Murray v. Harry et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 13 Respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 1/23/15. (km)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAWN CHRISTIAN MURRAY,
Petitioner
v.
SECRETARY JOHN WETZEL,
Respondent

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CIVIL NO. 4:CV-14-531
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
January 23, 2015
Background
Shawn Christian Murray filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 while previously confined at the State Correctional Institution
Camp Hill, Pennsylvania.1 Upon consideration of Petitioner’s motion to amend,
Superintendent John Thomas of SCI-Chester has been deemed the sole
Respondent in this matter.2 Service of the Petition was previously ordered.
Petitioner states that he was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI)

Murray recently notified the Court that he has been released from
confinement and is residing in Fayatteville, Pennsylvania. See Doc. 25.
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Prior to service of the Petition, Murray was transferred to the State
Correctional Institution, Chester, Pennsylvania (SCI-Chester).
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in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Pennsylvania on July 15, 2013
(No. 2116 of 2012). Murray notes that his conviction was the result of a trial
conducted in absentia. On August 22, 2013, he was sentenced to a three (3) to six
(6) month term of confinement as a result of that conviction. Petitioner states that
service of his sentence was to commence September 30, 2013 and conclude March
30, 2014.
Murray also indicates that his probation (which was imposed for an earlier
terroristic threats conviction, No. 1694 of 2009) was revoked on December 18,
2013 and he was sentenced to serve a nine to sixty month term of confinement
which was to commence December 31, 2013 and conclude June 7, 2018 with
sentence credit being awarded for the period of March 27, 2012 to March 21,
2013.3 See Doc. 1, p. 2.
Petitioner claims entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief on the grounds
that he was denied due process because his trial on the DUI charge and related
sentencing were held in absentia and without the benefit of counsel. See id. at p.
9. Murray raises additional and at times repetitive arguments challenging the
legality of his DUI conviction and sentence including the following claims: the
trial court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction; violation of the
Murray indicates that his 2012 DUI conviction caused the revocation of his
probation.
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prohibition against double jeopardy; trial court bias; improper denial of his request
for a change of venue; denial of his right to a mandatory arraignment; ineffective
assistance of counsel; unlawful arrest; imposition of a sentence without a drug and
alcohol assessment; and denial of counsel at his preliminary hearing, arraignment,
and pre-trial stages.
Respondent has filed a motion seeking dismissal of the petition on the
grounds that Murray failed to exhaust his available state court remedies. See
Doc. 13. The opposed motion is now ripe for consideration.
Discussion
Respondent maintains that Murray did not properly exhaust his available
state court remedies. See Doc. 14, p. 1 . Specifically, Respondent argues that the
claims before this Court were raised by Petitioner in a January 15, 2014 petition
pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) which “is still
pending at the state level.”4 Id. at p. 2. Petitioner asserts that his PCRA action is
now subject to dismissal on the basis of mootness and therefore he did everything
possible to comply with the exhaustion of state remedies requirement. See Doc.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. The PCRA “permits motions for
post-conviction collateral relief for allegations of error, including ineffective
assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty pleas, improper obstruction of rights
to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and violation of constitutional provisions."
Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1991).
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15, p. 4.
Title 28 United States Code Section 2254(b)(1) provides that an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court cannot be granted unless the applicant has exhausted the
remedies available in the courts of the State; or there is an absence of available
state corrective process; or there are existing circumstances which render the state
process ineffective.5 The exhaustion requirement is not a mere formality. It
serves the interests of comity between the federal and state systems, by allowing
the state an initial opportunity to determine and correct any violations of a
prisoner’s federal rights. Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2004).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that
“[U]nder 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c), such a petitioner ‘shall not be deemed to have
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.” Wenger v. Frank, 266 F.3d 218, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2001).
“A state prisoner is generally barred from obtaining federal habeas relief
unless the prisoner has properly presented his or her claims through one ‘complete

