 2016.” Id.
Plaintiff names the following four defendants and seeks to hold them liable in both
their individual and official capacities: (1) Sherry Barbour, Records Supervisor at SCI
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Camp Hill; (2) Diane Yale, Records Supervisor at SCI Dallas; (3) Lawrence Mahally,
Superintendent at SCI Dallas; and (4) Justin Adams, Counselor at SCI Dallas. Id.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR REVIEWING COMPLAINTS FILED BY PRO SE
PLAINTIFFS PROCEEDING IN FORMA PAUPERIS
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se

complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the
Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which
provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same
standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing
pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that “pleading standards have seemingly
shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a
plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.” Fowler
v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must do more

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than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.” Id. at 211. It also “has to ‘show’ such an
entitlement with its facts.” Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct
the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled
to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d
Cir. 2013). Thus a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to
raise the Plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth
in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
III.

ANALYSIS
A. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8 & 12(b)(6)
Plaintiff raises a false imprisonment claim under the Eighth Amendment.

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“The Eighth Amendment protects convicted individuals from ‘cruel and
unusual punishments,’ and the Third Circuit has recognized a cause of action
under this provision for prisoners detained past their scheduled release date.”
Davis v. Pa. Bd. Of Prob. & Parole, Civ. A. No. 05-330J, 2006 WL 3308440,
at *7 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2006) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110
(3d Cir. 1989); Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir. 1993)). The
Third Circuit has explained that, “there can be no doubt that imprisonment
beyond one’s term constitutes punishment within the meaning of the eighth
amendment.” Sample, 885 F.2d at 1108 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.
678, 685 [] (1978), and Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir.
1985) (en banc)). Detention beyond one’s maximum release date may be
cruel and unusual if it is “totally without penological justification.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Wiggins v. McAndrew, 2018 WL 3727389, *9 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Bolsold v. Warden,
2011 WL 6812902, *6).
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has stated that “in order to state a viable Eighth
Amendment claim for ‘incarceration without penological justification,’ a complaint must
allege the following three elements:
(1) A prison official had knowledge of the prisoner’s problem and thus of the
risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the
official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the
circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s plight; and (3) a causal connection
between the official’s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.
Relevant circumstances in assessing these factors are the scope of the
official’s duties and the role the official played in the life of the prison.”
Bosold, at *5.
Here, Plaintiff has not adequately stated an Eighth Amendment claim because he
has not alleged that any of the named Defendants had knowledge of his problem or the risk
that unwarranted punishment was being inflicted. Moreover, Plaintiff is unable to allege
that any prison official failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances
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because Plaintiff has not alleged that he was held past his release date. Indeed, Plaintiff
faces an uphill battle because the Complaint reveals that the Plaintiff himself does not know
whether he was held past his proper release date.
1. Knowledge
Plaintiff fails to allege that any named Defendants had knowledge of his problem or
the risk that unwarranted punishment was being inflicted. First, Plaintiff does not state any
facts suggesting that Superintendent Lawrence Mahally had knowledge of any wrongfully
extended incarceration or risk thereof. Although he is listed as a Defendant, Mr. Mahally
is not mentioned anywhere in the factual allegations of the Complaint. Neither do the
allegations suggest that any employee under his supervision knew of a risk of unwarranted
punishment. However, even if I were to liberally construe Officer Ferrera’s vague and
unexplained statement that Plaintiff “wasn’t supposed to be there” as evidence that Mr.
Mahally knew or should have known of improper prolonged incarceration, Plaintiff fails
to allege that Mr. Mahally failed to respond appropriately. (See infra Part III.A.2).
Second, Plaintiff alleges that he requested information about his sentence from the
records office over which Defendant Diane Yale supervises. Plaintiff does not claim he
informed the records office that he was being illegally incarcerated or that there was a risk
of such. Plaintiff explains that he received a response from Ms. Yale’s records office
indicating that they did not yet have the information requested. Wholly missing from
Plaintiff’s allegations is any indication that Ms. Yale knew or should have known of
potential illegal incarceration or risk thereof at that time.

