Sartoris v. Primecare Medical CEO and Staff et al

Filing 102

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Robert D Mariani on 11/25/2024. (cac)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Civil No. 3:23-cv-640

EDWARD SARTORIS,

(Judge Mariani)

Plaintiff
v.
PRIMECARE MEDICAL CEO THOMAS
J. WEBER, et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Edward Sartoris ("Sartoris"), an inmate who was housed, at all relevant
times, at the Monroe County Correctional Facility, in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania ("MCCF"),
initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 (Doc. 1). The action
proceeds via an amended complaint. (Doc. 24). The remaining Defendants are Warden
Garry Haidle, Deputy Warden Joseph McCoy, Sergeant Gregory Armond, Monroe County,
(collectively, the "moving Defendants"), and John Doe individuals. Presently before the
Court is the moving Defendants' motion (Doc. 73) for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the
moving Defendants' motion and enter judgment in their favor. The Court will also dismiss

1

19).

Sartoris is currently housed at the State Correctional Institution, Dallas, Pennsylvania. (Doc.

the action against the John Doe individuals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m).
I.

Statement of Undisputed Facts 2

On May 27, 2020, Sartoris was booked into the Monroe County Correctional Facility
after using a stun gun on his wife and stabbing her multiple times. (Doc. 80 ,I 1). On
October 28, 2022, Sartoris pied guilty to a first-degree felony in the Monroe County Court of
Common Pleas. (Id. ,I 3).
Sartoris' allegations in his amended complaint relate to events that occurred at the
MCCF in July 2020, when he was a pretrial detainee. (Id. ,I 4). Sartoris alleges that he was
housed in a cell on A-Block at the MCCF and that there was mold in his cell. (Doc. 24 W
11-12). He claims that he complained about the mold on several occasions and filed
grievances regarding the mold. (Id. ,I 12, 14-16). Occasionally, a maintenance worker

2

Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 be supported "by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered
paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried ." LOCAL RULE OF
COURT 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material
facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement and identifying
genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives from the
amended complaint and the moving Defendants' Rule 56.1 statement of material facts . (Docs. 24, 80) .
Although Sartoris filed several documents in response to the moving Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, he failed to file a responsive statement of material facts. Therefore, as authorized by Local Rule
56.1, the Court will admit as uncontroverted the statement of facts submitted by the moving Defendants.
See LOCAL RULE OF COURT 56.1 ("All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the
moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by
the opposing party."); Rau v. Allstate Fire & Gas. Ins. Co., 793 F. App'x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding
this Court's decision to strike non-movant's non-responsive counterstatement of facts under Local Rule
56.1 ); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that "the District Court is in
the best position to determine the extent of a party's noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1 , as well as the
appropriate sanction for such noncompliance").

2

would come to his cell with a rag and spray bottle and instruct Sartoris to clean the mold.
(Id. ~ 13). Sartoris asserts that no personal protective equipment was provided to clean his
cell. (Id.). He further asserts that maintenance workers refused to clean the mold. (Id.~
14). Sartoris alleges that the exposure to mold caused numerous health risks, such as
migraines and breathing disorders. (Id. ~ 17). He reported these ailments on sick call.
(Id.).
Sartoris also alleges that the water on A-Block was not potable, which caused
inmates to suffer skin disorders. (Id.~ 18). He claims that medical personnel provided
inmates with soap, lotions, antibiotics, and consultations with a dermatologist. (Id.).
Sartoris alleges that there were several cases of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
("MRSA") at the prison and, when he left MCCF, he had a severe MRSA infection. (Id.).
In addition to the named Defendants, Sartoris also names an unidentified Safety
Officer and an unidentified Maintenance Supervisor at MCCF. (Doc. 80 ~ 5). On February
6, 2024, the Court ordered Sartoris to show cause within 15 days as to why the action
against the Safety Officer and the Maintenance Supervisor should not be dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) for failure to serve the summons and
complaint within 90 days. (Id.~ 6) . Sartoris did not respond to the Order and has never
identified the John Doe individuals, nor has he filed any pleadings with the Court reflecting
that he served these Defendants. (Id.~ 7). The moving Defendants thus contend that
Sartoris has abandoned his claims against the John Doe individuals. (Id. ~ 8).
3

