Cavanaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 24 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Wal-Mart Stores East, LP Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 5/9/2024. (gg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-cv-1908
MADISON CAVANAUGH,
(JUDGE MANNION)
Plaintiff,
v.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 24.) Plaintiff initially sued Defendant, her former employer
of two months, alleging discrimination and retaliation related to her
pregnancy. However, the record presented to the court indicates no
evidence of discrimination or retaliation. Instead, the record indicates that
Plaintiff received accommodations related to her pregnancy and then
voluntarily ended her employment with Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's
motion will be GRANTED.
I.
Background
On January 31, 2022, Defendant hired Plaintiff as an OrderfillerBreakpack at its Distribution Center in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, where she
reported to Area Managers Richard Facyson, Jr., and Joseph Kochmer.
Plaintiff's duties included order filling , carrying goods, scanning and checking
labels for quality control , and sweeping. As per her job description she was
requ ired to move, lift, carry, and place merchandise and supplies weighing
up to 40 pounds without assistance.
On February 19, 2022, two weeks after her hire, Plaintiff told Facyson
she was pregnant and asked for accommodation. He referred her to
Defendant's Accommodation Service Center ("ACS") and third-party claims
adm inistrator, Sedgwick, for further direction . On February 20, 2022, Plaintiff
submitted a request for an intermittent leave of absence beginning February
21 , 2022 , and ending March 23, 2022. Sedgwick denied Plaintiff's request
because she was not el igible for leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (" FMLA"), which requires 1,250 hours of work within the preceding 12
months, but advised Plaintiff that she could request intermittent leave
through the ACS.
On February 21 , 2022 , Plaintiff contacted the ASC by phone and
requested an accommodation for breaks, snacks , and drinks while working ,
as well as the ability to sit down as needed. The ASC asked Plaintiff to
provide medical certification from her physician. During this time Facyson
and Kochmer provided Plaintiff with informal accommodations, including
bathroom
breaks
when
needed , pregnancy-related
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absences,
and
assignments that did not require significant lifting , such as sweeping and
folding t-shirts.
On March 11 , 2022, Plaintiff's physician sent Sedgwick a copy of
recommended restrictions, including : (1) a work schedule of no more than 8
hours a day, 40 hours a week; (2) no period greater than two hours of sitting
or standing without a break; (3) hourly restroom breaks as necessary; (4)
potentially limited stooping and bending after 20 weeks of gestation ; (5)
infrequent lifting , pulling , and pushing ; and (6) limited repetitive lifting , pu lling ,
and pushing. On March 14, 2022, Sedgwick notified Facyson that it initially
approved Plaintiff for Temporary Alternative Duty ("TAD") related to her
pregnancy restrictions , as well as extra breaks, through October 22, 2022,
her expected due date. Facyson subsequently provided an additional 10minute break per six-hour shift or a 15-minute break per shift lasting more
than six hours. Facyson did not address Plaintiff's chair request because a
chair could not be placed in the location Plaintiff worked (the warehouse
floor) without causing a safety hazard. Still Defendant gave Plaintiff extra
breaks in lieu of a chair and offered stationary tasks where she could sit.
Plaintiff did not appeal Sedgwick's decision and did not have
conversations about the decision with anyone at Defendant, other than
Facyson and her child 's father (who also worked at Defendant). Plaintiff did
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complain on one occasion to Facyson that he was not doing more to help
her and on March 21, 2022, asked Facyson if she could work as an unloader
in a different department, where she had seen other Breakpack associates
do so. Facyson denied Plaintiff's request because the unloader position ,
which required heavier lifting than her Orderfiller position, would violate her
pregnancy restrictions.
On or around April 15, 2022, Plaintiff told Human Resources Training
Manager Jennifer Letcher she was not being provided her accommodations.
However, Kochmer confirmed to Letcher via email that Plaintiff received
accommodations as soon as she announced her pregnancy. Plaintiff also
did not make any formal complaints via Sedgwick or Defendant's Ethics
Helpline. On April 16, 2022, Plaintiff left her shift early and did not return. She
subsequently informed Facyson and Kochmer she was resigning . Her
resignation become effective May 1, 2022. Prior to her resignation no one at
Defendant told her she was terminated .
Plaintiff initiated this action on December 1, 2022, alleging disability,
pregnancy, and gender-based discrimination and retaliation under federal
and state law. Discovery closed on January 31, 2024. Defendant now seeks
summary judgment on all counts.
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II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery
[including , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]
and disclosure materials on file , and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 322-23 (1986) ; Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
901 F.2d 335 , 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a
reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party and is material if it will
affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. v.
Ericksen , 903 F. Supp. 836 , 838 (M .D. Pa. 1995).
At the summary judgment stage , "the judge's function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; See
also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241 , 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (A court
may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.) The court
must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641 , 647
(3d Cir. 2007). Where the nonmovmg party's evidence contradicts the
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movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Big Apple BMW, Inc.
