Locklear v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 5/1/15. (km)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SAMANTHA L. LOCKLEAR
Plaintiff
v.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY OF CANADA
Defendant

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CIVIL NO. 4:14-CV-00401
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
May 1, 2015
Currently pending before this Court are Cross-Motions for Summary
Judgment (ECF Nos. 12, 16) and accompanying statements of facts and
memoranda. (ECF Nos. 13, 14, 17, 18). The matter has been fully briefed and is
now ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) is granted and Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts relevant to this case are entirely undisputed. On April 9, 2012,
De’Marcus Locklear (“Mr. Locklear”), through his employer Calfrac Well
Services, elected to obtain Accidental Death Insurance in a total amount of

$71,000. (AR0004, AR0019).1 This insurance policy was provided by Defendant
Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“Sun Life”). Id.
On August 9, 2012 at approximately 6:00 a.m., Mr. Locklear was traveling
southbound on State Highway Route 220/South Eagle Valley Road in Union
Township, Centre County, Pennsylvania, on his 2012 Harley Davidson motorcycle.
(AR0039-43). Daylight was present and there was no inclement weather.
(AR0043). This stretch of road was straight with a slight incline. (AR0032, 0040).
In an attempt to pass a construction vehicle, Mr. Locklear, traveling at the stated
speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour, (AR0040), moved his motorcycle into the
northbound lane near the crest of a slight incline in the road. (AR0043-44). At the
crest of the incline, Mr. Locklear’s motorcycle collided head on with a small
pickup truck. (AR0040-41). Mr. Locklear did not have time to slow his
motorcycle or take any apparent avoidance maneuvers. (AR0044). It is
undisputed that Mr. Locklear attempted to pass the construction vehicle in a nopassing zone; a No Passing Sign was in place facing southbound approximately 1.5
miles prior to the scene of the accident. Id.
As a result of the accident, Mr. Locklear suffered “very substantial traumatic
injuries involving almost his entire body.” (AR0032). Skull fractures resulted in

1

Citations to “AR” refer to the administrative record, attached the Ms. Locklear’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) as Exhibit A, and to Sun Life’s Statement of Facts (ECF No.
17) as Exhibit A.

2

“traumatic crush of the brain stem and focally of cerebrum.” Id. At the age of
twenty-five, Mr. Locklear had died of a motorcycle accident resulting in brain stem
and cerebral trauma. (AR0003). An autopsy revealed that no alcohol or drugs
were present in Mr. Locklear’s system. (AR0031). The driver of the pickup truck
suffered only minor injuries. (AR0042).
On September 11, 2012, Samantha L. Locklear (“Ms. Locklear”) filed a
claim for benefits as the beneficiary of Mr. Locklear’s insurance policy. (AR0009,
AR0027). Sun Life paid out the policy amount for Mr. Locklear’s basic insurance
on April 29, 2013, but requested additional information to determine the claim for
Accidental Death Insurance. (AR0026). After receiving additional information, on
August 15, 2013, Sun Life denied benefits under Mr. Locklear’s Accidental Death
Insurance. (AR0051). These benefits were denied because, inter alia, Sun Life
determined that Mr. Locklear’s death occurred during the commission of a crime. 2
(AR0053). Specifically, Sun Life believed that violations of Pennsylvania Vehicle
Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3301, 3714, and 3736 were properly classified as crimes. Id.
Ms. Locklear appealed this determination, and her appeal was denied based
solely on the “criminal act” exclusion of Mr. Locklear’s policy. (AR0064-0067).
After exhausting her administrative appeals, (ECF No. 17, ¶ 21), on March 4,

2

Mr. Locklear’s policy with Sun Life included an exclusion of benefits for any death that
occurred “due to or result[ing] from [an insured individual] . . . committing or attempting to
commit an assault, felony or other criminal act.” (AR0053).

3

2014, Ms. Locklear filed a Complaint with this Court under the provisions of the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). (ECF No. 1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” where it “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” where “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury,” giving credence to the evidence favoring the
nonmovant and making all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor, “could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” rests on the
party moving for summary judgment. In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 237 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). The moving party may satisfy this burden by either (1) submitting
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
claim; or (2) demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to
establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 331.

