Dempsey et al v. Bucknell University et al
Filing
104
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick on 10/7/2013. (cw)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REED C. DEMPSEY,
Plaintiff
v.
BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11-CV-1679
(BRANN, J.)
(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
In this action, Plaintiff Reed C. Dempsey has asserted various tort and contract
claims against Bucknell University and several individual defendants concerning his arrest
and criminal prosecution for an alleged sexual assault on another student, an internal
University investigation into the incident, and related University student conduct
proceedings. The parties have requested that the Court resolve a discovery dispute with
respect to certain documents responsive to the Bucknell University Defendants’ Rule 34
requests but withheld from production by Dempsey on the ground that they are protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and by the work-product doctrine as codified
in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This action arises from an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of
September 5, 2010, at a student dormitory on the campus of Bucknell University. Dempsey
and another student, “K.S.,” were involved in an altercation, the details of which are
disputed by the parties. 1 Later that day, a criminal investigation was initiated by the
University’s Department of Public Safety, based on allegations by K.S. that Dempsey had
sexually assaulted her.
On September 6, 2013, based on information gathered in the incipient criminal
investigation, the University suspended Dempsey. On September 7, 2013, a University
public safety officer filed a criminal complaint against Dempsey in state court, and Dempsey
was arraigned on state criminal charges that same day. On September 10, 2013, a second or
superseding criminal complaint was filed against Dempsey, and he appeared in state court
again that same day for an arraignment on the new charges. 2
On September 14, 2013, K.S. filed student conduct charges against Dempsey,
alleging sexual misconduct, physical assault, disorderly conduct, harassment, and
interference with her freedom of movement. The next day, Dempsey filed similar student
conduct charges against K.S. A student conduct hearing concerning the charges against both
students was held over the course of three days on October 5, 6, and 7, 2010, at which both
students were permitted to make opening and closing statements to the hearing panel and
put on witnesses, who were questioned by the hearing panel. On October 7, 2010, the
hearing panel found both students “responsible” for disorderly conduct, but “not responsible”
1
This summary is limited to facts material to the instant discovery dispute. The
Court previously discussed the alleged facts of the complaint in greater detail in Dempsey v.
Bucknell Univ., No. 4:11-CV-1679, 2012 WL 1569826, at *1–*3 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2012).
2
Neither side addresses the ultimate disposition of these criminal charges in their
pleadings or motions papers, but they appear to have been dropped. See Joseph Deinlein,
Sex Case Against BU Student Dropped, The Daily Item (Sunbury, Pa.), Nov. 2, 2010,
http://dailyitem.com/0100_news/x1048514169/Sex-case-against-BU-student-dropped.
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for all other charges.
Dempsey appealed the disorderly conduct finding, which was subsequently affirmed
following an appeals board hearing on October 20, 2010. Dempsey further appealed the
disorderly conduct finding, which was then affirmed following a hearing before the
University Provost on December 14, 2010.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The instant discovery dispute concerns Dempsey’s objection to producing several
documents that, despite being responsive to the Bucknell University Defendants’ Rule 34
requests, Dempsey contends are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product doctrine. The Bucknell University Defendants brought this dispute to
the Court’s attention by the filing of a letter request for a discovery conference on January 4,
2013. (Doc. 57). Dempsey filed a letter response on January 11, 2013. (Doc. 59). A
telephonic discovery conference was held before Magistrate Judge Arbuckle on February 7,
2013. Following this discovery conference, supplemental letter briefs were submitted by the
Bucknell University Defendants and Dempsey on February 12, 2013, and February 18, 2013,
respectively. (Doc. 66; Doc. 70). The Bucknell University Defendants submitted their third
letter to the Court addressing this dispute on February 19, 2013. (Doc. 71).
On February 27, 2013, pretrial management in this case was reassigned to Magistrate
Judge Blewitt, who held a second telephonic discovery conference on March 18, 2013. As a
result of the discovery conference, Dempsey was ordered to revise his privilege log to make
it more specific, and to serve it on the Bucknell University Defendants. (Doc. 81). On April
1, 2013, Dempsey served his amended privilege log on the Bucknell University Defendants.
Following service of the amended privilege log, the parties met and conferred to discuss the
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objections further. Ultimately, the parties were able to resolve several of the objections and
Dempsey produced certain of the disputed documents to the Bucknell University
Defendants. (Doc. 82).
On May 2, 2013, Magistrate Judge Blewitt held another telephonic discovery
conference to follow-up on this dispute. Dempsey was ordered to submit the allegedly
privileged documents for in camera review, together with a copy of Dempsey’s amended
privilege log. Later that same day, Dempsey filed a copy of his amended privilege log with
the Court. (Doc. 86). On May 6, 2013, Dempsey furnished the Court with a copy of the
allegedly privileged documents (see Doc. 100), which included over three thousand (3,000)
pages of notes, memoranda and emails for this Court’s in camera review.
On June 12, 2013, one day before fact discovery was scheduled to close, the parties
jointly moved to stay all discovery and other pretrial proceedings pending mediation and
resolution of pending discovery disputes. (Doc. 91). The Court entered an Order granting
the motion and staying the case later that same day. (Doc. 92).
On July 10, 2013, the parties advised the Court that mediation was not successful,
and they requested a telephone status conference to discuss a new scheduling order. (Doc.
93). On July 15, 2013, pretrial management in this case was reassigned to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge. A telephone status conference before the presiding District Judge is
currently scheduled to take place on October 8, 2013. (See Doc. 98). The case remains
stayed pending the status conference and the disposition of outstanding discovery disputes.
III.
