Shelton v. Bledsoe et al
Filing
257
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Malachy E Mannion on 7/7/17. (bs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NORMAN N. SHELTON,
:
:
Plaintiff
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11-0368
:
v
:
(JUDGE MANNION)
WARDEN BLEDSOE, et al.,
:
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude
evidence of previous lawsuits and complaints, including any settlements,
administrative remedies, internal Bureau of Prisons complaints, federal
complaints or other executive agency complaints filed against them or the
United States, (Doc. 228); and Plaintiff’s motions in limine to exclude evidence
of Plaintiff’s alleged prison misconduct, (Doc. 230), evidence of Plaintiff’s
other lawsuits, (Doc. 232); evidence of Plaintiff’s criminal convictions, (Doc.
234), evidence of Plaintiff’s religions, including portions of the videotape
debriefing showing Plaintiff praying, (Doc. 236); evidence of other
administrative grievances filed by Plaintiff, (Doc. 238); and to exclude video
and other evidence of September 22, 2010 use of force incident, (Doc. 248).
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion in
limine and GRANT, in part, and DENY, in part, Plaintiff’s motions in limine.
I.
BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2011, Norman N. Shelton, an inmate confined in the
United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg (“USP-Lewisburg”), Pennsylvania, filed
the above captioned Bivens1 action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331. Named as
Defendants were thirty-two (32) employees of USP-Lewisburg. Shelton raises
claims of deliberate indifference to his safety and excessive use of force with
regard to events surrounding an alleged August 29, 2010 assault upon him
by his cellmate, and claims regarding his resulting medical care. (Doc. 1,
complaint). In addition, Shelton generally alleges racial discrimination by staff
and complains of various forms of mistreatment, including “corporal
punishment,” the use of restraints, harassment, and being deprived of water,
lights and sleep. Id.
Acting on a series of motions to amend/correct his complaint, the Court,
by Order dated June 30, 2011, permitted Shelton an opportunity to file an
amended complaint. (See Doc. 55). To that end, Shelton was provided with
two copies of this Court’s civil-rights complaint form. Id.
1
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
2
On July 11, 2011, Shelton filed two completed civil-rights complaint
forms with the Court, both captioned with the docket number in this case.
(See Docs. 58, 60). Along with the complaints, Shelton filed a brief in support
of his amended complaints. (Doc. 59).
On August 10, 2011, upon review of Shelton’s amended complaint, the
following Order was issued:
1.
The Clerk of Court is directed to extract pages 1 - 4
from Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. 58),
consider them as the amended complaint of record,
file and docket them as same.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to return the remaining
sixteen pages of the first amended complaint (Doc.
58) to the Plaintiff.
3.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is permitted to proceed
with respect to Defendants, Correctional Officers
Raup and Whittaker, Lieutenants Heath and Galletta,
and Medical Examiner Potter. The remainder of the
Defendants are to be dismissed from the instant
action.
4.
The Clerk of Court is directed to serve Plaintiff’s
amended complaint on the five (5) Defendants named
therein.
5.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Doc. 60) is
STRICKEN from the record as duplicative of the first
three pages of Plaintiff’s first amended complaint.
6.
Defendants’ motion for enlargement of time to
respond to the amended complaint, (Doc. 61) is
3
GRANTED.
7.
Defendants may respond to the amended complaint within sixty (60) days
after service of the amended complaint.
8.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment, directed at Plaintiff’s original
complaint, (Doc. 42) is DISMISSED as moot.
9.
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (Doc. 50) and
motion requesting issuance of subpoena (Doc. 62)
are DENIED.
(Doc. 74, Order).
As a result of the Court’s August 10, 2011 Order, the following claims
contained in Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 58) were permitted to
proceed:
On August 30, 2009, [Plaintiff] was “forced to go into a cell with a
gang member against [his] will”. The gang member and [Plaintiff]
“told the officials that it would not work out between [them]”.
