Surine v. Edgcomb et al

Filing 123

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting GRANTING deft PSP troopers' MSJ 109 , GRANTING summ jdgmt on behalf of other remaining defts, sua sponte, on all of Surine's claims, DISMISSING claims to extent Surine asserts state law claims w/out prejudice, directing Clrk of Ct to enter JUDGMENT in favor of defts & to CLOSE case. (See memo & order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 01/19/12. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL SURINE,
Plaintiff
v.
STATE POLICE EMERGENCY
RESPONSE TEAM; NICHOLAS
MADIGAN; MICHAEL CLEGG;
CHRISTOPHER WHEELER;
SCOTT HENRY; MIKE SNYDER;
UNKNOWN CLARK; UNKNOWN
FRIZT; UNKNOWN BEDELL;
UNKNOWN DIAZ
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:08-CV-1921
(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
This is a civil rights action filed by pro se plaintiff Paul Surine (“Surine”).
Presently before the court is the motion (Doc. 109) for summary judgment filed by
defendants Nicholas Madigan, Michael Clegg, Christopher Wheeler, Scott Henry,
and Bedell (the “PSP troopers”) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court will also address sua sponte whether the other remaining
defendants—the State Police Emergency Response Team, Mike Snyder, Clark,
Fritz, and Diaz (the “other remaining defendants”)—are entitled to summary

judgment on Surine’s claims.1 For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the
PSP Troopers’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety and grant summary
judgment for the other remaining defendants on all federal claims.2

1

A court may grant summary judgment sua sponte if it provides the party
against whom judgment will be entered notice and an opportunity to come forward
with all of its evidence. See Gibson v. Mayor and Council of City of Wilmington, 355
F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)).
On October 28, 2011, the court provided Surine with notice that it would address
sua sponte whether the other remaining defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on all pending claims (see Doc. 114). The court allotted Surine fourteen
days to present any additional evidence relevant to his claims against the other
remaining defendants. (Id.) On November 16, 2011, the court granted Surine an
additional thirty days. (Doc. 116). To date, Surine has not responded to the court’s
order or requested an enlargement of time.
On December 17, 2011, after the deadline for Surine to file additional
evidence with the court, Surine appealed (Doc. 121) the court’s order (Doc. 118)
dated December 13, 2011, denying Surine’s motion (Doc. 117) to compel discovery.
The court denied Surine’s motion to compel discovery because Surine did not
request an enlargement of time to conduct discovery prior to the discovery deadline
of April 15, 2011, nor demonstrated good cause for the delay. (See Doc. 118).
Normally, the filing of a notice of appeal “divests the district court of its control over
. . . the case.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58-59, 103 S.Ct.
400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam). However, a district court may continue to
exercise authority over a case after the filing of a notice of appeal when the notice of
appeal relates to a non-appealable order or judgment. Mondrow v. Fountain House,
867 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[A] premature notice of appeal does not divest the
district court of jurisdiction.”). In the case sub judice, Surine’s notice of appeal
relates to a non-appealable discovery order. Therefore, the court retains
jurisdiction of the above-captioned matter.
2

To the extent Surine’s allegations can be construed as state law claims, the
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in light of the dismissal of all
federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Borough of West Mifflin v.
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
2

I.

Factual Background and Procedural History
A.

Factual Background

Nicolas Madigan (“Trooper Madigan”) is a Pennsylvania State Police
Trooper who has been assigned to the Narcotics Unit of Troop F since 1997. (Doc.
110 ¶¶ 2, 3). While investigating the sale of controlled substances in Tioga County,
Pennsylvania, in 2006-2007, Trooper Madigan learned that Surine and Lisa
Lehman-Curry (“Lehman”) were selling controlled substances at Surine’s
residence—RD. #1, Box 44, Elkland, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 3). Trooper Madigan
obtained this information primarily through confidential informants who
purchased cocaine from Surine.3 (Id. ¶ 4). The informants had provided reliable
information in the past, were registered as confidential informants with the
Pennsylvania State Police, and in some cases were observed entering the Surine
residence and returning with cocaine. (Id. ¶ 5). Trooper Madigan purchased the
cocaine from the confidential informants. (Id. ¶ 6).
On January 31, 2007, Trooper Madigan applied for search warrant in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 8). A Magisterial District Judge, the
Honorable Judge Brian Edgcomb (“Judge Edgcomb”), reviewed the search warrant
application and affidavit of probable cause. (See Doc. 110-1, Ex. A). Judge
Edgcomb approved the issuance of the warrant to search Surine’s residence and
any person located therein for specified items. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 8, 9, 10; Doc. 110-1, Ex.

