Owens v. Murray et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 69 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by John Murray, Davy, Rodney Carberry, Cook, Briggs, Garner, Scott Fair, Reisinger, Flowers, Renyalds, John Horner. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 9/15/2017. (jn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STEVEN OWENS,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN MURRAY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No.: 4:13-CV-680
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
I.

BACKGROUND
Steven Owens, an inmate presently confined at the Mahanoy State

Correctional Institute, Frackville, Pennsylvania (SCI-Mahanoy), filed this pro se
civil rights action. By Memorandum and Order dated February 21, 2014,
Defendants’ unopposed motion to dismiss was construed as seeking partial
dismissal and partially granted.1 See Doc. 22.
Remaining Defendants are the following officials at Plaintiff’s prior
confinement, the State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill Pennsylvania, (SCICamp Hill): Safety Manager Scott Fair; Major John Horner; Unit Managers

1

Dismissal was granted in favor of Defendants Superintendent Murray and Hearing Examiner
Reisinger as well as with respect to Murray’s conspiracy claim and the retaliation allegation
asserted against Unit Manager Carberry.
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Rodney Carberry and Christopher Chambers; Lieutenants Flowers and Davy;
Sergeant Cook; and Correctional Officers Briggs, Reynolds, and Gardner.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff had two separate periods of confinement at
SCI-Camp Hill from April 4, 2011-June 1, 2011 and from September 13, 2011
through October 11, 2011, respectively. According to the surviving portion of the
Complaint, Owens was assigned to the SCI-Camp Hill Restricted Housing Unit
(RHU) during his initial confinement because of misconduct at his prior place of
confinement. Plaintiff’s RHU cell is described as having a broken overhead light
and a plumbing problem which caused flooding whenever the water in his cell was
turned on. Despite being made aware of those conditions, Unit Manager Carberry
and Major Horner allegedly refused to move Owens to a different cell.
While housed in the RHU on April 9, 2011, Owens alleges that he was
placed on plexiglass shield and movement restriction for approximately one (1)
week by Defendant Flowers. See Doc. 1, ¶ 16. During that period, Owens
contends that he was refused showering, exercising, and shaving privileges, as well
as water, bedding and cell cleaning. A second week long period consisting of the
same deprivations and restrictions listed above was allegedly ordered by
Lieutenant Flowers on May 5, 2011.

Moreover, Owens was also purportedly

denied food for several days due to the lack of overhead lighting in his cell. See id.
at ¶ 24.
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Owens next states that he returned to SCI-Camp Hill from the State
Correctional Institution, Graterford, Pennsylvania (SCI-Graterford) on September
12, 2011 and was placed in a different RHU cell with a plexiglass shield allegedly
at the direction of Lieutenant Davy. Plaintiff asserts that the imposition of a shield
was improper, aggravated his asthma, and caused him to suffer shortness of breath.
His RHU cell is described as having rusty walls, a leaky toilet, and being insect
infested. During this period, Owens was purportedly denied adequate medical
treatment for a left ear infection.2
Plaintiff was allegedly served tomato soup by Flowers and Correctional
Officer Garner on September 28, 2011, even though he had a documented history
of being allergic to tomatoes. See id. at ¶ 46. Owens next asserts that he was
physically assaulted in his cell by Defendants Cook and Garner that same day
when they responded to a report that he had suffered an allergic reaction from
eating the tomato soup. This alleged use of excessive force is also described as
constituting assault and battery. In addition, Defendants Briggs and Reynolds
purportedly witnessed the attack and failed to intervene.

2

It is asserted that Lieutenant Flowers discontinued prescribed ear drops in retaliation for
Plaintiff’s pursuit of administrative relief.
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Following this incident, Plaintiff states that he was left in handcuffs for
approximately five (5) hours as a punitive measure by Flowers, Cook and Garner.
This application of restraints allegedly caused Owens to suffer temporary loss of
feeling in his hands, arms, and fingers.
Presently pending is the Remaining Defendants’s motion for summary
judgment. See Doc. 69. By Order dated April 27, 2017, Owens was granted
thirty (30) days in which to submit either a motion to compel discovery or file a
response to the summary judgment motion. See Doc. 82. He was thereafter
granted an extension of time in which to comply with the April 27, 2017 Order.
See Doc. 84. Despite being granted an ample opportunity to do so, Owens has not
filed a response. Accordingly, the summary judgment motion will be deemed
unopposed.
II.