DISCUSSION
This dispute concerns Dempsey’s objection to producing several documents on the
grounds that they are protected by attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine.
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A. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
“Because the attorney-client privilege obstructs the truth-finding process, it is
construed narrowly.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1423 (3d Cir. 1991). For the attorney-client privilege to attach to a communication, “it must
be ‘(1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.’’” In re Teleglobe Commc’ns
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 68 (2000) [hereinafter, “Restatement (3d) Lawyers”]). “‘Privileged persons’ include
the client, the attorney(s), and any of their agents that help facilitate attorney-client
communications or the legal representation.” Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 359 (citing Restatement
(3d) Lawyers § 70). “A communication is only privileged if it is made ‘in confidence.’”
Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 361 (citing Restatement (3d) Lawyers § 68). “[I]f persons other than the
client, its attorney, or their agents are present, the communication is not made in confidence,
and the privilege does not attach.” Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 361.
“As a general matter, the privilege is not destroyed when a person other than the
lawyer is present at a conversation between an attorney and his or her client if that person is
needed to make the conference possible or to assist the attorney in providing legal services.”
Miller v. Haulmark Transp. Sys., 104 F.R.D. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (privilege not waived
by presence of insurance agent who arranged coverage and aided in preparation of answer);
see also Quagliarello v. Dewees, 802 F. Supp. 2d 620, 632–33 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (attorney-client
privilege not waived when 18-year-old student-plaintiff consulted with her lawyer in the
presence of her parents and a neighbor who facilitated her obtaining legal counsel);
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Harkobusic v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 31 F.R.D. 264, 266 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (attorney-client
privilege applied to communications between client’s brother-in-law and various attorneys
where brother-in-law was acting as client’s agent in seeking legal advice). “These exceptions
are consistent with the goal underlying the privilege because [this] type of disclosure is
sometimes necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice.” Westinghouse, 951 F.2d
at 1424.
2. Work-Product Doctrine
“The work product doctrine is governed by a uniform federal standard set forth in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and ‘shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a
privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.’” In re Cendant
Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661–62 (3d Cir. 2003).
The purpose of the work-product doctrine differs from that of the attorneyclient privilege. . . . [T]he attorney-client privilege promotes the attorneyclient relationship, and, indirectly, the functioning of our legal system, by
protecting the confidentiality of communications between clients and their
attorneys. In contrast, the work-product doctrine promotes the adversary
system directly by protecting the confidentiality of papers prepared by or on
behalf of attorneys in anticipation of litigation. Protecting attorneys’ work
product promotes the adversary system by enabling attorneys to prepare cases
without fear that their work product will be used against their clients.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1427–28. Moreover,
the doctrine is an intensely practical one, grounded in the realities of litigation
in our adversary system. One of those realities is that attorneys often must
rely on the assistance of investigators and other agents in the compilation of
materials in preparation for trial. It is therefore necessary that the doctrine
protect material prepared by agents for the attorney as well as those prepared
by the attorney himself.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,238–39 (1975) (footnote omitted).
Thus, under Rule 26(b)(3), the work-product doctrine shields from discovery
“documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by
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or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant,
surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). “In distinguishing
between proceedings which qualify as litigation and those that do not, the adversarial nature
of the proceeding is characteristic of litigation.” In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.,
268 F.R.D. 114, 117 (D.D.C. 2010). Although a common hallmark of litigation is whether
“the parties have the right to cross-examine witnesses or to subject an opposing party’s
presentation of proof to equivalent disputation,” see United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 86
F.R.D. 603, 627 (D.D.C. 1980),
[t]he proper focus should be whether the proceeding required the lawyer to
function as lawyers usually do at a trial so that the proceeding can be
classified as “litigation.” This properly segregates the transactional work of
lawyers who draft contracts or provide legal advice from lawyers who have to
represent clients before tribunals that have the power to adjudicate their
clients’ rights, whatever the nature of the proceeding. If the tribunal has the
power to adjudicate those rights and demands that the party before it either make a
certain showing or disprove a particular allegation, the process is adversarial by its very
nature and surely qualifies as litigation.
Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge, 268 F.R.D. at 118 (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Third)
Lawyers § 87 cmt. h (“In general, a proceeding is adversarial when evidence or legal
argument is presented by parties contending against each other with respect to legally
significant factual issues.”).
Rule 26(b)(3) establishes two categories of protection: fact work product and opinion
work product. “Fact work product is discoverable only upon a showing [of] ‘substantial
need’ and by demonstrating that one cannot otherwise obtain the ‘substantial equivalent’ of
such materials without ‘undue hardship.’” In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 373,
381 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). Opinion work product, “which
consists of ‘mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney,’ is
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afforded almost absolute protection” and it “is discoverable ‘only upon a showing of rare
and exceptional circumstances.’” Linerboard, 237 F.R.D. at 381 (quoting Cendant, 343 F.3d
at 663).
Waiver of the work-product doctrine also works differently than waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. Unlike the attorney-client privilege, where disclosure to a third
party waives the privilege unless the disclosure is necessary to further the legal
representation, “the work product-doctrine serves instead to protect an attorney’s work
product from falling into the hands of an adversary,” and thus “disclosure must enable an
adversary to gain access to the information” for it to constitute waiver of work-product
protection. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428; see also Miller, 104 F.R.D. at 445–46.
Several of the documents at issue here involve notes or memoranda of witness
interviews. An attorney’s notes or memoranda reflecting his or her recollection or
impression of witness interviews constitute opinion work product, regardless of the factual
content of the notes or memoranda. Linerboard, 237 F.R.D. at 385–86. This is true also of
notes or memoranda prepared by a private investigator or other agent of an attorney.
