Smith v. Donate et al

Filing 136

MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiffs motion to compel (Doc. 115 ) is GRANTED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs motion to compel is construed as a motion to enlarge the discovery period in this action only with respect to the two final interrogatories propounded upon defendant Shanley. 2. Defendant Shanley shall respond to the final two interrogatories within 20 days from the date of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on December 20, 2011. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALAN SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JANINE DONATE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 4:10-CV-2133

(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this action, plaintiff Alan Smith, a state inmate who was previously held

in the custody of the Lackawanna County Prison, has sued 14 individuals who
were either employed by, or otherwise provided services to, the prison during the
period Smith was housed there. Plaintiff alleges that these 14 defendants violated
his constitutional rights by subjecting him to harassment, excessive force, and
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during his incarceration.
Thirteen of the defendants are represented by a single lawyer, whereas Defendant
Zologa, who allegedly provided medical services to the prison, is represented by
separate counsel.
Now pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant
Shanley to respond to two interrogatories seeking (1) the names of witnesses or

staff identified or involved in a Lackawanna County Prison incident report dated
November 21, 2008 and (2) the names of the trainees listed in the same incident
report. (Doc. 115) Plaintiff has supported the motion with a brief in support (Doc.
116), in which he recites the necessity for the information sought, provides details
explaining the conditions of his custody in state prison that have impaired his
ability to prepare documents in this litigation, and asserting his belief that the
discovery that he seeks to compel in this motion was timely filed in accordance
with the case management deadlines governing this action. (Doc. 116) Defendants
have filed a brief in opposition to the motion, in which they simply maintain that
the two interrogatories propounded upon defendant Shanley were served after the
discovery deadline had expired, and therefore no response was due. (Doc. 121)
Plaintiff has filed a reply brief in further support of the motion. (Doc. 134) Upon
consideration, we will treat the motion to compel as a motion to enlarge the
discovery deadlines to permit plaintiff to propound the two final interrogatories
upon defendant Shanley, and we will grant such limited relief.
II.

DISCUSSION
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant

discovery dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
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(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected
persons, a party may move for an order compelling
disclosure or discovery. . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense — including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court's discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
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“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to
the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of
the court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987).
Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to
compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of
an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.
1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate
Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly
broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See
Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group
Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J.1997). When a
magistrate judge’s decision involves a discretionary
[discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly
becomes an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa.2004)
(citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.Supp. 501,
502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v.
Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous.
Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that
discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold,
Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a
magistrate judge's resolution of discovery disputes deserves
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substantial deference and should be reversed only if there
is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97590, 2010 WL
3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26’s broad definition of that which can be obtained
through discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still
cabin and restrict the court's discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore,
the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a
concept which is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth.,
203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party
resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by
demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad
scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such
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marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would
outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane
Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D. Kan. 2009).
Mindful of the foregoing legal considerations governing motions to compel,
we begin by noting as a threshold factual matter that Plaintiff appears to have
misread the revised case management order that was entered in this action, and as a
result erroneously believed that the discovery deadline had been extended until
November 17, 2011, rather than to October 17, 2011. (Doc. 82) (establishing, inter
alia, October 17, 2011, as the discovery cutoff.)1
Notwithstanding this apparent error, it also appears from Plaintiff’s
submissions that in October and November of this year, he experienced a variety of
limitations on his right of access to prison law libraries, and attendant challenges to
his ability to work meaningfully on this litigation, owing at least in part to changes
to his housing classification status and his transfers between two or more state
correctional institutions. (Doc. 116, Ex. A) Defendants have not disputed
plaintiff’s representations in this regard.

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We note that this revised case management order was entered upon
consideration of plaintiff’s own motion, which sought to enlarge the discovery
deadline until October 28, 2011. (Doc. 80)
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Turning to the substantive basis for the requested relief, we note that the
interrogatories that are the subject of the motion are especially discrete, seeking
information that is expressly limited in scope. Indeed, the interrogatories seek only
the names of witnesses and staff who were identified or involved in the
Lackawanna County Prison incident report dated November 21, 2008, and the
names of the trainees listed in the same report. (Doc. 116, Ex. B) Plaintiff has
represented that the requested discovery is relevant to his claims in this action, and
defendants have not disputed the relevance of the information requested.
Given the limited nature of the relief sought, the challenges plaintiff appears
to have encountered during October and November of this year with respect to
being able to work on this litigation, and in further consideration of the fact that
defendants have not objected to the requested discovery on substantive grounds,
but instead solely because the interrogatories were propounded after the October
17, 2011 discovery cutoff, we find it in the interests of justice to construe the
motion to compel liberally as a motion for a final enlargement of time to complete
discovery, and we will grant such relief.

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III.

ORDER
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT

plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 115) is GRANTED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel is construed as a motion to enlarge the
discovery period in this action only with respect to the two final
interrogatories propounded upon defendant Shanley.

2.

Defendant Shanley shall respond to the final two interrogatories
within 20 days from the date of this Order.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: December 20, 2011

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