Howell v. Wetzel et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 15 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Paul Bach, MHM Correctional Services, Inc. Signed by Honorable Julia K Munley on 6//3/24. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REVEREND WESLEY HOWELL,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF CHRISTOPHER RYAN HOWELL,
Plaintiff

No. 3:22cv1255
(Judge Munley)

V.

CORRECTIONS SECRETARY
JOHN WETZEL; SCI-DALLAS
SUPERINTENDENT KEVIN RANSOM;
SCI-DALLAS CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER SEDESKI; SCI-DALLAS
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS JOHN
AND JANE DOE'S 1-5; WELL
PATH, LLC f/k/a
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC;
MHM CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
INC., a/k/a MHM a/k/a MHM HEAL TH
PROFESSIONALS LLC a/k/a MHM
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLC
and parent company CENTURION
HEAL TH; ABC CORPORATION ;
HEAL TH CARE PROVIDER
NICOLE ASHTON ; HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER TEMEKA AUSTIN;
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
CHARLES REED; HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS JANE/JOHN
DOES# 1-10; AND
DR. SCOTT PRINCE,
Defendants

.......... ........ .... .... .................... ... .......... .. ..........
............ .. .... ........................ .... ........ ..........................
...............................................................
........................................................................................

MEMORANDUM
Before the court for disposition is Defendant MHM Correctional Services'
motion to partially dismiss plaintiff's complaint 1 in this case involving allegations
of the improper treatment and eventual suicide of Christopher Ryan Howell in

1

The complaint identifies MHM Correctional Services as "MHM Services , Inc. a/k/a MHM a/k/a
MHM Health Professionals LLC a/k/a MHM Correctional Services , LLC and its parent company
Centurion Health ." (Doc. 1, Campi. ,I13) .

state prison. The parties h~ve briefed their respective positions , and the matter
is ripe for disposition.
Background 2

Plaintiff's decedent, Christopher Ryan Howell ("Howell"), took his own life
while imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution-Dallas, Pennsylvania. ("SCI
Dallas"). The complaint alleges that at birth , Howell was diagnosed with fetal
alcohol syndrome. (19..: ,i 17). Because of the fetal alcohol syndrome , Howell
suffered developmental , cognitive , and behavioral problems. (19..: ,i 18). He was
diagnosed with depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"),
bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder, as well as impulse control and
conduct disorder, for which he took medicines daily. (19..: ,i 19).
In 2018, Howell pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges of aggravated
assault and resisting arrest. (kl ,i 23). He was sent to SCI Dallas to serve his
sentence. (19..:) The Direct Client Contact Psychological Assessment Report,
generated at the time of Howell's incarceration at SCI Dallas, identified him as a
suicide risk based upon a clinical interview and a history of prior suicide attempts.
(kl ,i 25).

2

These brief background facts are derived from plaintiff's complaint. At this stage of the
proceedings , the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F. 3d 224 , 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The court makes no determination ,
however, as to the ultimate veracity of these assertions .

2

Based upon this assessment, SCI Dallas concluded that Howell needed
mental health care and listed him for "mental health services." (~ 26). When
Howell was incarcerated at SCI Dallas, the prison had information that he had
attempted suicide by hanging in 2011 during a previous period of incarceration.
(kl 1l 27).

For a short period of time, Howell was transferred from SCI Dallas to the
State Correctional Institution at Frackville, Pennsylvania ("SCI Frackville"). (kl_1l
28). While at SCI Frackville, shortly before being transferred back to SCI Dallas,
Howell was admitted for psychiatric observation (suicide watch) due to "exhibiting
an instability of mental health with a risk of self-harm and possible altered
thought processes." (~)
On or about May 11 , 2020, after being returned to SCI Dallas, Howell was
transferred to the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU "), or solitary confinement, due
to conduct arising from and related to his mental health issues. (~ ,I 29). The
RHU cells are small and dark. They are filthy dirty, with stains on the wa lls, dirt
everywhere, no windows and minimal air circulation . (~ ,I 33). The water that
comes out of the sink and showers is rust colored and undrinkable. (~)
Prisoners in RHU were forced to stay in their cells alone and isolated for 23
to 24 hours a day. (~ 1l 34 ). They were exposed to extreme deprivations of

3

social interaction and environmental stimulation , abusive staff and inadequate to
non-existent mental health care. (.!si.:)
Prison officials knew the conditions in RHU were extremely harsh and
caused psychological harm. (~ ,I 32). Staying in the RHU also exacerbated the
existing mental health issues of the inmates. (.!si.:) In fact, the majority of suicides
and suicide attempts and other acts of self-harm at SCI Dallas occurred in the
RH U. (.!si.:)
Howell remained in RHU from May 2020 until June 2020. (.!si.: ,I 30). He
returned to RHU in July 2020, and remained there until he committed suicide on
or around August 15, 2020. (.!si.:) While he was in RHU defendants failed to
provide Howell with adequate medications for his mental health issues, including
depression and anxiety. (~ ,I 37). They also failed to provide mental health
therapy/counseling or psychiatric care. (.!si.:) Howell began to spiral out of control
and became very agitated. (.!si.:) He engaged in bouts of screaming and loud
crying. (.!si.:) Howell also suffered untreated seizures while in the RHU. (~ ,I 40).
Despite pleas for help, plaintiff hung himself in his cell. (.!si.: ,I 47). He was
pronounced dead on August 15, 2020. (~ ,I 51 ). Based upon these facts,
plaintiff, Howell's estate, filed the instant civil rights complaint. The defendants
are: Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Secretary John Wetzel; SCI Dallas
Superintendent Kevin Ransom ; SCI Dallas Correctional Officer Sedenski; SCI

4

Dallas Correctional Officers John and Jane Doe 1-5; Well Path , LLC f/n/a Correct
Care Solutions, LLC ; MHM Services, Inc. a/k/a MHM a/k/a MHM Health
Professionals LLC a/k/ MHM Correctional Services, LLC and parent company
Centurion Health hereinafter ("MHM"); Health Care Provider Nicole Ashton ;
Health Care Provider Temeka Austin; Health Care Provider Charles Reed;
Health Care Provider Jane/John Doe 1-1 O; and Dr. Scott Prince. 3 The complaint
contains seven (7) causes of action. The first four allege violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
the remaining three counts are state law causes of action . The counts are as
follows:
Count I - Deliberate Indifference To Known Risk of Suicide;
Count II - Inadequate Medical Care;
Count Ill - Inhuman Conditions of Confinement;
Count IV - Supervisory Liability;
Count V - Corporate Negligence/Gross Negligence;
Count VI - NegligenceNicarious Liability; and
Count VII- Wrongful Death .

3

Originally, plaintiff also sued SCI Dallas Chief Psychologist Paul Bach , but he has since
been voluntarily dismissed from the case. (Docs . 30 & 31).

5

In response to the complaint, Defendant MHM filed a motion for partial
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
parties have briefed their respective positions and the motion is ripe for decision.
Jurisdiction

As plaintiff brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court has federal
question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Legal Standard

Defendant filed its motion to partially dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court tests the sufficiency of the
complaint's allegations when considering a Rule 12(b )(6) motion . All wellpleaded allegations of the complaint must be viewed as true and in the light most
favorable to the non-movant to determine whether, '"under any reasonable
reading of the pleadings , the plaintiff may be entitled to relief."' Colburn v. Upper
Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663 , 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Estate of Bailey by
Oare v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must
describe '"enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of' [each] necessary element" of the claims alleged in the
6

complaint. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 , 234 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp . v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 , 556 (2007)). Moreover, the
plaintiff must allege facts that "justify moving the case beyond the pleadings to
the next stage of litigation. "

kt at 234-35. In evaluating the sufficiency of a

complaint the court may also consider "matters of public record , orders, exhibits
attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case. "
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir.
1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have to accept legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of
Wilmington, Del., Inc. , 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch . Dist., 132 F.3d 902 , 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).
The federal rules require only that plaintiff provide "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a standard
which "does not require detailed factual allegations ," but a plaintiff must make "a
showing , rather than a blanket assertion , of entitlement to relief that rises above
the speculative level. " McTernan v. N.Y.C. , 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations and internal quotations and quotation marks omitted). The "complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face ."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S . at 570). Such "facial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff
7

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. "

~

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556). "[T]he factual detail in a complaint [cannot be] so undeveloped that it
does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated
by Rule 8. " Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citation omitted). "Though a complaint
'does not need detailed factual allegations , .. . a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do."' DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc.,
672 F.3d 241 , 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Supreme Court has counseled that a court examining a motion to
dismiss should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth ." 1.9..Q§l, 556 U.S. at
679. Next, the court should make a context-specific inquiry into the "factual
allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement
to relief." Id. at 681 .
Discussion

Defendant MHM 's motion raises three primary issues. The court will
address each separately.
I. Dismissal of Count I

Count I of plaintiff's complaint alleges a cause of action for deliberate
indifference to known risk of suicide. (Doc. 1, Campi.
8

,m 92-97).