Linerboard, 237 F.R.D. at 386; see also In re Hughes, 633 F.2d 282, 291 (3d Cir. 1980) (inquiry
into investigative techniques of private investigator retained by defense counsel was shielded
by work-product protection). Whether such material is discoverable typically turns on
whether the witness is available for deposition. See Linerboard, 237 F.R.D. at 387
(availability of interviewed witness to be deposed undermined the necessity that a litigation
adversary “invade the attorney’s files”); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1232
(3d Cir. 1979) (permitting discovery of interview memoranda pertaining to a deceased
witness, but denying discovery with respect to all other interview memoranda).
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B. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
This discovery dispute is premised on the parties’ differences of opinion with respect
to a handful of recurring issues: (1) whether Reed Dempsey’s parents, John and Shelley
Dempsey, were agents of Dempsey or his attorneys with respect to criminal proceedings for
the purpose of attorney-client privilege, such that they could participate in confidential
attorney-client communications or receive disclosure of protected information without
waiver of the privilege; (2) whether Dempsey’s parents were also themselves clients of
Attorney Stephen Becker with respect to non-criminal matters involving Bucknell
University; (3) whether the University student conduct proceedings constituted “litigation,”
such that materials prepared by Dempsey and his representatives, including his attorneys
and other agents (e.g., his parents), are shielded by the work-product doctrine; and
(4) whether the disclosure of otherwise protected materials to Martin Ligare, a Bucknell
University faculty member who served as Dempsey’s student conduct hearing adviser,
vitiated attorney-client privilege or waived work-product protection as to those materials.
As to the first issue, it is clear from the record before the Court that Dempsey’s
parents played two different roles in his legal defense, both of which permitted them to
participate in or receive disclosure of confidential communications without waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. From the earliest stages of this affair, Dempsey’s parents played an
essential role in securing legal representation for Dempsey. After the retention of legal
counsel, Dempsey’s parents actively assisted his attorneys in preparing a defense to criminal
charges and, later, student conduct charges against Dempsey. In particular, the Court notes
Attorney Stephen Becker’s unrebutted affidavit (Doc. 70-1), in which Becker stated that, due
to their professional backgrounds (John Dempsey is a forensic investigator and Shelley
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Dempsey is a retired attorney) and their relationship and knowledge of their son, he enlisted
the assistance of Dempsey’s parents in gathering and analyzing information and helping to
prepare Dempsey’s defense. It is also abundantly clear from the Court’s in camera review of
the documents at issue that Dempsey’s parents functioned just as Attorney Becker
represented, operating in concert with and at the direction of defense counsel, and providing
substantial assistance in preparation of the case. Whether they came upon these roles as
paid professionals or as family member volunteers is immaterial.
As to the second issue, the evidence of record establishes that Dempsey’s parents
were also clients of Attorney Stephen Becker with respect to non-criminal matters involving
Bucknell University. In his unrebutted affidavit, Attorney Becker stated unequivocally that
he was engaged to represent Dempsey and his parents with respect to non-criminal matters
involving Bucknell University. (Doc. 70-1). The Bucknell University Defendants disagree,
but they have produced no evidence to refute Attorney Becker’s sworn affidavit.
As to the third issue, the Bucknell University Defendants contend that materials
prepared in connection with Dempsey’s student conduct hearing and appeals are not subject
to work-product protection because University student conduct proceedings are not
“litigation” to which work-product protection may attach. In support, the Bucknell
University Defendants cite this Court’s characterization of the student conduct hearing
process as “strictly an internal one” in a related case. (Doc. 57, at 2 (citing Stefanowicz v.
Bucknell Univ., No. 10-CV-2040, 2010 WL 3938243, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2010)). But this
characterization in Stefanowicz is entirely inapposite, as the question in that matter was
whether Bucknell University qualifies as a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
Here, the question is whether the University’s student conduct hearing process is adversarial
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in nature, and thus “litigation” to which work-product protection may attach. Based upon
the record before the Court, it is clear that the student conduct hearing process was
adversarial in nature, involving a neutral tribunal empowered to adjudicate serious student
conduct charges against Dempsey, the opportunity for both sides to present evidence and
witnesses, and the opportunity for both sides to present opening and closing statements to
the tribunal. Whether it was a governmental proceeding or an internal one provided by a
private university is immaterial.
Finally, as to the fourth issue, the Bucknell University Defendants contend that
otherwise protected materials that were disclosed to Martin Ligare should be produced
because this disclosure to an individual employed by the University constitutes a waiver of
any attorney-client privilege or work-product protection that may otherwise attach to the
materials. Ligare is a Bucknell University faculty member who served as Dempsey’s
Hearing Adviser, in which role he was charged with assisting Dempsey in preparing for his
student conduct hearing and presenting his own remarks to the hearing officials. Although
one might ordinarily infer a confidential relationship of some degree from this description,
the University’s Student Handbook makes clear that the charged student’s relationship with
his or her Hearing Adviser is not a privileged one, and that the Hearing Adviser is obligated
to disclose to the University any information obtained from the student that supports the
charges. See Bucknell University Student Handbook 2013–14, at 126, available at
http://www.bucknell.edu/Documents/DeanOfStudents/StudentHandbook.pdf.
Under
these circumstances, it is clear that the disclosure of otherwise privileged or protected
materials to Ligare constitutes waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection with respect to that material.
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C. THE DISPUTED DOCUMENTS
The Court has reviewed each of the allegedly privileged documents in camera.
Dempsey’s objections shall be SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part, for the
reasons and in the manner stated hereinafter.
