Davis v. Wetzel et al

Filing 81

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 76 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Kevin Davis Signed by Chief MJ Karoline Mehalchick on 2/2/2024. (cw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEVIN DAVIS,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-01106

v.

(BRANN, J.)
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

JAY COWAN, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion to compel discovery filed by pro se prisoner-Plaintiff Kevin
Davis (“Davis”), who brings the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 1 (Doc. 76). Davis initiated the above-captioned civil rights action by filing a complaint
on July 2, 2020. (Doc. 1). In his third amended complaint, filed on March 7, 2023, Davis
realleges that Defendants Darla Cowden (“PA Cowden”) and Correct Care Solutions
(“CCS”) and Jay Cowan (“Dr. Cowan”) (collectively, “Defendants”) retaliated against Davis
while at SCI-Fayette based upon a previous civil action that he filed regarding his HepatitisC treatment, as well as grievances he submitted. 2 (Doc. 67).
Davis filed a motion to compel discovery on October 23, 2023, and a brief in support
on that same day with corresponding exhibits. (Doc. 76; Doc. 77; Doc. 77-1; Doc. 77-2; Doc.
77-3). On November 7, 2023, PA Cowden filed a brief in opposition to Davis’s motion to
compel. (Doc. 78). The motion is ripe and ready for disposition. (Doc. 76; Doc. 77; Doc. 78).

Davis is a Hepatitis-C positive prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correction
Institution in Fayette, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Fayette”). (Doc. 1, at 1, 6).
1

Davis’s previously filed lawsuit was filed on October 30, 2017. Davis v. Wetzel, No.
1:18-CV-00804 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017), ECF No. 5.
2

For the reasons stated herein, Davis’s motion to compel will be DENIED.
I.

DISCUSSION
A. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
Davis seeks the production of requested discovery documents, asserting that PA

Cowden has failed to properly respond to his Request for Production of Documents submitted
on August 20, 2023. (Doc. 77, at 3; Doc. 77-3, at 1-2). Davis avers “the material sought is
relevant and should be produced.” (Doc. 77, at 5). In opposition, PA Cowden maintains that
her responses and objections to Davis’s discovery requests were proper. (Doc. 78, at 1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the Court’s
discretion and judgment. A court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be
disturbed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699
F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion also extends to rulings by United
States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in
resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente
Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a magistrate
judge's decision involves a discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this
district have determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes
an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D.
169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp.
501, 502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under the standard, a magistrate judge's discovery
ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse of
discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42,
44- 45 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold,
Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and should be
reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
The exercise of this discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. At the

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outset, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally defines the scope of
discovery permitted in a civil action, prescribes certain limits to that discovery, and provides
as follows:
Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues
at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to
relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to move to compel
a party to comply with discovery obligations and specifically provides that:
On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a party may move for an
order compelling disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to
obtain it without court action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
Under Rule 37, a court may issue an order compelling discovery where “a deponent
fails to answer a question asked under Rule 30 or 31 [governing depositions on oral
examination or written questions].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i). A party moving to compel
discovery bears the initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information.
Morrison v. Phila. Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). “Once that initial
burden is met, ‘the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of
relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad
scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal

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relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary
presumption in favor of broad disclosure.’” Prime Energy & Chem., LLC v. Tucker Arensber P.C.,
No. 2:18-CV-0345, 2022 WL 1642394, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2022) (quoting In re Urethane
Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009)). The Court will address each of Davis’s
Requests for Production of Documents in turn.
1. Number 1
Discovery request number 1 requests PA Cowden’s complete work history in the
medical professional field. (Doc. 77-3, at 1). PA Cowden objects to request number 1 “on the
basis that it is neither relevant under Rules 401 or 403 nor reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Further, Responding Defendant has already admitted in
her Answer to Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint that she worked at SCI-Fayette as
alleged. See, Answer to the Third Amended Complaint at paragraph 7.” (Doc. 77-2, at 4).
Davis argues the requested information “is relevant and will lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence that will show a pervasive pattern of indifference /treatment, i.e., acts of
retaliation, discontinuing prescribed treatment, and the denial of treatment to sick, suffering
inmates/patients by Ms. Cowden.” (Doc. 77, at 3). In response, PA Cowden maintains her
objection was proper and emphasizes that “[o]nly the medical care PA Cowden provided to
Mr. Davis—and her actions towards him—are relevant for the claims against her.” (Doc. 78,
at 3). Cowden further argues that “[b]ecause PA Cowden has admitted that she was working
at SCI-Fayette during the allegations at issue, any additional information about PA Cowden’s
work history is irrelevant.” (Doc. 78, at 3).
The Court agrees with PA Cowden that requests relating to her complete work history
in the medical professional field appear to be overly broad and unrelated to the claims set

