Richards v. Centre County Transportation Authority

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 40 MOTION for Relief from Judgment filed by Billie Joe Richards. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 3/7/2017. (jn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
CENTRE AREA TRANSPORTATION:
AUTHORITY, INC.,2
:
:
Defendant.
:
BILLIE JO RICHARDS,1

4:08-CV-01947
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
March 7, 2017
Before the Court for disposition is Plaintiff Billie Jo Richards’s Motion
for Relief from Judgment. For the following reasons, Richards’s Motion is
denied.

Although one docket caption spells Plaintiff’s middle name with an “e,”
2 Although the docket caption titles Defendant, “Centre County
Transportation Authority,” all parties agree that it is “Centre Area
Transportation Authority.”
1

1

I.

BACKGROUND
In October 2008, Plaintiff Billie Jo Richards (“Richards”), filed a suit

with the aid of counsel against her former employer, Defendant Centre
Area Transportation Authority (“CATA”), and alleged retaliatory
discharge after filing a sexual harassment complaint in 2007.3 In 2010, this
Court granted CATA’s motion for summary judgment based on Richards’s
failure to establish pretext as the reason for her discharge from CATA.4
Richards subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, which affirmed this determination in 2011.5 The Third
Circuit’s plenary review concluded that Richards failed to point to
anything “in the record that would support an inference that the reasons
proffered by CATA were [pretextual].”6

ECF No. 1 at ¶ 30.
ECF No. 24 at 23.
5 ECF No. 26.
6 Richards v. Centre Area Transp. Authority, 414 Fed.Appx. 501, 504 (3d Cir.
2011).
3
4

2

Two years later, in 2013, Richards, now without the aid of counsel,
filed to reopen the matter7 and alleged that she possessed newly discovered
evidence.8 This Court, however, found that Richards’s motion was
untimely because it was filed three years after final judgment was entered
and more than two years after that judgment was affirmed by the Third
Circuit.9
Moreover, I also concluded that the new evidence would not have
changed the grant of CATA’s motion for summary judgment.10 I reasoned
that the comparator who allegedly permitted an inference of retaliatory
termination was not “similarly situated” to Richards in “all relevant
respects.”11 Accordingly, in May 2013, this Court denied Richards’s motion
to reopen the matter.12 Richards, then, in forma pauperis, appealed again to
the Third Circuit.

ECF No. 30.
8 ECF No. 33 at 1.
9
Id. at 1-2.
10 Id. at 1-2.
11 Id. at 3 (quoting Wilcher v. Postmaster Gen., 441 Fed.Appx. 879, 882-83 (3d.
Cir. 2011)).
12 Id. at 6.
7

3

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit agreed that
the motion was untimely and, therefore, precluded any consideration of
newly discovered evidence.13
Notwithstanding the untimeliness of Richards’s motion, the Third
Circuit also addressed the substantive reasons as to why her newly
discovered evidence argument was without merit. First, the Third Circuit
found that Richards failed to explain “when or how she received the ‘new
evidence’ she wishe[d] to use.”14 Richards never explicitly stated whether
this new evidence was provided in discovery.15 Second, Richards never
explained why, since she had been represented by counsel at the time, that
the new evidence would not have been discoverable when first litigated.16
Third, the Third Circuit agreed with this Court that “the proposed
evidence would not have changed the outcome of the original litigation”
because the “alleged comparator” did not engage in “similarly situated”

Richards v. Centre County Transp. Authority, 540 Fed.Appx. 83, 85 (3d Cir.
2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), 60(c)(1).
14 Id. at 85.
15 Id.
16 Id.
13

4

misconduct.17 Lastly, Richards misunderstood the allegation of fraud and
pretextual termination; therefore, Richards’s fraud claim was without merit
because she failed to provide evidence that information concerning the
“alleged comparator” was wrongfully withheld from her.18
Three years later, in October 2016, Richards, again pro se, filed yet
another Motion for Relief from Judgment, the contentions in which are the
subject of the instant Memorandum Opinion.19 In this motion, Richards
argues that the judgment in favor of CATA should be reopened based on
the doctrine of equitable tolling and, again, newly discovered evidence.20
CATA, in turn, moves to dismiss Richards’s motion, arguing that the issues
Richards raises in the instant matter are the same issues previously
adjudicated by both this Court and the Third Circuit, and which both were
“summarily dismissed.”21 Richards’s Motion for Relief from Judgment is
now ripe for disposition.

