Coleman v. Astrue

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - In accordance w/the accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The Clerk of Crt. shall enter jgm. in favor of the Commissioner & against Earl Stanley Colemana, Jr., as set forth in the following paragraph. 2. The de cision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., 8 suppl. security income benefits is affirmed. 3. The Clerk of Crt. shall close this file. 8 Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 9/2/11. (See memo for complete details.) (am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EARL STANLEY COLEMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant

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No. 4:10-CV-01842
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner")
denying Plaintiff Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr.’s claim for social
security supplemental security income benefits.

For the reasons

set forth below we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
This appeal only involves a claim for supplemental
security income benefits.

However, Coleman did initially also

file an application for disability insurance benefits alleging a
disability onset date of January 1, 1993. Tr. 214.129.1
Disability insurance benefits are paid to an individual
if that individual is disabled and “insured,” that is, the
individual has worked long enough and paid social security taxes.
The last date that a claimant meets the requirements of being

1. References to “Tr.___” are to pages of the administrative
record filed by the Defendant as part of his Answer on November
18, 2010.

insured is commonly referred to as the “date last insured.”

It is

undisputed that Coleman met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through December 31, 1993. Tr. 116.

In order

to establish entitlement to disability insurance benefits Coleman
was required to establish that he suffered from a disability on or
before that date.

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R.

§404.131(a)(2008); see Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d
Cir. 1990).
Coleman on June 5, 2008, amended his alleged disability
onset date to July 25, 2007, which represented a withdrawal of his
claim for disability insurance benefits and made him ineligible
for disability insurance benefits because the alleged onset date
was more than 13 years after the date last insured. Tr. 75 and
116.
Supplemental security income is a federal income
supplement program funded by general tax revenues (not social
security taxes).

It is designed to help aged, blind or other

disabled individuals who have little or no income. Insured status
is irrelevant in determining a claimant’s eligibility for
supplemental security income benefits.
Coleman was born in the United States on July 25, 1952.
Tr. 222.

Coleman graduated from high school and can read, write,

speak and understand the English language and perform basic
mathematical functions. Tr. 54, 79-81 and 241.

2

The administrative record reveals that Coleman had
limited employment as a painter of residential and commercial
buildings. Tr. 82, 242 and 302.

Records of the Social Security

Administration reveal that from January 1, 1993, through 2008
Coleman had earnings as follows:
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Tr. 233.
Id.

$

0.00
0.00
346.50
0.00
0.00
2332.78
1470.00
418.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2932.50
270.00
90.00
0.00

Coleman’s total earnings for this period were $7859.78.

According to the vocational expert who testified on June 5,

2008, at the first administrative hearing in this case,2 Coleman
had no past relevant employment3 that amounted to substantial
gainful activity.4 Tr. 102.

2. As will be explained infra there were two administrative
hearings held in this case.
3. Past relevant employment in the present case means work
performed by Coleman during the 15 years prior to the date his
claim for disability benefits was adjudicated by the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.960 and 416.965.
4. Substantial gainful activity is work that “involves doing
significant and productive physical or mental duties” and “is
(continued...)
3

Coleman has a history of drug abuse and he spent
thirteen years in prison for drug-related activity. Tr. 302.

His

drug of choice was heroin and he used that drug as recently as
February, 2004. Tr. 301.5

One medical record from January 10,

2005, states that Coleman “is a recovering heroin addict and is on
a methadone program.
beverages.

He is not currently drinking alcoholic

He is on no current medications.” Tr. 311.

Coleman

also has a history of smoking 1 ½ packs per day for 20 years. Tr.
302.
On March 19, 2007, Coleman protectively filed6 an
application for disability insurance benefits and an application
for supplemental security income benefits. Tr. 112, 123 and 214225.

Coleman claims that he became disabled on July 25, 2007,

because of back pain and the residuals of rectal cancer. Tr. 23.

