Lawrence v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commissioners finding that Lawrence was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. Accordingly, the Commissioners decision denying disability benefits is AFFIRMED.An appropriate Order follows. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, Jr on 11/21/22. (ms)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MELISSA JEAN LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-01239

v.

(SAPORITO, M.J.)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
In this matter, the plaintiff, Melissa Jean Lawrence, seeks judicial
review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying her claim for disability insurance benefits, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter has been referred to the undersigned
United States magistrate judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
I.

BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2019, Lawrence protectively filed a claim for

disability insurance benefits, asserting a disability onset date of
November 6, 2018. Her claim was initially denied by state agency
reviewers on July 24, 2019, and upon reconsideration on May 7, 2020.

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The plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing.
A telephone hearing was subsequently held on August 24, 2020,
before an administrative law judge, Theodore Burock (the “ALJ”). In
addition to the plaintiff herself, the ALJ received testimony from an
impartial vocational expert, Sheryl Bustin. The plaintiff was
represented by counsel at the hearing.
On November 3, 2020, the ALJ denied Lawrence’s application for
benefits in a written decision. The ALJ followed the familiar five-step
sequential evaluation process in determining that Lawrence was not
disabled under the Social Security Act. See generally Myers v. Berryhill,
373 F. Supp. 3d 528, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (describing the five-step
sequential evaluation process). At step one, the ALJ found that
Lawrence had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her
alleged disability onset date. At step two, the ALJ found that Lawrence
had the severe impairments of: depression, anxiety, asthma/COPD,
obesity, and headaches with neck pain.
At step three, the ALJ found that Lawrence did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

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Subpart P, Appendix 1. In doing so, the ALJ considered Lawrence’s
limitations in four broad functional areas as a result of her mental
disorders,

finding

(1) understanding,

mild

limitations

remembering,

or

in

one

applying

functional

area—

information—and

moderate limitations in the other three—(2) interacting with others, (3)
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and (4) adapting or
managing oneself. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c) (explaining
functional limitation rating process for mental impairments); 20 C.F.R.
pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1, § 12.00(E) (explaining the four areas of mental
functioning); id. § 12.00(F) (explaining process for using paragraph B
criteria to evaluate mental impairments). In connection with listings
12.04 and 12.06, the ALJ also considered whether Lawrence’s mental
disorders were “serious and persistent,” finding that her impairments
had not required medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support, or a highly structured setting that is ongoing and
that diminished the symptoms and signs of her mental disorders, nor
that she had achieved only marginal adjustment as a result. See
generally id. § 12.00(G) (explaining process for using alternative
paragraph C criteria to evaluate certain mental impairments).

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Between steps three and four of the sequential-evaluation process,
the ALJ assessed Lawrence’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See
generally Myers, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 534 n.4 (defining RFC). After
evaluating the relevant evidence of record, the ALJ found that
Lawrence had the RFC to perform the full range of “light work” as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b),1 with the following limitations:
[s]he is limited to simple routine repetitive tasks with
a GED of 1,1,1[2] involving very short and simple
The Social Security regulations define “light work” as a job that
“involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(b).
2 In determining whether a claimant is capable of performing work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, the agency
and the courts routinely rely on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(4th ed. 1991) (“DOT”), a publication by the U.S. Department of Labor
that identifies thousands of jobs by name and describes the skills and
other attributes required to perform each. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1566(d)(1) (“[W]e will take administrative notice of reliable job
information from various governmental and other publications. For
example, we will take notice of . . . [the] Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, published by the Department of Labor . . . .”); see also Evans v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 190 Fed. App’x 429, 436 n.7 (6th Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that courts may take judicial notice of the DOT as well).
The DOT includes a description of the “general educational
development” (“GED”) for each of the jobs catalogued therein. “General
Educational Development embraces those aspects of education (formal
and informal) which are required of the worker for satisfactory job
performance.” DOT app. C, 1991 WL 688702. “The GED Scale is
composed of three divisions: Reasoning Development, Mathematical
(continued on next page)
1

