Craig v. Rite Aid Corporation
Filing
530
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Dfts in camera motion for reconsideration is GRANTED as follows: 1. Dfts may withhold production of PRV 74-76, 216, 7291-7296, and 7308 because we find that these materials are subject to the a ttorney-client privilege. 2. Dfts may produce redacted copies of PRV 62-65, 7122, 69-70, 7284, 7285, and 7286, which may be redacted in the narrow manner described in Dfts in camera submission, in order to ensure that attorney-client confidential communications and information are not disclosed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on March 30, 2012. (kjn )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHIRLEY CRAIG, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs
:
:
v.
:
:
RITE AID CORPORATION and :
ECKERD CORPORATION d/b/a :
RITE AID,
:
:
Defendants
:
Civil Action No. 4:08-CV-2317
(Judge Jones)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
A.
Overview of the Case
Shirley Craig and others (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action for
overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) with the filing
of a collective action complaint on December 29, 2009. (Doc. 1) At bottom, the case
concerns Plaintiffs’ claims that Rite Aid misclassified Assistant Store Managers as
exempt employees under the FLSA. The District Court in this case subsequently
entered an order conditionally certifying the following collective class for purposes
of providing notice of the action and an opportunity to opt-in: “All individuals
classified as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay provisions and employed as
salaried Assistant Store Managers during any workweek within the previous three
years in any of the 4,901 stores identified in Rite Aid Corporation’s April 17, 2009
Annual Report as being operated by Rite Aid Corporation.” (Doc. 72) Thus far,
more than 1,000 individuals have identified themselves as putative opt-in plaintiffs
in the course of this litigation.
B.
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Court’s
February 9, 2012 Memorandum Opinion (Doc. 508) Ruling on
Defendants’ Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and WorkProduct Doctrine as Grounds to Withhold Production of Certain
Documents
On February 9, 2012, the Court entered a memorandum opinion in which we
ruled upon Defendants’ invocation of both the attorney-client privilege and the workproduct doctrine as bases to withhold production of a number of corporate documents
that Plaintiffs have sought in discovery. (Doc. 508) In a number of instances, we
found that Defendants reliance upon either the attorney-client privilege or workproduct protection was improper or unsubstantiated, and we ordered Defendants to
produce the documents in question. (Id., at 29-43.) With respect to other categories
of documents, we noted that although we could perceive how the documents might
be covered by privilege or work-product protection, we found that the Defendants had
not sufficiently demonstrated that the documents were privileged or protected. In
these instances, we provided Defendants with an final opportunity to explain the basis
for withholding the documents. (Id., at 44-52.)
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On February 23, 2012, Defendants filed an in camera submission containing
additional information regarding documents PRV 74-76, 216, 7291-7296, and 7308,
which are those documents that the Court found could be privileged, but which we
concluded Defendants had not sufficiently demonstrated should be withheld. (Doc.
514) (Notice of in camera submission.) In renewing their request that these
documents be withheld as privileged or otherwise subject to work-product protection,
Defendants have relied upon a second, and more detailed, declaration from Ron S.
Chima, Senior Counsel to Rite Aid. (“Chima Decl. II.”)
In addition to submitting this additional support for those documents that the
Court expressly identified as potentially privileged or protected, Defendants have also
requested that the Court narrowly reconsider its ruling that a limited number of
additional documents must be produced because the attorney-client privilege or workproduct doctrine did not shield them from production, at least in part. With respect
to this request, Defendants’ request is very narrowly tailored. The Defendants have
asked only that the Court permit them to redact discrete information appearing in
certain documents that Defendants contend reflects confidential advice from Rite Aid
counsel about legal matters, as confirmed by their more detail declaration. In support
of this request, Defendants have also relied upon Ron Chima’s second sworn
3
declaration in which he explains the nature of the documents in question, and the
reasons for the company’s assertion of the privilege.