4. (...continued)
done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.910. In
order to amount to substantial gainful activity the individual’s
earnings have to rise to at least a minimum level set by the
Social Security Administration.
5. Coleman told an emergency room physician in August, 2006,
that he had not used heroin since 1999. Tr. 306. However, at an
appointment with Ronald R. Alexander, M.D., an oncologist, on
April 9, 2004, he told Dr. Alexander that he had “used heroin as
recently as two months ago.” Tr. 301.
6. Protective filing is a term for the first time an individual
contacts the Social Security Administration to file a claim for
benefits. A protective filing date allows an individual to have
an earlier application date than the date the application is
actually signed.
4

On July 13, 2007, the Bureau of Disability Determination7 denied
Coleman’s applications. Tr. 136-143.

On September 13, 2007,

Coleman requested a hearing before an administrative law judge.
Tr. 144-145.

After about 9 months had passed, a hearing before an

administrative law judge was held on June 5, 2008.

Tr. 73-111.

On June 24, 2008, the administrative law judge issued a decision
denying Coleman’s application for supplemental security income
benefits and a separate order dismissing Coleman’s claim for
disability insurance benefits. Tr. 116 and 123-128.

As stated

earlier in this memorandum, the claim for disability insurance
benefits was dismissed because Coleman amended his alleged
disability onset date to a date well-after the date last insured.
On July 8, 2008, Coleman requested that the Appeals Council review
the administrative law judge’s decision denying him supplemental
security income benefits. Tr. 169-173.

On September 12, 2008, the

Appeals Council granted Coleman’s request for review and remanded
the case to the administrative law judge for further proceedings.
Tr. 133-135.8

On January 7, 2009, a second hearing was held

7. The Bureau of Disability Determination is an agency of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania which initially evaluates
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits on behalf of the Social Security
Administration. Tr. 136 and 140.
8. The administrative law judge found that Coleman did not have
a severe impairment and denied benefits at step two of the
sequential evaluation process. The sequential evaluation process
will be explained subsequently in this memorandum. The Appeals
(continued...)
5

before the same administrative law judge. Tr. 20-72.

At the

second hearing, H. Christopher Alexander, III, M.D., a medical
expert, as well as Coleman and a vocational expert, testified. Tr.
20.

On January 26, 2009, the administrative law judge issued a

decision denying Coleman’s application for supplemental security
income benefits. Tr. 13-19.

On March 6, 2009, Coleman requested

that the Appeals Council review the administrative law judge’s
decision denying him supplemental security income benefits. Tr. 69.

After 16 months had passed, the Appeals Council on July 26,

2010, concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant
Coleman’s request for review. Tr. 1-5.

Thus, the administrative

law judge’s decision stood as the final decision of the
Commissioner.
On September 1, 2010, Coleman filed a complaint in this
court requesting that we reverse the decision of the Commissioner
denying him supplemental security income benefits.

The

Commissioner filed an answer to the complaint and a copy of the
administrative record on November 18, 2010. Coleman filed his
brief on December 30, 2010, and the Commissioner filed his brief

8. (...continued)
Council concluded that Coleman had established a severe
impairment, i.e., “most recent objective evidence shows
limitations that would more than minimally affect the claimant’s
ability to do basic work activities.” Tr. 134.
6

on February 1, 2011.

The appeal9 became ripe for disposition on

February 18, 2011, when Coleman elected not to file a reply brief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a social security appeal, we have
plenary review of all legal issues decided by the Commissioner.
See Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d
Cir. 2007); Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,

181

F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999); Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d
857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995).

However, our review of the

Commissioner’s findings of fact pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is
to determine whether those findings are supported by "substantial
evidence."

Id.; Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.

1988); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
Factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence must
be upheld. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
38 (3d Cir. 2001)(“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if
we would have decided the factual inquiry differently.”); Cotter
v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)(“Findings of fact by
the Secretary must be accepted as conclusive by a reviewing court

9. Under the Local Rules of Court “[a] civil action brought to
review a decision of the Social Security Administration denying a
claim for social security disability benefits” is “adjudicated as
an appeal.” M.D.Pa. Local Rule 83.40.1.
7

if supported by substantial evidence.”);

Keefe v. Shalala, 71

F.3d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995); Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176
(4th Cir. 2001);

Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 & 1529

n.11 (11th Cir. 1990).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or
considerable amount of evidence, but ‘rather such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)); Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008);
(3d Cir. 1999).

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360

Substantial evidence has been described as more

than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance.
Brown, 845 F.2d at 1213.