1. Document No. 1
Document No. 1 is an undated table or chart analyzing witness statements and
conflicting evidence, described in the privilege log as “Notes and chart for criminal case
prepared with assistance of Attorney Becker and Attorney Simon.” The listed authors are
Dempsey’s parents, John and Shelley Dempsey, and his attorneys, Stephen Becker and Ted
Simon. Dempsey claims both attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. With
respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based
on the document description in the privilege log, counsel of record’s subsequent
representations in correspondence, and the Court’s review of the document in camera, the
preparation of this document involved confidential communication between Dempsey’s
parents, acting as agents of his attorneys, and Dempsey’s attorneys for the purpose of
providing legal assistance to Dempsey. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the
document itself constitutes opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s parents acting as
agents of his attorneys to assist in the defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which
unquestionably constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to
demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this
document.
2. Document No. 6
Document No. 6 is a fax dated September 30, 2010, sent from Attorney Becker (via
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his paralegal) to Attorney Simon and John Dempsey, transmitting a copy of Attorney
Becker’s handwritten witness interview notes dated September 8, 2010. Dempsey claims
attorney-client privilege. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production
shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the Court’s review of the document in camera, this
document constitutes a confidential communication, made for the purpose of providing
legal assistance to Dempsey, between his attorneys and his father, who was actively
assisting in the preparation of Dempsey’s legal defense as an agent of his attorneys.
3. Documents No. 7, 8, 10, 13, and 26
Documents No. 7, 8, 10, 13, and 26 are draft letters from John and Shelley Dempsey,
addressed to officials at Bucknell University, which were apparently never sent. The
privilege log describes these documents as having been ghostwritten or co-authored by
Attorney Becker. Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege. With respect to these documents,
Dempsey’s objections to production are SUSTAINED. Based on the document descriptions
in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the documents in camera, these drafts are
privileged because they were “prepared or circulated for the purpose of giving or obtaining
legal advice and contain information or comments not included in the final version.”
SEPTA v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.P., 254 F.R.D. 253, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
4. Document No. 9
Document No. 9 includes a partial draft letter from John Dempsey to the president
of Bucknell University and notes for an anticipated meeting between the two. The
document is undated but, based on its content, it was prepared in the period after Reed
Dempsey’s student conduct hearing, while his internal appeals remained pending at the
University. The privilege log describes this document as having been ghostwritten or co-
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authored by Attorney Becker. Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be
SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the privilege log and the Court’s
review of the document in camera, the preparation of this document involved confidential
communication between John Dempsey, acting as an agent of his son’s attorney, and
Attorney Becker for the purpose of providing legal assistance to Dempsey. See SEPTA, 254
F.R.D. at 258. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the document itself constitutes
opinion work product, prepared by his attorney to assist in the appeal of Dempsey’s student
conduct proceedings, which the Court has found to constitute litigation. The Bucknell
University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances”
that would justify disclosure of this document.
5. Documents No. 17, 30, 32, 50, and 53
Documents No. 17, 30, 32, 50, and 53 are notes prepared by or for Reed Dempsey
outlining arguments, evidence, and litigation strategy with respect to his student conduct
hearing and appeals. The privilege log describes these documents as having been prepared
by Dempsey with the assistance of and in communication with his attorneys. Dempsey
claims attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. With respect to these
documents, Dempsey’s objections to production are SUSTAINED. Based on the document
descriptions in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the documents in camera, the
preparation of these documents involved confidential communication between Reed
Dempsey and his attorneys for the purpose of providing legal assistance Dempsey. See
SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 258. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the documents
themselves constitute opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey and his attorneys to
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assist him in student conduct proceedings, which the Court has found to constitute litigation
in this case. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any “rare and
exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of these documents.
6. Document No. 18
Document No. 18 is a draft letter from John Dempsey, addressed to the general
counsel of Bucknell University, which apparently was never sent. The privilege log describes
this document as having been ghostwritten or co-authored by Attorney Becker. Dempsey
claims attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. With respect to this document,
Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document
description in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera, the
preparation of this document involved confidential communication between John Dempsey,
acting as an agent of his son’s attorney, and Attorney Becker for the purpose of providing
legal assistance to Dempsey. See SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 258. Moreover, upon examination,
it is clear that the document itself constitutes opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s
father acting as an agent of his attorney to assist him in student conduct proceedings, which
the Court has found to constitute litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed
to demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of
this document.
7. Document No. 20
Document No. 20 is a letter dated August 4, 2011, to Ted Simon, one of Reed
Dempsey’s criminal defense attorneys, from Clifford Rieders, an attorney whom Simon had
consulted regarding the latter’s possible retention by the Dempsey family to bring a civil
action related to Reed Dempsey’s criminal prosecution and student conduct proceedings.
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Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s
objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. The attorney-client privilege protects
communications between prospective clients and counsel as well as retained counsel. In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986). Whether
the communication was between client and prospective attorney directly or through retained
criminal defense counsel, acting as the client’s agent for the purpose of seeking a civil
litigation attorney, is immaterial. See Harkobusic, 31 F.R.D. at 266.
8. Documents No. 21 and 22
Documents No. 21 and 22 are pages of a “witness notebook” prepared by Attorney
Simon summarizing and commenting on anticipated witness testimony with respect to
Dempsey’s upcoming student conduct hearing and pending criminal proceedings. Dempsey
claims attorney-client privilege. Based on the Court’s in camera review of related email
correspondence, however, it is clear that these documents were disclosed to Martin Ligare, a
faculty member of Bucknell University and Dempsey’s student conduct hearing adviser. For
this reason, Dempsey’s claim to attorney-client privilege has been waived by disclosure of
the document to a third party. With respect to these documents, Dempsey’s objection to
production shall be OVERRULED and Dempsey will be directed to produce the requested
documents.