4

Where the moving party’s motion is properly supported, the nonmoving
party, to avoid summary judgment in his opponent’s favor, must answer by setting
forth “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250. For movants and nonmovants alike, the assertion “that a fact cannot
be or is genuinely disputed must” be supported by “materials in the record” that go
beyond mere allegations, or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish
the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–50.
In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the
Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Although the Court may consider any materials in the record, it need only consider
those materials cited. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, both parties agree to the central facts underlying the
cross-motions for summary judgment. See (ECF Nos. 13, 17, 19, 21). The only
true dispute is whether Mr. Locklear’s actions on the day of his death may be
properly classified as criminal.
5

In an ERISA challenge brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), the court
reviews the denial of benefits under a de novo standard of review “unless the
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). “If the record on review is
sufficiently developed, the district court may, in its discretion, merely conduct a de
novo review of the record of the administrator's decision, making its own
independent benefit determination.” Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare &
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1185 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing McMahan v. New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 431 (6th Cir. 1989)). Under an ERISA
benefits plan, the plan administrator bears the burden of proving that an exclusion
to the policy precludes coverage. See, e.g., McCartha v. Nat’l City Corp., 419 F.3d
437, 443 (6th Cir. 2005); Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d
246, 257 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, it is undisputed that the administrator’s decision is
subject to de novo review, and no further development of the record is required.
(ECF Nos. 14, 18).
Sun Life raises two arguments as to why denial of benefits under the
“criminal act” exception of the policy is appropriate. (ECF No. 23). First, Sun
Life argues that violations of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3303, 3305, 3714, and 3736
constitute crimes in Pennsylvania. Id. Ms. Locklear argues that such acts are not
6

crimes. (ECF No. 25). Second, Sun Life argues, for the first time in its brief in
opposition to Ms. Locklear’s Motion for Summary Judgment, that Mr. Locklear’s
actions were in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. (ECF No. 23). Ms. Locklear
asserts that (1) this argument should not be considered by the Court and (2) in any
event, Sun Life cannot establish the necessary mens rea for this crime. (ECF No.
25).
A.

Vehicle Code Violations

Pennsylvania law states that “[a]n offense defined by [Title 18] for which a
sentence of death or of imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 106(a). Pursuant to a plain reading of the statute, Pennsylvania courts
have repeatedly emphasized that, to constitute a crime in Pennsylvania, an offense
must carry the possibility of imprisonment or death. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Matty, 619 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. Super 1993); Lewis v. Commonwealth, 459 A.2d
1339, 1341 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); In Interest of Golden, 365 A.2d 157, 158-59
(Pa. Super 1976). Thus, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that “all
true crimes [are defined as] an offense [that] carries with it a jail sentence[.]”
Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 524 (1980) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 585-86 (1959)). Under Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code, a
summary offense is punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed ninety
days. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1105.
7

Offenses for motor vehicle violations are not contained in the Pennsylvania
Crimes Code, but are instead contained within the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code.
See 75 Pa.C.S. § 101, et. seq. Under the Vehicle Code, any violation is considered
a summary offense unless otherwise defined. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(a). However,
summary offenses under the Vehicle Code are punishable by a maximum twentyfive dollar fine unless another penalty is provided for. Id. Importantly, the
Pennsylvania General Assembly specifically excluded from any violation under the
Vehicle Code “Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses), insofar as it relates to
fines and imprisonment for convictions for summary offenses[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. §
6502(c).
Under this relatively straight-forward definition of a crime under Title 18,
none of Mr. Locklear’s Vehicle Code violations constitute a crime.3 While all
Vehicle Code violations constitute a summary offense, none of Mr. Locklear’s
violations would result in imprisonment. The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301
does not provide for any penalty, and therefore a violation is punishable only by a
fine of twenty-five dollars.4 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(a). A careless driving violation
similarly results in a twenty-five dollar fine, unless the violation results in “serious
3

The Court assumes, arguendo, that Mr. Locklear committed each alleged Vehicle Code
violation.
4
Sun Life also argues in its brief that Mr. Locklear violated 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3303, 3305, 3307.
(ECF No. 18). As discussed infra, the Court declines to consider these arguments. However,
none of these provisions provide for punishment beyond the maximum twenty-five dollar fine
mandated by Section 6502.

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bodily injury” or “unintentional death” in which case elevated fines are mandated.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3714. Punishment by imprisonment is not provided for. Id. Reckless
driving is punishable by a mandatory two hundred dollar fine, but no term of
imprisonment is provided for. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736.
None of the violations allegedly committed by Mr. Locklear could possibly
result in imprisonment. As previously noted, Pennsylvania law specifically
excludes the application of Title 18 punishments to Vehicle Code violations;
therefore, imprisonment for a Vehicle Code violation may only occur where the
Title 75 provision itself provides for a term of imprisonment.5 Absent a possibility
of imprisonment or death, Mr. Locklear’s traffic violations do not constitute crimes
under Pennsylvania law.6 See, Slusar v. Sestili, No. 2:11-cv-1311, 2013 WL
5774019, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2013) (concluding that, under Pennsylvania law,
“a traffic violation punishable by a $200 fine is not a ‘crime’”).