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instructions in a stable environment, occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors, no public
interaction, no more than occasional changes in work
settings, production oriented jobs requiring little
independent decision making, and no concentrated
exposure to extreme cold, heat, humidity, dust,
fumes, odors, gases, or poor ventilation.
(Tr. 16.)
In making these factual findings regarding Lawrence’s RFC, the
ALJ considered her symptoms and the extent to which they could
reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence of record. See generally 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529; Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (revised Oct. 25,
2017). The ALJ also considered and articulated how persuasive he
found the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings of
record. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
At step four, based on this RFC and on testimony by the vocational
expert, the ALJ concluded that Lawrence was unable to perform her

Development, and Language Development.” Id. Each division is rated
on a scale from level 1 to level 6. See id. Here, the ALJ’s reference to
“GED of 1,1,1” plainly signifies a finding that the claimant was limited
to jobs requiring a maximum of level 1 reasoning, mathematical, or
language development. Each of the three representative occupations
identified by the vocational expert, and adopted by the ALJ at step five,
has a GED rating of 1/1/1.
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past relevant work as a receiving checker clerk, small products
assembler, or cake decorator/icer, as actually or generally performed.
At step five, the ALJ concluded that Lawrence was capable of
performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. Based on her age, education, work experience, and RFC, the
ALJ concluded that Lawrence was capable of performing the
requirements of cleaner/housekeeper (DOT #323.687-014), potato chip
sorter (DOT #526.687-010), or bakery worker, conveyor line (DOT
#524.687-022). Based on this finding, the ALJ concluded that Lawrence
was not disabled for Social Security purposes.
The plaintiff sought further administrative review of her claims
by the Appeals Council, but her request was denied on May 24, 2021,
making the ALJ’s November 2020 decision the final decision of the
Commissioner subject to judicial review by this court.
The plaintiff timely filed her complaint in this court on July 14,
2021. The Commissioner has filed an answer to the complaint, together
with a certified copy of the administrative record. Both parties have
filed their briefs, and this matter is now ripe for decision.

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II.

DISCUSSION
Under the Social Security Act, the question before this court is not

whether the claimant is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s
finding that he or she is not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
relevant law. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(sentence five); Myers, 373
F. Supp. 3d at 533 (describing standard of judicial review for social
security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income
administrative decisions).
The plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ erred in his evaluation of
conflicting medical opinions and prior administrative findings with
respect to the plaintiff’s mental health impairments. 3 As a preface, we
note the well-established principle that, in evaluating the medical
opinion evidence of record, an “ALJ is not only entitled, but required to
choose between” conflicting medical opinions. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981). “[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent

The plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings with respect
to her physical RFC or the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinions or
prior administrative findings concerning her physical impairments.
3

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conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [an ALJ’s decision] from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Moreover, “[i]n the process of
reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we may not ‘weigh the
evidence or substitute [our own] conclusions for those of the factfinder.’” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Ultimately, to reverse the ALJ’s findings and decision, “we must find
that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels
it.” Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481 n.1 (1992); see also Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 782 & N.3 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Elias-Zacarias in the context of social security
disability benefits); Hert v. Barnhart, 234 F. Supp. 2d 832, 837 (N.D. Ill.
2002) (“The court may reverse the Commissioner’s decision only if the
evidence ‘compels’ reversal, not merely because the evidence supports a
contrary decision.”) (citing Elias-Zacarias).
Here, the plaintiff originally filed her administrative claim for
benefits in March 2019. Thus, a relatively new regulatory framework
governing the evaluation of medical opinion evidence applies to this

