Conway v. Rivello et al
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Robert D Mariani on 1/27/2025. (cac)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHRISTOPHER CONWAY,
Plaintiff
Civil No. 3:24-cv-427
(Judge Mariani)
V.
SUPERINTENDENT RIVELLO, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Christopher Conway ("Conway"), an inmate housed, at all relevant times, at
the State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Huntingdon"),
commenced this prose civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 (Doc. 1). The
matter is proceeding via an amended complaint. (Doc. 12). Named as Defendants are
Superintendent Rivello, Captain Wendie, Correctional Officer Wakefield, Correctional Officer
Wennick, Correctional Officer Renninger2, and Correctional Officer Stoltzfus.
Conway is currently housed at the State Correctional Institution, Forest, Pennsylvania ("SCIForest"). (See Docs. 1, 12).
1
2
Conway spells this Defendant's name as "Renderger." In their filings, however, Defendants
identify this individual as "Renninger." (See Doc. 17). The Court will adopt Defendants' spelling as correct.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to partially dismiss the
amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 3 (Doc. 14). For
the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Allegations of the Amended Complaint
I.
On June 16, 2023, while housed at SCI-Huntingdon, Conway alleges that
Defendants Wakefield and Renninger placed him in cell G-D-1002. (Doc. 12 f 1). While
Defendants Wakefield and Renninger were escorting Conway to the cell, they allegedly told
him that another inmate recently smeared feces around the cell, and that inmates often
smeared feces in that cell. (Id. f 2). Conway refers to the cell as a "grind-up cell." (Id.).
Conway claims that Defendants Wakefield and Renninger told him that Defendants Rivello
and Wendie approved the use of the cell for inmates who file grievances and that the cell
was on a tier where the correctional officer he had filed grievances against worked. (Id.).
When Conway was placed in the cell, he allegedly asked Defendants Winnick and
Renninger, and other staff members, to remove him from the cell and he made gestures to
the cell camera. (Id. f 3). He avers that he was forced to eat in the cell and told
Defendants Winnick and Renninger that he was suicidal. (Id. f 4). Conway further avers
that despite his suicide threat, Defendants Winnick and Renninger laughed and ignored
Defendants assert that if their motion is granted, this action shall only proceed on the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim. (See Doc. 14-1).
3
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him. (Id.). Conway states that he subsequently fashioned a noose and hung himself. (Id.~
5). As a result, he allegedly suffered a heart attack and had to be hospitalized. (Id.).
Conway claims that Defendants Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello, Wendie, and Renninger
conspired to retaliate against him by placing him in the cell, ignoring his requests to be
moved, and ignoring his suicide threat. (Id.~ 6). Conway maintains that "[a]t no point was
[he] to be place[d] in a cell with fecal matter[,]" but, rather, "was supposed to be kept in the
strip cage until a bio hazard worker trained in cleaning body fluids cleaned said cell." (Id. ~
7). Because of his placement in the cell, Conway alleges that he was "put. .. in a paranoid
schizophrenic mind state, [which] cause[d] [him] to attempt suicide." (Id.).
Conway also alleges that he was retaliated against for a grievance he filed against
Defendant Stoltzfus. (Id. ~ 8). Conway asserts that Defendant Stoltzfus kicked an object on
the second tier of the prison on or about November 27, 20224, causing it to strike Conway's
right leg. (Id.). Conway states that he reported the resulting injury to a correctional officer
but was never treated. (Id.).
Conway seeks damages, court costs, reimbursement for postage and copies, and he
requests that Defendants be terminated from their employment. (Id. at p. 4).
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The amended complaint alleges that this incident occurred on September 27, 2022, (Doc. 12,
9); however, Conway's grievance and grievance appeals identify the date of the incident as November 27,
2022, (Doc. 23-2). The grievance itself is dated November 28, 2022. (Doc. 23-2). The Court assumes that
November 27, 2022 is the correct date of the incident.
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II.
Legal Standard
A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), if it
does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At/.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The
plaintiff must aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).
"Though a complaint 'does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."' De/Rio-Mocci v. Connolly Prop.
Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words,
"[nactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
Covington v. Int'/ Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 118 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A court "take[s] as true all the factual
allegations in the Complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
facts, but . .. disregard[s] legal conclusions and threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ethypharm S.A. France v.
