Baker v. County of Northumberland

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 6/29/15. (km)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
NICOLE BAKER,

Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF
NORTHUMBERLAND,
Defendant.

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4:14-CV-00076

(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
June 29, 2015
I. BACKGROUND
On January 16, 2014, Plaintiff Nicole Baker initiated the above-captioned
action against Defendant Northumberland County seeking redress for Defendant’s
alleged acts of sexual discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq (hereinafter “Title VII”), and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act (hereinafter the “PHRA”), 43 P.S. § 953. Plaintiff initially
participated in the litigation by responding to Defendant’s motion to dismiss and
subsequently filing an amended complaint in response to this Court’s October 10,
2014 Order.
In July 2014, Defendant served Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents upon Plaintiff’s counsel. Though Defendant’s contacted Plaintiff’s
counsel requesting answer to these interrogatories, Plaintiff’s responses were never
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received. On November 21, 2014, shortly after filing the amended complaint,
Plaintiff’s counsel sought permission from this Court to withdraw and the Court
granted that request. Consequently, in December 2014, Defendant contacted
Plaintiff directly regarding her failure to respond to interrogatory requests but
continued to receive no response.
On February 4, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff to
provide answers to Defendant’s request for interrogatories and production of
documents, which this Court granted on March 9, 2015. Plaintiff was given until
April 9, 2015 to respond to Defendant’s request for interrogatories. However,
despite further attempted communication by Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to
comply with this Court’s Order and has not answered the request for
interrogatories sent by Defendant in July 2014. As of this date, no counsel has
entered an appearance on Plaintiff’s behalf, nor has Plaintiff communicated with
the Defendant or this Court in any way. On June 1, 2015, almost two months after
this Court ordered Plaintiff to provide her responses, Defendant filed the instant
motions for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant requests, primarily, dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint with
prejudice. In the alternative, it argues that Plaintiff should be precluded from
offering into evidence at trial any evidence or documents that were requested by
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Defendant’s July 2014 written discovery request and further required to be
produced by this Court’s March 9, 2015 Order. Plaintiff has not filed any response
to Defendant’s motion.
Rule 37(b) provides, in pertinent part, “If a party . . . fails to obey an order to
provide or permit discovery . . . the court where the action is pending may issue
further just orders. They may include . . . (v) dismissing the action or proceeding
in whole or in part.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Dismissal with prejudice is a harsh
sanction to be imposed only in the most extreme cases. See Harris v. Cuyler, 664
F.2d 388, 390 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Jones v. Smith, 99 F.R.D. 4, 5 (M.D.Pa.
1983) (“[W]e must give full regard for the severity of the sanction, granting
dismissal sparingly and only when less drastic alternatives have been explored.”).
It cannot be imposed as mere punishment, see id, nor can an action be dismissed
when a party’s failure to comply with a discovery order is due to inability and not
willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party. See Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrielles Et Commericaels, S.A.v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212
(1958). Moreover, similar to a dismissal under Rule 41(b), this Court must
consider the possibility and wisdom of alternative, less drastic sanctions. See
DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corporation, 506 F.2d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1974).
“However, dismissal is warranted when there is a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair,
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Inc., 104 F.R.D. 482, 507 (D.Del. 1985); see also Digregorio, 506 F.2d at 788
(“However, where one party has acted in willful and deliberate disregard of
reasonable and necessary court orders and the efficient administration of justice,
the application of even so stringent a sanction is fully justified and should not be
disturbed.”). In considering whether dismissal is the appropriate sanction, the
court must consider the entire circumstances of the case, including the degree of
the plaintiff’s personal responsibility for the delay, the amount of prejudice the
defendant will suffer as a result of the delay, the extent of Plaintiff’s history of
proceeding in a dilatory manner, and the effectiveness of less severe sanctions. See
Jones, 99 F.R.D. at 6.
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to meaningfully participate in the litigation
since at least October 2014, when she filed an amended complaint. She has not
responded at all to Defendant’s July 2014 request for interrogatories and she has
ignored all attempts at communication by the Defendant and this Court. Moreover,
she has failed to comply with an express Order of this Court, and has enlisted no
new counsel to do so on her behalf. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to correspond
with the Court and the Defendant and she has failed to discharge that obligation,
after knowingly and purposefully initiating the instant lawsuit. Moreover,
Defendant will suffer great prejudice based on its failure to conduct any kind of
discovery and ultimately prepare for trial. It will continue to be prejudiced as it is
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forced to attempt to communicate with the Plaintiff in an effort to resolve the
instant matter.
Finally, because of Plaintiff’s complete lack of involvement in the litigation,
this Court is at a loss as to what alternative sanction would serve to prevent further
delay or harassment to the Defendant, or that would persuade the Plaintiff to
comply with the rules of this Court. Consequently, dismissal of Plaintiff’s
complaint under Rule 37(b) is appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for sanctions is granted and
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

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