Id.
Id. at 86.
19 ECF No. 40.
20 ECF No. 43 at 5-6.
21 ECF No. 44 at 1.
17
18

5

II.

DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a party relief from a

final judgment or order “under a limited set of circumstances including
fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.”22 In particular, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(2) permits relief when “newly discovered evidence, with
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered” before summary
judgment was granted.23 Newly discovered evidence “refers to evidence of
facts in existence at the time of [summary judgment] of which the
aggrieved party was excusably ignorant.”24 A party is entitled to relief only
if the newly discovered “evidence is (1) material and not merely
cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered prior to trial through the

Taylor v. Wetzel, Civ. No. 4:CV-04-553, 2014 WL 5242076, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 15, 2014) (citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528, 125 S.Ct. 2461
(2005)).
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
24 Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing U.S. v. 27.93 Acres of
Land, More or Less, Situate in Cumberland County, Com. of PA Tract No. 36407, 924 F.2d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 1991)).
22

6

exercise of reasonable diligence, and (3) would probably have changed the
outcome of the [motion].”25
To satisfy a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, the movant “bears a heavy
burden”26 and must show more than the “potential significance of the new
evidence.”27 The Third Circuit views Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motions “as
extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary
justifying circumstances are present.”28 Despite the movant’s heavy
burden, the movant nonetheless is governed by the timing requirement of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), which provides that the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
must be made “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or
order or the date of the proceeding.”29
a. Equitable Tolling

Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930 (citing Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d
Cir. 1983)).
26 Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930 (citing Plisco v. Union R. Co., 379 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir.
1967)).
27 Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930 (citing Plisco, 379 F.2d at 16).
28 Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930 (citing Plisco, 379 F.2d at 16).
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
25

7

In Richards’s instant Motion for Relief from Judgment, she alleges
that equitable tolling is applicable because her severe mental impairments
constitute extraordinary circumstances, and, therefore, prevented her from
timely filing this Motion.30 The Third Circuit “has noted three
circumstances in which equitable tolling is appropriate”:
(1) [W]here a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with
respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been
prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other
extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts
her claims in a timely matter but has done so in the wrong
forum.31
The Third Circuit also has noted that equitable tolling “should be used
sparingly, only when the principle of equity would make the rigid
application of a limitation period unfair.”32 In addition, the United States
“Supreme Court has stated that equitable tolling requires the movant to
bear the burden of “establishing two elements: ‘(1) that he has been

ECF No. 40 at 8-9.
Bennet v. Susquehanna County Children & Youth Services, 592 Fed.Appx. 81,
83 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000)).
32 Griffin v. Penna, Civ. No. 10-4570, 2012 WL 3205482, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June
14, 2012) (citing Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003)).
30
31

8

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”33
Mental incompetency, alone, “is not a per se reason to toll a statute of
limitations.”34 Therefore, to establish mental impairment as an
extraordinary circumstance, the movant must “demonstrate with
particularized description the causal relationship between the mental
deficiency and the failure to timely file the [motion].”35 The Eastern District
of Pennsylvania explained the relationship between the severity of the
mental impairment and its affect on filing timely as such: “[A] mental
condition that burdens but does not prevent a [movant] from filing a timely
petition does not constitute ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying
equitable tolling.”36 Moreover, equitable tolling should only apply to a

Griffin, 2012 WL 3205482 at *5 (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 633,
130 S.Ct. 2549 (2010)).
34 Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001).
35 Champney v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 469 Fed.Appx. 113,
117 (3d Cir. 2012).
36 U.S. v. Harris, 268 F.Supp.2d 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
33

9

statute of limitations when it “is demanded by sound legal principles as
well as interests of justice.”37
In deciding whether equitable tolling should be applied, the Third
Circuit in Harris evaluated the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether the petitioner’s mental incompetence affected his ability to file a
timely action; thus, the court considered the following non-exclusive
factors:
(1) [W]hether the [movant] was adjudicated incompetent and, if
so, when did the adjudication occur . . . ; (2) [whether] the
[movant] [was] institutionalized for his mental impairment; (3)
[whether] the [movant] handled or assisted in other legal
matters which required action during the federal limitations
period; and (4) [whether] the [movant] supported his
allegations of impairment with extrinsic evidence such as
evaluations and/or medications.38
In Harris, the Court reasoned that petitioner’s mental impairments
did not constitute extraordinary relief to justify equitable tolling because
the petitioner had neither been institutionalized nor adjudicated