9. Document No. 36
Document No. 36 is an annotated transcript of a September 9, 2010, interview
between a University public safety officer and K.S., with her attorney in attendance.
According to the privilege log, the transcript was annotated by Dempsey’s mother at the
direction of Attorney Becker. No date for the annotations has been provided. Dempsey
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claims attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. With respect to this document,
Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document
description in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera, the
preparation of this document involved confidential communication between Dempsey’s
mother, acting as an agent of his attorneys, and Dempsey’s attorneys for the purpose of
providing legal assistance to Dempsey. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the
document itself constitutes opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s mother acting as
an agent of his attorneys to assist in the defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which
unquestionably constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to
demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this
document.
10. Document No. 38
Document No. 38 is a draft letter from Reed Dempsey, addressed to a Bucknell
University official, which was apparently never sent. The privilege log describes this
document as having been ghostwritten or co-authored by Attorney Becker. Dempsey claims
attorney-client privilege. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production
shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the privilege log and the
Court’s review of the documents in camera, this draft correspondence is privileged because it
was “prepared or circulated for the purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice and contain
information or comments not included in the final version.” SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 258.
11. Documents No. 41 and 46
Documents No. 41 and 46 are undated strategy notes composed by Dempsey’s
mother and father, respectively. Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege and work-product
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protection. With respect to these documents, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be
SUSTAINED. Based on the document descriptions in the privilege log and the Court’s
review of the document in camera, there is nothing to suggest that these documents
themselves were communicated to Dempsey’s counsel, nor that they contain references to
any privileged communications within them. But, upon examination, it is clear that the
documents themselves constitute opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s parents
acting as agents of his attorneys to assist in the defense of Dempsey against criminal charges,
which unquestionably constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed
to demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of
this document.
12. Document No. 43
Document No. 43 is an undated transcript of an interview of K.S. by local police and
University public safety officers, apparently conducted in the presence of another student
and a University official. Portions of the transcript are highlighted. According to the
privilege log, the highlighted portions are relevant to Dempsey’s criminal case, and the
highlighting was performed by Dempsey’s father at the direction of Attorney Becker.
Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. With respect to this
document, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the
document description in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera,
the preparation of this document involved confidential communication between Dempsey’s
father, acting as an agent of his attorneys, and Dempsey’s attorneys for the purpose of
providing legal assistance to Dempsey. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the
document itself constitutes opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s father acting as
- 18 -
an agent of his attorneys to assist in the defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which
unquestionably constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to
demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this
document.
13. Document No. 44
Document No. 44 is an October 6, 2010, email to Dempsey from his mother
discussing strategy in his criminal case. Dempsey claims attorney-client privilege and workproduct protection. Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the
document description in the privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera,
this email is privileged as it includes material prepared and previously communicated by
Attorney Simon, and thus it “reflect[s] confidential communications between client and
counsel . . . for the purpose of . . . providing legal services.” SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 259.
Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the document itself constitutes opinion work
product, prepared by Dempsey’s mother acting as an agent of his attorneys to assist in the
defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which unquestionably constitutes litigation.
The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any “rare and exceptional
circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this document.
14. Document No. 52
Document No. 52 is an undated table or chart analyzing witness statements and
conflicting evidence prepared by Dempsey’s mother in connection with the criminal
proceedings against him. Dempsey claims both attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be
SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the privilege log and the Court’s
- 19 -
review of the document in camera, it is clear that this document constitutes opinion work
product, prepared by Dempsey’s mother acting as an agent of his attorneys to assist in the
defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which unquestionably constitutes litigation.
The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any “rare and exceptional
circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this document.
15. Document No. 54
Document No. 54 is a copy of a portion of Document No. 17, annotated by Chris
Giovino, a private investigator who conducted a factual investigation in connection with
Dempsey’s legal defense. The annotations include comments and corrections to Dempsey’s
notes based on Giovino’s recollection of witness interviews he personally conducted.
Dempsey claims work-product protection. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s
objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the
privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera, it is clear that the
annotations on this document constitute opinion work product, prepared by a private
investigator acting as an agent of Dempsey’s attorneys to assist in his defense to criminal
charges, which unquestionably constitutes litigation. See Hughes, 633 F.3d at 291; Linerboard,
237 F.R.D. at 386. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any
“rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this document.
16. Documents No. 55 and 56
Documents No. 55 and 56 are notes prepared by or for Reed Dempsey outlining
arguments, evidence, and litigation strategy with respect to his criminal defense. The
privilege log describes these documents as having been prepared by Dempsey with the
assistance of and in communication with his attorneys. Dempsey claims attorney-client
- 20 -
privilege. With respect to these documents, Dempsey’s objections to production are
SUSTAINED. Based on the document descriptions in the privilege log and the Court’s
review of the documents in camera, the preparation of these documents involved confidential
communication between Reed Dempsey and his attorneys for the purpose of providing legal
assistance to Dempsey. See SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 258.
17. Document No. 59
Document No. 59 is an undated timeline of events annotated by Dempsey’s mother.
An unannotated copy of the timeline has been produced in discovery. Dempsey claims
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection with respect to his mother’s
annotations. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be
SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the privilege log and the Court’s
review of the document in camera, there is nothing to suggest that the document itself was
communicated to Dempsey’s attorneys, nor that it contains references to any privileged
communications within them. But, upon examination, it is clear that the document itself
constitutes opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s mother acting as an agent of his
attorneys to assist in Dempsey’s defense to criminal charges, which unquestionably
constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any
“rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this document.
18. Document No. 67
Document No. 67 is an undated set of notes prepared by Reed Dempsey,
commenting on a recorded witness interview with respect to his criminal defense. The
privilege log describes this document as having been prepared by Dempsey with the
assistance of and in communication with his attorneys. Dempsey claims attorney-client
- 21 -
privilege and work-product protection. With respect to these documents, Dempsey’s
objection to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the
privilege log and the Court’s review of the document in camera, the preparation of this
document involved confidential communication between Reed Dempsey and his attorneys
for the purpose of providing legal assistance to Dempsey. See SEPTA, 254 F.R.D. at 258.
Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the document itself constitutes opinion work
product, prepared by Dempsey to assist him in his defense against criminal charges, which
unquestionably constitutes litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to
demonstrate any “rare and exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of these
documents.
19. Document No. 68
Document No. 68 is an undated set of notes composed by Dempsey’s mother
suggesting questions to be asked of various witnesses to the events underlying the criminal
and student conduct proceedings against her son. According to the privilege log, these notes
were subsequently communicated to Attorney Becker. Dempsey claims attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection
to production shall be SUSTAINED. Based on the document description in the privilege log
and the Court’s review of the document in camera, the preparation of this document
involved confidential communication between Dempsey’s mother, acting as an agent of his
attorneys, and Dempsey’s attorneys for the purpose of providing legal assistance to
Dempsey. Moreover, upon examination, it is clear that the document itself constitutes
opinion work product, prepared by Dempsey’s mother acting as an agent of his attorneys to
assist in the defense of Dempsey against criminal charges, which unquestionably constitutes
- 22 -
litigation. The Bucknell University Defendants have failed to demonstrate any “rare and
exceptional circumstances” that would justify disclosure of this document.
20. Document No. 69
Document No. 69 is an undated timeline of events as described in various statements
given by K.S. during the course of the criminal and University investigations into her
allegations against Dempsey. According to the privilege log, this document was authored by
Dempsey’s father. Most importantly, however, the document was disclosed to Martin
Ligare, a faculty member of Bucknell University and Dempsey’s student conduct hearing
adviser. For this reason, Dempsey’s claim to attorney-client privilege has been waived by
disclosure of the document to a third party, and his claim to work-product privilege has
been waived by disclosure of the document to a University employee obligated to disclose
adverse information to the University. With respect to this document, Dempsey’s objection
to production shall be OVERRULED and Dempsey will be directed to produce the
requested document.
21. Document No. 71
Document No. 71 is a collection of email messages exchanged between members of
the Dempsey family, primarily concerning the criminal charges and student conduct
proceedings against Reed Dempsey. For the most part, the participants in this exchange of
email messages include Reed Dempsey, his parents, and his brothers, Matthew and
Jameson (or “JJ”) Dempsey. Most of these email messages are simply not privileged
communications or protected work product, touching on non-legal or non-litigation issues
only. Many are just chatter among family members and references to news articles or blog
posts of interest in light of Reed Dempsey’s experience. Several are transmittal messages
- 23 -
forwarding litigation documents without any comment at all—some of the attached
documents 3 may themselves be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the workproduct doctrine, but the transmittal messages are not. See Guicci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271
F.R.D. 58, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Transmittal documents themselves are not privileged
unless they reveal the client's confidences.”). Moreover, any attorney-client privilege is
waived with respect to those email messages for which Matthew or Jameson Dempsey is the
author or a recipient as there has been no showing whatsoever to support a finding that they
are “privileged persons” to whom otherwise privileged communications may be disclosed
without waiver. See Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 361. Such disclosure, however, does not waive
any applicable work-product protection. See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428; see also Miller,
104 F.R.D. at 445–46. A number of the email messages involve third parties with no
relationship whatsoever to the legal defense or representation of Reed Dempsey.
With respect to the email messages identified on Attachment A to this
Memorandum Opinion, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED on the
ground that each of these email messages, including any prior email messages appended
thereto, constitutes or contains privileged attorney-client communications or protected work
product. For the purpose of clarity, the Court notes that any applicable privilege or
protection attaches with respect to the entire email string, and thus only the final or “top”
3
Any non-email documents originally attached to these messages are not included
with the collection of email messages presented to the Court in Document No. 71. Those for
which privilege or protection is claimed and disputed, however, appear to have been
presented in camera and ruled upon separately.
- 24 -
email in the string is described in Attachment A. See Rhoads Indus., Inc. v. Bldg. Materials Corp.
of Am., 254 F.R.D. 238, 240–41 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
With respect to the remainder of Document No. 71, Dempsey’s objection to
production shall be OVERRULED, and Dempsey shall be directed to produce the
requested emails.
22. Document No. 72
Document No. 72 is a smaller collection of email messages exchanged between John
Dempsey and Chris Giovino, a private investigator who conducted a factual investigation in
connection with Dempsey’s legal defense. In this role, Giovino was acting as an agent of
Dempsey’s attorneys to assist in his defense both to criminal charges and, later, University
sexual misconduct charges. As a result, some of these emails between Dempsey and
Giovino may contain information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the workproduct doctrine. See Hughes, 633 F.3d at 291 (work product); Linerboard, 237 F.R.D. at 386
(work product); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 434 A.2d 740, 744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(attorney-client privilege). Several are transmittal messages—presented without their
original, potentially privileged attachments—that do not themselves reveal any confidential
information. See Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 79. A number of these email messages have already
been produced to the Bucknell University Defendants, and are so marked in the materials
provided to the Court for in camera review.