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Likewise, Plaintiff states that he informed his Block Counselor, Mr. Adams that he
was “approaching [his] parole minimum” and that he should be meeting with parole staff.
Mr. Adams informed Plaintiff that parole staff would reach out to Plaintiff when they
wanted to. Plaintiff does not allege or explain how his statements could have given Mr.
Adams knowledge of illegal detention or of a risk that Plaintiff would not be released at
the appropriate time. However, even if I were to so liberally construe these facts to mean
that Mr. Adams knew there was a risk of improper prolonged incarceration, nothing in the
Complaint indicates that Mr. Adams failed to take effective action. (See infra Part III.A.2).
Indeed, Plaintiff cannot allege that anyone took ineffective action without alleging that he
was in fact held past his legal release date. See id.
Finally, Defendant Sherry Barbour is the Records Supervisor at SCI Camp Hill.
Apparently, after being released from SCI Dallas, Plaintiff was again incarcerated at SCI
Camp Hill on an unrelated matter. Upon entering SCI Camp Hill, Plaintiff was issued a
“DC-16E” form that contained certain entries by an unnamed specialist at Ms. Barbour’s
Records Office. As Plaintiff’s Complaint is currently pleaded, I am unable to ascertain the
significance of this document or how it could be interpreted to impute knowledge of
wrongful incarceration or risk thereof to Ms. Barbour.
Thus, because Plaintiff has not alleged that any named Defendant had knowledge
of Plaintiff’s potential problem or risk thereof, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the first element of
his Eighth Amendment action. Plaintiff does not allege that he notified any of these people
that he was being held past his release date or that they knew or should have known of their
own accord. Indeed, the Complaint reveals that Plaintiff himself does not have knowledge
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pertaining to whether he was held in excess of his sentence. This is because Plaintiff admits
he has never seen his resentencing order and does not know how much time served he had
been credited. Although Plaintiff alleges the maximum date for his original parole violation
was February 5, 2016, he admits he does not have personal knowledge of how his February
2, 2016, resentencing hearing affected his final release date.
2. Failure to Act
Even if I were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s Complaint as an adequate allegation
that Defendants had knowledge of a risk of prolonged incarceration, Plaintiff’s Complaint
nevertheless fails because he does not allege that any Defendant failed to adequately act.
Indeed he cannot. This is because Plaintiff does not affirmatively allege that he was held
past his legal release date. It is impossible to conclude that anyone failed to adequately
prevent illegal incarceration when illegal incarceration is not actually alleged. Therefore,
Plaintiff fails to satisfy the second element of his Eighth Amendment action.
3. Conclusion
In sum, Plaintiff has not affirmatively alleged that he was held past his proper
release date. He admits he is unsure how much time he was credited at his resentencing
held on February 2, 2016, and therefore cannot know whether he was released at the proper
time. Plaintiff provides no facts that would permit me to conclude that any Defendants
knew of a risk of prolonged incarceration or that any Defendant failed to prevent prolonged
incarceration. Plaintiff has simply raised the possibility that he was perhaps held past an
unknown release date. This is not enough to state a claim under Rule 8 or 12(b)(6), which

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require not only that allegations be possible, but plausible. Without sentencing records1 or
at least an allegation that he was in fact held past his release date, this standard is not met.
An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: November 27, 2018

BY THE COURT
s/William I. Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge

1

Plaintiff is advised that he can obtain a copy of his February 2, 2016, sentencing order
by requesting it from the Lackawanna County Clerk of Judicial Records. Furthermore, as
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, Plaintiff is advised to consult his
Inmate Handbook, issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, which states:
“[An inmate] may request access to information maintained in [his] file by sending a DC135A, Inmate’s Request to Staff Member to the appropriate staff member. DC-ADM
003 lists the information that is available and the appropriate staff member to ask.”
Inmate Handbook, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, p. 26 at F.1 (2017 Edition).
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