5

For example, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(b), covering homicide by vehicle, provides for a maximum
five year sentence of imprisonment.
6
Sun Life cites to Black’s Law Dictionary for the proposition that, under a plain meaning of the
word “offense,” summary traffic offenses constitute crimes. See (ECF No. 23). While this may
be true as a general statement, the Pennsylvania “legislature has the exclusive power to
pronounce which acts are crimes, to define crimes, and to fix the punishment for all crimes.”
Commonwealth v. Church, 513 Pa. 534, 544 (1987). The Pennsylvania legislature plainly
intended to exclude any offenses that do not carry the possibility of imprisonment from its
definition of a crime, and its exclusive authority is binding in that respect. See, In the Interest of
Golden, 365 A.3d at 158 (“The definition of a crime is embodied in the Crimes Code itself. The
Code expressly tells that that: ‘An offense defined by this title for which a sentence of death or of
Imprisonment is authorized constitutes a crime’”).

9

The cases relied upon by Sun Life for the proposition that the traffic
violations at issue here constitute crimes are inapposite. Sun Life primarily relies
upon Commonwealth v. Genovese, 675 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 1996). There, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that restitution was appropriate for a traffic
offense, despite the fact that the Vehicle Code did not provide for restitution. Id. at
333. The Court noted that all traffic violations were summary offenses, and all
summary offenses are punishable by a magisterial district judge. Id. Under the
narrow definition of a crime employed by Title 18’s restitution section, a crime is
defined as “[a]ny offense punishable . . . by a magisterial district judge.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 1106(h). Thus, under this narrow definition, employed only by the
restitution section of Title 18, a traffic violation is a crime for which restitution is
appropriate. Id.
Furthermore, the Genovese Court concluded that restitution is not penal in
nature, id. at 333-34; it reasoned that the provisions of 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(c), which
prohibits the application of fines and imprisonment provided by Title 18 to the
Vehicle Code, did not operate to prevent the imposition of restitution. Id. The
Superior Court’s holding did not alter the broad definition of a crime in
Pennsylvania. First, the court in Genovese was relying on the narrow definition of
a crime used in a specific section of Title 18, rather than the general definition of a
crime used elsewhere in Title 18. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) (“As used in this
10

section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in
this subsection”) (emphasis added). Second, the court noted that Title 18
provisions relating to imprisonment were specifically excluded from application to
Title 75 offenses. Genovese, 675 A.2d at 333. Thus, this case does nothing to
change the analysis of a crime under the definition provided in 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(a).
The remaining cases relied upon by Sun Life all involved an analysis of Title
18 summary offenses, rather than summary offenses under Title 75. See, Lewis,
459 A.2d at 1341; In the Interest of Golden, 365 A.2d at 158; Matty, 619 A.2d at
1385-86. As these cases all involved summary offenses under Title 18, terms of
imprisonment were authorized and they could properly be classified as crimes. In
the matter at hand, however, none of the offenses Mr. Locklear committed are
punishable by imprisonment; therefore, the offenses do not constitute crimes, and
the administrator’s decision to the contrary was erroneous.
B.

Reckless Endangerment

Turning next to Sun Life’s allegation that Mr. Locklear’s actions constituted
reckless endangerment, the Court is presented with two significant issues. First,
when conducting de novo review, may the Court address arguments that were not
raised at the administrative level? Second, did Mr. Locklear’s actions constitute
reckless endangerment? These issues will be addressed in turn.
1.

Issues Not Raised at the Administrative Level
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ERISA mandates that every benefit plan shall “provide adequate notice in
writing” to a participant who is denied benefits under a plan, and must set “forth
the specific reasons for such denial” so as to “afford a reasonable opportunity . . .
for a full and fair review” by the plan administrators. 29 U.S.C. § 1133. As the
United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit has noted, “[o]ne of the main
purposes for the requirement that the denial letter provide specific reasons is to
provide claimants with enough information to prepare adequately for further
administrative review or an appeal to the federal courts.’” Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 268 F.3d 167, 178 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
omitted) abrogated on other grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S.
105 (2008)).
Consequently, in the context of an ERISA claim governed by deferential
review standards rather than de novo review, the Third Circuit observed in an
unpublished opinion that “[t]o enable plan participants to contest denials of their
claims, and to enable effective judicial review of the plan administrators'
determinations, ‘a reviewing court must focus on the evidence available to the plan
administrators at the time of their decision and may not . . . consider post hoc
rationales.’” Pacconi v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am., 264 F.App'x
216, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan, 491
F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2007)). However, whether post hoc rationales may be
12