On cell rotation of August 30, 2009, “[Plaintiff] was placed in
handcuffs and inmate Graham #11510-031 began assaulting
[Plaintiff] with multiple punches and kicks to [his] face and body”.
SMU officials stood there and watch for a whole three minutes
and did nothing to stop it. Once inmate stopped, C/O Raup, C/O
Whittaker and Lt. Heath came into the cell and “slammed
[Plaintiff] to the ground while [he] was cuffed behind [his] back,
after they sprayed [him] in the face with gas”.
Defendant Lt. Heath, “act[ing] intentionally and purposefully
place[d] her knee on the back of Plaintiff’s neck, cutting off his
breathing”.
4
C/O Whittaker “slammed Plaintiff to the floor while Plaintiff was
passively and handcuffed behind his back and Defendant
Whittaker punched and kicked Plaintiff in his left side of his body.”
C/O Raup “punched [and] kicked Plaintiff in his right side of his
body” and “Plaintiff could not breath and yelled he could not get
any air.” The gas was “burning Plaintiff’s skin on his face, neck
and back and Defendant C/O Raup stated we want you to suffer,
we don’t care if you can breath.”
Defendant Potter “witnesse[ed] Plaintiff’s wounds that he
sustained and the actual injury and the nature of his damages and
refuse to give Plaintiff any medical care or medicine for the pain
he was in.”
Lt. Galletta “attack[ed] and assault[ed] Plaintiff out of view of the
surveillance tv, punched and slamm[ed] Plaintiff up against the
wall” and “placing [him] in restraints.”
(Doc. 58, Amended Complaint). For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and
punitive damages for Defendants’ “excessive use of force, denial of medical
care” and “racial discrimination.” Id.
By Memorandum and Order dated February 14, 2012, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment was granted and the case was closed. (Docs.
136, 137).
On February 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed an appeal from the Court’s
Memorandum and Order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. (Doc. 141).
In an Opinion filed April 23, 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed
5
Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claim and affirmed the remainder of the
Court’s February 14, 2012 Order. (Doc. 147, Opinion).11 Thus, the only claim
that remains for trial is Plaintiff’s excessive use of force claim, alleging that
Defendants Whittaker, Heath, Raup, and Galletta used excessive force in
subduing Plaintiff Norman Shelton. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that on August
30, 2009, after his cellmate attacked him, Lieutenant Heath placed her knee
on the back of Plaintiff’s neck, cutting of his breathing; Officer Whitaker
slammed him to the floor and punched and kicked him on the left side of his
body; Officer Raup punched and kicked him on the right side of his body; and
Lieutenant Galletta punched and kicked him up against the wall.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of evidence at
trial. In considering motions in limine, “[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence can
aptly be characterized as evidentiary rules of inclusion, which are designed
to broadly permit fact-finders to consider pertinent factual information while
searching for the truth.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 268 F.R.D.
190, 196 (M.D. Pa. 2010). All relevant evidence is admissible unless
otherwise stated by the Constitution, statue or other Federal Rules.
FED.R.EVID. 402; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579,
11
On November 3, 2016, the above captioned action was reassigned to
the undersigned for trial.
587 (1993) (noting that the “[b]asic standard of relevance under Federal Rules
of Evidence is a liberal one.”). Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has
“any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” FED.R.EVID. 401. Evidence that is not relevant is not
admissible. FED.R.EVID. 402.
Pursuant to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court may
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED.R.EVID. 403; see also Sprint/United
Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 382 (2008); Coleman v. Home
Depot Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1343–44 (3d Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit has
cautioned that the exclusion of potentially relevant evidence pursuant to Rule
403 is an “extreme measure” at the pre-trial stage. Hines v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 274 (3d Cir.1991). Evidence should rarely be excluded
in limine pursuant to Rule 403 because “[a] court cannot fairly ascertain the
potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record
relevant to the putatively objectionable evidence.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir.1999).