With respect to the email messages identified on Attachment B to this
Memorandum Opinion, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be SUSTAINED on the
ground that each of these email messages, including any prior email messages appended
thereto, constitutes or contains privileged attorney-client communications or protected work
- 25 -
product. Once again, the Court notes that any applicable privilege or protection attaches
with respect to the entire email string, and thus only the final or “top” email in the string is
described in Attachment B. See Rhoads Indus., 254 F.R.D. at 240–41.
With respect to the remainder of Document No. 72, Dempsey’s objection to
production shall be OVERRULED, and Dempsey shall be directed to produce the
requested emails to the extent they have not already been produced.
23. Document No. 73
Document No. 73 is a significantly larger collection of email messages exchanged
between the Dempseys and their legal counsel. For the most part, these messages are
protected by attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. Some of the messages,
however, are not shielded from disclosure because they involve non-confidential
communication with authors or recipients who are not “privileged persons” or who are
affiliated with the Dempseys’ adversaries (e.g., Martin Ligare). See Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at
361; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428; Miller, 104 F.R.D. at 445–46. A few are merely
transmittal messages, forwarding non-confidential email messages without any comment or
discussion of confidential information. See Gucci, 271 F.R.D. at 79.
With respect to the email messages identified on Attachment C to this
Memorandum Opinion, Dempsey’s objection to production shall be OVERRULED, and
Dempsey shall be directed to produce the requested emails identified in Attachment C.
With respect to the remainder of Document No. 73, Dempsey’s objection to
production shall be SUSTAINED on the ground that each of these email messages,
including any prior email messages appended thereto, constitutes or contains privileged
- 26 -
attorney-client communications or protected work product. See Rhoads Indus., 254 F.R.D. at
240–41.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dempsey’s objections to production of the documents
described herein shall be SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part. Dempsey shall
be ordered to produce Documents No. 21, 22 ,and 69 and those portions of Documents No.
71, 72, and 73 that the Court has found are not shielded from disclosure by attorney-client
privilege or the work-product doctrine.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Karoline Mehalchick
Dated: October 7, 2013
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge
- 27 -
Attachment A
Privileged/Protected E-mail Messages from Document No. 71
Objections to these items are SUSTAINED and the following are not subject to production.
Author
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Reed Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Recipients
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Jameson
Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
- 28 -
Date
9/8/2010
9/8/2010
9/8/2010
9/8/2010
9/8/2010
9/8/2010
9/14/2010
9/14/2010
9/15/2010
9/17/2010
9/17/2010
9/17/2010
9/17/2010
9/22/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
10/4/2010
10/4/2010
10/6/2010
10/7/2010
10/12/2010
10/26/2010
10/26/2010
10/26/2010
10/26/2010
10/26/2010
10/27/2010
Time
12:24:40 a.m.
9:39:13 a.m.
10:01:09 a.m.
10:02:20 a.m.
10:03:27 a.m.
2:53:34 p.m.
10:01:44 a.m.
10:06:44 a.m.
7:48:19 p.m.
3:50:19 a.m.
3:54:08 a.m.
7:23:25 a.m.
10:24:13 a.m.
8:13:05 a.m.
10:29:12 p.m.
4:05:42 p.m.
6:59:33 a.m.
11:23:39 a.m.
1:12:58 a.m.
12:46:19 a.m.
11:22:34 a.m.
5:54:56 p.m.
6:01:33 p.m.
6:01:58 p.m.
6:02:34 p.m.
8:31:30 p.m.
1:25:14 a.m.
Privilege
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
attorney-client/work-product
attorney-client
work product
attorney-client/work-product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
8:00:18 a.m.
8:57:11 a.m.
work product
work product
Author
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Reed Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Recipients
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Jameson
Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Shelley
Dempsey
John Dempsey, Jameson Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Jameson Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Reed Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
- 29 -
Date
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
Time
9:27:31 a.m.
9:56:00 a.m.
10:00:16 a.m.
10:30:41 a.m.
11:48:40 a.m.
Privilege
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
10/27/2010
12:00:54 p.m.
12:01:55 p.m.
1:07:39 p.m.
attorney-client/work-product
work product
work product
10/28/2010
10/28/2010
10/28/2010
10/28/2010
10/28/2010
11/2/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11/28/2010
11:00:00 a.m.
11:06:01 a.m.
3:07:10 p.m.
5:39:18 p.m.
6:10:24 p.m.
12:17:58 a.m.
10:05:19 a.m.
10:10:15 a.m.
10:51:31 a.m.
10:54:01 a.m.
6:35:10 p.m.
6:40:49 p.m.
6:46:34 p.m.
7:04:26 p.m.
7:23:34 p.m.
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
attorney-client/work-product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
work product
attorney-client/work product
Attachment B
Privileged/Protected E-mail Messages from Document No. 72
Objections to these items are SUSTAINED and the following are not subject to production.
Author
Chris Giovino
John Dempsey
Recipients
John Dempsey
Chris Giovino
Date
9/17/2010
9/18/2010
- 30 -
Time
9:35:29 p.m.
8:43:23 a.m.
Privilege
attorney-client/work product
attorney-client/work product
Attachment C
Non-Privileged E-mail Messages from Document No. 73 to be Produced to Defendants
Objections to these items are OVERRULED and the following must be produced in accordance with this Court’s Order.