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case. “The new regulations have been described as a ‘paradigm shift’ in
the way medical opinions are evaluated.” Knittle v. Kijakazi, Civil No.
1:20-CV-00945, 2021 WL 5918706, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2021). “Prior
to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined
medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source
opinions with treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy.” Densberger
v. Saul, Civil No. 1:20-CV-772, 2021 WL 1172982, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 2021). Under this prior regulatory scheme, the Social Security
Administration “followed the ‘treating physician rule,’ which required
the agency to give controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion, so
long as it was ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and not ‘inconsistent with the other
substantial evidence’ in the record.” Michelle K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
527 F. Supp. 3d 476, 481 (W.D. Pa. 2021). However, the regulations
governing the evaluation of medical evidence were amended and the
treating physician rule was eliminated effective March 27, 2017. See
Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82
Fed. Reg. 5,844 (Jan. 18, 2017); see also Densberger, 202 WL 1172982,
at *7–*8; Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 481. “The range of opinions

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that ALJs were enjoined to consider were broadened substantially and
the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from a hierarchical
form of review to a more holistic analysis.” Densberger, 2021 WL
1172982, at *7.
Under these new regulations, the agency “will not defer or give
any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including
those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
“Rather than assigning weight to medical opinions, [an ALJ] will
articulate ‘how persuasive’ he or she finds the medical opinions.”
Knittle, 2021 WL 5918706, at *4; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b). If a
medical source provides one or more medical opinions, the agency will
consider those medical opinions from that medical source together using
the

following

factors:

“(1)

supportability;

(2)

consistency;

(3)

relationship with the claimant, including the length of the treatment
relationship, the frequency of examinations, purpose and extent of the
treatment

relationship,

and

the

examining

relationship;

(4)

specialization; and (5) any other factors that ‘tend to support or
contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding.’”

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Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 481; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a);
Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982, at *8. Under the new regulations, “[t]he
two ‘most important factors for determining the persuasiveness of
medical opinions are consistency and supportability,’ which are the
‘same factors’ that formed the foundation of the treating source rule.”
Densberger,

2021

WL

1172982,

at

*8;

see

also

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(b)(2); Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d at 481; compare 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (supportability), and id. § 404.1520c(c)(2)
(consistency), with id. § 404.1527(c)(3) (supportability), and id.
§ 404.1527(c)(4) (consistency). 4 An ALJ is specifically required to
address these two factors in his or her decision. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(2); see also Densberger, 2021 1172982, at *8; Michelle K.,
527 F. Supp. 3d at 482. “The ALJ may—but is not required to—explain

With respect to supportability, the new regulations provide that
“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more
persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). With respect to
consistency, the new regulations provide that “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the
claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
4

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how he considered the remaining factors.” Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d
at 482; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); Densberger, 2021 WL
1172982, at *8. “However, when the ALJ has found two or more medical
opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the record,
but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she
considered [the remaining] factors . . . .” Densberger, 2021 WL 1172982,
at *8; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(3); Michelle K., 527 F. Supp. 3d
at 482.
A. Prior Administrative Findings
The prior administrative findings included the opinions of state
agency psychological consultants, Emanuel Schnepp, Ph.D., and John
Gavazzi, Psy. D., both of whom found that, notwithstanding her
medically determinable mental impairments, Lawrence had no more
than mild or moderate limitations in any of the four areas of mental
functioning. Dr. Schnepp found that Lawrence was moderately limited
in her ability to understand and remember detailed instructions, to
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, to perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be
punctual within customary tolerances, to complete a normal workday

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and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods, to accept instruction and respond
appropriately to criticism from supervisors, to get along with coworkers
or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, to
respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, and to travel in
unfamiliar places or use public transportation. On reconsideration, Dr.
Gavazzi found fewer limitations, finding that Lawrence was moderately
limited in her ability to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods, to complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a
consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest
periods, to interact appropriately with the general public, to accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors,
and to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. 5 (Tr. 73–
77, 86–90.)
In evaluating the opinions of Dr. Schnepp and Dr. Gavazzi, the
ALJ found that:

5

Dr. Gavazzi found no significant limitations in any other areas.
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The state agency mental health opinions [of Dr.
Schnepp] are persuasive. In support of these opinions,
the state agency consultant cited to the claimant’s
psychiatric records, including multiple normal
findings during a mental status examination. He also
cited to therapy records and the claimant’s selfreports of crying spells and difficulties coping with
stress. He noted that even with the symptoms, the
claimant remained fairly independent with her selfcare and activities of daily living. He advised
although the claimant may have some difficulty
understanding, retaining, and following complex
detailed instructions, she remained capable of
retaining and following simple task instructions such
as one and two step tasks. He noted her basic memory
processes were intact for recent and remote events,
she had some limitations maintaining attention and
concentration for extended periods as well as some
limitations interacting with others and responding
appropriately to work setting changes. His opinions
are generally consistent with the opinions of the state
agency consultant upon reconsideration [Dr.
Gavazzi].
The state agency mental health opinions [of Dr.
Gavazzi] are persuasive. In support of these opinions,
the state agency consultant advised that the claimant
has some struggles with social skills, she has not
required inpatient care and care has generally
consiste[d] of taking psychotropic medications and
participating in psychotherapy. Moreover, his
opinions are generally consistent with the state
agency initial mental health opinions [of Dr. Schnepp]
and with a number of the progress notes from the
claimant’s counselor and psychiatrist.
(Tr. 20 (citations omitted).)

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The plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s evaluation of these
prior administrative findings.
B. Opinion of Treating Mental Health Counselor
On June 5, 2020, Lawrence’s treating mental health counselor,
Ann Stipe, Ph.D., LCSW, RN, 6 completed a mental status evaluation

In her briefs, the plaintiff has argued that the ALJ improperly
discounted Dr. Stipe’s medical opinion, noting that the ALJ referred to
Dr. Stipe as “Ms. Stipe” and as a “social worker/counselor.” The plaintiff
suggests that Dr. Stipe should instead be referred to as “Dr. Stipe”
because she has a doctorate degree, and the plaintiff suggests that Dr.
Stipe’s opinion was entitled to greater persuasive weight than that
afforded by the ALJ because she is a licensed psychologist rather than
merely a “social worker/counselor.” In our review of the administrative
record, however, we find no evidence to indicate that Dr. Stipe was a
licensed psychologist. The forms completed by Dr. Stipe do not expressly
state that she is a licensed psychologist, and while her signature
indicates that she has been awarded a Ph.D.—which indeed merits use
of the honorific “Dr.” rather than “Ms.”—it otherwise indicates only that
Dr. Stipe was a licensed social worker and a registered nurse. Reference
to the publicly available Pennsylvania Licensing System database,
which is available at https://www.pals.pa.gov/#/page/search (last visited
Nov. 18, 2022), discloses that Dr. Stipe has active state professional
licenses as a clinical social worker and as a registered nurse. See Anaya
v. Berryhill, Case No. 5:16-CV-01199-GJS, 2018 WL 565698, at *4 n.2
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2018) (taking judicial notice of information found in
a publicly accessible state online database of professional licenses);
Dufresne v. Astrue, No. 5:12-CV-00049 (MAD/TWD), 2013 WL 1296376,
at *6 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013) (same). There is no record that she
has been licensed as a psychologist, now or in the past. Considering the
evidence of record, and taking judicial notice of the Pennsylvania state
professional license database, we find no error in the ALJ’s
characterization of Dr. Stipe as a “social worker/counselor.”
6

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form.7 Dr. Stipe noted that Lawrence had been treating with her for six
years at that time. She reported current diagnoses of other specified
persistent mood disorders and other specified anxiety disorders. Dr.
Stipe opined that Lawrence had extreme limitations in four broad areas
of work-related mental functioning: her ability to respond appropriately
to supervision, criticism, and redirection; her ability to concentrate,
persist, and complete tasks; her ability to adapt or manage herself; and
her ability to understand, remember, or apply information. Dr. Stipe
opined that Lawrence would have four or more “bad days” per month
during which her symptoms are increased and she would not be able to
complete an 8-hour work shift. Dr. Stipe also noted that Lawrence’s
symptoms “keep getting progressively worse.” Dr. Stipe further opined
that Lawrence was entirely unable to perform a great variety of workrelated tasks on a regular, reliable, and sustained basis: maintain
regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usual strict
tolerances; work in coordination with or proximity to others without

Attached to the form was a mental medical source statement that
Dr. Stipe had previously completed on October 8, 2019. On the June
2020 evaluation form, however, Dr. Stipe indicated that limitations
assessed in her October 2019 statement remained an accurate reflection
of Lawrence’s current limitations.
7

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being unduly distracted; make simple work-elated decisions; complete
a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without
an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; accept instructions
and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with
co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting
behavioral extremes; respond appropriately to changes in a routine
work setting; deal with normal work stress; understand and remember
detailed instructions; carry out detailed instructions; set realistic goals
or make plans independently of others; deal with stress of semiskilled
and skilled work; travel in unfamiliar places; and use public
transportation. Dr. Stipe opined that Lawrence was capable of
performing several other work-related tasks on an occasional basis only:
understand and remember very short and simple instructions; maintain
attention for two hour segments; and be aware of normal hazards and
take appropriate precautions. (Tr. 763–68.)
In evaluating Dr. Stipe’s medical opinion, the ALJ stated that:
. . . [T]he opinions from the claimant’s social
worker/counselor [Dr.] Stipe are not persuasive.
Regarding supportability, [Dr.] Stipe advised the
claimant’s symptoms have been getting progressively
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worse and that mood swings and impulse control
issues have not been managed well by medications.
However, therapy notes indicate the claimant is
processing through various mental health issues, and
the claimant has been able to be maintained with
conservative care. Generally, progress notes do not
indicate the claimant is getting progressively worse
other than some concerns with suicidal ideation
which were passive in May and June 2020, not
present in early July 2020, and present in late July
2020. Regarding consistency, these opinions are
inconsistent with the claimant’s psychiatric progress
notes, which indicate that medications have been
helpful and with the state agency opinions.
Additionally, these opinions are inconsistent with
progress notes from [Dr.] Stipe herself, including
records from early 2020 which indicate normal
speech, normal thought process, and an appropriate
[a]ffect.
Although the claimant had a depressed mood and
anxious behavior as well as moderate issues with
energy and motivation, these findings are not
surprising given the claimant’s mental health
impairments. That being said, findings such as
depressed mood, anxious behavior, and some issues
with energy and motivation do not support that an
individual is completely unable to work from a mental
health standpoint. Although these records indicate
the claimant was very upset about an email she got
from her employer, the claimant was able to process
this in therapy, and her therapist noted the claimant
is definitely becoming more assertive in being able to
stand up for herself, which is a major improvement.
The claimant receives mental health therapy about
every 2 weeks, which is consistent with conservative
rather than more aggressive care. Many other
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therapy records contain similar findings . . . .
(Tr. 19 (citations omitted).)
Here, the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence of record
and the relevant factors of supportability and consistency. He expressly
articulated the basis of his evaluation and his findings with respect to
the persuasiveness of this opinion as well.
The plaintiff argues that the ALJ made only selective references
to the record in his decision. She points out several medical findings not
expressly discussed by the ALJ that she contends support a contrary
finding with respect to the supportability and consistency of Dr. Stipe’s
opinion. But it is the exclusive province of the ALJ, not this court, to
resolve conflicting evidence. “In the process of reviewing the record for
substantial evidence, we may not ‘weigh the evidence or substitute our
own conclusions for that of the fact-finder.’” Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552
(quoting Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182); see also Stancavage v. Saul, 469
F. Supp. 3d 311, 334 (M.D. Pa. 2020). Moreover, it is well settled that
an ALJ is not required to discuss every detail of the record evidence cited
in his opinion. See Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 203–
04 (3d Cir. 2008). “A written evaluation of every piece of evidence is not