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forth in the third amended complaint. (Doc. 67). Second, the Court finds that PA Cowden
appears to have satisfied her burden by admitting that she worked at SCI-Fayette as alleged
during the relevant timespan. (Doc. 70, at 2). Because the Court has doubt as to the relevance
of the discovery of Cowden’s complete work history in the medical professional field and the
likelihood this will lead to admissible evidence, the Court will deny Davis’s request to the
extent that he seeks information and records beyond those relating to his care and treatment
provided by PA Cowden during the timeframe specified in the third amended complaint.
Accordingly, at this time, PA Cowden’s objections are sustained and Davis’s motion to
compel discovery is denied.
2. Numbers 2, 3
In discovery request numbers 2 and 3, Davis seeks every complaint ever filed against
PA Cowden and the corresponding response to every complaint including, but not limited to,
complaints filed by co-workers, patients, and employers; complaints lodged in federal court;
complaints lodged in state court; and administrative complaints and responses. (Doc. 77-3, at
1). PA Cowden objects to request numbers 2 and 3 on the basis that they are overly broad,
unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(Doc. 77-2, at 5). Notably, PA Cowden emphasizes that to the extent Davis seeks complaints
filed in civil actions in either state or federal court, these complaints are matters of public
record. (Doc. 77-2, at 5). Davis argues this information is relevant, will lead to admissible
evidence, and is necessary because “it will establish that the medical staff at the SCI-Fayette,
who was aware of the danger/harm that Defendant Cowden posed to Plaintiff and other
patients, reported what they observed to protect themselves, other staff and other inmates.”
(Doc. 77, at 3). Regarding number 3, Davis argues this information “will establish whether

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or not medical personnel at the SCI-Fayette was of the belief that Ms. Cowden was a danger
to Plaintiff/other patients [that] she treated.” (Doc. 77, at 4). PA Cowden maintains her
objections to request numbers 2 and 3 are proper as the requested information is irrelevant to
the claims in this action. (Doc. 78, at 5-6). PA Cowden further avers that she does not have
any such responses in her possession to produce, and any civil complaints and/or responses
are matters of public record. (Doc. 78, at 5-6).
PA Cowden’s objections are properly raised and shall be sustained. First, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 34 instructs that parties are only bound to produce documents already in
existence or in their “possession, custody, or control.” See generally Harris v. Koenig, 271
F.R.D. 356, 371 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Lack of evidence showing that producing party is in fact in
possession of a document is grounds to deny a motion to compel.”) (citations omitted).
Second, the Court agrees with PA Cowden that any civil actions in either state or federal court
in which PA Cowden was a party is publicly available information that Davis may obtain
through docket searches. In addition, the Court notes that Davis’s discovery request appears
to be overly broad without any narrowing to a subject matter or timeframe. “Even if discovery
is proportional to the needs of the case, courts have the discretion to impose limits where the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or where the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Occidental Chem. Corp. v. 21st Century
Fox Am., Inc., No. 18-11273, 2020 WL 1969898, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2020). Davis’s third
amended complaint describes acts of alleged retaliation including the denial of Davis’s insulin
treatment in February, April, and October 2020. (Doc. 67, ¶¶ 18-59). As such, Davis’s
allegations are unique to the medical care PA Cowden provided to him during the relevant
time period, from February to October 2020. (Doc. 67, ¶¶ 34-59). Accordingly, because the