In an adequately developed factual

record substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight
of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence."
Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Substantial evidence exists only "in relationship to all
the other evidence in the record," Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706, and
"must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight."

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S.

474, 488 (1971).

A single piece of evidence is not substantial

8

evidence if the Commissioner ignores countervailing evidence or
fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence.
F.2d at 1064.

Mason, 994

The Commissioner must indicate which evidence was

accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Johnson, 529 F.3d at 203; Cotter, 642
F.2d at 706-707.

Therefore, a court reviewing the decision of the

Commissioner must scrutinize the record as a whole.

Smith v.

Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981); Dobrowolsky v.
Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979).

SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To receive disability benefits, the plaintiff must
demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(A).

Furthermore,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for
work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), “work which exists in the
national economy” means work which exists in significant
numbers either in the region where such individual
9

lives or in several regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner utilizes a five-step process in
evaluating supplemental security income claims.
416.920; Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91-92.

See 20 C.F.R. §

This process requires the

Commissioner to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is
engaging in substantial gainful activity,10 (2) has an impairment
that is severe or a combination of impairments that is severe,11
(3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

10. If the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity,
the claimant is not disabled and the sequential evaluation
proceeds no further. Substantial gainful activity is work that
“involves doing significant and productive physical or mental
duties” and “is done (or intended) for pay or profit.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.910.
11.
The determination of whether a claimant has any severe
impairments, at step two of the sequential evaluation process, is
a threshold test. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920©. If a claimant has no
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits the claimant’s physical or mental abilities to perform
basic work activities, the claimant is “not disabled” and the
evaluation process ends at step two. Id. If a claimant has any
severe impairments, the evaluation process continues. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(d)-(g). Furthermore, all medically determinable
impairments, severe and non-severe, are considered in the
subsequent steps of the sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.923 and 416.945(a)(2). An impairment significantly limits
a claimant’s physical or mental abilities when its effect on the
claimant to perform basic work activities is more than slight or
minimal. Basic work activities include the ability to walk,
stand, sit, lift, carry, push, pull, reach, climb, crawl, and
handle. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(b). An individual’s basic mental or
non-exertional abilities include the ability to understand, carry
out and remember simple instructions, and respond appropriately
to supervision, coworkers and work pressures. 20 C.F.R. §
416.945©.
10

equals the requirements of a listed impairment,12 (4) has the
residual functional capacity to return to his or her past work and
(5) if not, whether he or she can perform other work in the
national economy. Id.

As part of step four the administrative law

judge must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity.
Id.13
Residual functional capacity is the individual’s maximum
remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary
work setting on a regular and continuing basis.

See Social

Security Ruling 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34475 (July 2, 1996). A
regular and continuing basis contemplates full-time employment and
is defined as eight hours a day, five days per week or other
similar schedule. The residual functional capacity assessment must
include a discussion of the individual’s abilities.

Id; 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.945; Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 359 n.1 (“‘Residual functional
capacity’ is defined as that which an individual is still able to
do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).”).

12. If the claimant has an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment, the
claimant is disabled. If the claimant does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listed
impairment, the sequential evaluation process proceeds to the
next step.
13. If the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do
his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.
11

DISCUSSION
The administrative law judge at step one of the
sequential evaluation process found that Coleman had not engaged
in substantial gainful work activity since March 19, 2007, the
date the application for benefits was filed. Tr. 15.
At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the
administrative law judge found that Coleman had the severe
impairment of back pain. Tr. 15.

In so finding the administrative

law judge stated as follows; “The medical expert, Dr. Haddon
Alexander, who is board certified in rheumatology and internal
medicine, testified after reviewing the medical records that back
pain was the only impairment established in the record. He
testified that the claimant had single cell carcinoma of the anal
canal in 2004, but there are no residuals.” Tr. 15.
At step three of the sequential evaluation process the
administrative law judge found that Coleman’s impairments did not
individually or in combination meet or equal a listed impairment.
Tr. 16.
At step four of the sequential evaluation process the
administrative law judge found that Coleman had no past relevant
employment. Tr. 18. The administrative law judge further found
that Coleman had the residual functional capacity to perform a
limited range of medium work. Tr. 16.