3

Trooper Madigan also directly bought cocaine from other individuals
located at the Surine residence. (Id. ¶ 4).
3

A). On February 1, 2007, the Pennsylvania State Police’s Special Emergency
Response Team executed the warrant at Surine’s residence, secured the property,
and took Surine, Lehman, and Sonny Surine (“Sonny”) into custody. (Doc. 110 ¶
11, 13). The PSP troopers were not members of the State Emergency Response
Team. (Id. ¶ 12). After the State Emergency Response Team secured the area,
numerous state and federal law enforcement officials conducted a search and
seized hundreds of items. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15).
On June 26, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Surine. (Id. ¶ 17). The grand
jury issued a superseding indictment on September 27, 2007, charging Surine with,
inter alia, conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. (Id. ¶ 18). On May 30, 2008, Surine pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances. (Id. ¶ 19). On August 5, 2009, United States District Judge
James F. McClure sentenced Surine to 360 months of imprisonment. (Id. ¶ 21).
Surine appealed the sentence, and on April 13, 2010, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment. (Id. ¶ 22).
B.

Procedural History

Surine filed his initial complaint (Doc. 1) pro se4 on October 20, 2008, and an
amended complaint (Doc. 58) on May 4, 2009, alleging civil rights violations against

4

On January 29, 2009, the court conditionally granted Surine’s motion to
appoint counsel. (Doc. 49). However, the court’s pro bono program was
unsuccessful in its efforts to secure pro bono counsel for Surine. (Doc. 55).
4

the PSP troopers and the other remaining defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5
Specifically, Surine seeks relief for:
an illegal search and seizure conspiracy, breaking and entering
conspiracy, forced entry conspiracy, aggrivated [sic] assalt [sic],
excesive [sic] force, theft conspiracy, wrongful imprisonment, purjury
[sic] and defamation of character when the Defendants raided [his]
home at RD #1 Box 44 Elkland PA 16920 on February 1st 2007 at 6:45
AM.
(Doc. 58, at 1). Additionally, Surine alleges “malicious abuse of due process”
against Trooper Madigan. (Id. at 2). The PSP troopers filed the instant motion
(Doc. 109) for summary judgment on June 6, 2011, on all of Surine’s claims.6 The
motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (See Docs. 111, 112).
II.

Standard of Review
Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do

not present a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial
would be an empty and unnecessary formality. See FED . R. CIV . P. 56(a). Once the
moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the
burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence,

5

Surine also asserted claims against Judge Edgcomb, Tom Young, George
Wheeler, Agent O’Dell, Agent O’Malley, and Attorney Scott Gardner, which were
previously dismissed by the court. (See Docs. 77, 78, 80, 81, 89).
6

The PSP troopers’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment
did not discuss Surine’s aggravated assault and malicious abuse of due process
claims. (See Doc. 110). However, the PSP troopers moved for summary judgment
on all Surine’s claims and the court provided Surine with notice that it would
consider granting summary judgment on his aggravated assault and malicious
abuse of due process claims. (See Docs. 109, 114).
5

beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. Pappas v.
City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of
law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the non-moving party on the claims. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986); see also FED . R. CIV . P. 56(a).
Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. Pappas, 331 F. Supp.
2d at 315.
III.