considered in a de novo review remains an open question within the Third Circuit,
although most district courts have held that post hoc arguments may not be
considered.7 See, Nair v. Pfizer, Inc., Civ.A. No. 07-5203, 2009 WL 1635380, at
*10 (D.N.J. June 10, 2009) (collecting cases).
Other circuit courts have concluded that, ordinarily, post hoc rationales
provided for the purposes of litigation should not be considered when conducting a
de novo review. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has held that a court “may not . . . consider post hoc rationales . . . even in
the case of de novo review unless there is good cause to depart from the general
rule[.]” Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
held that, in certain circumstances, an insurer may waive defenses by failing to
raise them at the administrative level. Lauder v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 284
F.3d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Juliano v. Health Maint. Org. of N.J., Inc., 221
F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000)). See also Glista v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d
7

In Gritzer v. CBS, Inc., the Third Circuit did state that non-action from a plan administrator
constituted a denial with reason under ERISA. 275 F.3d 291, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court
concluded that in such circumstances, the rationales provided during litigation should be
reviewed under the de novo standard. Id. However, this case does not answer the relevant
question for two reasons. First, the Court was specifically addressing the correct standard of
review, and did not address the propriety of addressing post hoc rationales in such circumstances.
Id. Second, the Court did not answer the question of whether and in what circumstances a court
may consider post hoc rationales when conducting a de novo review of a plan administrator’s
decision. Id. Specifically, as discussed infra, many circuits have concluded that, where a plan
administrator has offered other defenses to coverage, they may be precluded from offering post
hoc argument during litigation. This exception would make Gritzer distinguishable.

13

113, 131-32 (1st Cir. 2004); Pitts v. Am. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 357 (5th
Cir. 1991).
The prudent rule seems to be that employed by the Second and Eighth
Circuits: where the insurer possessed sufficient knowledge and information
regarding an argument and failed to later present it at the administrative level, the
insurer should not be able to later present that argument during litigation. Lauder,
284 F.3d at 382; Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th
Cir. 1992). To permit otherwise would
raise concerns that plan administrators . . . will try the easiest and least
expensive means of denying a claim while holding in reserve another,
perhaps stronger, defense should the first one fail. In light of ERISA’s
remedial purpose of protecting plan beneficiaries, we are unwilling to
endorse manipulative strategies that attempt to take advantage of the
beneficiaries in this manner.
Lauder, 284 F.3d at 382. Allowing the introduction of post hoc justifications
would ultimately discourage the “meaningful dialogue” between plan
administrators and their beneficiaries as ERISA intended, Abram v. Cargill, Inc.,
395 F.3d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 2005), “invite more terse and conclusory decisions
from plan administrators,” Skretvedt, 268 F.3d at 178 n. 8, and allow insurers to
“sand-bag” the most vulnerable party in the proceedings – the beneficiary.
Applying this standard to the case at bar, Sun Life may not provide post hoc
rationales for its denial of benefits. The factual record was entirely developed at
the administrative level, and neither party has referenced any facts beyond the
14

administrative record. Mr. Locklear’s conduct was well-known to Sun Life, and is
entirely undisputed. Ms. Locklear provided all of the information requested by
Sun Life, and Sun Life deemed this information sufficient to deny benefits. Sun
Life possessed adequate facts to deny benefits on the ground that Mr. Locklear’s
conduct constituted reckless endangerment, but opted instead to pursue the easier
argument that his undisputed traffic violations were criminal in nature. Given
these facts, it is not appropriate to allow Sun Life to assert post hoc rationales in
defense of its decision. However, even if the Court were to consider this argument,
it is apparent that a denial of benefits would not be appropriate.
2.