DISCUSSION
Remaining Defendants claim entitlement to entry of summary judgment on

the grounds that: (1) the official capacity claims against them are moot; (2) there
are no assertions of personal involvement in constitutional misconduct raised
against Defendants Fair and Horner; (3) Plaintiff’s surviving claims were not
administratively exhausted; (4) the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement were
constitutionally adequate; (5) a viable retaliation claim has not been stated; (6)
Owens was not subjected to unwarranted use of excessive force; and (7) the state
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law claims are barred by sovereign immunity. See Doc. 73, p. 2.
A.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c); See also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir.
2001). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit
under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A factual dispute is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis
that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Id. at 248. The court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana, 260 F.3d
at 232; see also Reeder v. Sybron Transition Corp., 142 F.R.D. 607, 609 (M.D. Pa.
1992). Unsubstantiated arguments made in briefs are not considered evidence of
asserted facts. Versarge v. Township of Clinton, 984 F.2d 1359, 1370 (3d Cir.
1993).
Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to
support the claims of the non-moving party, the non-moving party may not simply
sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, it must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its]
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own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).
Summary judgment should be granted where a party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and
on which that party will bear the burden at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
“‘Such affirmative evidence – regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial –
must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of
the court) than a preponderance.’” Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Williams v.
Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).

B.

Official Capacities

This Court’s February 21, 2014 Memorandum and Order previously ruled
that Owens’ claims for monetary damages brought against the individual
Defendants in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. It
was also noted that any claims for injunctive relief against the individual
Defendants in their official capacities appeared to be moot since Owens was no
longer confined at SCI-Camp Hill. Remaining Defendants initial summary
judgment argument asserts that the surviving official capacity claims are subject to
dismissal on the basis of mootness. See Doc. 73, p. 25.
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Federal courts can only resolve actual cases or controversies, U.S. Const.,
Art. III, § 2, and this limitation subsists “through all stages of federal judicial
proceedings. . . .” Id. see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (the
adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon “the continuing existence of a
live and acute controversy)” (emphasis in original). “An actual controversy must
be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Id.
at n.10 (citations omitted). “Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to
sustain a present case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by continuing, present
adverse effects.” Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No. 3:CV-02-465, slip op. at p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May
17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.).
Furthermore, an inmate's claim for injunctive and declaratory relief fails to
present a case or controversy once the inmate has been transferred. Wahl v.
McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Carter v.
Thompson, 808 F. Supp. 1548, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1992). Since Owens was
transferred from SCI-Camp Hill on September 13, 2011 and there is no indication
that he will be returned to that facility in the foreseeable future, this Court agrees
that any claims by the Plaintiff for injunctive or declaratory relief are now moot.
Consequently, since Plaintiff’s official capacities claims for monetary
damages were previously dismissed, the Remaining Defendants are entitled to
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entry of summary judgment with respect to all claims against them in their official
capacities.
C.

Defendants Fair and Horner

Remaining Defendants’ second argument contends that Major Horner and
Safety Manager Fair are entitled to entry of summary judgment on the basis of lack
of personal involvement. See Doc. 73, p. 28. It is asserted that the Complaint does
not raise any contention that either of those officials were personally involved in
any civil rights violations and that they are being named as Defendants solely on
the basis of their supervisory positions or their respective
alleged failures to respond to Plaintiff’s requests and grievances.
It is initially noted that a similar argument was previously advanced in
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and was denied. Specifically, the February 21,
2014 Memorandum and Order concluded that given the latitude afforded to pro se
filings, the allegation that Fair was made aware of purportedly unsafe conditions
existing within Owens’ RHU cell and failed to address those problems despite
being authorized to do so sufficiently satisfied the personal involvement
requirement at that juncture in the proceedings. See Doc. 21, p. 10. It was
similarly determined that the allegations that Horner was aware that the overhead
light in Owens’ RHU cell was broken and that the cell had a plumbing problem
and failed to move Owens to another cell adequately asserted personal involvement
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sufficient to withstand scrutiny on a motion to dismiss.
As previously discussed by this Court, in order to state an actionable civil
rights claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) that the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law, and (2) that
said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995); Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135,
1141-42 (3d Cir. 1990).
Federal civil rights claims brought under § 1983 cannot be premised on a
theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988). Rather, each named defendant must be shown, via the complaint's
allegations, to have been personally involved in the events or occurrences which
underlie a claim. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Hampton v.
Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976). As explained in Rode:
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs. . . . [P]ersonal involvement
can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of
actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of
participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however,
must be made with appropriate particularity.
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
Safety Manager Fair is described as being responsible for responding to