Pursuant to Rule 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, character
7
evidence is generally not admissible to prove conduct. In particular, “evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” FED.R.EVID. 404(b).
Other crimes, wrongs or acts are admissible, however, to prove motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, and plan. Id.
In a closely related vein, but contrary to the general rule on character
evidence, evidence of habit or routine practice is admissible to prove that the
conduct of a person on a particular occasion is in conformity with the habit or
routine practice. FED.R.EVID. 406; see also FED.R.EVID. 406 advisory
committee notes (1972) (“Character and habit are close akin.”). Habit is
described as one’s regular response to a repeated, specific situation. See
Becker v. ARCO Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 204 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting
FED.R.EVID. 406 advisory committee notes (1972)); see also id. (‘The doing
of the habitual acts may become semiautomatic.’).
Finally, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the
admissibility of a witness’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes.
Pursuant to Rule 609(a), for purposes of attacking the character for
truthfulness of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
felony “shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403 ... if the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the accused.” FED.R.EVID. 609(a)(1). In analyzing conviction evidence, the
8
court must engage in a “genuine balancing” of probative value and prejudicial
effect. Tabron v. Grace, 898 F.Supp. 293, 297 (M.D.Pa.1995). Important
considerations include “the nature of the convictions, the time that has
elapsed since conviction, the importance of credibility to the underlying claim,
and the potential for prejudice from admitting the convictions.” Id. at 295.
A conviction more than ten years old (measured from the date of
conviction or release from confinement for the conviction, whichever is later),
is generally not admissible “unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances substantial outweighs its prejudicial effect.” FED.R.EVID.
609(b). Thus, convictions over ten years old are only to be admitted in
exceptional circumstances and the Rule 403 balancing is reversed. Whereas
under Rule 403 unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the evidence's
probative value, for convictions over ten years old, the probative value of the
conviction must substantially outweigh the prejudicial effect.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Defendants’ motion in limine
Defendants seek to exclude evidence of previous complaints and
lawsuits, including any settlements, administrative remedies, internal Bureau
of Prison complaints, federal complaints or other executive agency complaints
9
filed against them or the United States. (Doc. 229). Defendants believe that
such evidence constitutes improper character evidence under FED.R.EVID.
404; is irrelevant and prejudicial; and would cause undue delay in the
proceedings. Id.
While Plaintiff agrees to exclude evidence that Defendants provided
during discovery regarding prior lawsuits and administrative remedies, Plaintiff
opposes Defendants’ motion to the extent it seeks to exclude “yet to be
identified evidence of excessive force lawsuits and administrative complaints
against Defendants that were not provided by Defendants during discovery.”
(See Doc. 247). Plaintiff identifies the evidence sought through discovery is
as follows:
1.
The OIA investigative reports as to Defendants
Whittaker, Galletta, and Health produced to Plaintiff
on April 10, 2017 (DEF-00000508 to DEF-00000541),
which Defendants characterized as “completely
irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case” at
the time of production. Ex. A (Letter from Michael
Butler, AUSA, to Rose Marie Wong, Esq., dated Apr.
10, 2017).
2.
The evidence of previous administrative complaints
and lawsuits filed against Defendants disclosed by
Defendants during their depositions on March 7-8,
2017, and March 22-23, 2017.
Id. Plaintiff, however, is opposed to a broad exclusion of unidentified previous
complaints or lawsuits. Id.
10
Defendants reply, stating that no excessive force lawsuits were provided
during discovery, because no court has ever granted summary judgment to
any inmate against any of the named Defendants. (See Doc. 250). As such,
there are no applicable cases to satisfy the discovery request. Morever,
Defendants indicate that, as a showing of good faith, they agreed to provide
Plaintiff with five years of excessive force claims filed. Id. Thus, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks evidence of excessive force claims or lawsuits beyond the five
years, such request surpasses the agreement between counsel. Id.