Author
Reed Dempsey
Reed Dempsey
John Dempsey
Gay Huey Evans
John Dempsey
Gay Huey Evans
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker
Ted Simon
Recipients
Stephen Becker, John Dempsey, Ted Simon
Kari Conrad, Stephen Becker, John Dempsey
Gay Huey Evans
John Dempsey
Gay Huey Evans
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Jameson Dempsey
Reed Dempsey, Ted Simon, Martin Ligare, John Dempsey
Ted Simon, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Kari Conrad, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey
Wayne Bromfield, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey
Ted Simon, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Kari Conrad, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Martin Ligare, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey
Martin Ligare, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Ted
Simon
Kari Conrad, Martin Ligare, Reed Dempsey
Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare, Shelley Dempsey, Ted
Simon
Ted Simon, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare, John Dempsey, Shelley
Dempsey
Ted Simon, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Ted Simon, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare, John Dempsey, Shelley
Dempsey
Stephen Becker, Shelley Dempsey, Martin Ligare, Reed Dempsey, John
- 31 -
Date
9/10/2010
9/10/2010
9/14/2010
9/14/2010
9/14/2010
9/14/2010
9/17/2010
9/23/2010
9/28/2010
9/29/2010
9/29/2010
9/29/2010
9/29/2010
9/30/2010
9/30/2010
Time
6:13:43 p.m.
7:22:07 p.m.
3:38:24 a.m.
5:00 a.m.
1:39:17 p.m.
9:34 a.m.
5:46:57 p.m.
3:10:54 p.m.
5:32:27 p.m.
11:56:45 a.m.
4:15:16 p.m.
4:16:07 p.m.
10:44:51 p.m.
6:33:16 a.m.
11:35:55 a.m.
9/30/2010
10/1/2010
10/1/2010
7:37:28 p.m.
4:17:22 p.m.
4:21:14 p.m.
10/2/2010
10/3/2010
11:20:35 a.m.
9:13:18 p.m.
10/4/2010
3:05:00 p.m.
10/4/2010
4:50:36 p.m.
10/4/2010
6:13:49 p.m.
10/4/2010
9:41:52 p.m.
Author
Shelley Dempsey
Martin Ligare
Stephen Becker
Ted Simon
Ted Simon
Ted Simon
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Ted Simon
Shelley Dempsey
Ted Simon
Ted Simon
Shelley Dempsey
Ted Simon
Reed Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Ted Simon
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Martin Ligare
Reed Dempsey
Reed Dempsey
Recipients
Dempsey
Ted Simon, Stephen Becker, Martin Ligare, Reed Dempsey, John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey, Ted Simon, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, John
Dempsey
Michael Lowenstein, Ted Simon, John Ellison, John Dempsey, Jeremy
Feinstein, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare, Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Shelley Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Kari Conrad, Stephen Becker, Martin Ligare
Michael Lowenstein, John Ellison, Jeremy Feinstein, Martin Ligare, Ted
Simon, John Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey
Stephen Becker, Michael Lowestein, John Ellison, Jeremy Feinstein, Martin
Ligare, John Dempsey, Reed Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey
Martin Ligare, Shelley Dempsey, Stephen Becker
John Dempsey, Martin Ligare, Stephen Becker
John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Stephen Becker
Kari Conrad, Stephen Becker
Stephen Becker, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey
- 32 -
Date
Time
10/5/2010
10/5/2010
7:53:26 a.m.
8:43:36 a.m.
10/5/2010
10:29:44 a.m.
10/6/2010
10:25:58 a.m.
10/6/2010
10:36:42 a.m.
10/6/2010
10:53:15 a.m.
10/6/2010
10/6/2010
10/6/2010
12:05:38 p.m.
1:43:16 p.m.
2:03:52 p.m.
10/7/2010
10/7/2010
9:45:20 a.m.
10:21:17 a.m.
10/7/2010
11:09:01 a.m.
10/7/2010
10/7/2010
11:09:34 a.m.
11:23:45 a.m.
10/7/2010
10/7/2010
11:46:40 a.m.
11:46:46 p.m.
10/8/2010
1:08:38 a.m.
10/8/2010
10/8/2010
10/9/2010
10/14/2010
10/19/2010
8:10:23 p.m.
8:24:22 p.m.
9:27:00 a.m.
10:48:10 a.m.
3:40:30 p.m.
Author
Stephen Becker
Shelley Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Martin Ligare
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Reed Dempsey
John Dempsey
Stephen Becker
Reed Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
Shelley Dempsey
John Dempsey
John Dempsey
Recipients
Ted Simon, Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey
Stephen Becker, Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Shelley Dempsey, Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Martin Ligare
Reed Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey, Ted Simon, Stephen
Becker
Matt Mason
Stephen Becker, Ted Simon
Reed Dempsey, Ted Simon, John Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey, Martin
Ligare
Stephen Becker, Ted Simon, Shelley Dempsey, John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Reed Dempsey, Martin Ligare, Ted Simon, Shelley Dempsey, John
Dempsey
Stephen Becker, John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
Martin Ligare, Stephen Becker, Reed Dempsey, Shelley Dempsey
Martin Ligare
John Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey, Matthew Dempsey, Connor Dempsey, Linda Roberto,
Barbara Dempsey
Jameson Dempsey
- 33 -
Date
10/27/2010
10/30/2010
10/30/2010
10/30/2010
Time
11:15:21 p.m.
1:40:25 p.m.
1:53:41 p.m.
2:01:47 p.m.
11/9/2010
11/9/2010
12/1/2010
3:08:25 p.m.
4:27:28 p.m.
12:11:31 p.m.
12/2/2010
12/2/2010
12/3/2010
10:23:31 a.m.
10:42:31 a.m.
11:25:18 p.m.
12/3/2010
12/3/2010
12/6/2010
12/7/2010
8/21/2011
9/7/2011
6:37:12 p.m.
6:50:30 p.m.
9:49:33 a.m.
10:14:11 a.m.
4:42:11 p.m.
3:23:07 p.m.
2/10/2012
9:43:38 a.m.
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