The moving Defendants are as follows. Garry Haidle was the Warden of the MCCF
during the events described in the complaint. (Id. , 9) . Joseph McCoy was the Deputy
Warden of Security at the MCCF. (Id. , 10). Gregory Armond was a Sergeant at the MCCF
who supervised correctional officers in the units in which he was assigned. (Id. , 11 ).
Monroe County owns the building identified as the MCCF. (Id., 12). The correctional staff
at the MCCF are employees of the County. (Id., 13). However, the medical staff are
employed by PrimeCare Medical, Inc. , which is under contract with Monroe County to
provide health care services to inmates. (Id., 14).
In 2020, during the relevant time, the nation was in the middle of the COVID-19
epidemic. (Id. , 15). During that time, correctional staff was asked to wear masks to
prevent the transmission of the COVID-19 virus, and precautions were taken by the staff to
clean the facility and wipe down surface areas to avoid the transmission of the virus. (Id. ,
16). Cleaning operations were performed daily throughout the facility. (Id., 17). However,
Sartoris and other inmates were not given access to chemicals that could be harmful to
them or to staff, or that required personal protective equipment to handle safely. (Id.). To
protect the health of the inmates and the staff, the MCCF took various health precautions ,
including recommending masks for correctional staff and maintaining rigorous cleaning
protocols to minimize virus transmission. (Id. , 31). Defendants maintain that there were
no issues with harmful environmental conditions like mold or asbestos, and all inmates,

4

including Sartoris, received safe, nutritionally balanced meals, drinkable water, and had
access to commissary items. (Id.

,m 18, 32) .

There was no policy or practice of Monroe County to ignore environmental conditions
that could harm inmates and staff. (Id. ,r 19). The MCCF is inspected regularly by the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"), which never cited the MCCF for
environmental hazards during Sartoris' incarceration. (Id.).
PrimeCare staff do not share the medical records of an inmate with the correctional
staff due to confidentiality laws (i.e., HIPAA) unless there is a need to know, such as to warn
officers of an inmate's suicidal ideation or when he needs special care due to a medical
condition. (Id. ,r 20). There is no record of PrimeCare staff informing the administration of
an environmental risk at the MCCF that posed a danger to Sartoris or others. (Id. ,r 21).
The MCCF has a grievance procedure that is set forth in the Inmate Handbook. (Id.

,r 22). Defendants maintain that Sartoris was given a copy of the Inmate Handbook when
he was first incarcerated at the MCCF. (Id. ,r 23). The grievance procedure allows an
inmate to make complaints about: (1) the conditions of his confinement; (2) complaints
against specific officers relating to their treatment of him or about officers' misbehavior; (3)
his dissatisfaction with his medical care; and (4) claims that officers subjected him to harm
or failed to provide him with a proper level of medical care. (Id. ,r 25).
The claims in Sartoris' amended complaint are claims that were covered by the
MCCF grievance procedure. (Id. ,r 26). The grievance procedure provides for several
5

levels of review if an inmate is dissatisfied with the response he receives from his
grievances. (Id.~ 27). Warden Haidle is the final level of review in the grievance process
and all grievances and decisions responding to grievances or grievance appeals are
memorialized in writing. (Id.~ 28). Defendants maintain that Sartoris did not exhaust his
administrative remedies concerning the environmental conditions at the MCCF, the alleged
failure to provide Sartoris with an appropriate level of medical care, the alleged malfeasance
of the Defendants, and any complaints relating to the policies of Monroe County. (Id.~ 29).
Defendants maintain further that if Sartoris had submitted grievances relating to the claims
in his amended complaint, they would have been investigated and addressed. (Id.~ 30) .

II.

Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not

present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact." FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a). "As to materiality,
... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence
of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving
party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'/ Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
6

Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of
the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIv. P.
56(c)(1 )(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, "[t]he court
need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record."
FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c)(3). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then
the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993) .
However, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127
S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the
summary judgment rule,
its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts . Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
7

it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.
Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
Ill.

Discussion
A.