Discussion
The court will first address whether the favorable termination rule

articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Surine’s claims.
Concluding that it does not, the court will then address whether the PSP troopers
and other remaining defendants are otherwise entitled to summary judgment on
Surine’s claims.
A.

Application of Heck v. Humphrey

The PSP troopers contend that Surine’s claims relating to the search of his
home, his arrest, and his subsequent prosecution are barred by Heck’s favorable
termination rule. (Doc. 111, at 5-8). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
6

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). In the Third Circuit, district
courts must conduct a fact-based inquiry to determine whether a claim “necessarily
implies” the invalidity of the underlying conviction. Gibson v. Superintendent, N.J.
Dep’t of Law and Public Safety, 411 F.3d 427, 450 (3d Cir. 2005) overruled on other
grounds by Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
The court, out of an abundance of caution, will not bar any of Surine’s claims
under Heck’s favorable termination rule. Surine pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (a)(1). It
appears from the record and the nature of the charges that Surine’s guilty plea
most likely derived primarily from Trooper Madigan’s investigation and the
subsequent search and seizure of hundreds of items from his residence on February
1, 2007.7 However, the parties failed to provide a list of the items seized from
Surine’s residence and a review of the transcript of Surine’s plea colloquy indicates
the government may have had other evidence available to prove that Surine
conspired to distribute controlled substances. (Doc. 110-1, Ex. B, at 23). The court
will therefore refrain from applying Heck’s favorable termination rule.

7

That Surine’s guilty plea likely derived from the search and seizure of his
residence on February 1, 2007 is also evident by the fact that Surine moved to
withdraw his guilty plea in part because his counsel did not file a motion to
suppress. See United States v. Surine, 375 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
7

B.

Surine’s Claims
1.

Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Claims

The court construes seven of Surine’ claims as Fourth Amendment illegal
and search and seizure claims: (1) illegal search and seizure conspiracy; (2)
breaking and entering conspiracy; (3) forced entry conspiracy; (4) theft conspiracy;
(5) aggravated assault; (6) excessive force; and (7) wrongful imprisonment. (Doc. 58,
at 2). Surine’s claims relate to the issuance of the search warrant, the execution of
the search warrant, and his arrest. The court will address each seriatim.
a.

Issuance of the Search Warrant

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Surine alleges that Trooper Madigan made false
statements on the affidavit of probable cause attached to the search warrant issued
by Judge Edgcomb on January 31, 2007. (See Doc. 58, at 9).
To establish a Fourth Amendment claim against Trooper Madigan, Surine
must proffer affirmative evidence that Trooper Madigan either knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth included materially false
statements or omissions in the affidavit of probable cause. Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)). Surine has proffered no affirmative evidence that Trooper
Madigan knowingly and deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made
false statements or material omissions in the affidavit of probable cause. See
8

Woods v. Grant, 381 F. App’x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s
order granting summary judgment when the plaintiff “failed to set forth any
evidence showing that Defendants ‘knowingly and deliberately’ or ‘with a reckless
disregard for the truth” falsified a statement in order to procure’ a search warrant).
Corneal v. Jackson Twp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (“[T]he
non-moving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its
complaint.”). Accordingly, Trooper Madigan is entitled to summary judgment on
Surine’s Franks claim.
b.

Execution of the Search Warrant

To the extent Surine attempts to assert Fourth Amendment claims against
the PSP troopers and remaining defendants for executing an improperly issued
warrant, his claim fails as a matter of law. Trooper Madigan’s detailed
affidavit—describing numerous confirmed drug buys by reliable confidential
informants at Surine’s residence, corroborated by independent testing and his own
personal observations—establishes probable cause as a matter of law.8 See
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that a court may

