Deitrick v. Costa et al
Filing
441
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 8/18/15. (km)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONNA DEITRICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK A. COSTA, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:06-CV-01556
(Judge Brann)
(Magistrate Judge Arbuckle)
MEMORANDUM
August 18, 2015
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Donna Deitrick’s Motion for
the Entrance of Final Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 436). Briefing has concluded,1 the Motion is ripe for
consideration and, for the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This matter comes before the Court as a result of the Court’s April 9, 2015
Order adopting Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle III’s Report and
Recommendation. (ECF No. 414). That Order granted judgment in favor of
Defendant Jane Acri and terminated her from the case. Id. After filing an appeal
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The Court notes that Ms. Deitrick filed her brief in support of the Motion nineteen days after
filing the Motion, well outside of the allowed fourteen days. Defendant Jane Acri filed a brief in
opposition on July 16, 2014. (ECF No. 438). Ms. Deitrick has filed no reply brief, and the time
to do so has now lapsed.
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on June 25, 2015,
Ms. Deitrick filed this Motion, seeking entrance of final judgment and a partial
stay of proceedings. (ECF No. 436).
II. DISCUSSION
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) provides that:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief--whether as a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim--or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only
if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. In entertaining a motion under Rule 54(b), the district court
acts “as a ‘dispatcher’” to determine “the ‘appropriate time’ when each final
decision in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey,
351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956)). The district court exercises its discretion “in the
interest of sound judicial administration.” Id. (quoting Mackey, 351 U.S. at 437).
A district court must balance “considerations of judicial administrative
interests (preservation of the federal policy against piecemeal appeals) and equities
(justice to the litigants).” Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 346 (3d Cir.
1999) (citing Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8). “Factors to be considered therefore
include ‘whether the claims under review [are] separable from the others remaining
to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined [is] such
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that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even
if there were subsequent appeals.’” Id. (alterations in original).
Exercising its discretion, this Court determines that there is just reason for
delay. The Court recognizes that there is some small risk of piecemeal litigation.
It is possible that, after denying Ms. Deitrick’s Rule 54(b) Motion, the remaining
parties will complete trial and thereafter, the Third Circuit may reverse this Court’s
grant of summary judgment and remand the case with instructions to reinstate Ms.
Acri as a defendant. In this situation, Ms. Deitrick would have to proceed in a
second trial. However, this possibility is outweighed by the prejudice that would
result to the Defendants if Ms. Deitrick’s Motion were granted, as well as the
detrimental effect that Rule 54(b) entry would have on judicial economy.
First, entering final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) and granting a partial
stay of proceedings would force this case to a grinding halt. It appears likely that
this case will proceed to trial relatively soon, and prior to the issuance of any
decision by the Third Circuit on the merits of Ms. Deitrick’s appeal. This means
that, to avoid two trials, this matter would need to be delayed. With significant
assistance from Magistrate Judge Arbuckle, this Court has endeavored for the past
two and one-half years to push this case back on track toward a timely conclusion.
This action has now passed its ninth year in the Middle District of Pennsylvania
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without conclusion, and the Court will not allow it to drag on for an additional nine
years without resolution.
Second, it is apparent that significant prejudice would befall Ms. Acri if the
Court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). Bearing in mind the
possibility that she may be reinstated as a defendant in this case, Ms. Acri would
likely need to prepare for trial in order to account for the possibility that she may
once again be added as a defendant. This would entail the expenditure of
significant time and money in preparation for an event that may well never occur.
Finally, granting Ms. Deitrick’s Motion would prejudice several other
Defendants. Following her dismissal from the case, Ms. Acri, without objection
from Ms. Deitrick, entered her appearance as the attorney of record for Defendants
Linda Long, Vanessa (Long) Yoncuski, and Robert Yoncuski (collectively the
“Long/Yoncuski Defendants”). (ECF No. 419). Previous counsel for the
Long/Yoncuski Defendants withdrew from the case without objection from Ms.
Deitrick. (ECF No. 432). Granting Ms. Deitrick’s Motion would again raise the
specter of Ms. Acri being called as a material witness in the case. This possibility
would force Ms. Acri to withdraw as counsel for the Long/Yoncuski Defendants,
which would in turn force the Long/Yoncuski Defendants to find replacement
counsel. More time and money would be expended for replacement counsel to
reacquaint himself with the case (assuming the Long/Yoncuski Defendants’ former
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counsel would be willing to reenter the case). Consequently, the Court concludes
that a balance of the equities militates against granting Ms. Deitrick’s Motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
After balancing the aforementioned factors, the Court determines that just
reason for delay exists. Therefore, Ms. Deitrick’s Motion for the Entrance of Final
Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is denied.
An appropriate Order will follow.
BY THE COURT:
/s Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
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