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“safety issues” within the SCI-Camp Hill RHU. Doc. 1, ¶ 15. The Complaint
alleges that Fair was deliberately indifferent to the conditions in Plaintiff’s RHU
cell in that the Defendant “refused to respond to the maintenance work orders that
were placed into the prison’s computer to have the Plaintiff’s overhead light and to
have the cracked pipe fixed.” See id. at p. 15. Curiously, Owens adds that due to
the purported failure to repair the broken light, he was not fed for a week. See id.
Remaining Defendants contend that since the undisputed record shows that
Fair was not responsible for supervising or completing institutional work orders,
there is no basis for a finding of personal involvement. See Doc. 73, p. 30.
In support of the pending unopposed summary judgment argument, Remaining
Defendants have submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury by SCI-Camp
Hill Deputy Superintendent for Facility Management James Meintel. See Doc. 752. Meintel states that in Defendant Fair’s capacity as safety Manager, he was
responsible for the oversight of the prison’s occupational safety and health
program. See id. at ¶ 5. According to Meintel, the Safety Manager neither
supervises nor is directly responsible for maintenance issues within the prison.
Moreover, it was the prison’s maintenance managers who were responsible for the
handling of work orders and the repair of cell related problems such as electrical,
plumbing, and heating issues. Meintel adds that the prison contracts with a pest

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control company which provides a monthly service to address bug and insect
problems.
Accompanying Meintel’s declaration are copies of Fair’s job description and
records showing that there were pest and control measures provided during the
relevant time period. As previously noted, Plaintiff has not disputed Meintel’s
declaration nor otherwise opposed the non-personal involvement argument. Based
upon the undisputed record, this Court agrees that since Fair was not personally
involved in the prison’s maintenance department or in the completion of work
orders there is no basis for a determination that this Defendant was personally
involved in any constitutional misconduct. Safety Manager Fair’s unopposed
request for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiff contends that Major Horner had supervision over the prison’s
housing units. Owens asserts that his complaints regarding the conditions of his
RHU confinement were referred to Horner by Deputy Superintendent Southers.
See id. at ¶ 22. Defendant Horner’s subsequent response is described as
concluding that although Plaintiff had missed three meals, these deprivations were
the result of his failure to follow established prison procedure and not the result of
any improper staff conduct. Horner also allegedly had knowledge that the
overhead light in Owens’ RHU cell was broken and that the cell had a plumbing

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problem. Plaintiff asserts that despite acknowledging those significant deficiencies
in his cell, Horner failed to move him to another cell and thus acted with deliberate
indifference.
In support of the pending summary judgment argument, Major Horner has
submitted a supporting declaration. See Doc. 75, p. 1. The declaration notes that
upon Plaintiff’s arrival at SCI-Camp Hill he was immediately placed in the RHU
because of misconducts received at his prior place of confinement. Horner avers
that during the relevant time period he supervised Plaintiff’s housing unit and was
a member of a Program Review Committee (PRC) that reviewed Owen’s RHU
placement. Horner elaborates that during an April 6, 2011 PRC meeting, the
Plaintiff indicated that he had no requests or concerns. See id. at ¶ 12. With
respect to a May 4, 2011 PRC review Plaintiff again stated “that he no requests or
concerns.” Id. at ¶ 14.
On May 9, 2011, Owens submitted a grievance to Superintendent Murray
complaining denial of food for several days, inadequate lighting, a leaky toilet, and
other issues. Horner acknowledges that he was subsequently assigned to conduct
an investigation into those claims.