12

Specifically, the

administrative law judge found that Coleman could perform medium
work to the extent that
he can occasionally use foot/leg controls with the
bilateral (sic)14 left lower extremity, climb stairs,
stoop, kneel, crouch and reach overhead with the
bilateral upper extremities. He can never climb ropes,
ladders, scaffolding or poles or crawl. He can have
occasional exposure to extreme outside weather. He can
never have his left lower extremity exposed to vibrating
objects or surfaces, work in high exposed places or
work around fast moving machinery on the ground.
Tr. 16.

In finding that Coleman could perform a limited range of

medium work, the administrative law judge relied primarily on the
testimony of Dr. Alexander and rejected the opinions of Stuart A.
Hartman, D.O., a physician who treated Coleman on approximately
seven occasions from July 28, 2007, to February 3, 2009, and Brian
F. D’Eramo, D.O., a physician who examined Coleman on behalf of
the Bureau of Disability Determination. Tr. 336-339 and 356-400.
Both Dr. Hartman and Dr. D’Eramo provided functional assessments
that limited Coleman to less than a limited range of medium work.
The administrative law judge explained his rejection of the
opinions of those two physicians as follows:
The claimant alleges disability due to back problems
and cancer. He reports chronic pain. The claimant
testified as follows: Since the last hearing, he had

14. The insertion of the word “bilateral” is a typographical
error because when questioning the vocational expert the
administrative law judge only stated “foot and leg pedals or
levers with the left lower extremity is limited to occasionally.”
Tr. 57.
13

his gallbladder removed, but has recovered. He cannot
lift 50 pounds. His back, buttocks and legs are
not getting any better. He is taking methadone
and his dose has increased since the last hearing.
*
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
In terms of the claimant’s alleged back pain, the
claimant is generally credible but not to the extent
of the limitations alleged. His allegations are not
supported by the signs, findings and observable
phenomena. The degree of treatment is inconsistent
with his complaints. Since the amended onset date,
he has not had hospitalizations, physical therapy,
chiropractic treatments or TENS unit. There is no
indication that he needs surgery.
As stated by Dr. Alexander, there is no imaging
which provides a basis for his pain complaints. . .
The doctor noted that Dr. D’Eramo indicated that the
claimant could stand and walk 5 hours and then have
a rest period. However, Dr. Alexander believes he
could stand and walk 6 hours. Dr. Alexander noted
that at the examination with Dr. Hartman on December
2, 2008, the claimant had an antalgic gait on the left.
However, Dr. Hartman does not state there is atrophy.
Dr. Alexander does not know how to interpret that
strength was 75% good, which was then described as
abnormal because minimal weakness is not significant.
Muscle testing of the other leg was 5/5. At this
exam, the claimant also had numbness on the outside
of the leg, which was not corroborated by the
consultative evaluation, who found muscle strength
at 5/5 and reflexes at 2+. He also had muscle
tightness.
As for the opinion evidence, Dr. Alexander testified
that the opinion of Dr. Hartman in April 2008 for
light work is too restrictive and not consistent with
the other records (Exhibit 9F). The opinion of Dr.
D’Eramo was also too restrictive in part, as he does
not understand the restriction for pushing and pulling
with the upper extremities or with the limitation for
temperature extremes.
*

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14

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The undersigned notes that the claimant had back
surgery in 1993 and had no treatment for over 10
years. There is no imaging to support a worsening
of his condition since that time. Despite the
finding of Dr. Hartman, the doctor stated that he
could shop, travel with a companion, ambulate
without a wheelchair, walker, canes or crutches,
walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or
uneven surfaces, use public transportation, climb
a few steps, prepare a meal, care for personal
hygiene and sort, handle and use paper/files. Although
the claimant has a limp, he does not need a cane to
ambulate.
The claimant does not have a good work history even
prior to the back surgery. He always lived off his
girlfriend which makes it questionable as to whether
he really has a motivation to work. On his function
report, he stated that he could do cleaning and
laundry and shop at the grocery store.
Tr.17-18.

Dr. Alexander testified that Coleman could lift and

carry and push and pull fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five
pounds frequently, sit for six hours in an eight hour workday and
stand and walk for six hours in and eight hour workday.