However, a Section 2254 petition may be denied on the merits
notwithstanding the failure of a petitioner to exhaust available state court remedies.
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round of the State’s established appellate review process.’” Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (2006) (internal citations omitted);
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)(while exhaustion does not
require state prisoners to invoke extraordinary remedies, the state courts must be
afforded one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues via completion of
the State's established appellate review process). The United States Supreme
Court in O’Sullivan explained, that state prisoners must “file petitions for
discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review
procedure in the State.” Id. at 847. The Supreme Court added that, in determining
whether a state prisoner has preserved an issue for presentation in a federal habeas
petition, it must be determined not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state
remedies, but also whether he has properly exhausted those remedies, i.e., whether
he has fairly presented his claims to the state courts. See id. at 848.
Fair presentation requires that the “substantial equivalent” of both the legal
theory and the facts supporting the federal claim are submitted to the state courts,
and the same method of legal analysis applied in the federal courts must be
available to the state courts. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 959 F. 2d 1227,
1230 (3d Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997).
Moreover, to satisfy exhaustion, the state court must be put on notice that a federal

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claim is being asserted. Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner’s claims are presented through
a collateral proceeding, such as a petition under the PCRA, and it is not necessary
to present federal claims to state courts both on direct appeal and in a PCRA
proceeding. Evans, 959 F.2d at 1230.
In his Petitioner, Murray acknowledges that he did not seek relief via the
initiation of a direct appeal in Pennsylvania state court. See Doc. 1, p. 3. The
petitioner further admits that although he filed a PCRA action on January 13,
2014, that matter is still pending before the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin
County. See id. Thus, it is undisputed that Murray’s pending claims are
unexhausted.
Federal habeas corpus relief may not be granted on a petition containing
unexhausted claims. However, in both Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) and
Crews v. Horn, 360 F. 3d 146 (3d Cir. 2004), a § 2254 petitioner filed a timely but
mixed (one containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims) federal habeas
corpus petition. Both Rhines and Crews addressed arguments that federal habeas
petitions should be held in abeyance while unexhausted claims were exhausted in
state court because those claims might be time barred upon returning to federal
court due to the time limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).

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The United States Supreme Court in Rhines, recognized that under such
“limited circumstances” district courts have discretion to stay a mixed § 2254
federal habeas corpus petition so that the petitioner can pursue review of his
unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. The Third Circuit in
Crews similarly recognized that in order to avoid an unfair result, “when an
outright dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a stay is
the only appropriate course of action.” Crews, 360 F.3d at p. 154 (internal
citations omitted).
Rhines and Crews both contemplate that the initial federal petition must be
timely filed. In the present case, there is no indication in the record that Murray’s
pending federal petition is untimely under the time frame established by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. As discussed above
Petitioner’s pending § 2254 action includes claims that he is also asserting via a
PCRA petition which is presently under consideration in Pennsylvania state court.
Although Petitioner speculates that his PCRA action is now subject to dismissal as
moot, there is no indication that any state court has actually rendered such a
determination.
As in Crews, Murray should not face the prospect of forfeiting federal court
review of issues. Under these circumstances, Crews counsels in favor of a stay of

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litigation in this case while Murray exhausts the state review process on his
pending federal claims. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
state remedies will be granted in part and this matter will be stayed.6
Within thirty (30) days of the termination of Petitioner’s state court
proceedings regarding his pending federal claims, he will be required to file a
written status report with the Court detailing the conclusion of his state court
exhaustion efforts and including a copy of the relevant Superior and/or Supreme
Court’s dispositions if he wishes to proceed with this matter. An appropriate
Order will issue.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are made when: (1) the state
corrective process is so deficient as to render any effort to obtain relief futile, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b); (2) acts of state officials have, in effect, made state remedies
unavailable to the petitioner, Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1987);
or (3) "inordinate delay" in state proceedings has rendered state remedies ineffective.
Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1994); Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819
F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1986).
Based upon the record to date in this matter, it has not been sufficiently shown
that Petitioner is presently entitled to be excused from the exhaustion requirement.
However, in the event that Murray can satisfy one of the exceptions outlined above he
may seek the reopening of this matter.
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