Abbott Laboratories, 707 F.3d 223, 231, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
Twombly and Iqbal require [a district court] to take the following three steps to
determine the sufficiency of a complaint: First, the court must take note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
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entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013).
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). This "plausibility" determination will be a "context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
However, even "if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court
must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or
futile." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).
[E]ven when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a
defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment
would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she
has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.
Id.
Ill.
Discussion
A.
First Amendment Retaliation Claim
The First Amendment offers protection for a wide variety of expressive activities.
See U.S. CONST. amend I. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead that
(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) officials took an adverse action against the plaintiff;
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and (3) "a causal link" exists "between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the
adverse action taken against him." Rauser v. Horn , 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original));
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). "[A]n otherwise legitimate and
constitutional government act can become unconstitutional when an individual
demonstrates that it was undertaken in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment
speech." Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997).
An "adverse action" is one that would "deter a person of ordinary firmness" from
exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna,
203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). This is an objective inquiry. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d
352, 376 (3d Cir. 2012). "Government actions, which standing alone do not violate the
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a
desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right." Id. at 224 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The retaliatory conduct "need not be great in order to
be actionable" but must be "more than de minimus." McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d
Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Retaliatory motive can be inferred from either: "(1) an unusually suggestive temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of
antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link." Lauren W., 480 F.3d at 267.
"These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at
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as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d
271 , 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177
(3d Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff asserting retaliation "will have to show .. .that the decision maker
had knowledge of the protected activity[.]" Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331 , 351
(3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Conway alleges that Defendants5 retaliated against him by placing him in cell G-D1002 for filing a grievance against Defendant Stoltzfus. (Doc. 12, pp. 4-6).
Defendants contend that Conway has not plausibly alleged causation with respect to
his retaliation claim against Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield, Winnick, and Renninger. (Doc. 17,
pp. 6-9). They maintain that, while Conway filed a grievance against Stoltzfus in November
2022, this fact does not plausibly allege causation for Conway's retaliation claim against
Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield, Winnick, and Renninger.
The Court agrees. It is well-settled that causation cannot be inferred simply by
asserting that a plaintiff pursued some protected activity (such as a prison grievance)
against a Defendant who is not the alleged perpetrator of the retaliatory adverse action.
See, e.g., Nunez v. Wetzel, No. 1:21-cv-01484, 2023 WL 2385931 , at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6,
2023) (collecting cases); Kendrick v. Hann, No. 1:19-cv-01642, 2021 WL 2914986, at *9
(M.D. Pa. July 12, 2021); Victor v. Lawler, No. 3:07-cv-2058, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D.
5
Although not entirely clear, the amended complaint appears to lodge a retaliation claim against
Defendants Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield, Winnick, and Renninger. (Doc. 12 ~ 6).
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Pa. Dec. 3, 2010); Evans v. Rozum, No. 07-cv-230J, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa.
Dec. 17, 2009) ("[T]here is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to
retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a lawsuit against others." (second alteration in original));
Royster v. Beard, No. 1:06-cv-0842, 2008 WL 2914516, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2008)
(concluding that plaintiff failed to satisfy the causal connection for his retaliation claim
against defendant because previous grievance did not name or impact that defendant), aff'd
308 F. App'x 576 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential). Such general allegations fail to establish
or even infer knowledge of the protected conduct and they likewise fail to show why a
defendant would take the alleged adverse action. Conway's amended complaint lacks any
causal connection between his protected conduct and Defendants Rivello, Wendie,
Wakefield, Winnick, and Renninger.
Moreover, in his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Conway
clarifies that "since [he] ... engaged in protective activity[,] officer Stoltzfus subjected [him] to
ongoing retaliation due to Plaintiff utilizing the grievance system." (Doc. 23, p. 1; see a/so
Doc. 23-1 , p. 1). He appears to contend that he has plausibly alleged a pattern of
antagonism that demonstrates causation with respect to Stoltzfus. (Id.). The only
antagonistic incidents in Conway's amended complaint that predate the alleged retaliation
involve Defendant Stoltzfus. (Doc. 12 ~~ 6, 8). Thus, without plausibly pleading causation,
Conway's retaliation claims against Defendants Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield, Winnick, and
Renninger are fatally deficient and must be dismissed. However, in the event that Conway
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seeks to pursue a retaliation claim against Stoltzfus, the Court will grant him leave to amend
this claim.
B.
Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes
duties on prison officials to provide prisoners with the basic necessities of life, such as food,
clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). To show that
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff bears the burden of
proving two requirements: "(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, 'sufficiently
serious,"' resulting in the "denial of 'the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,"' and
"(2) the 'prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind."' Thomas v. Tice, 948
F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 299, 302-303 (1991) (cleaned up)); McClure v. Haste, 820 F. App'x 125, 128 (3d Cir.
2020) (nonprecedential). Only "extreme deprivations" are sufficient to present a claim for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Fantone v. Herbik, 528 F. App'x 123, 127 (3d
Cir. 2013) (nonprecedential) (quoting Hudson v. McMil/ian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)).
Conway alleges that Defendants Wakefield and Renninger placed him in a cell "that
a prisoner had recently smeared fecal matter all over the cell, [and] that this is a cell where
this conduct occurs frequently." (Doc. 12 ~ 2). Defendants argue that this claim must be
dismissed because Conway does not allege that he suffered harm as a result of this
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condition and because courts have found that exposure to similar conditions for longer
periods of time does not violate the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 17, pp. 9-12).
Conway complains that there was feces on the wall in his cell . (Doc. 12, 2; Doc.
23-3). Courts have held that an inmate's exposure to urine or feces in a cell does not
constitute a substantial risk of serious harm. See Gilb/om v. Gil/ipsie, 435 F. App'x 165, 169
(3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (denying conditions of confinement claim when inmate
spent approximately thirty-six hours in a cell with his own excrement). Although "likely
unpleasant and ... unsanitary," such conditions do not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Thomas, 948 F.3d at 139. Moreover, the duration of the conditions
"cannot be ignored in deciding whether such confinement meets constitutional standards."
Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Nyhius v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). The amended
complaint suggests that Conway was subjected to these conditions for a short duration of
time-for less than one hour on June 16, 2023. (Doc. 12, 1; Doc. 23-3, pp. 2, 5).
Exposure to unsanitary cell conditions for even longer durations of time have been found
not to present a substantial risk of serious harm. See, e.g., Gilb/om, 435 F. App'x at 169;
Edge v. Mahlman, 2021 WL 3725988, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2021 ), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 20113138 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022) ("It is wellestablished that the presence of some unsanitary conditions in a cell (including fecal matter)
does not establish an Eighth Amendment claim, except in circumstances where the volume
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of matter and duration of exposure are extreme."); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299,
1311-12 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that an eleven-day stay in unsanitary cell did not constitute
Eighth Amendment violation because duration was relatively brieD; White v. Nix, 7 F.3d 120,
121 (8th Cir. 1993) (eleven day stay in unsanitary cell not unconstitutional because of
relative brevity of stay and availability of cleaning supplies).
The Court next considers whether Conway has pied that he suffered any harm
because of the feces in his cell. Conway alleges that his placement in the cell "put [him] in a
paranoid schizophrenic mind state, and cause[d] [him] to attempt suicide." (Doc. 12, 7).
Conway created a noose, hung himself, suffered a heart attack, and was hospitalized. (Id. ,
5). Based on the pleadings, the Court finds that Conway has alleged an excessive risk to
his health or safety. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Shaffer, 411 F. App'x 466,468 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (concluding that whether plaintiff suffered harm was critical to determination
whether unsanitary conditions were unconstitutional). The Court, therefore, will deny
Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Conway's Eighth Amendment claim
concerning the conditions of his cell.
C.
Conspiracy Claim against Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello, Wendie, & Renninger
To demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him of a
constitutional right under color of law. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phi/a., 5 F.3d
685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.
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v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). The complaint must not plead merely a
"conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
A plaintiff must allege "facts that plausibly suggest a meeting of the minds" with specific
facts addressing "the approximate time when the agreement was made, the specific parties
to the agreement.. ., the period of the conspiracy, [and] the object of the conspiracy." Great
W Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010); see
also Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n. 16 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding conspiracy claims
based on plaintiff's subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation were properly
dismissed at screening).
Conway's amended complaint fails to meet the pleading standards for a civil
conspiracy claim. The conspiracy claim set forth in the amended complaint is speculative
and conclusory. (Doc. 12 ~ 6). Conway alleges that he "was placed in this cell as a
conspiracy to retaliate for plaintiff filing grievances." (Id.). In the absence of other wellpleaded factual assertions, Conway's conspiracy claim amounts to little more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, and, as
such, fails as a matter of law. See Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 2010).