We will consider these documents separately below, beginning with the
documents for which the Court invited Defendants to submit additional information,
before turning to those documents for which Defendants have urged the Court to
reconsider its ruling to permit limited redaction.1
In conducting this analysis, we recognize that in general, “[t]he purpose of
a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909
(3d Cir. 1985). Therefore, typically such a motion should only be granted in three,
narrowly defined circumstances, where there is either : “(1) [an] intervening
change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not previously
available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice”.
Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992 ). Thus, a
party’s mere disagreement with the court does not translate into the type of clear
error of law which justifies reconsideration of a ruling. Dodge, 796 F. Supp. at
830. Furthermore, “[b]ecause federal courts have a strong interest in the finality of
judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted sparingly.” Continental
Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
Moreover, it is evident that a motion for reconsideration is not a tool to re-litigate
and reargue issues which have already been considered and disposed of by the
court. Dodge, 796 F. Supp. at 830. Rather, such a motion is appropriate only
where the court misunderstood a party or where there has been a significant
change in law or facts since the court originally ruled on that issue. See Above the
Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983).
With respect to the first category of documents that we consider in this
opinion, the Court expressly invited Defendants to submit a more detailed
explanation to justify their privilege assertions. With respect to the additional
documents that Defendants have asked the Court to reconsider, we note that they
have done so in a narrow manner, seeking only to have limited information
redacted from a limited number of documents. The Court had previously directed
1
4
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Documents for Which the Court Permitted Defendants to Submit
Additional Information
1.
PRV 74-76
These documents consist of internal communications between and among
members of Rite Aid’s restructuring team, and include emails exchanged between
Kristin Crandall, Rite Aid’s Vice President of Field Human Relations, and Bradley
Sapp, the then Director of Labor Relations for the West Coast. In the emails, Ms.
Crandall solicits Mr. Sapp’s input on certain proposed changes to the store leadership
structure, and Mr. Sapp provides detailed guidance regarding particular concerns and
Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s motion to compel on a relatively expedited
basis (Doc. 265, at 1), and in their response Defendants represented that they had
responded to all of Plaintiff’s legal arguments, but stood ready to provide
additional factual support if necessary. (Doc. 269, at 3) In this regard, Ron Chima
made the Court aware that Rite Aid’s response was being submitted during a
period in which he and other members of Rite Aid’s in-house team of lawyers had
very limited availability due to other company business, and he represented that he
was prepared to provide additional information if the Court required. Upon
consideration of these circumstances, we find that Defendants’ request that the
Court narrowly reconsider its early ruling is reasonable, since privilege protection
is evanescent, and once it is lost it is gone forever. Therefore, we believe that in
appropriate instances reconsideration of privilege issues is, in fact, necessary to
“prevent manifest injustice” arising from the loss of a valid claim of privilege,
something that can never be fully restored once lost. See Dodge v. Susquehanna
Univ., 796 F. Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
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problems presented by collective bargaining agreements applicable to California
stores.
In our prior ruling, we noted that “[a]lthough legal concerns animate Mr.
Sapp’s correspondence, it does not appear to have been shared with a lawyer, and it
is not clear that the correspondence was provided for purposes of securing legal
advice from counsel,” and noted that “the documents appear to describe business
decisions taken in response to past litigation.” (Doc. 508, at 45) In their motion for
reconsideration, Defendants address the Court’s concerns in this regard, and assert
that the information provided in the communications “was sought at the direction of
counsel for the purpose of providing legal advice for purposes of Rite Aid’s then (and
now) ongoing FLSA litigation over manager classification.”
(In Camera
Memorandum, at 3.)
As evidentiary support for this assertion, Defendants rely upon the second
declaration from Ron Chima, who made specific representations that the information
exchanged in the correspondence was gathered at the direction of Mr. Chima and
Traci Burch, another member of Rite Aid’s in-house counsel. (Chima Decl. II, at ¶
5.)
Mr. Chima’s second declaration goes into more detail than his previous
declaration, or Defendants’ privilege log, in explaining the reason for the
communications that are contained in these documents, and his representation is
6
persuasive that these documents contain information that was gathered at the
direction of counsel, was maintained confidentially, and was collected for purposes
of securing legal advice and guidance for the company. We thus conclude, following
our review of Ron Chima’s second declaration, that PRV 74-76 may properly be
withheld on the basis of attorney-client privilege.
