Doe et al v. Schuylkill County Courthouse et al

Filing 477

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 471 First MOTION for Reconsideration re 446 Memorandum. Signed by Chief MJ Daryl F. Bloom on March 10, 2025. (kjn)

Case 3:21-cv-00477-DFB

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANE DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY
COURTHOUSE, et al.,
Defendants.

: Civ. No. 3:21-CV-477
:
:
:
:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Introduction
This is a civil rights action filed by the plaintiffs against Schuylkill

County and several individual defendants, in which the plaintiffs allege
claims of sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting such
harassment. This matter is scheduled for a jury trial beginning on March
24, 2025. Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider
our order granting Defendant Roth’s motions in limine to preclude
evidence of Jane Doe 1’s claims. (Doc. 471). For the following reasons,
the motion to reconsider will be denied.

Case 3:21-cv-00477-DFB

II.

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Discussion
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”

Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237,
251 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted). It is not to
“rehash arguments already briefed.” Dentsply Int’l Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co.,
42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (D. Del. 1999). Thus, motions for reconsideration
should be granted sparingly and only if the plaintiff can show: “(1) [an]
intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not
previously available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830
(M.D. Pa. 1992); Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884
F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
Here, the plaintiffs do not assert an intervening change in the law
or the availability of new evidence. Rather, they assert that we erred in
our consideration of the law and the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims
as they relate to the evidence in question concerning Jane Doe 1.
Specifically, the plaintiffs urge us to permit evidence of the
discrimination and harassment suffered by Jane Doe 1, as well as

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evidence of the sexual relationship between Jane Doe 1 and Defendant
Halcovage. In their view, this evidence is crucial to provide context and
credence to the remaining plaintiffs’ claims, inasmuch as the remaining
plaintiffs allege that they suffered discrimination and harassment
because of their friendship with or support of Jane Doe 1. For their part,
the defendants assert that the plaintiffs have not met the requisite
showing for a motion to reconsider and merely rehash their arguments
that have already been decided by this court.
After consideration, we will deny the motion to reconsider. At the
outset, the plaintiffs request clarification of our order. They assert that
permitting the parties to stipulate to certain information, but prohibiting
the introduction of the underlying alleged discrimination, is a
contradictory holding. We disagree.

As we held in our prior order, we

will permit the parties to stipulate to very limited information concerning
Jane Doe 1’s claims to provide context the plaintiffs believe is necessary
to present their claims. This stipulation may include the facts that there
was a relationship between Jane Doe 1 and Halcovage, that Jane Doe 1
reported this to her supervisor, Jane Doe 3, and that she told Jane Doe 2
about the relationship.

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Such a limited stipulation will allow the plaintiffs to provide
context to their claims. For example, the plaintiffs assert that when Jane
Doe 1 rebuffed Halcovage’s advances, he would harass Jane Doe 2.
Stipulating to the fact that Jane Doe 1 told Jane Doe 2 about the
relationship provides necessary context to Jane Doe 2’s claim that
Halcovage harassed her after she found out about the relationship.
Similarly, a stipulation to the fact that Jane Doe 1 reported her
complaints to Jane Doe 3 provides context for Jane Doe 3’s claims that
she started experiencing harassment and retaliation for supporting Jane
Doe 1. In our view, this limited information provides the necessary
context to the plaintiffs’ claims without getting into the details of the
facts underlying Jane Doe 1’s claims, which we find are not relevant and
would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendants. This is particularly the
case here, where the plaintiffs continue to assert that the relationship
between Jane Doe 1 and Halcovage was not consensual. As we will
discuss below, this continued assertion underscores how this evidence is
more prejudicial than probative.
As we found in our prior order, even if we determined that evidence
underlying Jane Doe 1’s claims was relevant, we find that the danger of

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unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value of this evidence. At the
outset, permitting evidence of the sexual encounters between Jane Doe 1
and Halcovage and whether those encounters were consensual would
undoubtedly result in a “trial within a trial.” As we have noted, in their
motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs vehemently assert that Jane
Doe 1 did not consent to the encounters with Halcovage, which they claim
were unwanted and unwelcome. (Doc. 472 at 4-5). At least one of the
defendants asserts the encounters were consensual. (See e.g., Doc. 354
at 3). However, whether these encounters were consensual or unwelcome
is not the issue or relevant to the remaining plaintiffs’ claims of
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The issue before the jury is
not whether the encounters were consensual. The issue is whether the
plaintiffs experienced harassment and discrimination because of their
sex, and whether they were retaliated against as a result of their
protected activity. Further, the three remaining plaintiffs do not bring
claims against Halcovage, or any other defendant for that matter, that
involve allegations of consensual or nonconsensual sexual encounters.
Thus, evidence of those sexual encounters is plainly more prejudicial
than probative and is likely to lead to confusion among the jury as to the

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remaining claims in this case. Moreover, to the extent the plaintiffs
assert that Halcovage’s conduct toward them was unwanted and
unwelcome, they can testify regarding Halcovage’s behavior toward them
and their reaction without getting into the extrinsic details of
Halcovage’s consensual or nonconsensual relationship with Jane Doe 1.
The plaintiffs also characterize this evidence as permissible under
Rule 404 to prove the defendants’ motive, intent, and opportunity to
discriminate and retaliate against the remaining plaintiffs. They assert
that evidence regarding the defendants’ knowledge of and lack of
response to Halcovage’s conduct toward Jane Doe 1 is probative of the
defendants’ motive and intent toward the remaining plaintiffs. However,
as we stated in our prior order and as was discussed at the oral argument
in this matter, other than Jane Doe 3’s assertion that she discussed a
rumor with Defendant Roth about Halcovage and Jane Doe 1 sleeping
together, there is no evidence that the defendants knew of Halcovage’s
conduct toward Jane Doe 1 until she reported the same in May of 2020.
Accordingly, we find that any limited probative value this evidence might
have is far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendants.

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Finally, we note the plaintiffs’ assertion that precluding evidence of
Jane Doe 1’s claims because she has settled and is no longer a party
effectively permits the defendants to “buy their way out of having
relevant and admissible evidence presented.” (Doc. 472 at 6). But, in
seeking the admission of this evidence, it is the plaintiffs who are
attempting to have it both ways. Allowing evidence of Jane Doe 1’s
claims and permitting her to testify to the same would provide her to
have her day in court against defendants with whom she has already
settled and to receive the benefits of the settlement agreement. Further,
allowing this evidence at trial would essentially force the defendants to
defend against, and possibly face liability for, claims that have already
been dismissed. In our view, this is precisely the type of unfair prejudice
that Rule 403 warns against.
Accordingly, we will deny the motion to reconsider. In doing so, we
reiterate that the parties are permitted to stipulate to certain
information concerning Jane Doe 1’s claims—the fact that she had a
relationship with Halcovage, that she reported that relationship to Jane
Doe 3, and that she told Jane Doe 2 of the relationship—in order to
provide context to the plaintiffs’ claims.

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We will leave the precise

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wording of the stipulation to the parties. Should the parties be unable to
agree to the wording of the stipulation, the parties will submit their
contested versions of the stipulation to the court for consideration and a
final determination.
III.

Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration (Doc. 471) is DENIED.

So ordered this 10th day of March 2025.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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