Hynoski et al v. Colulmbia County Redevelopment Authority et al

Filing 125

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 7/24/13. (lg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BONNIE HYNOSKI,
STEPHEN HYNOSKI,
CHRISTINE HYNOSKI,
TOM HYNOSKI,
THE BOROUGH OF CENTRALIA,
HAROLD MERVINE,
JOHN KOSCHOFF,
HELEN HYNOSKI AND
WALTER HYNOSKI,

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Plaintiffs
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v.
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COLUMBIA COUNTY
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REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, :
ROSENN JENKINS
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AND GREENWALD, LLP,
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JOHN T ZELINKA, GARY TAROLI,:
BLASCHAK COAL CORP.,
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STEVEN FISHMAN,
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COMMONWEALTH OF
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PENNSYLVANIA,
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DEPT. OF COMMUNITY AND
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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AND C. ALAN WALKER,
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Defendants.
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Case No. 4:10-CV-2222

(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
July 24, 2013
This civil action, brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
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U.S.C. § 1983, and commenced on October 27, 2010, proceeds on the Amended
Complaint and arises from eminent domain proceedings conducted in Pennsylvania
state court. Before the Court is Defendant Columbia County Redevelopment
Authority’s (“CCRA”), Motion for Reconsideration. May 3, 2013, ECF No. 115.
For the reasons discussed herein, the motion will be denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
The facts giving rise to the instant litigation are fully set forth in this Court’s

April 19, 2013 Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motions to
dismiss. ECF No. 114. In 1962, an underground mine fire was discovered in the
Borough of Centralia, Columbia County, Pennsylvania. Despite voluntary and
involuntary relocation programs spanning over two decades, Plaintiffs continue to
believe that the underground mine fire never posed a threat to the health or safety
of its residents, but was instead used as a pretext to justify removing all residents
from the land under which the fire burned, and allow access to billions of dollars
worth of coal which could then be mined by defendant Blaschack. See Amd.
Compl. ¶¶ 44-45, ECF No. 54.
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiffs’ due process, equal
protection, and First Amendment rights. ECF No. 54. After considering four
motions to dismiss, the Court ultimately dismissed eight Plaintiffs and six

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Defendants from this action. ECF No. 114. CCRA, one of only two remaining
Defendants, has filed a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 115) of the Court’s
ruling on its motion to dismiss (ECF No. 35). Specifically, CCRA asks the Court
to reconsider its decision that Defendant is not immune from suit under either the
Eleventh Amendment or the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act,
42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 et seq.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

LEGAL STANDARDS

“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki,
779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). A judgment may be altered or amended if the
party seeking reconsideration establishes at least one of the following grounds: “(1)
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that
was not available when the court granted the motion ...; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Max's Seafood Café, by
Lou Ann, Inc., v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). “A motion for
reconsideration is not to be used as a means to reargue matters already argued and
disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of disagreement between the Court
and the litigant.” Ogden v. Keystone Residence, 226 F.Supp.2d 588, 606 (M.D.

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Pa. Oct. 2002) (McClure, J.) “[R]econsideration motions may not be used to raise
new arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Hill v. Tammac Corp., No. 05 1148, 2006 WL 529044, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 2006) (Kane, J.) citing McDowell Oil Service, Inc. v. Interstate Fire and Cas.
Co., 817 F.Supp. 538, 540 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (McClure, J.)
In the case at bar, Defendant claims that revisiting the April 19, 2013 Order
is necessary to correct a “clear error of law.” Def. Mot. to Recons., May 3, 2013,
ECF No. 115.
B.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendant admits that its claim to immunity from suit was not propounded
or argued in its brief accompanying the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 65), but only
appears in paragraph twelve (12) of the motion itself (ECF No. 35). The Court did
not consider this passing reference to an immunity argument for the same reason
that the motion for reconsideration will be denied – because it is without merit.
CCRA claims that the Court’s acknowledgment that Defendant is a “state
actor for purposes of § 1983 liability” serves to confirm its immunity from suit as a
state under the Eleventh Amendment. Defendant confuses what it means to be a
“state actor” subject to liability under § 1983 and who is a state entity for Eleventh
Amendment purposes. The two are not co-extensive. Indeed, they could not be or

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no party could ever be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The former is a prerequisite for liability to attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
that only persons acting “under color of state law” can be held liable for
constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This does not, however, include
states (see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997)), their
agencies (see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990)), or purely private parties
(see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982)). It is the Eleventh
Amendment which bars the liability of states and their agencies.
The CCRA, by contrast, is a “municipal authority created pursuant to the
Municipal Authorities Act of 1945.” Def. Mot. for Recons. 8, May 3, 2013, ECF
No. 116. While the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945 was repealed and rewritten
in 2001, (see 53 P.S. § 301 et seq., 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 5602), the controlling statute
continues to define a “municipal authority” as “the body or board authorized by
law to enact ordinances or adopt resolutions for the particular municipality” and
includes those authorities which were created under the Municipal Authorities Act
of 1945. 53 Pa. C.S.A. § 5602. In this case, that municipality is Columbia County
and the pertinent authority is the CCRA. As such, CCRA is specifically granted
the power, inter alia, of eminent domain and to sue and be sued. 53 Pa. C.S.A. §
5607(d)(2),(15).

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Defendant agrees with the allegations in the Amended Complaint that CCRA
is a “municipal creature for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” but fails to appreciate
that municipalities, while “state actors,” are not “states” which are shielded by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Def. Mot. for Recons. 9, May 3, 2013, ECF
No. 116. In fact, as Plaintiffs point out, municipalities may be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 by way of the theory of liability enumerated in Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct.
2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipal liability must rest on the actions of the
municipality by way of a policy, regulation or decision, and not on the actions of
the employees of the municipality).
Defendant’s reliance on the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims
Act is also misplaced. As its name makes clear, immunity under this Act applies
only to tort claims. The instant litigation, and the claim asserted against CCRA,
arises from the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which this
Court exercises federal question jurisdiction. Accordingly, the state law to which
Defendant cites is inapplicable to these claims.
In its Reply Brief to the Motion for Reconsideration, CCRA raises, for the
first time, an argument that the Amended Complaint fails to properly plead a claim
against it for municipal liability. ECF No. 124. Regardless of its merits,

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Defendant offers no reason why this argument could not have been raised in its
motion to dismiss filed on December 29, 2010. Because such an argument is
entirely legal in nature, there are no new facts or evidence that might warrant
review in a motion for reconsideration. In fact, it appears as though Defendant
merely neglected to include this argument in its motion to dismiss and became
aware of its omission only when Plaintiffs alluded to the municipal liability issue
in their Opposition Brief. ECF No. 122.
As noted above, this is not the proper purpose of a motion for
reconsideration. See McDowell Oil Service, Inc., 817 F.Supp. at 541 (motion is
not to be used as a means to put forward additional arguments which it could have
made but neglected to make before judgment). Accordingly, the Court does not
consider Defendant’s argument that the Amended Complaint fails to properly plead
municipal liability and will deny the motion.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant CCRA’s Motion for

Reconsideration will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

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s/Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

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