In so finding, we recognize that, in general, the attorney-client privilege “does
not shield documents merely because they were transferred to or routed through an
attorney.” Resolution Trust Corp. v. Diamond, 773 F. Supp. 597, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
In this regard, “[w]hat would otherwise be routine, non-privileged
communications between corporate officers or employees transacting the general
business of the company do not attain privileged status solely because in-house or
outside counsel is ‘copied in’ on correspondence or memoranda, Andritz SproutBauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609, 633 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (citing U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
However, “communications between counsel and company employees remain
privileged ‘so long as the information is relayed for the purpose of obtaining legal
counsel.” Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981)).
Furthermore, we observe that “[a] document need not be authored or addressed to an
7
attorney in order to be properly withheld on attorney-client privilege grounds.”
SmithKline Beacham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 477 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(quoting Santrade, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1993)).
Where a corporate client is concerned, “privileged communications may be shared by
non-attorney employees in order to relay information requested by attorneys.” Id.
(citing Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 202-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)).
Additionally, “documents subject to the privilege may be transmitted between nonattorneys . . . so that the corporation may be properly informed of legal advice and act
appropriately. Id. (citing Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 38 (E.D.N.Y.
1973)). The test for touchstone for whether corporate communications are properly
subject to the privilege is whether “the information is relayed for the purpose of
obtaining legal counsel.” Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
Keeping these legal principles in mind, and considering the detailed, sworn
representations made by Ron Chima in his second declaration submitted in support
of Defendants’ motion for reconsideration in light of what is contained in these
particular documents exchanged between non-legal officers of the company, we find
that the documents labeled PRV 74-76 were gathered and exchanged at the direction
of counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for the company, and, therefore,
may be withheld from production on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.
8
2.
PRV 216
In our initial order, we described this particular document as follows:
This single document is an email that Kristin Crandall sent
to members of Rite Aid’s senior leadership team regarding
the proposed store structure changes, and particularly
regarding assistant store managers. Although the email is
sent to a number of leadership personnel, we observe that
the email was not sent to or copied on any member of Rite
Aid’s in-house or outside counsel, and does not appear to
seek legal advice of any kind.
(Doc. 508, at 46-47) Although we acknowledged Rite Aid’s position that the
document reflected the legal advice that in-house counsel had provided during the
corporate restructuring process that had been undertaken in the face of FLSA
litigation, we ultimately found that “Defendants have not explained with any degree
of specificity why the document should be privileged,” (Id., at 47), although we noted
that after reviewing the contents of the email we could “perceive how some parts of
the correspondence may reflect the advice given by counsel, which was in turn being
shared with senior management involved in the store-restructuring project,” (Id.). We
thus found that the “document presents a close call” and although we found
Defendants did not carry their burden of proving the privilege applied, “because it
[appeared] that the document touches upon legal matters and real and potential
litigation against the company,” we permitted Defendants a further opportunity to
9
more fully and specifically explain the bases for asserting that the document should
be shielded from production. (Id. at 47-48.)
Defendants have taken this invitation, and have provided the Court with a more
robust, detailed, and compelling explanation as to how the email from Kristin
Crandall to a small group of senior managers regarding store restructuring actually
is replete with legal advice conveyed by Ron Chima. (Chima Decl. II, at ¶ 6.) Ron
Chima’s second declaration provides clarity regarding the nature of the information
that Ms. Crandall was sharing with senior leadership, the reason the advice was being
disseminated among a small number of individuals who were to maintain it in
confidence, and the way in which the advice conveyed is legal in nature. Reading this
document in the context of this more persuasive and substantive declaration, we
conclude that Defendants may withhold PRV 216 from production on the basis of the
attorney-client privilege.
3.