Griffin, 2012 WL 3205482 at *5 (citing Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
38 Id. at 117-18 (citing Passmore v. Pennsyvlania, No. 08-705, 2008 WL
2518108, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 19, 2008)).
37

10

incompetent for his alleged mental impairments.39 Although petitioner
supplied evidence of his mental health evaluations, both the countervailing
evidence presented by the Commonwealth coupled with the petitioner’s
“participation in court proceedings over an extended period of time
compel[led] the conclusion that the extraordinary remedy of equitable
tolling” was not warranted.40
Here, Richards’s Motion raises similar issues. First, Richards neither
was adjudicated mentally incompetent nor institutionalized for her
impairment during the one-year period in which to file an appeal. Second,
although Richards provided mental health evaluations with her Motion,
she does not “demonstrate with particularized description the causal
relationship between the mental deficiency and the failure to timely file the
[motion].”41 Richards does in fact provide extrinsic evidence of her medical
evaluations; however, Richards only relies on her mental impairments as a
per se justification for equitable tolling, which does not establish with
Champney, 469 Fed.Appx. 118.
Id.
41 Id. at 117.
39
40

11

particularized specificity the causal relationship between her impairments
and her inability to file a timely motion.
Moreover, during Richards’s original claim against CATA, she was
represented by counsel and timely filed all appeals. Thus, despite
Richards’s contention that she suffered an extraordinary circumstance due
to her mental impairment, her original claim, with the aid of counsel,
proceeded on an ordinary schedule of a suit in federal court and a timely
appeal thereafter. Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances reveals
that Richards was neither prevented on her first appeal nor her first motion
for reconsideration from asserting her claim.
Lastly, Richards’s argument is contrary to the interests of justice. This
regrettable Motion is yet another attempt for this Court to review her
previously adjudicated matters. Although this Court dismissed Richards’s
first motion for reconsideration due to timeliness, the Third Circuit
nonetheless reviewed her motion on its merits. Finding no dispute of law,
the Third Circuit affirmed this Court. Thus, Richards’s argument for
equitable tolling on the ground of mental impairment fails the totality of

12

the circumstances test and is contrary to the interests of justice because she
already was given an unwarranted determination on the merits of her
claim.
b. Newly Discovered Evidence
Richards next argues that she recently has obtained newly discovered
evidence from a comparator, which demonstrates that CATA’s proffered
reasons for termination were pretextual.42 Newly discovered evidence is
facts that existed at the time of summary judgment, but of which the
“aggrieved party was excusably ignorant.”43 For Richards to satisfy the
standard of relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), she bears a heavy burden44
in showing “that the new evidence (1) be material and not merely
cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered before trial through the
exercise of reasonable diligence[,] and (3) would probably have changed
the outcome of the trial.”45

Br. of Pl. at 12.
Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930.
44 Compass Technology, Inc. v. Tseng Laboratories, Inc., 71 F.3d 1125, 1130 (3d
Cir. 1995).
45
Id.; see Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930.
42
43

13

Specifically, Richards alleges that the newly discovered evidence only
came to her knowledge “just prior” to her first Motion for Relief from
Judgment in February 2013.46 Richards admits that she was unaware what
her counsel specifically requested in discovery, but did admit that her
counsel “did propound reasonably thorough discovery requests.”47
Richards, however, alleges that her counsel “did not seek information
regarding reinstatements of discharged CATA employees.”48
The Third Circuit, in September 2013, concluded that Richards’s
newly discovered evidence argument would not prevail even if it were
filed timely.49 First, the Third Circuit found that Richards both failed to
state when or how she received the information, and failed to state “that
this evidence was not provided in discovery during the case.”50 Second, the
Third Circuit found that Richards provided no explanation as to why “this
evidence would not have been discoverable when she was originally
Br. of Pl. at 16.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Richards, 540 Fed.Appx. at 85.
50
Id.
46

