Williams v. Sage

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Signed by Honorable Julia K Munley on 3/27/24. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DWIGHT WILLIAMS,
Petitioner

No. 3:24-CV-0129
(Judge Munley)

V.

JESSICA SAGE,
Respondent

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MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Dwight Williams initiated the above-captioned action by filing a

prose petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He
alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly calculated his
earned time credits under the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. 115-391 , 132 Stat.
5194 (2018). For the following reasons, the court will dismiss Williams' Section
2241 petition.

I.

BACKGROUND
Williams is currently serving a 110-month sentence imposed in 2021 by the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for various
controlled substance offenses. (See Doc. 7-2 at 1 ,I 3; Doc. 7-3 at 2). His
current projected release date, via FSA release, is June 20, 2026. (See Doc. 7-2
at 1 ,I 3; Doc. 7-3 at 2).

Williams filed the instant Section 2241 petition in January 2024. (See
generally Doc. 1). His petition is difficult to follow, but he appears to allege that
the BOP failed to properly calculate his earned time credits under the FSA. (See
id. at 2

,m 11-12).

Under Williams' calculations, he contends that he should have

been released in November 2022. (See id. at 21112).
Respondent timely responded to the Section 2241 petition. (See generally
Doc. 7). Williams did not file a traverse and the time for doing so has passed.
His Section 2241 petition , therefore, is ripe for disposition.
II.

DISCUSSION
Williams contends that the BOP miscalculated his FSA time credits.

Respondent counters that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
and that, even if he had properly exhausted his claim, his FSA credits have been
accurately computed. Respondent is correct on both accounts.

A.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Although there is no explicit statutory exhaustion requirement for Section
2241 habeas petitions, the United States Court .of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has consistently held that exhaustion applies to such claims. See Callwood v.
Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Schandelmeier v. Cunningham,
819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986)); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757,
760 (3d Cir. 1996). Exhaustion allows the relevant agency to develop a factual

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record and apply its expertise, conserves judicial resources, and provides
agencies the opportunity to "correct their own errors" thereby fostering
"administrative autonomy." Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761-62 (citations omitted). The
BOP has a specific internal system through which federal prisoners can request
review of nearly any aspect of their imprisonment. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§
542 .10-.19. That process begins with an informal request to staff and progresses
to formal review by the warden, appeal with the Regional Director, andultimately-final appeal to the General Counsel. See id. §§ 542.13-.15.
Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally
preclude federal habeas review. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761 . Only in rare
circumstances is exhaustion of administrative remedies not required . For
example, exhaustion is unnecessary if the issue presented is one that consists
purely of statutory construction . See Vasguez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshawv. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Exhaustion is likewise not required when it would be futile. Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982); see Cottillion v. United Refining Co. , 781 F.3d 47, 54
(3d Cir. 2015) (affirming , in ERISA context, futility exception to exhaustion
requirement). "In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion , a party must
'provide a clear and positive showing' of futility before the District Court." Wilson

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v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp.,
297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2002)).
The record plainly reflects that Williams did not exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to any FSA time-credit claim . To date, Williams has filed
two administrative remedies concerning FSA credits. The first remedy , 1119343,
was denied at the first-level appeal by the Regional Director in August 2022.
(See Doc. 7-4 at 2-3). Williams did not appeal that denial to the General Counsel
(sometimes referred to as "Central Office"). (See id.; see also Doc. 7-2 at 3 ,I 8).
Williams filed a second remedy, 1144837, on December 14, 2022. (See Doc. 7-4
at 4 ). That remedy was denied at initial review by the warden six days later.
(See id.) Williams did not appeal the warden 's denial to the Regional Director or
to the General Counsel. (See id. ; see also Doc. 7-2 at 3 ,i 8).
Proper exhaustion requires an inmate to complete each step of their
facility's grievance process and to do so properly so that the agency decides the
issue on the merits. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 , 90 (2006) (explaining
that proper administrative exhaustion "means using all steps that the agency
holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the
merits)" (citation omitted)). Williams' failure to do so precludes this Court from
ruling on the merits of his Section 2241 petition. See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 762 (3d Cir. 1996); Ryan v. United States, 415 F. App'x

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345, 347 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) ("As [Petitioner] readily acknowledges
that he failed to exhaust available administrative grievance processes, the
District Court was correct to dismiss his petition." (citing Moscato, 98 F.3d at
760)).

B.

Merits of FSA Claim

Even if Williams had exhausted his FSA challenge, it is likely meritless.
The BOP appears to have correctly calculated Williams' FSA time credits.
As Respondent points out, Williams has been afforded 365 days' credit
toward early placement into supervised release (the maximum amount allowed
by statute), and an additional 100 days' credit toward early placement in a
residential reentry center or home confinement. (See Doc. 7-2 at 3 ,I 9); 18
U.S.C. § 3624(9)(3). Williams began accruing FSA credits on April 20, 2021 , at a
rate of 10 days for every 30 days of successful FSA programming. (See Doc. 75 at 1); 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). After he received two assessments at a low
or minimum recidivism risk level, he began accruing time credits at a rate of 15
days of time credits for every 30 days of programming. (See Doc. 7-5 at 1); 18
U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii). Thus, the total amount of FSA time credits Williams
accrued is 465 days, which is the amount of credits he has been afforded by the
BOP. (See Doc. 7-2 at 3 ,I 9).

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Williams did not file a traverse to Respondent's answer to his petition, nor
did he provide a copy of any of his administrative remedies that would potentially
expound on why he believes that his FSA time cred its have been miscalculated.
Williams, therefore, has failed to identify any error with the BOP's calculations or
assert a specific argument regarding why he contends that he has earned more
FSA time credits than reflected in his records. No relief could be granted on such
a vague and conclusory habeas challenge.
Williams' petition may be liberally construed as arguing that he should have
immediately accrued time credits at a rate of 15 (rather than 10) days for every
30 days of successful FSA programming. (See Doc. 1 at 21112). If so, that
argument is meritless.
Williams did not immediately begin to accrue time credits at a rate of 15
days for every 30 days of successful FSA programming. Rather, that 5-day
increase did not occur until he had "2 consecutive assessments" during which he
did not increase his recidivism risk. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii). Indeed,
the plain language of the statute indicates that there are two prerequisites to
begin earning 15 days, rather than 10 days, of time credits per 30 days of
successful FSA programming. The prisoner must: (1) be determined by the BOP
to be at a "minimum" or "low" risk for recidivating, and (2) not have increased
their recidivism risk "over 2 consecutive assessments." See id. Only then can an

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eligible prisoner "earn" time credits at a rate of 15 days of credit for every 30 days
of successful programming. See id.; see also Khatiwala v. Rickard , No. 4:23-CV00327, 2023 WL 6143509, at *4-5 & n.50 (M .D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023) (Brann,
C.J.). This interpretation is bolstered by the corresponding agency regulations.
See 28 C.F.R. § 523.42(c); Khatiwala, 2023 WL 6143509, at *5 (noting that, even
if there were ambiguity in Section 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii), BOP's interpretation was not
unreasonable or impermissible (citing, inter a/ia, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 & n.11 (1984))).
In sum , because Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the
court must dismiss his Section 2241 petition. See Moscato, 98 F.3d at 762;
Ryan , 415 F. App'x at 347. Moreover, even if Williams had properly exhausted
his administrative remedies, it appears that his underlying claim is meritless.

Ill.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing , the Court will dismiss Williams' petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appropriate Order follows.