PRV 7291-7296
As we noted in our prior order,
These documents are also draft internal corporate memoranda that
Kristin Crandall prepared, and placed in a file, at some point during
fiscal year 2010. These memoranda relate to Rite Aid’s front end store
structure and FLSA compliance, and contain different proposals for
managerial staffing and FLSA designation depending on the front-end
volume of a respective store. The memoranda also contain handwritten
10
notes, although the notes are brief and quite general. . . . [T]hese
documents were labeled as “Attorney Directed Work Product.”
(Doc. 508, at 49) Defendants asserted that the draft memoranda had been prepared
at the direction of Ron Chima, for purpose of providing legal advice and in light of
pending FLSA litigation. Defendants had also noted that they had produced final
versions of the draft documents that had been used for business purposes, and thus
argued that they should not be required to divulge the draft documents that reflected
counsel’s direction.
Although we found that this was “a somewhat closer issue” than a number of
the other documents at issue, we ultimately concluded that Defendants did not
adequately support their claim that these notes and memoranda should be considered
either attorney work product or attorney-client privileged communications. (Id.)
Nevertheless, we provided Defendants with a further opportunity to more fully and
adequately explain and support their basis for asserting that either the attorney-client
privilege or work-product doctrine entitled them to withhold these documents from
Plaintiffs.
In their follow-up brief, Defendants explain that these draft documents were
prepared at the direction of counsel for the purpose of evaluating a number of legal
issues that ultimately were reflected in PRV 216, discussed above. (Chima Decl. II,
11
at ¶ 7.) According to Ron Chima’s more detailed second declaration, the notes and
draft memoranda reflect the advice and work-product of in-house and outside counsel
because it was prepared specifically with pending and anticipated FLSA litigation in
mind, and the analysis was related directly to the company’s specific responses to this
litigation. (Id.) Moreover, Mr. Chima represents that Ms. Crandall shared with him
verbally the risk analysis information contained in the notes and draft memoranda,
and thus the document essentially reflect confidential communications between Ms.
Crandall and Rite Aid’s counsel regarding legal responses the company was
evaluating. (Id.)
Having previously found this issue to be relatively close, and following a
second careful review of these documents with the benefit of Mr. Chima’s more
fulsome declaration, we now agree that these documents may be withheld as
privileged communications because the documents reflect not only counsel’s advice
and direction, but also confidential communications that Ms. Crandall had with
company lawyers in an effort to secure legal advice on behalf of the company.
In addition, we note that Rite Aid has previously produced to Plaintiffs the
final store structure charts that merely omit Ms. Crandall’s notes and one column,
which reflected concerns that had been identified by in-house and outside counsel,
and Plaintiffs are thus in possession of the company’s final store structuring
12
memoranda, but without notes and draft materials that reflect confidential information
to and from counsel. (RASC 0172405, 01724100.) Rite Aid may, therefore, withhold
production of PRV 7291-7296.
4.
PRV 7308
This document is another internal memorandum regarding Rite Aid’s store
restructuring proposals, which Kristin Crandall prepared and placed in a file
sometime in or around 2008. The document sets forth a number of corporate
objectives, including FLSA compliance, defined supervisory structure, clarity of
leadership expectations, and profitability. Although we found that the document
touched upon legal and business issues, we did not find that the memorandum clearly
reflected the advice of in-house counsel with respect to anticipated or existing FLSA
litigation, as Defendants had represented in their privilege log. Additionally, we did
not find that Ron Chima’s initial declaration spoke directly to this memorandum,
which appeared to have been created by a non-lawyer and thereafter placed in a file.
Nevertheless, we provided Defendants a further opportunity to explain and support
their assertion that the document was privileged or otherwise subject to work-product
protection.
In their follow-up brief, Defendants do not seek to withhold the entirety of this
document, but instead request only that they be permitted to redact a specific section
13
of the document addressing FLSA status that they have represented reflects the advice
of counsel in light of the impact of restructuring changes and the impact of those
changes on anticipated and ongoing litigation.
In addition to providing this
explanation regarding the modest redaction requested, Ron Chima represents that the
section to be redacted consists of objectives that Kristin Crandall specifically
reviewed with in-house counsel in consideration of real and expected litigation. On
the basis of these more detailed explanations, and Defendants’ more carefully tailored
request to redact this memorandum rather than withhold it entirely, we find that
Defendants have sufficiently justified their assertion of the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection to permit the requested redaction prior to production.