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Court has substantial doubt as to the relevance of the discovery of any complaint and
corresponding response that may have been filed against PA Cowden regardless of whether
such claims were ultimately meritorious or not, the Court will sustain PA Cowden’s
objections at this time, without prejudice to Davis seeking a narrower discovery response that
more precisely explains the relevance of this information in his claims, and which narrows
the scope of the discovery sought to specific case names and a reduced timeframe. Schiavone
v. Luzerne Cnty., 343 F.R.D. 34, 41 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (sustaining medical defendant’s objections
to discovery request where Court has substantial doubt as to the relevance of the discovery of
any civil actions that may have been filed against any of the named defendants regardless of
whether such claims were ultimately meritorious). Davis's motion to compel discovery is
denied.
3. Number 4
In discovery request number 4, Davis seeks “[t]he action taken in response to each
complaint filed against Defendant Cowden including, but not limited to, suspension from her
job, reprimands, job demotions, counseling[], mental health evaluations, treatment of any
kind.” (Doc. 77-3, at 1). PA Cowden objects to this request as overly broad, unduly
burdensome, irrelevant, and not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Doc.
77-2, at 5). Davis argues “this information is relevant and will lead to admissible evidence and
is necessary because it will establish whether or not Ms. Cowden’s treatment of Plaintiff is the
reason why she left her job at SCI-Fayette immediately thereafter.” (Doc. 77, at 4). PA
Cowden maintains her objection to request number 4 is appropriate and argues Davis’s
request “is overly broad when (1) it fails to define what complaints are being referenced and
(2) it fails to define what period is being referenced." (Doc. 78, at 7).

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That the request for every action taken in response to each complaint filed against PA
Cowden appears to be overly broad without any narrowing to subject matter or timeframe.
Because the Court has substantial doubt as to the relevance of the discovery of all actions
taken against PA Cowden in response to complaints filed against her, the Court will sustain
PA Cowden’s objection, without prejudice to Davis seeking a narrower discovery response
that more precisely explains the relevance of this information in his claims, and which
narrows the scope of discovery sought to information about the claims outlined in his third
amended complaint. Accordingly, Davis's motion to compel discovery is denied.
4. Number 5
In discovery request number 5, Davis seeks “the names and status of every[]one who
was provided a copy of each complaint that was filed against Defendant Cowden and their
response/report filed.” (Doc. 77-3, at 2). PA Cowden objects to discovery request number 5
because it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, irrelevant, and not likely to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence and poses a significant security risk that is not outweighed
by any probative value of the information in this litigation. (Doc. 77-2, at 5). Davis argues
this information is “highly relevant” as repeated complaints about PA Cowden’s
mistreatment of inmates have been made and nothing has been done to address them. (Doc.
77, at 4). PA Cowden maintains her objections to request number 5 are appropriate, and
Davis’s request is “totally irrelevant to the allegations against the Third Amended
Complaint—notwithstanding Request No. 5 not defining what complaints are being
referenced in the first instance.” (Doc. 78, at 8).
Disclosure of this kind of document creates a security risk, particularly to prison
personnel, that outweighs any potential relevance to the Davis’s case. Davis’s request for the

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names and status of every individual who was provided a copy of every complaint filed against
PA Cowden and their corresponding response is overly broad since it seeks discovery of
complaints of any nature and involving any subject matter. As this discovery request is beyond
the scope of litigation and implicates important privacy interests, the Court will sustain PA
Cowden's objections at this time, without prejudice to Davis seeking a discovery response that
more precisely explains the relevance of this information in his claims, and which narrows
the scope of the discovery sought to only those documents which are discoverable under Rule
26. Accordingly, the motion to compel production of these documents is denied.
II.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Davis’s motion to compel discovery is DENIED.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: February 2, 2024

s/ KarolineMehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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