Exhaustion of Administrative Review3

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.,
requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials
for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639,
642 (2016) (explaining that only "available" remedies must be exhausted). Proper
exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is seeking relief-like monetary damages-that
cannot be granted by the administrative system. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 85
(2006) . However, there are situations in which a grievance procedure may be rendered
"unavailable" to an inmate, such as when a prison official thwarts an inmate's ability to use
it, Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44, when intimidation by means of "serious threats of retaliation
and bodily harm" prevent an inmate from filing, Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 26667 (3d Cir. 2018), or when a prison has "rendered its administrative remedies unavailable ...
when it failed to timely (by its own procedural rules) respond to [an inmate's] grievance and
then repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests for a decision on his claim," Robinson v.

3

On August 13, 2024, the Court issued an Order apprising the parties that it would consider
exhaustion in its role as factfinder in accordance with Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018)
and Small v. Camden Cnty. , 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013), and afforded the parties the opportunity to
supplement the record with any additional evidence relevant to exhaustion of administrative remed ies.
(Doc. 94).

8

Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Shifflett v.
Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2019).
Under Third Circuit precedent, "exhaustion is a question of law to be determined by a
judge, even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts." Small v. Camden
Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 781 (3d
Cir. 2010)); see a/so Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781 ("Juries decide cases, not issues of judicial
traffic control. Until the issue of exhaustion is resolved, the court cannot know whether it is
to decide the case or the prison authorities are to.") (quoting Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739,
741 (7th Cir. 2008)); cf. Wilkerson v. United States, No. 3:13-1499, 2014 WL 1653249, at *9
(M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2014) ("[l]f there is a dispute of material fact, the court should conduct a
plenary trial on the contested facts prior to making [an exhaustion of administrative
remedies] determination."). "Although the availability of administrative remedies to a
prisoner is a question of law, it necessarily involves a factual inquiry." Small, 728 F.3d at
271 (citations omitted).
Here, Sartoris has presented no evidence that he properly exhausted his
administrative remedies, that prison officials thwarted his attempt to comply with the prison
grievance process, or that there was any confusion regarding the grievance procedure.
First, Sartoris argues that he attempted to exhaust his administrative remedies, but the
grievances "disappeared[,]" he did not receive a response, and when he did receive a
response, prison officials advised that the matter was under review. (Doc. 84-2, p. 6).
9

Sartoris submitted initial inmate grievances, and states that the prison officials' responses
were "disingenuous[,]" and it took several months to receive their responses. (Doc. 84-4
through Doc. 84-13). Sartoris has failed to submit any evidence that he appealed any of his
grievances to the final level of review. Second, in his amended complaint, Sartoris alleges
that he filed grievances related to his claims, but the grievances "seemed to be cursed."
(Doc. 24, pp. 9-10) . Sartoris' bald assertion that the grievance process was long or that
grievances were unanswered, standing alone, does not carry his burden of proving "that
there was some extraordinary reason he was prevented from complying with the statutory
mandate." Davis v. Warman , 49 F. App'x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). He does not provide any
evidence to support a claim that the administrative remedy process was not available to him
or that prison officials failed to respond to his grievance. In fact, he has submitted copies of
his initial grievances with the prison officials' responses. Sartoris' only evidence of
exhaustion confirms that he did not fully and properly exhaust his administrative remedies
prior to filing this lawsuit. Moreover, although Sartoris was transferred from the MCCF to
SCI-Dallas, a transfer from one facility to another does not excuse the PLRA's exhaustion
requirement, and Sartoris does not advance any argument that administrative exhaustion
was rendered futile after his transfer. See Williamson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 131
F. App'x 888, 890 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
In contrast, the moving Defendants have presented evidence in the form of an
affidavit from Warden Haidle confirming that he reviewed Sartoris' file, none of Sartoris'
10

grievances were submitted to the final level of review and, thus , Sartoris did not exhaust all
of his available MCCF grievance remedies outlined in the Inmate Handbook. (Doc. 80-1 ,
pp. 84-85 ~~ 2-8, Declaration of MCCF Warden Garry Haidle ("Haidle Deel.")). Allegations
without the support of evidence are not sufficient to survive summary judgment. Jutrowski
v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018). Sartoris' allegation that he filed
initial grievances, without any evidence that he appealed them to the final level of review, is
not sufficient to survive Defendants' motion.
It is undisputed that Sartoris failed to properly exhaust all levels of review provided
by the MCCF inmate grievance system. Instead, Sartoris bypassed the inmate grievance
system and proceeded to federal court. "[l]t is beyond the power of this court-or any
other-to excuse compliance with the exhaustion requirement, whether on the ground of
futility, inadequacy or any other basis." Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000).
Sartoris' course of action is precisely the conduct that the PLRA administrative exhaustion
requirement seeks to curtail. The moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
based on Sartoris' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Even had Sartoris properly exhausted, the moving Defendants would be entitled to
summary judgment on the merits, as set forth below.
8.