B.
Portions of Documents for Which Defendants Seek the Court’s
Partial Reconsideration in Light of Additional Information
In addition to providing more detailed declarations in support of their request
that the Court reconsider its earlier ruling with respect to the foregoing documents,
Defendants have also requested that the Court permit them to redact certain portions
of other documents that the Court did not find to be privileged. Defendants have
carefully tailored this request, and have directed the Court’s attention to a discrete
number of instances in these documents where the documents reflect attorney-client
protected communications or attorney work-product. Defendants have relied on Ron
14
Chima’s declarations, including a more detailed and explanatory second declaration,
in which Mr. Chima articulates how the information Defendants seek to redact
reflects legal advice or other protected information.
1.
PRV 62-65, 7122
With respect to these documents, which consist primarily of internal emails
from Kristin Crandall to other Rite Aid managers regarding ongoing assessment of
Rite Aid’s existing store structure, Defendants ask that they be permitted to redact
certain information that they contend communicate (a) specific requests from Rite
Aid’s in-house counsel that were made for the purpose of providing legal advice
regarding the ongoing store restructuring in light of FLSA litigation; (b) legal advice
provided to Kristin Crandall by in-house counsel regarding these ongoing matters;
and (c) the mental impressions of counsel with respect to ongoing FLSA litigation.
The Court had previously found that Defendants had not sufficiently explained how
the information contained in these documents was legal in nature, even if counsel had
been involved, and, therefore, declined to permit Defendants to use a blanket
approach to shielding these documents in their entirety.2 Upon review of Ron
Specifically, the Court noted that although Kristin Crandall’s email
indicated that one of the questions in her email was inspired by a “great
suggestion” from former General Counsel, Robert Sari, we found that the email
was silent as to what the suggestion was, and whether it was legal in nature. (Doc.
508, at 30) In his second declaration, Ron Chima persuasively represents that the
2
15
Chima’s second declaration, which more carefully explains the nature and provenance
of the information to be redacted, (Chima Decl. ¶ 9), we now concur in Defendants’
request to redact specific portions of PRV 62-65, and 7122 because these discrete
portions of the documents reflect confidential communications and instructions from
corporate counsel regarding matters that are primarily legal in nature. Accordingly,
Defendants may redact those portions of PRV 62-65 and 7122 that are identified on
page 8 of their in camera submission.
2.
PRV 69-70
Defendants similarly request permission to redact limited information from
these documents – some of which is duplicative of PRV 62-63 – because the
information reflects information that members of Rite Aid’s in-house counsel
specifically requested Ms. Crandall to gather to allow counsel to render legal advice
regarding certain store structuring decisions, particularly as the changes related to
FLSA litigation. As Mr. Chima details in his second declaration, the information to
be redacted consists not only of the information that counsel directed her to obtain,
but also of an email in which Ms. Crandall articulates the legal advice that counsel
suggestion from counsel concerned legal matters rather than primarily business
issues, and he places counsel’s suggestion in context of Rite Aid’s ongoing store
restructuring initiatives. As a result, we agree with Defendants that their proposed
redactions of these documents are appropriate, and tailored specifically to matters
implicating counsel’s advice on matters of a legal nature.
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provided. (Chima Decl. II, at ¶ 10.) Upon consideration of this more persuasive
declaration, we agree that Defendants may redact the portions of PRV 69 and 70
identified in their in camera submission because the information consists of
privileged communications to and from counsel about legal matters.
3.
PRV 7284
This document appears to be a discussion outline and handwritten notes that
Kristin Crandall prepared in 2008 and placed in a file. On our initial review of this
document, we noted that it did not appear to have been shared with any Rite Aid
personnel or counsel, and addressed matters that the appeared to the Court to be
primarily focused on business, rather than legal, concerns. Having interpreted the
document in this way, we further found that Defendants had not sufficiently
demonstrated that the document was privileged or otherwise protected from
disclosure.
In their motion before the Court, Defendants seek permission to redact a single
bulleted note, which they represent reflects Mr. Chima’s legal advice regarding the
implications of a particular restructuring consideration. Mr. Chima has further
explained the legal nature of the advice contained within this note, which addresses
specific FLSA exemption rules and their potential relevance to the restructuring being
assessed. Upon consideration of Mr. Chima’s explanation, and the limited nature of
17
the relief sought in order to protect the disclosure of legal advice that Mr. Chima had
provided to Ms. Crandall, we find that Defendants may properly redact this single
bulleted note from PRV 7284.3
4.
PRV 7285 and 7286
Similar to PRV 7284, PRV 7285 and 7286 are also internal memoranda relating
to Rite Aid’s store restructuring project, which were also prepared by Kristin Crandall
sometime in or around 2008. The documents were not shared with anyone, but were
instead placed in a file. These memoranda are substantively identical, except that
PRV 7286 contains handwritten notes that Defendants claimed reflect counsel’s legal
advice and mental impressions. As with PRV 7284, however, we found that
In our previous order, we noted that some courts had found that a memo to
the file prepared by a non-lawyer is not subject to attorney-client privilege,
because these documents do not constitute a “communication” for purposes of
obtaining legal advice. See Stafford Trading, Inc. v. Lovely, No. 05-C-4868, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13062, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2007). In Stafford Trading,
however, the district court found that “[m]emos to files prepared by non-legal
personnel containing business information are clearly not privileged.” Id.
(emphasis added). In this case, Defendants’ in-house counsel has given a sworn
declaration in which he attests that the limited language to be redacted concerns a
specific legal matter about which he was providing advice. We, therefore, find
that Defendants have overcome our initial ruling that “there is simply insufficient
evidence for the Court to conclude that Ms. Crandall’s memo to her file contains
legal advice of counsel, or counsel’s mental impressions, as Defendants’ assert.”
(Doc. 508, at 42 n.3) We now find that, with respect to the single bullet point
being redacted, Defendants have provided sufficient evidence to justify the
requested redaction.
3
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Defendants had not sustained their burden of showing that the memoranda should be
withheld entirely on the basis of either the attorney-client privilege or because they
constituted attorney work-product. We found Defendants’ privilege log to be overly
general, and Ron Chima’s first declaration did not speak directly about the
memoranda or Ms. Crandall’s handwritten notes. Upon review of the materials
themselves, we were further unable to conclude that the memoranda or notes were
the product of counsel’s mental impressions or legal advice.
Defendants have asked the Court to reconsider this ruling in a narrow fashion,
seeking permission to redact a single identical sentence on both memoranda regarding
FLSA matters relating to staffing considerations, which Defendants maintain reflects
counsel’s confidential legal advice and also mental impressions relating to ongoing
and anticipated litigation under the FLSA. Defendants have bolstered this assertion
with additional declarations from Ron Chima, in which he explains that the discrete
portion of the memoranda to be redacted reflects advice that he personally gave to
Ms. Crandall, and which he emphasized should be specially considered as part of the
store restructuring project, in light of pending litigation. (Chima Decl. II, at ¶ 12.)
Upon consideration of Mr. Chima’s explanation, and the very limited nature of the
relief sought in order to protect the disclosure of legal advice that Mr. Chima had
provided to Ms. Crandall, we find that Defendants may properly redact the single
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portion on each memoranda identified on page 13 of Defendants’ in camera
submission.4
III.
ORDER
For the reasons discussed and explained above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT Defendants’ in camera motion for reconsideration is GRANTED as follows:
1.
Defendants may withhold production of PRV 74-76, 216, 7291-7296,
and 7308 because we find that these materials are subject to the
attorney-client privilege.
2.
Defendants may produce redacted copies of PRV 62-65, 7122, 69-70,
7284, 7285, and 7286, which may be redacted in the narrow manner
described in Defendants’ in camera submission, in order to ensure that
attorney-client confidential communications and information are not
disclosed.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
4
See footnote 2, supra.
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