Therefore, Conway's conspiracy claim, which is pied in a conclusory fashion without
supporting factual detail, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court
will dismiss the Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello,
Wendie, and Renninger without prejudice and with leave to amend.
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D.
Claim for Injunctive Relief
The case or controversy requirement of Article Ill, § 2 of the United States
Constitution subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Parties must
continue to have a "personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit." Lewis v. Continental
Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).
In other words, throughout the course of the action, the aggrieved party must suffer
or be threatened with actual injury caused by the defendant. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
Further, the adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon "the continuing existence of
a live and acute controversy." Steffel v. Thompson , 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). An "actual
controversy" must exist not only "at the time the complaint is filed ," but through "all stages"
of the litigation. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) ("To qualify as a case fit for
federal-court adjudication, 'an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed"' (quoting Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401)).
A case becomes moot-and therefore no longer a "Case" or "Controversy" for
purposes of Article III-"when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, (1982) (per
curiam) (some internal quotation marks omitted). No matter how vehemently the parties
continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit, the case is
moot if the dispute "is no longer embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs'
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particular legal rights." Alvarez, 558 U.S. at 93. A prisoner's transfer from the prison
complained of generally moots his claims for prospective injunctive relief. Sutton v.
Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[A] federal court has neither the power to
render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in
the case before them.") (quoting Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401 ); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson , 4 F.3d
195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993).
Conway's request for injunctive relief is specific to individuals employed at SCIHuntingdon. (Doc. 12, p. 4). This is problematic as Conway is no longer housed at that
institution. He has been transferred to SCI-Forest. In this instance, Conway's transfer to a
different facility renders his request for injunctive relief moot. Therefore, the claim for
injunctive relief will be dismissed.
E.
Official Capacity Claims
Lastly, Defendants argue that the claims against them in their official capacities must
be dismissed. (Doc. 17, pp. 15-16). Personal capacity suits under section 1983 seek to
recover money from a government official, as an individual, for acts performed under color
of state law. Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1988). Official capacity suits, in
contrast, generally represent an action against an entity of which the government official is
an agent. Id. ; see also Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978).
When suits are brought against state officials in their official capacities, those lawsuits are
treated as suits against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991 ). However, the
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, established by the Eleventh Amendment, protects states,
such as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from suits by citizens. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 , 117 (1984); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2000). That
immunity runs to state officials if they are sued in their official capacity and the state is the
real party upon which liability is sought. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).
Congress has not abrogated the immunity regarding Conway's claims, nor has
Pennsylvania waived this grant of immunity. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521(b). Thus, Conway's
section 1983 claim against the Defendants in their official capacities is barred by sovereign
immunity. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010). The
official capacity claims will be dismissed.
IV.
Leave to Amend
When a complaint fails to present a prima facie case of liability, district courts must
generally grant leave to amend before dismissing the complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d
Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has admonished that when a
complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, courts should liberally grant
leave to amend "unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile ." Phillips, 515
F.3d at 245 (citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)). The federal rules
allow for liberal amendments in light of the "principle that the purpose of pleading is to
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facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
The Court finds that the following claims are factually and legally flawed : the
retaliation claim against Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield , Winnick, and Renninger, the claim for
injunctive relief and the official capacity claims. Thus, the Court finds that granting leave to
amend these claims would be both futile and inequitable.
However, the Court finds that the pleading deficiencies of the retaliation claim
against Stoltzfus, and the conspiracy claim against Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello, Wendie,
and Renninger are largely factual in nature and thus conceivably could be cured by an
amended pleading. Therefore, the Court will grant Conway leave to amend the retaliation
claim against Stoltzfus and his conspiracy claim against Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello,
Wendie, and Renninger.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion (Doc. 14) to partially dismiss the
amended complaint will be granted in part and denied in part. The Court will grant
Defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim against Rivello, Wendie, Wakefield,
Winnick, and Renninger, the claim for injunctive relief, and the official capacity claims with
prejudice. The Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the retaliation claim against
Stoltzfus and the conspiracy claim against Wakefield, Winnick, Rivello, Wendie, and
Renninger without prejudice and with leave to amend.
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The Court will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss the conditions of confinement
claim.
A separate Order shall issue.
1ani
United States District Judge
Dated: January
;);J_,2025
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