Tr. 32

and 36-39. Coleman also could balance, climb stairs but not ropes,
ladders, scaffolding or poles; he could occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch, squat and crawl but he could not operate rapidly moving
machinery or work at heights. Id.

Dr. Alexander testified that

Coleman had the ability to stand and walk an entire workday with
reasonable breaks and sit for six hours with normal breaks. Tr.

15

36.

Dr. Alexander’s testimony is consistent with the functional

requirements of a limited range of medium work.15

15. The terms sedentary, light and medium work are defined in
the Social Security regulations as follows:
(a) Sedentary work. Sedentary work involves lifting no
more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting
or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and
small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as
one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking
and standing is often necessary in carrying out job
duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are
required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are
met.
(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more
than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even
though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is
in this category when it requires a good deal of
walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most
of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg
controls. To be considered capable of performing a
full or wide range of light work, you must have the
ability to do substantially all of these activities.
If someone can do light work, we determine that he or
she can also do sedentary work, unless there are
additional limiting factors such as loss of fine
dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time.
© Medium work. Medium work involves lifting no more
than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. If
someone can do medium work, we determine that he or she
can do sedentary and light work.
20 C.F.R. § 416.967.

16

At step five, the administrative law judge based on a
residual functional capacity of a limited range of medium work as
described above and the testimony of a vocational expert found
that Coleman had the ability to perform work as a battery stacker,
mail clerk and food and beverage order clerk, and that there were
a significant number of such jobs in the state and national
economies. Tr. 19.
The administrative record in this case is 400 pages in
length, primarily consisting of medical and vocational records.
Coleman’s primary argument is that the administrative law judge
erred by failing to accept the opinions of Dr. Hartman and Dr.
D’Eramo and by not appropriately assessing Coleman’s
credibility.16

He also argues that the Appeals Council should

16. Coleman also argues that (1) the administrative law judge
did not comply with the Appeals Council’s remand order of
September 12, 2008, (2) there is a lack of evidence supporting
the existence of other jobs that he can perform, (3) the
administrative law judge did not evaluate appropriately the
testimony of Coleman’s girlfriend, and (4) the administrative law
judge erred by failing to find that Coleman was disabled under a
Medical-Vocational Rule (the “Grids”). These arguments lack
merit. The administrative law judge adequately complied with the
remand order by calling a medical expert to testify at the second
hearing; the testimony of the vocational expert supports the
existence of other jobs Coleman can perform; Coleman’s girlfriend
testified at the first administrative hearing and the testimony
was relatively brief and does not add much to the discussion of
Coleman’s credibility; and the issue of whether Coleman met the
requirements of a Medical-Vocational Rule is subsumed within the
issue of whether the administrative law judge appropriately
rejected the opinions of Dr. Hartman and Dr. D’Eramo.
17

have remanded the case to the administrative law judge based on an
MRI of Coleman’s lumbar spine conducted in February, 2009, after
the administrative law judge issued her decision.

We have

thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and find no merit in
Coleman’s arguments.

The administrative law judge did an adequate

job of reviewing Coleman’s vocational history and medical records
in his decision. Tr. 15-19.

Furthermore, the brief submitted by

the Commissioner thoroughly reviews the medical and vocational
evidence in this case. Doc. 12, Brief of Defendant.
Because the administrative law judge adequately reviewed
the medical evidence in her decision we will only comment on a few
items.
The Court of Appeals for this circuit has set forth the
standard for evaluating the opinion of a treating physician in
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000).

The Court of

Appeals stated in relevant part as follows:
A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility
determinations is that the ALJ accord treating
physicians’ reports great weight, especially “when
their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a
continuing observation of the patient’s condition
over a prolonged period of time.” . . . The ALJ
must consider the medical findings that support a
treating physician’s opinion that the claimant is
disabled. In choosing to reject the treating
physician’s assessment, an ALJ may not make
“speculative inferences from medical reports” and
may reject “a treating physician’s opinion outright
only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence”
and not due to his or her own credibility judgments,
18

speculation or lay opinion.
Id. at 317-18 (internal citations omitted). The administrative law
judge is required to evaluate every medical opinion received. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).
The social security regulations specify that the opinion
of a treating physician may be accorded controlling weight only
when it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the case. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2); SSR 96-2p.