After careful review of the motion and Plaintiff's response thereto, the
Court agrees that the following evidence should be excluded: evidence of all
previous lawsuits and complaints, including any settlements, administrative
remedies, internal Bureau of Prison complaints, federal complaints or other
executive agency complaints filed against them or the United States, that
exceeds the five year agreement between counsel. Such evidence is
irrelevant under FED.R.EVID. 401 and 402 to Plaintiff’s remaining claim of
excessive force because it does not have a tendency to make the existence
of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Even if such evidence were minimally relevant, that probative value
would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, and wasting time. See
Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thus, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
11
B.
Plaintiff’s motions in limine
1. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Alleged Prison Misconduct
Plaintiff seeks to exclude from introducing into evidence, questioning,
or argument, other acts of alleged misconduct by Plaintiff, including
disciplinary charges in connection with such misconduct, other than any
alleged misconduct during the August 30, 2009 incident at issue in this case.
(Doc. 231). Plaintiff believes that such evidence violates Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
and 403, and is irrelevant because Plaintiff’s alleged misconduct, and any
discipline resulting from those allegations, have no bearing on whether he
was the victim of excessive force at the hands of the Defendants on August
30, 2009. Id.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s disciplinary record demonstrates that
staff were dealing with a violent individual who they had to approach with
care. (Doc. 246). Specifically, because there is a dispute as to why
Defendants initially brought Plaintiff to the ground. Id. Plaintiff claims that he
was passive, while Defendants will testify that this was the SMU, and Plaintiff
was there because he was a violent offender and they knew SMU inmates
had lengthy disciplinary histories. Id. Defendants believed Plaintiff’s acts of
kicking and approaching the cell door were violent acts of a violent prisoner
and his actions of not going down and rocking back and forth were
aggressive. Id. In addition, Defendants argue that Shelton’s knowledge of the
12
officer’s responses based on his previous disciplinary history demonstrate that
he would be gassed or physically restrained when he acted accordingly. Id.
The Court finds that Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s past behavior
may be relevant to determine whether force used in this case “was applied in
a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). Among the factors considered in determining
whether force was properly applied is “the extent of the threat to the safety of
staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the
basis of the facts known.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
Considering this evidence in the context of the claims brought in this case, if
the individual corrections officers were aware of the Plaintiff’s prior
misconduct, propensity for violence, or disciplinary issues while incarcerated,
and this information helped to form a basis to assess the threat level that the
plaintiff presented, then “knowledge of such history would be relevant to the
inquiry as to whether the force used against plaintiff was reasonable under the
circumstances.” Smith v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 06-4312, 2009 WL
3353148, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2009) (claims of excessive force against
corrections officers) (citing Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir.
1980) (“If it can be established that the accused knew at the time of the
alleged crime of prior violent acts by the victim, such evidence is relevant as
13
tending to show a reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused.”)).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion will be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
Limited testimony on these matters will be permitted for this purpose to the
extent that these matters were known to the officers and informed their
judgment regarding the quantum of force needed in this case. However, the
Court finds that any use of the disciplinary record, outside of showing
Defendants knowledge and how that knowledge informed their decisions
regarding the use of force, is inadmissible character evidence, in violation of
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
2. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Other Lawsuits
Plaintiff argues that evidence of his other lawsuits would constitute
improper character evidence under Rule 404(a)(1) and, therefore, should be
excluded. (Doc. 233). Additionally, Plaintiff believes that because his other
lawsuits are not relevant to any of the issues in this case (i.e., whether
Plaintiff was the victim of excessive force on August 30, 2009), their
admission is also barred by Rules 401 and 402. Id. Finally, introduction of his
other suits would also present a danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403
because they might paint Plaintiff as a litigious person. Id.
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff claims that he has physical and
emotional injuries, and that he lacks trust of officers, any contact with officers
in which he claims that they injured him would be relevant to damages
14
because it may mitigate against his claim or provide evidence that his lack of
trust or physical injuries has a different proximate cause. (Doc. 245).
