Sopheap v. Kerestes et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 4/21/15. (km)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MEL SOPHEAP,
Petitioner
v.
SUPT. JOHN KERESTES,
Respondent

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CIVIL NO. 4:CV-14-75
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
April 21, 2015
Background
Mel Sopheap filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 while confined at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institution,
Frackville, Pennsylvania (SCI-Mahanoy). Named as Respondent is SCI-Mahanoy
Superintendent John Kerestes. Service of the petition was previously ordered.
Petitioner states that he entered a guilty plea to criminal charges in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on August 7, 2012. See Doc. 1, ¶
2. As a result of his plea, Sopheap was sentenced that same day to serve a 1 ½ to
3 year term of imprisonment. See id. at ¶ ¶ 2-3. The present action does not
challenge the legality of Petitioner’s plea or sentence.
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Rather, Sopheap claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on the
grounds that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Parole Board)
violated his substantive due process rights when denying his initial parole
application on November 9, 2013. See id., ¶ 12. Petitioner notes that he did not
pursue his present claim in Pennsylvania state court because there is no state court
remedy for parole denial.1 As relief, Petitioner seeks his immediate release on
parole.
In an accompanying supporting memorandum, Sopheap argues that the
Parole Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner because he satisfied all
the requirements for obtaining parole and had been given a favorable institutional
recommendation. See Doc. 1-1, p. 1. Moreover, the adverse parole decision was
allegedly based upon non-legitimate factors, vindictiveness, and inaccurate facts.
Respondent’s response provides that Petitioner’s minimum sentence expired
on February 1, 2014 and his maximum sentence expires on August 1, 2015. See
Doc. 7, p. 2. The Respondent adds that the November 9, 2013 discretionary
decision denying parole was based upon appropriate criteria and did not violate

Sopheap does acknowledges that at the time this matter was initiated he did
have an action pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
seeking sentence credit for all time spent confined.
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any of the Petitioner’s due process rights. It was also noted that Petitioner was to
be reconsidered for release on parole during October 2014. See id.
Discussion
Habeas corpus review “allows a federal prisoner to challenge the ‘execution’
of his sentence.” Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d
Cir. 2005). A habeas corpus petition may be brought by a prisoner who seeks to
challenge either the fact or duration of his confinement in prison. Telford v.
Hepting, 980 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 920 (1993). Federal
habeas relief is available only “where the deprivation of rights is such that it
necessarily impacts the fact or length of detention.” Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d
532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002). Since Sopheap’s claim of improper denial of parole, if
proven, would impact the length of his imprisonment, this matter was properly
raised via a habeas corpus petition.
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the United States
Constitution subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Parties
must continue to have a “‘personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
U.S. 395, 401 (1975). In other words, throughout the course of the action, the
aggrieved party must suffer or be threatened with actual injury caused by the
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defendant. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477.
The adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon "the continuing
existence of a live and acute controversy." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
459 (1974) (emphasis in original). "The rule in federal cases is that an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed." Id. at n.10 (citations omitted). "Past exposure to illegal
conduct is insufficient to sustain a present case or controversy ... if unaccompanied
by continuing, present adverse effects." Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F. Supp. 1451,
1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974));
see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No. 3:CV-02-465, slip op. at p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May
17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.).
As explained in Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. Feb. 18,
2009). in the context of a habeas corpus challenge to the execution of a sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “[i]ncarceration satisfies the case or controversy
requirement; it is a concrete injury.” Id. However, once the petitioner has been
released, “some continuing injury, also referred to as a collateral consequence,
must exist for the action to continue.” Id. See also United States v. Jackson, 523
F.3d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 2008).
Sopheap seek habeas corpus relief on the grounds that he was improperly
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denied parole. However, Petitioner also noted that he had an action pending in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which could also conceivably
favorably impact the length of his present confinement.
In addition, Respondent’s response indicates that Petitioner was to be
reconsidered for parole release during October, 2014. Since the outcome of those
two proceedings is unknown, this Court conducted a computerized data base
search the electronic inmate locator database maintained by the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections2 and the Pennsylvania Statewide Automated Victim
Information & Notification (SAVIN) website3 and discovered that Petitioner has
been paroled from DOC custody.
The Supreme Court in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), held that
release of a petitioner from custody on a parole violator term deprived federal
courts of the power to act. Significantly, the Court found that there were no
“collateral consequences” remaining after expiration of the parole violator term
sufficient to animate the matter with a case or controversy capable of concrete
redress, explaining that federal courts “are not in the business of pronouncing that
past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong.”
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See www.cor.pa.gov.

3

See www.vinelink.com
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Id. at 18. See also United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181-82 (3d Cir.
2002) (a petitioner unconditionally released from probation cannot maintain
challenge to sentence received for violating the terms of probation); Lane v.
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1982); Hagwood v. Grondolsky, 2009 WL
455499 *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2009)(a federal inmate’s challenge to the reversal of a
decision to place him on home confinement became moot once he was placed on
home confinement).
It appears that Petitioner has been afforded the release sought in this action,
i.e, his release on parole and he has not shown that he is suffering any collateral
consequences as required under Spencer Johnson, and Kissinger stemming from
the alleged initial failure of state officials to grant him parole. As noted in
Hagwood, the type of habeas corpus claim asserted herein is mooted once an
inmate is released from imprisonment.
Since Sopheap has been granted parole from state custody, under the
principles set forth in Steffel, his claim of being improperly denied parole is
subject to dismissal as moot since it no longer presents an existing case or
controversy. An appropriate Order will enter.4

In the event that Petitioner has not been granted parole, he may file a motion
seeking reconsideration of this decision within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
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BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

Memorandum.
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