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Surine only specifically alleges that the last paragraph of the search
warrant contains a false statement. (See, Doc. 58, at 9; Doc. 112, at 2). Assuming
arguendo that his conclusory allegation in the amended complaint and brief in
opposition could establish a violation of Franks, Surine would still need to prove
that the false statement was material to the original probable cause finding.
Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 400. Surine cannot meet this burden because Trooper
Madigan’s affidavit describes numerous undisputed controlled buys which easily
establish probable cause to search Surine’s residence for the items specified in
Attachment A. (Doc. 110-1, Ex. A).
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conclude in the appropriate case that probable cause exists as matter law “if the
evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a
contrary factual finding”); (Doc. 110, Ex. A). Next, the warrant describes with
particularity the items to be searched and seized, and it is tailored to the probable
cause established in Trooper Madigan’s affidavit. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); (Doc. 110-1, Ex.
A). Finally, the Application for the Search Warrant and Authorization with an
attached affidavit signed by Trooper Madigan contains Judge Edgcomb’s signature
verifying that Trooper Madigan was duly sworn (or affirmed) before the issuing
authority according to the law.9 (Doc. 110-1, Ex. A). The warrant signed by Judge
Edgcomb states, “WHEREAS, facts have been sworn to or affirmed before me by
written affidavit(s) attached hereto from which I have found probable cause.” (Id.).
Thus, Judge Edgcomb properly issued the search warrant under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Next, Surine contends that the PSP troopers and remaining defendants
improperly executed the search warrant by failing to comply with the knock and
announce rule, using excessive force, and not providing him with a copy of the
warrant prior to the search. (See Doc. 58, 112). Surine has failed to come forth with
any affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings, to connect any of

9

There is no federal constitutional requirement that an affidavit of probable
cause be properly signed, dated, or sealed by the judge who issues the search
warrant. U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
10

the defendants except the State Emergency Response Team to the initial execution
of the warrant and his subsequent arrest. (Doc. 110-1, ¶¶ 10-12). Liability in a civil
rights action cannot “be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). A
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs through either evidence of “personal direction or [] actual
knowledge and acquiescence.” Id. In the instant case, Surine has not proffered a
scintilla of evidence that any of the defendants had actual knowledge and
acquiesced to the alleged wrongs committed by the State Emergency Response
Team.10 (Doc. 110 ¶ 9); Pappas, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 315. Furthermore, Surine cannot
bring a § 1983 damages action against the State Emergency Response Team
because it is a state entity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989) (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities
are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). To the extent Surine requests injunctive relief
against the State Emergency Response Team, his claim is barred by the Eleventh

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It appears that Surine has not conducted any discovery during the three
year pendency of his case. Surine only requested the court’s assistance in obtaining
purportedly relevant documents seven months after the close discovery. (Doc. 103;
Doc. 117). Furthermore, even Surine’s allegations in the amended complaint fail to
demonstrate he has personal knowledge regarding the identities of the members of
the State Emergency Response Team. (See Doc. 58).
11

Amendment to the United States Constitution.11 U.S. CONST . amend. XI. Benn v.
First Judicial District, 426 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2005).
c.

Surine’s Arrest

Finally, Surine alleges that he was wrongfully imprisoned because he was
arrested without probable cause. (Id. at 2, 12). Surine, however, has not linked any
of the defendants to his initial arrest during the execution of the search warrant by
the State Emergency Response Team. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; (Doc. 110-1, ¶
12). Furthermore, Surine has presented no affirmative evidence that Trooper
Madigan “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth,
made false statements or omissions . . . that created a falsehood in applying for an
arrest warrant” later that day. Merkle v. Upper Dublin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782,
789 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the PSP troopers and other remaining defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on Surine’s Fourth Amendment claims.
2.

Perjury Claim12

Surine alleges that PSP troopers and other remaining defendants committed
perjury “for statements that were published” which the court construes as a
Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of due process claim. (Doc. 58, at 2); See Ali v.

