Doe et al v. Schuylkill County Courthouse et al

Filing 478

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 453 First MOTION for Reconsideration re 449 Memorandum. Signed by Chief MJ Daryl F. Bloom on March 10, 2025. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JANE DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY
COURTHOUSE, et al.,
Defendants.

: Civ. No. 3:21-CV-477
:
:
:
:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
:
:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Introduction
This is a civil rights action filed by the plaintiffs against Schuylkill

County and several individual defendants, in which the plaintiffs allege
claims of sexual harassment and retaliation for reporting such
harassment. This matter is scheduled for a jury trial beginning on March
24, 2025. Pending before the court is the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider
our order granting the County Defendants’ motion in limine to preclude
evidence of the consent decree between the County and the DOJ and
evidence of nonparty complaints. (Doc. 453). For the following reasons,
the motion to reconsider will be denied.

II.

Discussion
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”

Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237,
251 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted). It is not to
“rehash arguments already briefed.” Dentsply Int’l Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co.,
42 F. Supp. 2d 385, 419 (D. Del. 1999). Thus, motions for reconsideration
should be granted sparingly and only if the plaintiff can show: “(1) [an]
intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not
previously available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830
(M.D. Pa. 1992); Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884
F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
Here, the plaintiffs do not assert an intervening change in the law
or the availability of new evidence. Rather, they assert that we erred in
our consideration of the law and the facts underlying the plaintiffs’ claims
as they relate to the evidence in question concerning the consent decree
and other complaints. We note that these arguments are essentially the
same arguments made in the plaintiffs’ initial response to the County’s

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motion in limine.

Specifically, the plaintiffs urge us to permit the

introduction of this evidence to establish their retaliation claims against
the defendants. They argue that this evidence—the consent decree and
nonparty complaints—is admissible under Rule 404 as evidence of the
defendants’ motive and intent to retaliate against them.
As we stated in our prior order, evidence of the consent decree is
akin to a settlement and is barred by Rule 408. See Fed. R. Evid. 408(a);

Wilson v. Parisi, 2009 WL 151666, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2009)
(collecting cases). As the plaintiffs submit, courts have permitted the
introduction of consent decrees for purposes other than liability, and the
plaintiffs attempt to argue that they intend to offer this evidence for
purposes other than liability. (Doc. 454 at 5). However, in our view,
permitting this evidence to establish, as the plaintiffs assert, “the facts
that establish the elements of Plaintiffs’ claims and warrant a finding by
the jury of liability” would be, in essence, permitting the plaintiffs to use
this evidence as evidence of the County’s liability. This is plainly barred
by Rule 408.
We are also constrained to note that the documents the plaintiffs
have attached to their motion, which include their email reports made

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pursuant to the consent decree, seem to have little relevance to their
claims of retaliation.

With respect to the documents concerning

Halcovage’s alleged violations of the consent decree, it appears that this
occurred at a time where two of the plaintiffs remained suspended and
would not have been in the courthouse at the time of the alleged violation.
(See Doc. 454-1 at 6-10). Thus, even if Defendant Halcovage violated the
consent decree by being in the courthouse when he was not permitted,
this evidence would seem to have little if any, relevance to their claims of
retaliation.

As to the plaintiffs’ claims that they relodged their

complaints pursuant to the consent decree and believe that the County
failed to adequately investigate those claims in further retaliation, the
defendants note that the EEO Officer who investigated such reports
pursuant to the consent decree was not a County employee. Thus, this
evidence similarly appears to have little, if any relevance, to the
plaintiffs’ claims against the County.
Further, and fundamentally, we conclude that any relevance this
evidence may have is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and
misleading or confusing the jury. As we noted in our prior order, some of
the defendants were not parties to the consent decree and made no

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admissions regarding the same.

Admission of this evidence would

prejudice those defendants, and further, would likely confuse or mislead
the jury as to the issues that remain in this case. Accordingly, we will
deny the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, and evidence of the consent
decree will be excluded.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the evidence of the
nonparty complaints of Brynn Krasinsky and Debra Twigg.

The

plaintiffs argue that evidence of these nonparty complaints are relevant
to show the defendants’ motive and intent under Rule 404. Specifically,
as to Ms. Krasinsky, they contend that Ms. Krasinky’s allegations
against Halcovage speak to Halcovage’s state of mind and motive
regarding his alleged sexual harassment of the remaining plaintiffs.
However, as we found in our prior order, Ms. Krasinsky’s claims have
been likened to Jane Doe 1’s claims, in that they involved alleged
unwanted physical touching by Halcovage.

As we have already

concluded that evidence of Jane Doe 1’s claims will be excluded, we find
that evidence of Ms. Krasinsky’s complaint would have minimal, if any,
relevance to the remaining plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, as we previously
discussed, this evidence would result in unfair prejudice to the

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defendants and likely result in a “trial within a trial” regarding Ms.
Krasinsky’s claims against Halcovage.

Accordingly, evidence of Ms.

Krasinksy’s claims will be excluded.
As to Ms. Twigg’s claims, we similarly conclude that this evidence
should be excluded. The plaintiffs argue that evidence of Ms. Twigg’s
complaints is relevant to show the County’s pattern of retaliatory conduct
and its intent to retaliate against the remaining plaintiffs. First, as we
previously found, we believe this evidence has little, if any, relevance to
the remaining plaintiffs’ claims. While the plaintiffs argue that this
evidence shows the County’s intent to retaliate against them, in our view,
the County’s alleged actions toward Ms. Twigg that occurred in 2023
would not be relevant to show the County’s intent to retaliate against the
plaintiffs. Moreover, permitting evidence of Ms. Twigg’s allegations that
the County failure to hire her because she voiced support for the plaintiffs
would likely lead to confusion of the issues and result in a “trial within a
trial” as to Ms. Twigg’s claims, and potentially could result in the jury
holding the defendants liable for their alleged actions toward a nonparty.
Thus, any limited relevance this evidence may have is plainly outweighed

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by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants. Accordingly, this
evidence will be excluded.
III.

Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for

reconsideration (Doc. 453) is DENIED.

So ordered this 10th day of March 2025.

s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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