Moreover, Defendants claim that Plaintiff was found to have lied or
misrepresented facts to a court in Shelton v. Rohrs, 406 F. App’x 340, 340
(2010), denied it at his deposition and was not forthright with his complaints
in the instant matter. Id. Defendants believe that such actions go directly to
Plaintiff’s credibility, and they should be allowed to explore Plaintiff’s lack of
candor under oath as to this case and to the other courts. Id.
The court agrees with Plaintiff that the evidence is irrelevant if offered
to prove motive.
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 excludes irrelevant evidence from
admission at trial. Relevant evidence “means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 402. Here, Plaintiff’s motivation for his actions giving
rise to the suit, or for bringing the suit, are irrelevant to the issue of whether
Defendants used excessive force on August 30, 2009. Accordingly, evidence
of Plaintiff’s past lawsuits is irrelevant if offered by Defendants to prove
Plaintiff’s motive, and shall be inadmissible at trial for that purpose.
The Court also finds that evidence of Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits is not
relevant to negate Plaintiff's claim for emotional damages. The Defendants’
15
arguments to the contrary simply lack credence. Accordingly, Defendants may
not introduce evidence of Plaintiff’s other lawsuits. However, to the extent that
statements made during other lawsuits were found to be untrue, this goes to
Plaintiff’s credibility and if there is a good foundation to cross-examine Plaintiff
on such statements made in other lawsuits, the Defendants may use such
evidence. As such, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part.
3. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Criminal Convictions
On July 13, 1993, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
322 months, after having been convicted of conspiracy, bank robbery, armed
bank robbery, and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. (Doc. 235-1,
Plaintiff’s criminal docket). He was serving this sentence at the time he filed
the above captioned action on August 30, 2009. Id. He was released from
custody on April 14, 2017.2
Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence and inquiry about his prior criminal
convictions, including inquiry on cross-examination, under Rules 402, 403,
404, 608 and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 235). Plaintiff
argues that his convictions have no bearing on whether he was the victim of
excessive force while imprisoned at USP-Lewisburg on August 30, 2009 and,
therefore, are irrelevant. Id. In addition, Plaintiff claims that there is a
substantial danger that evidence relating to his prior convictions would be
2
See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
16
unfairly prejudicial to him and confuse the jury on the relevant issues in this
Bivens civil rights case. Id.
Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s convictions are relevant to
Defendants’ state of mind. (Doc. 244). Specifically, they claim that while
Plaintiff maintains that he was passive, Defendants will testify that they
believed Plaintiff’s actions of kicking and approaching the cell door were
violent acts of a violent prisoner, and his actions of not going down and
rocking back and forth were acts of aggression by an inmate housed in the
SMU, where violent offenders are located. Id.
Upon consideration of the parties’ competing positions on the relevance
and potential for prejudice resulting from Plaintiff’s impeachment through his
prior convictions, and mindful of the Third Circuit’s cautious approach to Rule
403 challenges, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion to wholly exclude
evidence of the his convictions should be denied for at least two reasons.
First, Rule 609(a) makes clear that evidence of felony convictions is indeed
relevant to a jury’s effective evaluation of witness credibility. Rule 609(a)
states that the evidence of a witness’s felony conviction “shall be admitted”
except for those instances where Rule 403 or the time limit of Rule 609(b)
demands otherwise. Rule 609 is based upon the “common sense proposition”
that an individual who has “transgressed society’s norms by committing a
felony is less likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath.” See
17
Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 523 (3d Cir. 1997). Its
purpose is to aid the jury in assessing the credibility of a witness. Id. In this
case, Plaintiff’s credibility will play a decisive role in the jury’s decision-making
process. In addition to Plaintiff’s credibility, is Defendants’ state of mind.