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Country
Floors, Inc. v. P'ship Composed of Gepner & Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1061 (3d
Cir. 1991 ). But a non-movant "may not prevail merely by discrediting the
credibility of the movant's evidence; it must produce some affirmative
evidence. " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively
identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving
party can discharge this burden by showing that "on all the essential
elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial , no
reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." In re Bressman, 327
F.3d 229,238 (3d Cir. 2003); See also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving
party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but
must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v.
County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)) .
The nonmoving party must direct the court's attention to specific,
triable facts by "citing particular parts of materials in the record ." Fed . R. Civ.
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P. 56(c)(1)(A); See United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 216 (3d Cir.
2009) ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs. ")
(Quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991 )); See
also DeShie/ds v. Int'/ Resort Properties Ltd., 463 F. App'x 117, 120 (3d Cir.
2012) ("If factual support for [a plaintiff's] claim exist[s] in the record , it [i]s
incumbent upon her to direct the District Court's attention to those facts. ")
If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on
which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial ," Rule 56
mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure
"necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23;
Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
Ill.
Discussion
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disability, pregnancy, or
gender-based discrimination or retaliation. Plaintiff withdraws her disabilitybased discrimination and retaliation claims. However, she argues that
summary judgment should be denied as to her remaining claims because
there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding those claims.
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A. Plaintiff's Disability Based Claims
Plaintiff withdraws her disability-based discrimination and retaliation
claims (Counts I, II , and VII of her complaint.) Accordingly, Defendant's
motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to those claims.
8. Plaintiff's Pregnancy Discrimination Claims
The court uses the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to analyze Plaintiff's Title VI I pregnancy discrimination claims. 1
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this analysis, the employee must first establish a
prima facie case. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 365
(3d Cir. 2008). If the employee is able to present such a case, then the
burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its adverse employment decision. Id. If the employer is able to do
so, the burden shifts back to the employee, who , to defeat a motion for
summary judgment, must show that the employer's articulated reason was a
pretext for intentional discrimination. Id.
1
The Third Circuit construes Title VII and the PHRA consistently with
each other. See Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ. , 470 F. 3d 535, 539 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006.) Accordingly, the court's
analysis of Plaintiff's Title VII claims also applies to Plaintiff's PHRA claim .
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To establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination a plaintiff
must show: (1) she was pregnant, and the employer knew of the pregnancy;
(2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment decision; and (4) the nexus between the plaintiff's pregnancy
and an adverse employment action raises an inference of discrimination. Id.
Here Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not identified evidence of an
adverse employment action or that would support an inference of
discrimination.
Under Title VII , an adverse employment action for purposes of a
discrimination claim is "a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities , or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Betts
v. Summit Oaks Hosp., 687 Fed. Appx. 206, 207 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Burlington Indus. , Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
The only adverse employment action Plaintiff claims was the denial of
her physician's recommendation she be provided with a chair and her verbal
request to transfer to another position. Regarding Plaintiff's request for a
chair, she does not dispute that Defendant could not provide her with a chair
on the warehouse floor without creating a safety hazard nor does she point
to evidence that Defendant offered a chair on the warehouse floor to any
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employee, pregnant or not. Still Defendant offered Plaintiff additional breaks
and stationary tasks where she could sit in lieu of a chair. Given this context
the denial of Plaintiff's chair request cannot be consider a significant change
in employment status nor does it raise an inference of discrimination.
Regarding Plaintiff's request for a job transfer she cites Hanafy v. Hill
lnt's, Inc. , 669 F. Supp. 3d 419 (E.D. Pa. 2023), for the proposition that the
denial of an informally requested accommodation constitutes an adverse
employment action . However, Defendant points out that this case addressed
a fai lure to accommodate in violation of the ADA, which Plaintiff has now
withdrawn all her claims under.
Moreover, Defendant cites persuasive authority that courts should not
consider lateral transfers adverse employment actions. See e.g. , Good v.
Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, No. 05-383 , 2007 WL 2955615 , at *8 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 9, 2007) (citing Fallon v. Meissner, 66 Fed. Appx. 348 , 352 (3d Cir.
2003)) ("It is wel l settled that a lateral transfer, or failure to be given the same,
is not a material ly adverse employment action sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of employment discrimination. ") Since the present motion was
briefed , the Supreme Court found that employees need not show significant,
serious , substantial or any similar harm to successfully challenge a job
transfer under Title VI I. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S.
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- , 144 S. Ct. 967, 972 (2024). Nonetheless, Muldrow involved an
employee's involuntary job transfer, while the present case involves an
employee's request for a voluntary job transfer. As such this new authority is
not applicable to the present case and does not make the denial of Plaintiff's
request an adverse employment action.
The Third Circuit has held that whereas here the record does not
support "the existence of an adverse employment action , it was not
necessary for the District Court to reach the other requirements for a prima
facie case, including the requirement that the adverse employment action
occur under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination." Betts v. Summit Oaks Hosp. , 687 F. App'x 206, 208 (3d Cir.