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As part of his investigation, Horner confirmed that none of the the inmate’s
complaints had been previously raised with any prison official. Horner adds that
he also inspected Plaintiff’s cell and was informed by housing staff that repair was
requested of the plumbing and lighting problems. During the Plaintiff’s second
stay at SCI-Camp Hill, Horner again was part of a PRC which conducted a
September 21, 2011 review. Once again, the Plaintiff failed to express any
concerns or complaints. Thereafter, Horner was assigned to investigate a grievance
by Plaintiff regarding the condition of his cell. However, by that juncture Plaintiff
had already been moved to another cell.
As previously discussed in this Court’s February 21, 2014 Memorandum
and Order, inmates also do not enjoy a constitutional right to a prison grievance
system. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119,
137-138 (1977); Speight v. Sims, No. 08-2038, 2008 WL 2600723 at *1 (3d. Cir.
Jun 30, 2008)(citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)(“[T]he
existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a
prisoner”). Consequently, any attempt by a prisoner plaintiff to establish liability
against any correctional official solely based upon the substance or lack of
response to his institutional grievances does not by itself support a constitutional
due process claim.

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It is apparent that the claims against Horner are based upon either the
Defendant’s participation on PRC committees or upon his review and investigation
of institutional grievances. Since the undisputed record shows that Major Horner
undertook appropriate remedial measures with respect to any verified housing
problems experienced by the Plaintiff while at SCI-Camp Hill, this Court agrees
that the personal involvement requirement has not been satisfied. Major Horner’s
unopposed request for summary judgment will also be granted.
D.

Administrative Exhaustion

Remaining Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff initiated eight (8)
grievances regarding his two periods of SCI-Camp Hill confinement between April
4, 2011 and October 11, 2011. See Doc. 73, p. 16. However, they argue that since
none of those grievances were properly appealed to final administrative review,
entry of summary judgment on the basis of non-exhaustion is appropriate.
Section 1997e(a) of title 42 U.S.C. provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under Section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or any other federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.
Under that provision, administrative exhaustion is required in “all inmate suits
about prison life.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner,
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532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6 (2001). Claims for monetary relief are not excused from
the exhaustion requirement. Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 74 (3d Cir. 2000).
Dismissal of an inmate’s claim is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies before bringing a civil rights action. Ahmed
v. Sromovski, 103 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843 (E.D. Pa. 2000). “[E]xhaustion must occur
prior to filing suit, not while the suit is pending.” Tribe v. Harvey, 248 F.3d 1152,
2000 WL 167468, *2 (6th Cir. 2000)(citing Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645
(6th Cir. 1999)); Oriakhi v. United States, 165 Fed. Appx. 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006).
An inmate is not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in
his or her complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); see also Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002)(a prisoner does not have to allege in his
complaint that he has exhausted administrative remedies). Rather, pursuant to the
standards announced in Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997), it is
the burden of a defendant asserting the defense of non-exhaustion to plead and
prove it.3 The United States Supreme Court in Jones noted that the primary
purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow prison officials to address
complaints before being subjected to suit, reducing litigation to the extent

3

In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit similarly stated that “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an
affirmative defense for the defendant to plead.”
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complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and improving litigation that does occur by
leading to the preparation of a useful record.
The administrative exhaustion mandate also implies a procedural default
component. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2004). As explained by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a procedural default rule
“prevents an end-run around the exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 230. It also
ensures “prisoner compliance with the specific requirements of the grievance
system” and encourages inmates to pursue their administrative grievances “to the
fullest.” Id. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has observed that proper
exhaustion of available administrative remedies is mandatory, meaning that
prisoners must comply with the grievance system’s procedural rules, including
time limitations. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
Furthermore, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[t]here is no futility
exception” to the exhaustion requirement. Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 75). A subsequent Third Circuit decision
reiterated its no futility exception by rejecting an inmate’s argument that
exhaustion should be excused because prisoner grievances were regularly rejected.
Hill v. Smith, 186 Fed. Appx. 271, 274 (3d Cir. 2006). “[S]ensitive subject matter
or ‘fear of retaliation’ as a basis for excusing a prisoner’s failure to exhaust” have

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also been rejected. Pena-Ruiz v. Solorzano, 281 Fed. Appx. 110, 113 (3d Cir.
2008).
A Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System has been established by
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”).4 A copy of the policy has
been submitted in support of Remaining Defendants’ non-exhaustion argument.
Section III of DC-ADM 804 (effective December 1, 2010) states that “every
individual committed to its custody shall have access to a formal procedure
through which to seek resolution of problems or other issues of concern arising
during the course of confinement.” See Doc. 76-1, p. 6. It adds that the formal
procedure shall be known as the Inmate Grievance System and provides a forum of
review and two (2) avenues of appeal. Section I (“Grievances & Initial Review”)
of DC-ADM 804 provides that, after attempted informal resolution of the problem,
a written grievance may be submitted to the Facility Grievance Coordinator within
fifteen (15) working days after the events upon which the claims are based, but
allowances of extensions of time will be granted under certain circumstances. A
rejected grievance may be resubmitted within five (5) working days of the rejection
notice date.
An appeal from the Grievance Coordinator's Initial Review decision may be
4

While the DOC’s grievance system has been periodically amended, the three tiered appeal
system was in effect throughout the relevant period of Plaintiff’s SCI-Mahanoy confinement.
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made in writing within fifteen (15) working days to the Facility Manager or
Superintendent. A final written appeal may be presented within fifteen (15)
working days to the Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals
(SOIGA). A prisoner, in seeking review through the DOC grievance system, may
include reasonable requests for compensation or other legal relief normally
available from a court. However, an improperly submitted grievance will not be
reviewed.
In support of their non-exhaustion argument, Remaining Defendants have
submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury by Grievance Review Officer Keri
Moore of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). See Doc. 76-1.
Moore asserts that her job duties include maintaining records of inmate final
review appeals filed with SOIGA. She explains that those appeals are recorded in
the DOC’s Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System and the system indicates
whether a particular grievance has been fully exhausted.
Moore states that based upon her review of the tracking system records,
Owens filed eight (8) grievances regarding aspects of his April 4, 2011-October
11, 2011 confinements at SCI-Camp Hill; this argument is unopposed. Owens
filed correspondence with SOIGA regarding three of those grievances. In
response to his correspondence, the Plaintiff was directed by SOIGA to submit

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paperwork which was required for the initation of a proper appeal. See id. at p. 57.
As a result of Owens’ failure to provide the requested and necessary paperwork,
his appeal was deemed incomplete and duly rejected.
Also submitted is a declaration by SCI-Camp Hill Grievance Coordinator
Deborah Alvord. See Doc. 76-2. Alvord similarly states that Plaintiff failed to
properly administratively appeal any of his eight grievances to SOIGA.
Accompanying Alvord’s declaration are copies of the Plaintiff’s relevant
grievances and related documents.
The undisputed record therefore establishes that the DOC had an established
grievance procedure in place during the relevant time period. Second, Owens
failed to file a proper SOIGA final administrative appeal relating to any of his
surviving claims against the Remaining Defendants. The Remaining Defendants’
undisputed evidence satisfies their burden of establishing that Plaintiff did not
properly exhaust this available DOC administrative remedy prior to initiating this
action. Specifically, none of his relevant grievances were accepted for final
administrative review by SOIGA.
Based upon those factors, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to provide a viable
reason to excuse his failure to exhaust or to even respond to this argument, a
finding of non-exhaustion and entry of summary judgment in favor of the

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Defendants under the well-settled Spruill and Woodford standards is appropriate.5
Pendent State Law Claims
Remaining Defendants also seek dismissal of Owens’ state law claims for
assault and battery on the basis that they are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Federal courts have jurisdiction over state claims which are related to the
federal claims and result from a common nucleus of operative facts. See United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
(1997) provides that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim when the court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. Once the basis for federal jurisdiction disappears, a district
court should only exercise its discretion to entertain pendent claims if
extraordinary circumstances exist. New Jersey Department of Enviromental
Protection v. Glouchester Enviromental Management, 719 F. Supp. 325, 337 (D.
N.J. 1989). Those extraordinary circumstances do no exist here. Since this Court
has determined that entry of summary judgment is appropriate with respect to
Plaintiff’s federal claims, jurisdiction will be declined with respect o Owens’

5

Since it has been determined that Plaintiff did not exhaut his available administrative remedies
with respect to any of his pending claims, it is not necessary to address the Remaining
Defendants’ additional arguments for summary judgment.
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pendent state law claims.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

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