The Plaintiff has brought an excessive force claim against the
Defendants arising out of an August 30, 2009, incident in the prison. The
keystone to analysis of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim entails
issues of motivation–whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). Therefore, excessive force
claims often turn on factual disputes which cannot be resolved as a matter of
law. Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000). Consistent with this
fact-bound approach to litigation of these claims, there are several factual
considerations that a jury must examine in determining whether a correctional
officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
including: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force’; (2) ‘the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used’; (3) ‘the extent of
injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates,
as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts
known to them’; and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response.’ ” Id. at 106.
18
When considering such claims, the reasonableness of a particular use
of force is often dependent upon factual context and must be “judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-7 (1989).
Moreover, in the context of prison excessive force claims, in determining
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992), “even if we concede [that an inmate] has established
at most that prison officials over-reacted to the disturbance that he caused.
. . , any such over-reaction would still fall short of supporting a finding that
prison officials acted ‘maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Fuentes v.
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 2000).
Given this fact-bound approach, which examines “the extent of the
threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by
responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them,” Brooks v. Kyler,
204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000), an inmate’s known propensity for violence
would be pertinent to a determination of the quantum of force needed in a
correctional setting to restore or maintain order. Thus, this evidence is
relevant to the issues in this case since “relevant evidence,” is defined in
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
19
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
Considering this evidence in the context of the claims brought in this case, if
the individual corrections officers were aware of the Plaintiff’s prior criminal
conduct and propensity for violence while incarcerated, and this information
helped to form a basis to assess the threat level that the Plaintiff presented,
then “knowledge of such history would be relevant to the inquiry as to whether
the force used against plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances.”
Smith v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. A. No. 06-4312, 2009 WL 3353148, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2009) (claims of excessive force against corrections
officers) (citing Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 1980) (“If
it can be established that the accused knew at the time of the alleged crime
of prior violent acts by the victim, such evidence is relevant as tending to
show a reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused.”)).
However, to the extent this evidence is offered for purposes found to be
permissible, since it informs “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the
facts known to them,” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000,) it will
be admissible subject to the limitations imposed by Rules 402 and 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. This Rule 403 balancing of probative value and
prejudicial impact also cautions against permitting detailed testimony in this
case regarding the specifics of Shelton’s prior convictions, an approach
20
endorsed in the past by this court. See ” Womack v. Smith, 1:06-CV-2348,
2012 WL 1245752 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2012). Thus, in assessing the degree
of force that the defendants perceived was necessary on August 30, 2009,
“Defendants may testify to their knowledge that [Shelton] was convicted of
crimes of violence and the length of his sentences,” Womack v. Smith, 1:06CV-2348, 2012 WL 1245752 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2012), but Defendants may
not describe the specific nature of those offenses, unless Plaintiff opens the
door on direct examination. Thus the Court notes that this ruling is without
prejudice to Defendants’ right to revisit the issue upon the conclusion of
Shelton’s trial testimony. As such, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part, and
DENIED in part.
4. Evidence of Plaintiff’s Religion
Plaintiff seeks to exclude evidence and inquiry about his religious
background under Rules 402, 403, and 610 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(Doc. 237). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his religion played no role in the
excessive force claim that remains in this case, he does not allege that
Defendants were motivated by his religious background when they used
excessive force upon him, and given the anti-Muslim political climate that has
emerged since September 11, 2001, and the attacks carried out by terrorist
groups such as ISIS, there is a substantial risk that reference to Plaintiff’s
Muslim religious beliefs may lead to unfair prejudice with members of the jury.
21
Id.
In response, Defendants concede that they would not be using Plaintiff’s
Islamic faith, in contravention to FED.R.EVID 601, to impeach him because he
simply has that faith. (Doc. 242). Nor would they inflame a jury with any
witness’s religion, causing unfair prejudice under FED.R.EVID. 403. Id. Rather,
Defendants argue that evidence of Plaintiff’s religion is relevant because
Plaintiff has made his religion an issue in his complaint and other related court
filings. Id.