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For identical reasons, the State Emergency Response Team is entitled to
summary judgment on all of Surine’s remaining claims.
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It is not entirely clear whether Surine brings his perjury claim against the
PSP troopers and the other remaining defendants or only Trooper Madigan and a
previously dismissed defendant, Scott Gardner. The court will construe the claim
liberally as applying to all of the PSP troopers and the other remaining defendants.
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Person, 904 F.Supp. 375, 377 (D.N.J. 1995) (construing allegations of perjury as a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim). These allegations appear to refer to
statements published in a local newspaper about Surine shortly after his arrest.
(See id. at 16-17). These statements cannot constitute perjury because they were not
made under oath.13 BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Defining perjury as
“[t]he act or an instance of a person’s deliberately making material false or
misleading statements while under oath”). Accordingly, the court will grant the PSP
troopers and the other remaining defendants summary judgment on this claim.
3.

Malicious Prosecution Claim

Next, Surine alleges “malicious abuse of due process” against Trooper
Madigan which the court construes as a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.14
(Doc. 58, at 2). To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must
prove that “(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without
probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty

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Assuming arguendo Surine’s perjury claim refers to statements included
either in the search warrant or arrest warrant, Surine’s claim still fails as a matter
of law. As discussed above, there is no evidence that Trooper Madigan knowingly
and deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth made material false
statements or omissions to Judge Edgcomb in his applications for the warrants.
Merkle, 211 F.2d at 789.
14

Surine also alleges Trooper Madigan “put his police power to malicious
and malice acts [sic] by targeting me as a drug king pin . . . .” (Id. at 3). The court
construes this allegation as overlapping with Surine’s malicious prosecution claim.
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consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Trooper Madigan is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Surine’s
criminal proceeding ended with Surine’s guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances. (Doc. 110 ¶ 19).
4.

Defamation Claim

Finally, Surine alleges that the PSP troopers and the other remaining
defendants defamed his character by making false statements about him in a
newspaper article. The court construes the claim as a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation. (See Doc. 58, at 3,
16-17). Damage to reputation alone is insufficient to establish a § 1983 due process
claim. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976). Rather, a plaintiff must
demonstrate “a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or
interest” previously recognized under state law. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549
F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1987). In
the instant case, Surine cannot meet the “stigma plus” because he cannot show the
deprivation of any additional right or interest. Paul, 835 F.2d at 711-12.
Furthermore, Surine has not proffered any evidence specifically identifying any of
the PSP troopers or the other remaining defendants as the source of the alleged
defamatory statements in the newspaper article or that they had actual knowledge
and acquiesced to the alleged wrong. 42 PA . CON . STAT . § 8343 (stating that
defamation under Pennsylvania law requires publication by the defendant); Rode,
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845 F.2d at 1207. Accordingly, the PSP troopers and the other remaining
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Surine’s defamation claim.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated in the above memorandum, the court will grant the

PSP troopers’ motion. The court will also sua sponte grant summary judgment for
the other remaining defendants on all federal claims. To the extent Surine is
asserting state law claims, the court will decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
An appropriate order follows.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge

Dated:

January 19, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL SURINE,
Plaintiff
v.
STATE POLICE EMERGENCY
RESPONSE TEAM; NICHOLAS
MADIGAN; MICHAEL CLEGG;
CHRISTOPHER WHEELER;
SCOTT HENRY; MIKE SNYDER;
UNKNOWN CLARK; UNKNOWN
FRIZT; UNKNOWN BEDELL;
UNKNOWN DIAZ
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:08-CV-1921
(Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of January, 2012, upon consideration of the motion
for summary judgment (Doc. 109) filed by defendants Nicholas Madigan, Michael
Clegg, Christopher Wheeler, Scott Henry, and Bedell (the “PSP troopers”), and
plaintiff Paul Surine’s (“Surine”) pending claims against the other remaining
defendants—the State Police Emergency Response Team, Mike Snyder, Clark,
Fritz, and Diaz (the “other remaining defendants”)—and for the reasons set forth in
the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

The motion (Doc. 109) for summary judgment filed by the PSP
troopers is GRANTED.

2.

The other remaining defendants are GRANTED summary judgment
sua sponte on all of Surine’s claims.

3.

To the extent Surine asserts state law claims, the claims are
DISMISSED without prejudice.

4.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of
defendants.

5.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge