Jones v. Hashagen et al

Filing 112

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting motions to dismiss 78 & 95 , denying motion to strike 102 as moot, directing Clrk of Ct to CLOSE case, & deeming any appeal from this order as frivolous & not in good faith. (See memo & order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 03/26/12. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER JONES,
Plaintiff
v.
CO LINDLER & DR. DEMPSEY,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:09-CV-0887
(Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM
This action arises out of an assault upon pro se plaintiff Christopher Jones
suffered while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas
(SCI-Dallas) . The attack took place on February 5, 2008, perpetrated by another
inmate at SCI-Dallas. Jones claims via 42 U.S.C § 1983 that the defendants violated
Jones’ Eighth Amendment rights through their deliberate indifference: defendant
Correctional Officer Lindler (originally incorrectly designated Linhart) by failing to
protect Jones from the assault and defendant Dr. William Dempsey by failing to
provide adequate medical care following the assault. The complaint, making its
claims against Lindler and Dempsey in their official and individual capacities, seeks
both compensatory and punitive awards against each of them.
Presently before the court are three motions: Lindler’s motion to dismiss or
alternatively for summary judgment (Doc. 78); Dempsey’s motion to dismiss (Doc.
95); and Dempsey’s unopposed motion to strike (Doc. 102) two of Jones’
supplemental briefs relating to the defendants’ above-mentioned dispositive

motions. For the reasons that follow, both motions to dismiss will be granted and
the motion to strike will be denied as moot.
I.

Background1
This case has a lengthy history, with its essential facts repeated many times

by the parties, by this court, and by the Third Circuit; they are set forth here with
an emphasis on concision and only as necessary for disposition of the pending
motions.2
On February 5, 2008, while at SCI-Dallas, Jones was outside his cell heading
toward the guards’ desk when another inmate, Woodrow Mitchell, threw a
television set from the top tier of the cell block, which hit Jones on the head and
knocked him unconscious. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 13, 15.) While Jones lay immobile on the floor,
Mitchell threw hot water and an “object” at him, injuring him further. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.)
Correctional Officer Lindler, who was on duty that day and “only a few feet away”
from Mitchell, did not physically intervene; instead, he ordered Mitchell to return to

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Following the standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true. See infra
Part II. Although the Federal Rules demand no “detailed” averments of fact in a
complaint, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Those portions of the complaint that demonstrate the shortcomings
disapproved of in Iqbal are disregarded. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d
121, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying Iqbal in giving no presumption of truth to mere
“conclusions”).
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The remaining defendants are two of five that the complaint originally
named; all claims against the other three defendants have been dismissed. (See
Docs. 26, 53, 64, 64-2.)
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his cell and close the door. (Id. ¶ 19.) Medical personnel arrived in due course, took
Jones to the infirmary for treatment and then sent him to an outside hospital for
further treatment. (Id. ¶ 20.) Upon return to SCI-Dallas, Jones remained under the
care of Dr. Dempsey. (Id. ¶ 23.)
On February 12, 2008, Jones filled out an official inmate grievance form (Doc.
87, at 13) and directed it to Robin Lucas, the facility grievance coordinator. In
italicized, bold-faced print, the grievance form commanded: “State all relief that
you are seeking.” (Id.) Nonetheless, Jones’ complaint included no statement for
relief. (Id.)
Lucas assigned unit manager Joseph Semon to respond to Jones’ grievance;
Semon found the grievance meritless and denied it. (Id. at 11.) Jones appealed the
denial, which was upheld March 28, 2008. (Doc. 1, ¶ 28.) On May 12, 2008, Jones’
final appeal was dismissed as untimely.
Jones filed his pro se complaint on May 11, 2009. (Doc. 1.) Then-defendants
Hashagen, Semon, and Klopotski successfully obtained dismissal of all claims
against them (see Docs. 26, 53), which dismissal survived Jones’ appeal to the Third
Circuit (see Docs. 64, 64-2). This court had“constructively dismiss[ed]” (Doc. 64-2, at
8) the claims against the current defendants essentially on the basis of their never
having been served with the complaint. However, the Third Circuit reversed the
dismissal as to these two defendants. The Third Circuit held that because Jones was
proceeding in forma pauperis, the court and its officers were responsible for

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effecting service—and “a failure to serve should not prejudice a faultless plaintiff.”
(Id. at 7–8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).)
Following the Third Circuit’s mandate, Lindler and Dempsey were served
with notice of the suit against them; they subsequently filed the pending motions
(Docs. 78, 95, 102), which are now ripe for adjudication.
II.

Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the

dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
FED . R. CIV . P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Gelman v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d
170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Although the court is generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the
complaint, it “may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached
to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
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Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629
F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal
conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual allegations have been
isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible
claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts
sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim “has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. When the complaint fails to present a prima
facie case of liability, however, courts should generally grant leave to amend before
dismissing a complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2000).
III.

Discussion
The two motions to dismiss present, in effect, two primary areas of inquiry:

sovereign immunity and procedural default. After a brief discussion of the general
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principles behind 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the private right to sue that it grants, the two
primary issues will each be discussed in turn.
A.

Section 1983

Section 1983 creates no substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for
infringement of rights established by other federal laws. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“[Section] 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing
individual rights ‘secured’ elsewhere . . . .”). The statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2011). Recovery under § 1983 requires proving that “a
person acting under color of state law” deprived the plaintiff of a “right secured by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199,
1204 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.
1995)). In this case, Jones is claiming that he was deprived of his Eighth
Amendment rights by state actors.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

Jones’s complaint sets forth its claims against all defendants in their official
and individual capacities. The principle of law that bars suits in federal court
against states and their subsidiary agencies finds expression in the Constitution
itself: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
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any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting U.S. CONST . amend. XI). This constitutional limitation on the power of the
federal courts has been interpreted to grant immunity from suit to individual state
employees sued in their official capacity, since “official-capacity suits generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against a state.” Id. at 254
(quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is no dispute that Lindler was acting in his official capacity as a state
employee during the time of the actions or omissions that Jones described in his
complaint. According, Jones’ Eighth Amendment claim against Lindler in his
official capacity must be dismissed.
Dempsey argues that he cannot be sued in his official capacity because he
was neither employed by the state nor the physician who treated Jones at the
outside hospital (which apparently was the Community Medical Center in
Scranton, Pennsylvania). Dempsey maintains that his being employed by
Emergency Services at CMC precludes a finding that he was acting under color of
state law.
However, Jones correctly points out in his brief opposing Dempsey’s motion
that the provision of medical services to prison inmates is traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54–55 (1988); see also
Correctional Institution Medical Services Act, 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3301–07
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(2009) (requiring provision of medical services to persons incarcerated within
Pennsylvania’s Correctional Institution system). As the West court observed, “[it] is
only those physicians authorized by the State to whom the inmate may turn.” West,
487 U.S. at 55. Because the government controls the medical care that its prisoners
receive, including any care that prisoners receive at medical facilities not owned or
operated by the government, any such medical care remains fairly attributable to
the state. See id. at 56 (“[T]he dispositive issue concerns the relationship among the
State, the physician, and the prisoner.”). See also Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220
(4th Cir. 1994):
Regardless of whether the private physician has a contractual duty or
simply treats a prisoner without a formal arrangement with the prison,
the physician’s function within the state system is the same: the state
authorizes the physician to provide medical care to the prisoner, and
the prisoner has no choice but to accept the treatment offered by the
physician.
Id. at 225 (discussing and applying the principles of West).
Accordingly, the undisputed fact that Jones received medical treatment at an
outside facility strictly implies that, regardless of who provided treatment or the
existence or absence of a contract between the prison system and the service
provider, the medical treatment is attributable to the state, and a official-capacity
suit by a prisoner against a medical service provider is “only another way of
pleading an action against a state.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d
249, 54 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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The truth of either competing set of facts does not change the inexorable
conclusion that Jones’ Eighth Amendment claim against Dempsey in his official
capacity must be dismissed. Either Dempsey did treat Jones, as Jones claims, in
which case sovereign immunity bars the claim; or Dempsey did not treat Jones, in
which case Dempsey was not acting under color of state law and is not subject to
suit under § 1983.
C.

Procedural default

Having narrowed the claims for discussion to those against Lindler and
Dempsey in their individual capacities, the analysis next turns to the matter of
procedural default, which Lindler raised in his supporting brief. (Doc. 86, at 10–11.)
He notes that Jones failed to include any request for relief in his grievance, despite
(1) the bold-faced, italicized statement on the grievance form directing the inmate
to do so, and (2) the same mandate appearing in the official grievance policy that
was in effect at the time that Jones filed his grievance.3 Jones does not dispute the

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See Doc. 86-1, at 7, 7–22 (reproducing the policy governing the inmate
grievance system that was in effect at the time that Jones filed the grievance that
forms the seed of this civil dispute). The relevant portion of the grievance policy
reads: “If the inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally
available from a court, the inmate shall request the specific relief sought in
his/her initial grievance.” Id. at 11–12.
The current version of the policy is substantially the same. COMMONWEALTH
OF PA . DEP ’T OF CORR ., DC-ADM 804, INMATE GRIEVANCE SYSTEM PROCEDURES
MANUAL, SECTION 1—GRIEVANCES & INITIAL REVIEW , pt. A.11 (PDF 7), available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/919465/804_inmate_grievan
ces_pdf.
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authenticity of the reproduced versions, present in the record, of his 2008 grievance
or of the official policy that governed the requirements for filing grievances in 2008.
In filing his grievance, Jones failed to follow the applicable regulations, which
required him to specify what relief, if any, he sought. Such failure results in
procedural default. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2004).
Dismissal of all remaining claims against both Lindler and Dempsey in their
personal capacities is, therefore, appropriate, and no amendment of the complaint
could cure the deficiencies in Jones’ claims.
IV.

Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant the motions to dismiss filed

separately by C.O. Lindler (Doc. 78) and Dr. Dempsey (Doc. 95) and deny as moot
C.O. Lindler’s motion to strike (Doc. 102). An appropriate order follows.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge

Dated:

March 26, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER JONES,
Plaintiff
v.
CO LINDLER & DR. DEMPSEY,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:09-CV-0887
(Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of March, 2012, upon consideration of the motion to
dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment (Doc. 78) filed by C.O. Lindler; the
motion to dismiss (Doc. 95) filed by Dr. Dempsey; and the motion to strike (Doc.
102) filed by C.O. Lindler, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying
memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

The motions to dismiss (Docs. 78, 95) are GRANTED.

2.

The motion to strike (Doc. 102) is DENIED as moot.

3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the case.

4.

Any appeal from this order is DEEMED frivolous and not in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge