Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) RE: Complaint 1 filed by Paula Jean Reynolds. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C Carlson on 2/7/24. (rw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PAULA JEAN REYNOLDS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY, 1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

CIV NO. 3:23-CV-405

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Factual Background
This lawsuit is a pro se Social Security appeal filed by Paula Reynolds. (Doc.

1). Ms. Reynolds initially brought this action on March 7, 2023. (Id.) At the time that
this appeal was filed, Ms. Reynolds was provided with a copy of the court’s Standing
Practice Order in Social Security appeals. (Doc. 4). That Standing Practice Order
instructed the plaintiff that she was obliged to file a brief in support of this appeal
thirty days after the service of the defendant’s answer. (Id., ¶ 3). The Standing
Practice Order also notified Ms. Reynolds in clear and precise terms that:

1 Martin O’Malley became the Commissioner of Social Security on December 20,
2023. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Martin O’Malley is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the
defendant in this suit.
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“Noncompliance of the plaintiff with paragraph 3 will result in the dismissal without
any further warning from the court.” (Id., ¶ 7).
The defendant’s answer and administrative transcript was filed on May 3,
2023. (Docs. 8, 9). When Ms. Reynolds failed to timely file a brief, the court entered
an order on June 12, 2023, which stated as follows:
Pursuant to the Standing Practice Order of December 1, 2022, Plaintiff’s
brief in support of her Complaint was due on or before June 2, 2023.
Plaintiff has neither filed her brief nor requested an extension of time
within which to do so. AND NOW, this 12th day of June, 2023, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff show cause on or before June 22,
2023 why this case should not be dismissed.
(Doc. 11).
Despite this explicit warning, Ms. Reynolds has not filed a brief in support of
this Social Security appeal and the time for filing such a brief has long since passed.
Accordingly, in the absence of any action by the plaintiff to comply with the court’s
orders and prosecute this appeal, this case will be deemed ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, this Social Security appeal will be dismissed.
II.

Discussion
A.

Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss
a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute
or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the

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action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal
of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296
F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while
broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of
the following factors: (1) the extent of the party’s personal
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to
meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula’ that we apply to
determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure
to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis
factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether
a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).

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Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is
dispositive,’ [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in
order to dismiss a complaint.’” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218,
222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad
discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six
factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where
there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable
to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256
F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 F. App’x 506 (3d
Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in
favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor,
the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, shows that the failure to litigate this
case is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders or
submit a brief in support of this Social Security appeal.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor— the prejudice to the adversary caused by
the failure to abide by court orders—also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed,
this factor—the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions—is entitled to great
weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:

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“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in
support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J.
Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir.
1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally,
prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable
dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly
irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . . However, prejudice
is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware
v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T.
Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d
Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party’s
ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware,
322 F.3d at 222.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff’s failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court
orders, now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such
instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff’s continuing inaction
and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256
F. App’x 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 F.
App’x 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 F.
App’x 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels
dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor—the history of dilatoriness on the
plaintiff’s part—it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In
this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes

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a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness
in complying with court orders.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29
F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to comply with
court orders or file a brief in support of this Social Security appeal as directed. Thus,
the plaintiff’s conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and
conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response
. . . , or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor—whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith—also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we
must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in
that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere
negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to
comply with instructions of the Court, the Court is compelled to conclude that the
plaintiff’s actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an
ongoing disregard for this case and the Court’s instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such
as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with
the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See,
e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such
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a situation where the plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of
the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an
orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff
on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no
avail. The plaintiff still ignores her responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions
have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to
the Court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the
meritoriousness of the plaintiff’s claims. In our view, however, consideration of this
factor cannot save this particular plaintiff’s claims since the plaintiff is now wholly
non-compliant with the court’s instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply
with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of her claims,
and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss
the case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,’
[and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss
a complaint.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964
F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff’s claims,
standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
In any event we note that Social Security appeals are governed by a highly
deferential standard of review. When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision
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denying a claimant’s application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the
question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by
substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536
(M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount
of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a
mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). As the Supreme
Court has observed:
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––, 135
S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence
standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks
whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the agency’s
factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And
whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold
for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this
Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales,
402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consolidated Edison,
305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150,
153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the
substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous
standard).
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
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Mindful of this highly deferential standard of review, we note that the decision
denying benefits to the plaintiff was set forth in a detailed ruling. (Tr. 12-35). Given
that substantial evidence is a term of art which “means—and means only—‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,’ ” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, in the absence of any briefing
or submission by the plaintiff we cannot say that it has been shown that the ALJ’s
decision denying benefits to Ms. Reynolds lacks the modest evidentiary support
required to sustain this agency determination. Therefore, a preliminary merits
consideration also weighs against the plaintiff and it appears that all of the Poulis
factors favor dismissal of this case.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this case will be DISMISSED for

failure to prosecute.
An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 7th day of February 2024.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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