Reynolds v. United States of America

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Since there is no assertion by petitioner that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has granted him leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, his pending action action to the extent that it can be construed as an unauthorized § 2255 action is also subject to dismissal. Signed by Honorable Richard P. Conaboy on 6/14/18. (cc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,

:
:
Petitioner
:
CIVIL NO. 3:CV-18-1093
:
v.
:
:
(Judge Conaboy)
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
:
:
Respondent
:
___________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM
Background
This pro se “Hazel-Atlas motion for fraud upon the court” was
filed by Michael Curtis Reynolds, an inmate presently confined at
the Federal Correctional Institution, Greenville, West Virginia
(FCI-Greenville).

This is the latest of multiple attempts by

Reynolds which challenge the legality of his federal criminal
conviction under Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322
U.S. 238 (1944).

Reynolds’ submission is accompanied by an in

forma pauperis application.

Named as Respondent is the United

States of America.
As previously discussed by rulings in Petitioner’s prior
filings, Hazel-Atlas, a decision regarding a civil case, recognized
that a court may set aside its own judgment when the judgment was
obtained by fraudulent means.

See Mumma v. High Spec, Inc., 2010

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WL 4386718 (3d Cir. Nov. 5, 2010).
Based upon a review of Reynold’s latest action it is unclear
as to whether it is his intention that this matter proceed as a
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. s 2241, a 28 U.S.C. 2255
motion, or a civil rights complaint.

It is recognized that the

caption of this matter lists Reynolds as being a Petitioner.
Furthermore, the caption does include the docket number of
Reynolds’ criminal case.
Petitioner has also filed a motion seeking mandamus relief
(Doc. 4) and a motion for judicial notice (Doc. 5).

For the

reasons outlined below, Reynolds will be granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis for the sole purpose of the filing of this
matter, however, his action will be dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner was convicted of multiple terrorism related
criminal offenses following a July, 2007 jury trial before the
Honorable Edwin M. Kosik of this district court.
v. Reynolds, Case No. 3:05-CR-493.

See United States

Reynolds was sentenced to a

term of imprisonment on November 6, 2007.

By decision dated March

18, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed Petitioner’s conviction.
Petitioner thereafter sought collateral relief via a § 2255
petition which was dismissed on the merits by decision dated August
15, 2012.

Thereafter, Reynolds next filed actions in the United

States District Court for the Central District of California which
were construed as seeking § 2255 relief and transferred to this
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district.

Those actions were subsequently dismissed by decision

dated November 28, 2012, because Petitioner failed to obtain
authorization to file a second or successive § 2225 action from the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
A February 25, 2014 decision by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals likewise observed that Petitioner has filed unauthorized
second or successive § 2255 petitions.

See United States v.

Reynolds, C.A. No. 13-4195, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
Reynolds also previously filed multiple unsuccessful § 2241
petitions with this Court challenging the legality of his federal
prosecution.

See Reynolds v. Bledsoe,

Civil

No. 4:CV-08-909 and

Reynolds v. Kosik, Civil No. 4:CV-08-293; Reynolds v. Martinez,
Civil No. 4:CV-08-2094.1

He has also filed civil rights actions

challenging the legality of his federal criminal prosecution.

See

Reynolds v. Gurganus, et al., Civil No. 4:06-CV-1753 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 11, 2006); Reynolds v. Kosik, et al., Civil No. 4:06-CV-2466
(M.D. Pa. Jan.18 , 2007);

Reynolds v. Judge Kosik, et al., Civil

No. 4:07-CV-161 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2007).
Reynolds’ pending action again challenges the legality of his
federal criminal conviction.

Petitioner’s motion is a lengthy

narrative which asserts multiple challenges to his conviction.

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Reynolds has also previously unsuccessfully attempted to
challenge the legality of his federal criminal prosecution by
filing civil rights complaints.
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Discussion
Civil Rights
As sole relief, Reynolds seeks his immediate release for m
confinement.

See Doc. 1, p. 21.

It is well-settled that inmates may not use civil rights
actions to challenge the fact or duration of their confinement or
to seek earlier or speedier release.
U.S. 475 (1975).

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

Reynolds seeks his release from federal custody

on the grounds that he was subjected to an unconstitutional federal
prosecution.

Thus, he is clearly attacking the legality of both

his criminal prosecution and seeking immediate release.

The

United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
646 (1997), concluded that a civil rights claim for declaratory
relief “based on allegations ... that necessarily imply the
invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable” in a §
1983 civil rights action.

Id. at 646.

Pursuant to the standards announced in Preiser and Edwards,
Plaintiff’s demand for release from confinement and his challenge
to his federal criminal conviction is not properly raised in a
civil rights complaint.

Accordingly, this action, to the extent

that Reynolds wishes it to proceed as a civil rights complaint, is
subject to dismissal.
Habeas Corpus
When challenging the validity of a federal conviction and
sentence, and not the execution of his sentence, a federal prisoner
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is generally limited to seeking relief by way of a motion pursuant
to § 2255.

In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997);

Russell v. Martinez, No. 08-3898, 2009 WL 1154194, at *2 (3d Cir.
Apr. 30, 2009)(“a section 2255 motion filed in the sentencing court
is the presumptive means for a federal prisoner to challenge the
validity of a conviction or sentence”).
A challenge can only be brought under § 2241 if “it . . .
appears that the remedy by [a § 2255] motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
2255(e).

28 U.S.C. §

This language in § 2255, known as the safety-valve

clause, must be strictly construed.

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251;

Russell, 2009 WL 1154194, at *2 (the safety valve “is extremely
narrow and has been held to apply in unusual situations, such as
those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge
his conviction for a crime later deemed to be non-criminal by an
intervening change in the law”).
Clearly, Reynolds’ pending claims do not fall within this
narrow exception to the general rule that section 2255 provides the
exclusive avenue by which a federal prisoner may mount a collateral
challenge to his conviction or sentence.
Fed. Appx. 55, 57

See Levan v. Sneizek, 325

(3d Cir. April 2009). Since there is no basis

for a determination that § 2255 is

inadequate or ineffective to

test the legality of Petitioner’s conviction, his pending action to
the extent that it seeks habeas corpus relief under § 2241 will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 2255
Reynolds cannot evade the limitations of § 2255 by simply
labeling his action as being a Hazel-Atlas motion.

It is also

noted that a review of the docket of Petitioner’s criminal case
shows that he has previously filed multiple § 2255 motions.
Since there is no assertion by petitioner that the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has granted him leave to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion, his pending action action to
the extent that it can be construed as an unauthorized § 2255
action is also subject to dismissal.

An appropriate Order will

enter.
S/Richard P. Conaboy
RICHARD P. CONABOY
United States District Judge

DATED: JUNE 14, 2018

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