Defendant

MHM seeks dismissal of this count arguing that plaintiff has alleged insufficient
facts to support such a cause of action . After a careful review , the court
disagrees.
To establish a claim for deliberate indifference to known risk of suicide,
plaintiff must establish the following three elements:
1) the prison detainee had a particular vulnerability to suicide; 2) the
custodial officers knew or should have known of the vulnerability; and 3) those
officers acted with reckless indifference to the detainee's particular vulnerability.
Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. , 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).
To demonstrate that a detainee had a particular vulnerability to suicide, plaintiff
must establish "a strong likelihood , rather than a mere possibility, that selfinflicted harm [would] occur." Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 320
(3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Third Circuit,
however, does not "demand a heightened showing at the pleading stage"
regarding vulnerability to suicide. Palakovic v. Wetzel , 854 F.3d 209 , 230 (3d
Cir. 2017). "A particular individual's vulnerability to suicide must be assessed
based on the totality of the facts presented ."

kl

With regard to these elements plaintiff alleges that the defendants "knew or
should have known that [Howell] was particularly vulnerable to suicide and that
there was a strong likelihood that he would attempt suicide in the RHU , and
9

notwithstanding this knowledge of a significant risk to Decedent's health and
safety, they were deliberately indifferent by failing to take any action or
precaution to prevent him from hanging himself, such as placing him on suicide
watch or providing him his prescribed medication and/or therapy and counseling
or placing him in housing that would not exacerbate his severe mental health
issues and vulnerability to suicide." (~ ,I 93).
Defendant MHM argues that the last time plaintiff was diagnosed with
suicidal ideation was at a different prison three (3) months or ninety (90) days
before his death. According to MHM, the passing of ninety (90) days between
when Howell was last diagnosed as suicidal and his suicide is too much time for
him to have been considered vulnerable to suicide at the time of his death.
In support of its position , MHM cites to a nonprecedential opinion from the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals , Baez v. Lancaster Cnty., 487 F. App'x 30 (3d Cir.
2012). Defendant argues that this case indicates that suicidal ideation as recent
as 18 days prior to a suicide did not support a finding of a "strong likelihood" of
suicide. Similarly, MHM cites to Hinton v. United States, No. 4: 14cv854, 2015
WL 737584 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2015). In this case, the decedent had had three
prior suicide attempts approximately ten years before he killed himself while
incarcerated in a federal prison . The court noted that he had been on
antidepressant medicine until six years prior to his suicide. Id. *5. No facts were
10

alleged that the decedent demonstrated suicidal ideation following the
discontinuation of the medicine. Thus , the court found the allegations did not
present a vulnerability to suicide after the medicine was discontinued six years
prior.

~

*6.

These cases demonstrate that the issue of vulnerability to suicide is very
fact sensitive. Here, the complaint alleges that Howell was housed at SCI-Dallas
and then transferred for a brief period to SCI Frackville. While at SCI Frackville
shortly before being transferred back to SCI Dallas , Howell was on suicide watch .
(Doc. 1,

~

28). Then after being returned to SCI Dallas , the prison put him in

RHU or solitary confinement for conduct arising out of and related to his mental
health issues. (19..: ~ 29). He was in RHU for a month from May to June 2020 ,
and then transferred back to RHU in July 2020 , where he remained until he died
in August 2020. (19..: ~ 30).
Per the complaint, a week prior to Howell's suicide, he was mentally
decompressing . His depression increased , and he constantly thought about
sexual abuse he had suffered as a child . He cried and paced his cell.
Additionally, he suffered racing thoughts , had trouble sleeping and demonstrated
a lack of interest in leaving his cell the one hour per day permitted. (kl._~ 38).
Collectively, the facts as pied , including the rapid decompression a week prior to
the suicide, the fact that Howell suffered severe mental illness, had a number of

11

prior suicide attempts, and was on suicide watch at SCI Frackville, distinguish
this case from the facts of the cases cited by Defendant MHM and support a
finding that Howell had a particular vulnerability to suicide. Dismissal of this
cause of action on the basis that plaintiff has pied insufficient facts to establish a
particular vulnerability to suicide is thus inappropriate.
II. Defendant MHM's Policies and Practices
As noted plaintiff is pursuing an Eighth Amendment vulnerability to suicide
claim against MHM . Defendant MHM , a private entity, is alleged to have had a
contract with the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI Dallas , and/or
Wellpath , Inc. "to hire, train and supervise psychiatric and/or medical personnel
and to establish related procedures and policies for SCI Dallas, and to provide
constitutionally adequate medical/psychiatric care to persons incarcerated at SCI
Dallas, and to protect those inmates from suicide[.]" (Doc. 1, ,I 13). For a private
corporation contracting with the state to be liable under section 1983, plaintiff
must demonstrate that an official corporate policy or custom resulted in the
alleged constitutional violation. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Fae. , 318 F.3d
575 , 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003).
With regard to corporate policy or custom plaintiff's complaint alleges:
"Defendant .. . MHM .. . authorized, enforced, [and] encouraged the policy,
practice and/or custom of warehousing suicidal , mentally ill inmates in solitary
12