Conditions of Confinement Claim

Because Sartoris was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, the Fourteenth
Amendment governs his conditions of confinement claim. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150,
11

166 (3d Cir. 2005). To establish a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must allege that their conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 538 (1979). "Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and
subjective components." Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). "[T)he
objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious
and the subjective component asks whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted) .
Only conditions of confinement that "cause [detainees] to endure genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time" violate due process. Bell, 441 U.S. at 542.
Additionally, '"a particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of
express intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or
condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when
the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose."' Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d
Cir. 2012) (quoting Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68); see also Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494,504
(3d Cir. 2017). Courts should consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating such a
claim. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 373 ("In evaluating a pretrial detainee's claim of unconstitutional
punishment, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances within the institution.").
To satisfy the subjective component of the analysis, a prisoner must assert that
prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded
a serious risk to the detainee's health or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99
12

(1991); see also Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x 169,173 (3d Cir. 2011) (percuriam) ('"[T]he
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial harm exists, and he must also draw that inference."') (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,837 (1994)); cf. Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App'x 132,
135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) ("[W]e agree with the District Court and find no reason to
apply a different standard here as we have applied the 'deliberate indifference' standard
both in cases involving prisoners and pretrial detainees." (internal citations omitted)).
"The knowledge element of deliberate indifference is subjective, not objective
knowledge, meaning that the official must actually be aware of the existence of the
excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware." Beers-Capitol v.
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). Knowledge may be shown where the official
has actual notice of the risk, Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1996), or where the
risk was "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in
the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been
exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842.
The presence of toxic mold or asbestos in a prison may violate the Constitution if it
poses a substantial risk of serious harm. See Fantroy v. Owens, 150 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir.
1998) (considering deliberate indifference claim based on asbestos exposure in prison);
Hall-Wadley v. Maintenance Department, 386 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
13

(considering deliberate indifference claim based on mold exposure); Johnson v. Beard, No.
09-886, 2014 WL 4793905, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) ("Toxic mold which causes [an]
inmate to suffer headaches, sinus problems, blurred vision, breathing difficulty, irritated eyes
and fatigue can[] set forth a viable conditions of confinement claim .") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding
that inmates should not be "expose[d] to [contaminants] that pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his future health").
Here, Sartoris failed to submit evidence supporting his assertion that he was housed
under conditions subjecting him to a substantial risk of harm from exposure to mold,
asbestos, and contaminated water. During his incarceration at the MCCF, Sartoris
complained that his exposure to these conditions caused breathing and lung issues,
migraines, a sore throat, and skin infections.
First, there is no objective evidence of record that the MCCF failed to maintain
sanitary conditions based on the presence of mold, asbestos, or contaminated water.
Sartoris submitted declarations, under penalty of perjury, of other incarcerated individuals
alleging similar facts about the presence of mold, asbestos, and contaminated water.
(Docs. 84-1, 84-2; Doc. 88, p. 5). The Court may consider the statements of Sartoris' fellow
inmates. By contrast, the moving Defendants show an absence of any inspection reports
establishing the presence of mold, asbestos, or contaminated water at the MCCF. (See
Doc. 80-1, Haidle Deel. at pp. 85-86 ,nr 9-11 , 17). The record before the Court shows that
14