47

14

litigating this case with the aid of counsel.”51 Third, the Third Circuit
affirmed this Court’s conclusion that “the proposed evidence would not
have changed the outcome of the original litigation” because the alleged
comparator was not “similarly situated.”52
Here, Richards clarifies that her comparator provided her with the
facts surrounding his discharge in February 2013. Even with this
clarification, however, February 2013 is two years after the Third Circuit
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of CATA, thus violating the oneyear time limitation permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Furthermore,
despite Richards’s claim that she received the information in February
2013, the Third Circuit still considered and ruled on the evidence in its
September 2013 determinations. Therefore, in 2013, the Third Circuit ruled
on the “newly discovered evidence” that Richards proffers in her instant
Motion.
Next, Richards argues that, although her counsel did make thorough
discovery requests, counsel did not seek reinstatement information of
51
52

Id.
Id.
15

discharged CATA employees; thus, this reinstatement information could
“have revealed similarly situated employees’ disciplines and terminations
such as” the comparator’s. Richards, however, not only fails to state why
this evidence would not have been discoverable through reasonable
diligence, but also fails to address the materiality of this evidence, i.e., why
it is relevant. Rather, Richards argues that her counsel simply did not
request the right discovery documents, not that the evidence was neither
material nor undiscoverable. Thus, Richards is unable to satisfy the first
and second factors of the newly discovered evidence test in showing that
the allegedly new evidence was material and could not have been
discoverable before trial.
Lastly, Richards fails to show how the purported newly discovered
evidence would have changed the outcome of the case. This Court first
stated, and the Third Circuit subsequently affirmed, that the comparator on
which Richards grounds her argument “was not ‘similarly situated’
because of the different ‘nature of the misconduct engaged in that formed

16

the articulated reason for termination.’”53 This Court emphasized the
comparator’s conduct was only a subset of Richards’s, and the comparator,
unlike Richards, had no “incidents that suggested potential violence.”54
Accordingly, Richards fails to satisfy her heavy burden of proving that she
was excusably ignorant in discovering the evidence through reasonable
diligence.
c. Sanctions
The instant Motion is the third time Richards attempts to relitigate
this case. In the most recent instances,55 Richards has failed to file a timely
motion and has relied on similar grounds to the already adjudicated
matters. Thus, Richards, again, seems to be looking for an alternative route
to obtain what she desires.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 “requires a party who signs a
pleading, motion, or other paper to conduct a reasonable inquiry to assure
Richards, 540 Fed.Appx. at 85 (citing Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464
F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006)).
54
Richards, 540 Fed.Appx. at 85.
55
Richards’s first appeal, with counsel, was filed timely. Only the last two
appeals, which were filed without counsel in 2013 and in this instant
Motion, have been untimely.
53

17

that the document is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument. . . . “56 In other words, “the purpose of Rule
11 is to deter the initiation of frivolous lawsuits,”57 and requires a person to
“stop, think, investigate and research” before filing a motion.58 The Third
Circuit has, unsurprisingly, articulated a duty on both counsel and
unrepresented parties, such as Richards in the present matter, to conduct
an objectively “reasonable inquiry as to both facts and law.”59
Although a pro se motion, such as the instant Motion, “is held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by trained lawyers,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions, nonetheless, will “be imposed in the
exceptional circumstance where a pleading or motion is patently without
merit or frivolous.”60 Thus, pro se litigants, like Richards, must follow the
requirements provided under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.61 In considering Fed. R.

Martin v. Farmers First Bank, 151 F.R.D. 44, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 48.
60
Id.
61
Id.
56

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Civ. P. 11 sanctions, however, this Court “may take a person’s status as a
pro se litigant into account.”62
In light of the foregoing, Richards is hereby admonished that any
further attempt to re-raise similar issues, which are now final and
adjudicated, may result in, but are not limited to, paying the opposing
party’s attorney’s fees and costs. Raising issues that are final and have been
previously adjudicated indicates to the Court an objectively unreasonable
inquiry by Richards as to both the facts and the law in her instant Motion.
While this Court certainly does not intend to “chill” Richards’s access to
the judicial system, her repeated attempts to obtain another bite of the
judicial apple further indicates the frivolous nature of the instant Motion.63
Therefore, regarding the instant Motion, this Court will not impose
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against Richards; however, Richards is now
aware that subsequent motions based on these similar grounds, without an

62
63

Id.
Id. at 47.
19

objectively “reasonable inquiry as to both facts and law,” may result in the
imposition of fees and costs against her.64
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

64

Id.
20