confinement in the RHU , and the policy/practice/custom of limiting/denying
suicidal, mentally ill inmates in the RHU access to adequate medicines, and care
and treatment of their mental health issues, including denying them access to
psychologist/psychiatrist. " (Doc. 1, Compl. 1172). Further, MHM "approv[ed],
condon[ed] , [and] acquiesc[ed]" in these policies and practices . (kl 1175).
To establish an Eighth Amendment vulnerability to suicide claim against a
non-prison official such as Defendant MHM , plaintiff must demonstrate that the
policy changes proposed would have put the custodial officials on notice of the
decedent's propensity to commit suicide , and that the failure to implement
appropriate policies amounted to deliberate indifference. Schuenemann v.
United States v. United States, No. 05-2565 , 2006 WL 408404 , *3 n.5 (3d Cir.
2006). Defendant MHM argues that Howell did not exhibit a particular
vulnerability to suicide prior to his death . According to defendant, any measures
to change policies and practices related to inmates vulnerable to suicide would
not have had any impact on him. Therefore Defendant MHM argues that it
should be dismissed. The court disagrees. As set forth above, plaintiff's
complaint sufficiently alleges that Howell did suffer from a particular vulnerability
to suicide. A change in policies and practices could have impacted him and the
treatment he received . Thus , defendant's argument fails , and it will not be
dismissed on this ground .
13

Ill. Conditions of Confinement Claim
Count Ill of plaintiff's complaint raises a conditions of confinement cause of
action against all defendants. (Doc. 1, Com pl.

,m 103-109). The gist of this

claim is that the conditions in the RHU were so barbarous that they rise to the
level of a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment. Defendant MHM seeks dismissal of this cause of action on the
basis that plaintiff's complaint does not support such a claim.
There is "no static test by which courts determine whether conditions of
confinement are cruel and unusual. Rather, what constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment is measured by the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. " Young v. Quinlan , 960 F.2d 351 , 359 (3d Cir.
1992) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981 )).

Defendant MHM

argues that Howell's rights were not violated simply because he was placed in
the RHU/solitary confinement. The law provides that the mere allegation that a
prisoner was placed in restricted housing does not violate civilized standards of
humanity and decency. See Griffin v. Vaughn , 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997).
Here, however, plaintiff alleges more than mere placement in the RHU . The
conditions in RHU are alleged to have been cruelly substandard . The RHU cells
are small , dark, and dirty. The cells have stains on the walls , dirt everywhere , no
windows, and minimal air circulation. (Doc. 1, Campi. 1l 33). The water that
14

comes out of the sink and showers is rust colored and undrinkable. (~) As a
prisoner in RHU , Howell was forced to stay in his cell alone and isolated for 23 to
24 hours a day. (~ 1l 34 ). He was subjected to extreme deprivations of social
interaction and environmental stimulation. He also encountered abusive staff
and inadequate to non-existent mental health care. (~) Because plaintiff has
alleged more than mere placement in restricted housing , but also the inhuman
conditions in these cells and lack of medical care, plaintiff's conditions of
confinement claim will not be dismissed . See Thomas v. Rosemeyer, 199 F.
Appx. 195 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that a prisoner's claim that he was placed in
the RHU alone without allegations of deprivation of food, clothing , sanitation,
shelter, medical care or personal safety is insufficient to assert an Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim). Accordingly, plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment claim will not be dismissed on this ground.
Defendant MHM next argues that to be liable for the conditions of
confinement claim , it would have had to been aware of the violation . Here,
according to the defendant the complaint fails to allege that MHM was aware of
plaintiff's placement in the RHU . The court disagrees. The complaint discusses
Defendant Temeka Austin , who was employed by the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections or Defendant MHM (Doc. 1, Campi.

1J 15). A week before his

suicide, Austin evaluated Howell and knew he was having issues with being
15

housed in the RHU . (kl ,I 38). That knowledge might be ascribed to Defendant
MHM , if she is indeed an MHM employee .
Regardless , as the entity responsible for providing mental health treatment
to Howell it seems plausible that MHM would know that he had been housed in
RHU because he had been there for approximately two months in total.
Discovery may reveal that MHM did not in fact know, but for purposes of a
motion to dismiss, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to infer MHM 's knowledge
of Howell 's placement in the RHU . Accordingly, the conditions of confinement
claim against MHM will not be dismissed .
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant MHM 's motion for partial
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint will be denied . An appropriate order follows .

C URT:

16