the DOC maintains a sanitation policy and regularly inspects the MCCF. (See id., Haid le
Deel. at p. 85 ,r 9). During Sartoris' confinement at the MCCF, the facility passed all DOC
inspections. (See id., Haidle Deel. at p. 85 ,r 10). Additionally, there is no record of the
medical staff informing prison administration of an environmental risk at the MCCF that
posed a danger to Sartoris. (See id., Haidle Deel. at p. 86 ,r 17). The record is devoid of
any official documentation reporting the presence of any environmental hazards at the
MCCF during Sartoris' incarceration. (See id., Haidle Deel. at p. 85 ,r 11).
In further support of his position, Sartoris relies on a "Public Notice" from the
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") dated December 1, 2022. (Doc. 84-3, p. 1;
Doc. 90-1, p. 45). Therein, DEP advised its clients, including the MCCF, that they failed to
properly test for a contaminant in the water system. (Id.) . DEP advised that the situation
was not an emergency, the annual test was supposed to be conducted in September 2022,
but instead was conducted in October 2022. (Id.). This Public Notice document only
explains that DEP "failed to monitor" the facility's water, that corrective action was taken,
and "[t]here is nothing you need to do at this time." (Id.). Sartoris' reliance on this
document is misplaced, as it does not cite the MCCF for failure to maintain sanitary
conditions. (See id.). Sartoris has not submitted any other reports or expert testimony
regarding water quality, mold, or asbestos at the MCCF.
Second, if Sartoris were to have presented adequate evidence of the existence of
mold, asbestos, and contaminated water at the MCCF, he does not offer any evidence that
15

there was a substantial risk of serious harm from such exposure. Sartoris complains about
symptoms caused by his exposure to mold, asbestos, and unclean water. While Sartoris
believes his ailments are attributable to the conditions at the MCCF (see Doc. 88), he has
not submitted any medical records to the Court in support of this assertion. Nor does he
come forward with any medical expert evidence which would establish that his ailments
could have been caused by the conditions of his confinement, thus creating a substantial
risk of serious harm. The Court notes that "the mere presence of mold does not indicate an
objectively serious deprivation." Johnson, 2014 WL 4793905, at *6 (collecting cases)
(emphasis added). Based upon an application of the above cited legal standards to the
factual record, the Court finds that Sartoris has not presented evidence establishing a
substantial risk of serious harm to him.
Further, assuming arguendo that a complained-of condition existed, Sartoris' claim
would nonetheless fail because he does not establish that the moving Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference. To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment claim brought pursuant
to § 1983, a pretrial detainee must also demonstrate that a particular defendant acted with
"deliberate indifference" to those conditions. Edwards, 663 F. App'x at 135. Deliberate
indifference is established if a defendant "knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious harm" and "disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Sartoris has not produced any evidence to show that the moving
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The moving Defendants attest that the DOC
16

regularly inspected the prison, and it earned full compliance during the relevant time period.
(See Doc. 80-1 , Haid le Deel. at p. 85 ff 9-10). The moving Defendants further attest that
they took reasonable measures to keep the prison clean . (See Doc. 80 ff 16-17; Doc. 801, Haidle Deel. at p. 85 f 13). They presented evidence regarding access of cleaning
supplies to individuals incarcerated at the MCCF and attach the policy directing staff to
ensure that mandatory cell cleaning is proper and thorough. (Doc. 80-1, pp. 45-82). The
policy provides:
[i]nmate beds are to be made and the cells straightened up, swept and mopped
before unit activities begin. The procedure for mopping cells shall be as
follows: a. Each inmate is responsible for a daily mopping of their cell. b. Cell
cleanup begins at 0600 and shall be completed in a timely manner at the
direction of the Housing Unit Officer. c. Each housing unit is equipped with all
the cleaning supplies for inmate cell/unit cleanup.
(Id. at 59-60) . The record shows that prison officials cleaned the facility on a daily basis , the
DOC regularly inspected the facility and there were no findings of environmental hazards,
water was tested monthly, windows were replaced as needed, and medical staff never
informed the administration of an environmental risk at the MCCF. (See Doc. 80 f 17; Doc.
80-1 , Haidle Deel. at pp. 85-86 ff 9-11 , 13, 17; Docs. 84-4, 84-9). Sartoris has not
presented any evidence that, with deliberate indifference, the moving Defendants exposed
him to mold, asbestos, and contaminated water, that caused him harm or posed an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.
Finally, Sartoris failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine dispute of
fact as to the cause of the ailments he claims he suffered. While toxic mold causing an
17