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required, as long as the ALJ articulates at some minimum level her
analysis of a particular line of evidence. Moreover, the ALJ’s mere
failure to cite specific evidence does not establish that the ALJ failed to
consider it.” Philips v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. App’x 775, 780 n.7 (3d Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). While the evidence cited by the plaintiff on
appeal might reasonably support a different conclusion with respect to
the persuasiveness of Dr. Stipe’s medical opinion, it does not compel it.
The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in referring to the
conservative nature of Lawrence’s mental health treatment. But an
ALJ may properly consider the fact that conservative treatment of a
claimant’s medical condition contradicts the degree of severity alleged
by the claimant. See Myers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 684 Fed. App’x 186,
192 (3d Cir. 2017); Garrett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 274 Fed. App’x 159,
164 (3d Cir. 2008); Dietrich v. Saul, 501 F. Supp. 3d 283, 297 (M.D. Pa.
2020); Antoniolo v. Colvin, 208 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597 (D. Del. 2016).
Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions
of the plaintiff’s treating mental health counselor, Dr. Stipe, is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a
correct application of the relevant law.

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C. Opinion of Treating Psychiatrist
On July 9, 2020, Lawrence’s treating psychiatrist, Gary B.
Zimberg, M.D., provided her attorney with a letter stating his medical
opinion with respect to her mental functional limitations. Dr. Zimberg
conveyed his opinion that Lawrence had extreme limitations with
respect to her ability to concentrate, persist, and complete tasks,
marked limitations with respect to her ability to respond appropriately
to supervision, criticism, and redirection, and moderate limitations with
respect to her ability to adapt or manage herself and her ability to
understand, remember, or apply information. He further opined that
Lawrence’s mental disorder was “serious and persistent,” and that her
symptoms were severe enough that she would be forced to miss four or
more days of work each month. Dr. Zimberg’s letter did not provide any
support or explanation for these opinions. (Tr. 803.)
In evaluating Dr. Zimberg’s opinion, the ALJ stated that:
The opinions from the claimant’s treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Zimberg, . . . are not persuasive. [In
his letter], Dr. Zimberg did not support why he
reached the opinions that he did other than noting
that the claimant’s mental disorder was serious and
persistent. This is insufficient support for his
proposed limitations, some areas of which he noted
were markedly to extremely limited. Additionally, the
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limitations he noted are inconsistent with his actual
treatment records, such as [his treatment notes from
a March 26, 2019, encounter], which indicated the
claimant rated her mood as an eight on a 0 to 10 scale,
she displayed some humor, she found a recent
increase in medication helpful in terms of anxiety and
obsessional thinking, she was well groomed with a
euthymic mood, and appropriate affect, and
appropriate insight and judgment. Mental Status
examination findings from December 2018 through
February 2019 were similar[,] as were many of the
mental status examination findings from March 2019
through March 2020.
(Tr. 19–20 (citations omitted).)
Here, the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence of record
and the relevant factors of supportability and consistency. He expressly
articulated the basis of his evaluation and his findings with respect to
the persuasiveness of this opinion as well.
As with Dr. Stipe’s opinion, here the plaintiff once again points to
some of the medical evidence that supports a contrary finding. But it is
the exclusive province of the ALJ, not this court, to resolve conflicting
evidence. See Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552; Stancavage, 469 F. Supp. 3d
at 334. Moreover, to the extent the plaintiff has suggested that the ALJ
has erred in failing to discuss the particular items of evidence she now
cites, it is well settled that an ALJ is not required to discuss every detail

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of the record evidence cited in his opinion. See Johnson, 529 F.3d at
203–04; Philips, 91 Fed. App’x at 780 n.7. While the evidence cited by
the plaintiff on appeal might reasonably support a different conclusion
with respect to the persuasiveness of Dr. Zimberg’s medical opinion, it
does not compel it.
Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion of the
plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Zimberg, is supported by
substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
of the relevant law.
III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commissioner’s

finding that Lawrence was not disabled is supported by substantial
evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the
relevant law. Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision denying
disability benefits is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: November 21, 2022

s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge
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