2017). Still for the sake of good order the court will address Plaintiff's
additional argument that Facyson's lack of authority to deny her request
raises a genuine dispute of material fact.
Besides the fact that Plaintiff cites no authority indicating the court can
infer a discriminatory nexus from Facyson's allegedly unauthorized denial, it
is undisputed that Plaintiff did not request the denied accommodation
through the channels she had already requested and been granted other
accommodations. Plaintiff claims it was because she was new to the job and
did not know Facyson lacked the authority to grant her request. But again ,
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Plaintiff had already been directed by Facyson to request accommodations
through Sedgwick and the ACS, which it is undisputed she did not do for th is
particular request. Additional ly, Plaintiff does not identify any evidence that
Facyson actually did lack the authority to deny her request, nor does she
dispute that granting her request would violate her pregnancy restrictions.
Absent such evidence there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding
the existence of a discriminatory nexus between Plaintiff's pregnancy and
the denial of her job transfer request even if that denial was considered an
adverse employment action.
Accord ingly, a reasonable Jury could not find that Plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination and Defendant's
motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to her pregnancy
discrimination claims.
C. Plaintiff's Gender Discrimination Claims
Title VI I gender discrimination claims are also analyzed under the
McDonnell
Douglas
burden-shifting
framework.
Like
pregnancy
discrimination claims to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination
a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the position she sought to retain ; (3) she suffered an adverse
employment action , and (4) the action occurred under circumstances giving
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rise to an inference of discrimination. Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp. , 706
F. 3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013). Again , Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
failed to identify evidence of an adverse employment action and again the
court agrees that the denial of Plaintiff's request for a chair and lateral job
transfer does not constitute an adverse employment action. Likewise,
Facyson's allegedly unauthorized denial of Plaintiff's request does not give
rise to an inference of discrimination, even if the denial was considered an
adverse employment action .
Accordingly, a reasonable Jury could not find that Plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of gender discrimination and Defendant's
motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to her gender
discrimination claims.
D. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claims
Like discrimination claims retaliation claims under Title VII, regardless
of whether they are based on pregnancy or gender, are analyzed under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
a plaintiff must show: (1) that she engaged in protected conduct; (2) that she
was subject to an adverse employment action subsequent to such activity;
and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
adverse action . Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia , 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d
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Cir. 2015). Once again Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not subject to any
adverse employment action and even if she was there is no causal link
between her protected activity and Defendant's employment decisions.
As discussed above Facyson's denial of Plaintiff's request for a chair
and lateral job transfer cannot be considered an adverse employment action .
See Betts, 687 Fed. Appx. 207 (3d Cir. 2017). But even if it was, Defendant
argues that it occurred too long after Plaintiff's protected activity to establish
a causal connection. Specifically, Defendant asserts that at the time of the
alleged retaliation nearly two months had lapsed since Plaintiff announced
she was pregnant and requested accommodations. See Williams v.
Philadelphia Haus. Auth. Police Oep't, 380 F.3d 751 , 760 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding two-month lapse between protected activity and alleged retaliation
does not create inference of retaliatory intent). Conversely, Plaintiff argues
that her protected activities include not only requesting accommodations for
her pregnancy but also complaining to Letcher that she was not receiving
adequate accommodations. She asserts that a dispute of material fact
remains as to whether Letcher took any sufficient action to investigate her
complaint.
Plaintiff allegedly complained to Letcher on or around April 15, 2022,
which was only 15 days before the official end of her employment with
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Defendant. However, it undisputed that Plaintiff was not terminated. As
previously stated , the only adverse employment action alleged was
Facyson's denial of Plaintiff's request for the additional accommodation of a
chair and lateral job transfer, which are respectively supposed to have
happened on March 11 and March 21 , 2022. Thus, the court cannot infer a
causal link between Plaintiff's complaint to Letcher and denial of her requests
which did not occur subsequent to her complaint but approximately a month
before. Furthermore, Letcher did investigate Plaintiff's complaint by emailing
with Kochmer and Plaintiff cites no authority indicating such an investigation
is inadequate or that such inadequacy would otherwise support a retaliation
claim.
Still Facyson 's denial of Plaintiff's requests on March 11 and March 21 ,
2022, were less than two months after Plaintiff's initial announcement of her
pregnancy and request for accommodations , on February 19, 2022. Under
other circumstances such temporal proximity could suggest a retaliatory
motive. But here Facyson denied Plaintiff's request because granting it
would have led her to perform heavier lifting in violation of her pregnancy
restrictions. As such the court could not infer a casual connection even if
Facyson's denial was considered an adverse employment action.
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Accord ing ly, a reasonable jury could not find that Plaintiff has
established a prima facie case of retaliation based on pregnancy or gender
and Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect
to her retaliatio n claims.
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the aforesaid Defendant's motion for summary judgment will
be GRANTED and this case closed . An appropriate order follows.
tes District Judge
DATE: May 9, 2024
22-1908-01
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