"inmate to suffer headaches, sinus problems, blurred vision, breathing difficulty, irritated
eyes, and fatigue can set forth a viable conditions of confinement claim," Johnson, 2014 WL
4793905, at *6 (citation omitted), there is no evidence that Sartoris' alleged exposure to
mold, asbestos, and contaminated water caused him harm. See, e.g., Mal/es v. Lehigh
Cnty., 639 F.Supp.2d 566, 581 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (no evidence prison officials' action or
inaction proximately caused inmates injuries from MRSA). Sartoris has only submitted his
personal belief that exposure to mold, asbestos, and unclean water caused his symptoms.
Absent medical, scientific, or other evidence, the Court cannot infer that the conditions at
the MCCF caused his symptoms or harm. Sartoris' comments are merely his conclusory
opinion, and do not constitute evidence that the conditions at the MCCF fail to meet
constitutional standards. See, e.g. , Ford v. Mercer Cnty. Correctional Center, 171 F. App'x
416, 420 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding the plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence that a jury
could reasonably return a verdict in his favor that the air quality in the prison posed an
unreasonable risk of harm to his health in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) .
The party adverse to summary judgment must raise "more than a mere scintilla of
evidence in its favor" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion and cannot survive
by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams
v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). Sartoris has failed to
meet this burden. There is no evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on the
conditions of confinement claim . Viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in
18

the light most favorable to Sartoris, there are no facts in the record to make a sufficient
showing on the essential elements of his claim. The Court will enter summary judgment in
favor of the moving Defendants on Plaintiffs conditions of confinement claim. 4
IV.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)

Rule 4(m) sets forth the following time frame a plaintiff has to serve a defendant with
the summons and copy of the complaint:
If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the
court -- on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff -- must dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure,
the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m). The John Doe Defendants were named in the amended complaint that
was filed on August 1, 2023, and, to date, have not been identified or served in this case.
The Court must engage in a two-step process in determining whether to dismiss the
unidentified, non-served Defendants or grant Sartoris additional time to effect service.
"First, the district court should determine whether good cause exists for an extension of
time. If good cause is present, the district court must extend time for service and the inquiry
is ended. If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may in its discretion decide
whether to dismiss the case without prejudice or extend time for service." Petrucelli v.
Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995). Good cause requires good faith

4

Because the Court finds that summary judgment must be entered in favor of Defendants on the
conditions of confinement claim, the Court need not reach Defendants' remaining arguments regarding
qualified immunity and Mone// liability.
19

on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for
noncompliance with the time specified in the rules. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts,
Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995). In determining whether good cause exists, a
court's "primary focus is on the plaintiffs reasons for not complying with the time limit in the
first place." Id. Although prejudice is a factor to be considered, the absence of prejudice to
the opposing party alone does not constitute good cause to excuse late service. Id.
In the present matter, Sartoris failed to establish good cause. On February 6, 2024,
the Court ordered Sartoris to provide additional information concerning the identity of the
John Doe Defendants and warned him that failure to comply may result in the dismissal of
his claims against those Defendants pursuant to Rule 4(m). (Doc. 58). Sartoris failed to do
so, and his pro se status is not good cause to excuse his failure to timely identify or serve
these Defendants. Veal v. United States, 84 F. App'x 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2004). Based upon
the lack of any explanation for his failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 4, the Court
finds that Sartoris failed to establish good cause.
If a plaintiff cannot show good cause for his failure to serve the defendant within 90
days, a district court may either dismiss the defendant, or exercise its discretion to order
that service be made within a specific time. Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305; see also FED. R.
CIv. P. 4(m). It is Sartoris' responsibility to properly identify all defendants, and provide
accurate mailing addresses for the defendants, in a timely fashion. (See Doc. 8 ,r 8; Doc.
25 ,r,r 3-4) (advising Sartoris that failure to properly name a defendant, or provide an
20

accurate mailing address for a defendant, may result in dismissal of the claims against that
defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)).
In light of Sartoris' lack of good faith effort to identify or serve the John Doe
Defendants, despite this Court's warning of the possible consequences, including dismissal,
the Court concludes that dismissal is appropriate under the present circumstances .
Accordingly, the unidentified, non-served Defendants will be dismissed from this action.
V.

Conclusion
Plaintiffs principal failure to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial lies in his

failure to submit factual evidence of the presence of mold, asbestos, or contaminated
drinking water and his concomitant failure to submit evidence creating an issue of fact as to
the cause of the maladies he claims to have suffered which are, likewise, unsupported with
material evidence.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court will grant the moving Defendants' motion
(Doc. 73) and enter judgment in their favor. The Court will also dismiss the action against
the John Doe individuals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). A separate
Order shall issue.

Dated: November ~

2024

21