In his initial complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants placed him in a
cell with a gang member because he was a Muslim. (Doc. 1 at 7). Shelton
references this claim in a separate class action that he filed at Shelton v.
Bledsoe, 3:11-cv-1618 (M.D. Pa), where he claims that he is a Muslim,
officers know that gang members attack Muslims, and the officers-Defendants in this case-- placed him in a cell with a gang member, the very
same gang member who attacked him on August 30, 2009, to cause him
harm. (See Doc. 242-1 at 16-17). Plaintiff later, however, claims that his
religion in no way motivated Defendants’ actions on August 30, 2009, (see
Doc. 237 at 3).
The Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to present evidence of
Plaintiff’s religion on their direct case. However, they may be entitled to
impeach Plaintiff on this issue if the Plaintiff “opens the door” during his
22
presentation of evidence.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s motion seeks the exclusion of portions of
a videotape in which Plaintiff was captured on video camera, praying, while
being held in a holding cell immediately after the use of force incident on
August 30, 2009, (see Doc. 237 at 1-2), the Court agrees that it sees no
relevance to that evidence, and it will be excluded at this time. Plaintiff’s
motion, therefore, is GRANTED.
5. Evidence of other administrative grievances filed by Plaintiff
Plaintiff moves under Rules 402, 403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to preclude Defendants from presenting evidence concerning
administrative grievances filed by Plaintiff that are unrelated to the August 30,
2009 use of force incident. (Doc. 243). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that such
evidence has no relevance, and if used, may portray Plaintiff as a litigious,
confrontational or otherwise unstable person. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff argues
that if such information was used to show a tendency to file fraudulent or
frivolous claims; or to show bias against Defendants or USP-Lewisburg staff
generally, such evidence constitutes inadmissible character evidence and
presents a substantial danger of unfair prejudice. Id. Finally, Plaintiff contends
that presentation of his other grievances would result in a series of mini-trials
on collateral issues, which would waste the jury’s time and cause confusion.
Id.
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Defendants argue that the use of Plaintiff’s prior grievances would not
be used to show Plaintiff’s litigiousness, and that his litigiousness shows bias,
but would rather be used to show the jury that Plaintiff holds certain opinions
with respect to USP-Lewisburg officers, which creates a relevant bias. (Doc.
243). Defendants rely on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in United
States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 46 (1984) for support that a witness may be
subject to cross examination as to bias. Id. This Court disagrees.
Rule 401 defines as “relevant evidence” evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Rule 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, by Act of Congress,
or by applicable rule. A successful showing of bias on the part of a witness
would have a tendency to make the facts to which he testified less probable
in the eyes of the jury than it would be without such testimony. Abel, 469 U.S.
at 46. However, all the grievances filed by the Plaintiff occurred after this
incident. As such, Defendants may not introduce evidence of Plaintiff’s
administrative remedies as they are not relevant to the issue of whether the
Defendants used excessive force on August 30, 2009. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion
will be GRANTED.
6. Video and other Evidence of September 22, 2010 use of force
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incident.
Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendants from presenting video and other
evidence in connection with a September 22, 2010 calculated use of force
incident involving Plaintiff and his then-cellmate, Damon Johnson. (Doc. 249).
Plaintiff argues that this incident, which occurred more than a year after the
incident at issue in this case, has nothing to do with whether Defendants
assaulted Plaintiff on August 30, 2009. Id.
Defendants do not oppose this motion, but reserve the right to use the
video to the extent it may be needed for impeachment or rebuttal evidence.
(Doc. 251). As such, Plaintiff’s motion will be GRANTED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion in
limine, and will GRANT, in part, and DENY, in part, Plaintiff’s motions in
limine. An appropriate order will follow.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: July 7, 2017
O:\Mannion\shared\MEMORANDA - DJ\CIVIL MEMORANDA\2011 MEMORANDA\11-0368-02.wpd
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