Likewise, an administrative law judge

is not obliged to accept the testimony of a claimant if it is not
supported by the medical evidence.

An impairment, whether

physical or mental, must be established by “medical evidence
consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings,” and not
just by the claimant’s subjective statements.
404.1508 (2007).

20 C.F.R. §

In this case the administrative law judge

appropriately considered the contrary medical opinion of Dr.
Alexander and the objective medical evidence and concluded that
the opinion of Dr. Hartman was not adequately supported by
objective medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms and
laboratory findings.

The administrative law judge gave an

adequate explanation for rejecting the opinion of Dr. Hartman, the
treating physician.

19

As for Dr. D’Eramo the law does not accord the opinions
of non-treating, consultative physicians any special preference.
The administrative law judge gave an adequate explanation for
concluding that Dr. D’Eramo’s assessment was too restrictive.
Coleman argues that the administrative law judge
inappropriately assessed his credibility. The administrative law
judge was not required to accept Coleman’s claims of completely
debilitating pain. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873
(3d Cir. 1983)(providing that credibility determinations as to a
claimant’s testimony regarding the claimant’s limitations are for
the administrative law judge to make).

It is well-established

that “an [administrative law judge’s] findings based on the
credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and
deference, particularly since [the administrative law judge] is
charged with the duty of observing a witness’s demeanor . . . .”
Walters v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 127 f.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir. 1997); see also Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991)(“We defer to the ALJ as trier
of fact, the individual optimally positioned to observe and assess
the witness credibility.”).

Because the administrative law judge

observed Coleman when he testified at the hearings on June 5,
2008, and January 7, 2009, the administrative law judge is the one
best suited to assess the credibility of Coleman.

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The administrative law judge appropriately took into
account Coleman’s limitations in his residual functional capacity
assessment.

She limited him to a range of medium work.

The

testimony of Dr. Alexander, the objective medical evidence and
Coleman’s activities of daily living do not support Coleman’s
claim of totally debilitating pain. The administrative law judge
appropriately evaluated Coleman’s credibility.
After the administrative law judge issued her decision,
Coleman’s attorney submitted further evidence to the Appeals
Council.

Evidence submitted after the administrative law judge’s

decision cannot be used to argue that the administrative law
judge’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 594-595 (3d Cir. 2001).

The only

purpose for which such evidence can be considered is to determine
whether it provides a basis for remand under sentence 6 of section
405(g), 42 U.S.C.

Szubak v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,

745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984).

Under sentence 6 of section

405(g) the evidence must be “new” and “material” and a claimant
must show “good cause” for not having incorporated the evidence
into the administrative record. Id.
The evidence submitted by Coleman to the Appeals Council
was an MRI of his lumbar spine conducted on February 10, 2009.
Tr. 394.

This evidence is not new and material and Coleman has

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not established “good cause” for failing to submit the evidence in
a timely fashion.

No explanation is given as to why Dr. Hartman,

his treating physician, did not order an MRI in April, 2008, when
Dr. Hartman opined that Coleman was functionally limited because
of back pain. Tr. 374-380. We are not convinced that the evidence
is material. The MRI does not show spinal or nerve root
compression, both sources of possible pain. Although the MRI does
show degenerative disc disease a possible source of pain,

the

administrative law judge found that Coleman’s back pain was a
severe impairment which limited him to less than the full range of
medium work. Finally, Coleman has the option to file a new
application for supplemental security income benefits based on
this alleged new evidence.17
Our review of the administrative record reveals that the
decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.
We will, therefore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.

17. Supplemental security income is a needs based program and
eligibility for this benefits is not limited based on an
applicant’s date last insured.
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An appropriate order will be entered.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
WILLIAM W. CALDWELL
United States District Judge

Dated: September 2, 2011

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EARL STANLEY COLEMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff
vs.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant

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No. 4:10-CV-01842
(Judge Caldwell)

ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of

the Commissioner and against Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., as set
forth in the following paragraph.
2.

The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying Earl Stanley Coleman, Jr., supplemental security income
benefits is affirmed.
3.

The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
WILLIAM W. CALDWELL
United States District Judge
Dated: September 2, 2011

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