Reckless Endangerment Mens Rea Requirement

Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second
degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” “[T]he mens rea required for
recklessly endangering another person is a conscious disregard of a known risk of
death or great bodily harm to another person.” Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616
A.2d 988, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1992). The mens rea requirement for recklessly
endangering another person is synonymous with the mens rea required for reckless
driving. Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2003).
In Commonwealth v. Mastromatteo, the defendant appealed a conviction for
reckless endangerment based upon his driving while intoxicated. 719 A.2d 1081
15

(Pa. Super. 1998). There, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “driving
under the influence of intoxicating substances does not create legal recklessness
per se but must be accompanied with other tangible indicia of unsafe driving to a
degree that creates a substantial risk of injury which is consciously disregarded.”
Id. at 1083. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
no statistical evidence has been proffered to support the conclusion
that driving under the influence alone creates the degree of risk legally
necessary to convict for reckless endangerment . . . in order for us to
conclude that driving while legally intoxicated results in recklessness
per se we would have to conclude that driving while legally
intoxicated creates a “substantial” risk that death or serious bodily
injury will occur. However, this does not necessarily follow.
Id. at 1083-84.
Given that driving while intoxicated does not constitute recklessness per se,
it follows that passing a vehicle in a no-passing zone cannot constitute recklessness
per se. After all, driving while intoxicated is perhaps the most dangerous and illadvised activity one can undertake in a motor vehicle. As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania noted “[d]runk drivers are brainless lethal weapons . . . [such]
conduct places the drunken driver, himself or herself, [as well as innocent people]
in a position of extreme peril[.]” Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 48485 (1995) (Papadakos, J., dissenting). This Court concludes that, similar to drunk
driving, passing a vehicle in a no-passing zone requires some other “tangible

16

indicia of unsafe driving” to satisfy the mens rea required for recklessness.
Mastromatteo, 719 A.2d at 1083.
Here, Sun Life has failed to establish the presence of “tangible indicia”
which Pennsylvania courts typically look to. Mr. Locklear was not speeding,
which is one typical tangible indicia of unsafe driving that is considered in
determining a reckless mens rea. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schmohl, 975 A.2d
1144, 1148-49 (Pa. Super 2009). The evidence does not establish that Mr.
Locklear definitively knew of the danger or harm that was likely to result from his
actions. See, Commonwealth v. Scofield, 521 A.2d 40 (Pa. Super. 1987);
Commonwealth v. Wood, 475 A.2d 834 (Pa. Super 1984). The evidence further
does not establish a prolonged pattern of dangerous behavior prior to the accident.
See, Commonwealth v. Jeter, 937 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Pa. Super 2007);
Commonwealth v. Breighner, 684 A.2d 143, 144-45 (Pa. Super. 1996).
This is not to say that Mr. Locklear’s decision to pass a construction vehicle
on a hill – when he presumably was not able to view vehicles coming from the
opposite direction – was condonable behavior. Certainly in this instance, that
decision led to tragic results for Mr. Locklear. In that sense, actions could properly
be described as a “careless disregard” for his safety and the safety of others. 75
Pa.C.S. § 3714. It is notable that the police report drafted for this accident
described Mr. Locklear’s conduct as “careless” rather than reckless. (AR0039).
17

It should again be emphasized that it is Sun Life’s burden to demonstrate
that Mr. Locklear possessed the mens rea necessary to commit reckless
endangerment of another person and therefore be excluded from coverage.
McCartha, 419 F.3d at 443; Critchlow, 378 F.3d at 257. Sun Life has failed to
carry that burden. For that reason, even considering Sun Life’s argument that
recklessly endangering another person qualified for exclusion under Mr.
Locklear’s policy, the Court concludes that Mr. Locklear did not recklessly
endanger another person, and therefore cannot be excluded from payout under the
policy.
C.

Damages Award

Although summary judgment will be entered in Ms. Locklear’s favor,
further briefing is required before an award can be entered in her favor. Ms.
Locklear has requested “damages including, but not limited to, past due benefits,
interest, attorney’s fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), costs incurred in
bring[ing] this action, and for such other relief as the Court deems equitable, just
and proper.” (ECF No. 1). Neither party has briefed this issue.
Specifically, before entering any award, the Court requires a list of any costs
incurred by the plaintiff, as well as a detailed breakdown of all hours expended by
counsel for the Plaintiff. The hours expended should be detailed with sufficient
specificity to allow the Court to reach a determination as to whether any time was
18

duplicative, unreasonable, or otherwise unnecessary. Additionally, both parties
will need to brief the issue of the proper monetary award under the policy, as well
as any interest due on that award. Such briefing is necessary due to the possible
uncertainty as to the amount owed under Mr. Locklear’s policy. See (AR0024).
IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the record demonstrates that Mr. Locklear was not committing a
crime at the time of his death. Consequently, no exclusion applies and the plan
administrator erred in denying benefits to Ms. Locklear. For those reasons, Sun
Life’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Ms. Locklear’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

19