Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc. v. Criswell et al
Filing
66
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 39 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM And to Strike Certain Affirmative Defenses filed by Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 1/21/15. (km)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIFFLINBURG TELEGRAPH,
INC.,
:
:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
HEIDI CRISWELL, DARLENE
:
SHARPE, DALE E. CRISSWELL, :
WILDCAT PUBLICATIONS, LLC, :
MARGARET WOLFE,
:
RICOH, USA, INC.
:
:
Defendants.
:
Case No. 4:14-cv-00612
(Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM
January 21, 2015
Before the Court is Plaintiff Mifflinburg Telegraph’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant Margaret Wolfe’s Counterclaim and to Strike Certain Affirmative
Defenses (ECF No. 39). In accordance with the following reasoning, the motion is
granted in part, the Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed without prejudice, the
affirmative defenses are stricken without prejudice, and the Defendant is granted
leave to amend.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc., (“Plaintiff” or “Mifflinburg Telegraph”
or “Mifflinburg”) instituted this action on March 31, 2014. The Complaint alleges
1
claims against numerous Defendants, including claims against Defendant Margaret
Wolfe, the subject of the pending Motion, for aiding and abetting conversion and
civil conspiracy.1 See Pl.’s Compl., Mar. 31, 2014, ECF No. 1. Defendants Heidi
Criswell, Darlene Sharp, and Dale Criswell are former employees of the
Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc., a printing business located in Mifflinburg,
Pennsylvania. Wildcat Publications is a company newly formed by Heidi Criswell
(“Crisswell”).2
After the prior owner of the Mifflinburg Telegraph, a general-interest
community newspaper located in Mifflinburg, Union County, Pennsylvania, passed
away, Angelo Mark Papalia, the executor of the estate, engaged in negotiations
with Criswell to purchase the Mifflinburg Telegraph from the estate. Negotiations
ceased after Criswell and Papalia failed to agree upon a purchase price.
Instead of purchasing the Mifflinburg Telegraph, Criswell, Sharp, and
Criswell, all former employees of Mifflinburg, left the business and established a
1
Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants include: violation of and aiding and
abetting the violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.;
conversion and aiding and abetting conversion; breach of and aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty; tortious interference with business relations; misappropriation and misuse of
trade secrets and confidential information in violation of Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, 12 Pa. C.S. § 5301, et seq.; unfair competition; procuring information by improper means;
defamation; civil conspiracy; and, unjust enrichment. See Pl.’s Compl., Mar. 31, 2014, ECF No.
1.
2
The Court refers to Heidi Criswell, Darlene Sharp, Dale Criswell, and Wildcat
Publications, LLC, collectively as the “Wildcat Defendants.”
2
competing business, Wildcat Publications, LLC. Mifflinburg alleges that the
Wildcat Defendants attempted to “cripple” the Mifflinburg Telegraph before
leaving. Pertinent to the motion under consideration, Mifflinburg alleges that
Defendant Wolfe arranged to have a Mifflinburg Telegraph printer transferred to
Wildcat Publications for use in the new business. Mifflinburg further alleges that
Wolfe arranged to have the cost of the printer included in the Mifflinburg
Telegraph lease for another printer, such that Mifflinburg was paying for the
printer that Criswell’s competing business was using without being aware of nature
of its payments.
On April 1, 2014, following the Complaint filed on March 31, 2014,
Mifflinburg filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction against the Wildcat Defendants. (ECF No. 3). On April 4, 2014, in
response to the Wildcat Defendant’s motion, the Court denied the request for a
temporary restraining order on procedural grounds, continued the pending
preliminary injunction hearing, and granted Mifflinburg’s request for expedited
discovery. Mifflinburg then filed a renewed request for a temporary restraining
order, which the Court granted on April 10, 2014, and converted into a preliminary
injunction order on April 17, 2014 based on the Parties’ agreement.
On June 2, 2014, Defendant Wolfe filed an answer to the Plaintiff’s
3
Complaint raising affirmative defendants, and including crossclaims against all
other defendants and a counterclaim against Mifflinburg for tortious interference
with he employment contract. Plaintiff now moves to dismiss Wolfe’s
counterclaim and strike her affirmative defenses.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff Mifflinburg Telegraph seeks to dismiss Defendant Wolfe’s
counterclaim for tortious interference with a contract for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Plaintiff argues that Wolfe failed to allege sufficient facts necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss for each element of a tortious interference claim under
Pennsylvania law. After stating the applicable legal standard, the Court scrutinizes
Plaintiff’s allegations of Wolfe’s pleading insufficiencies.
1.
Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The standard applies to counterclaims as well as
complaints. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
4
382 U.S. 172, 174–75 (1965); Total Care Sys., Inc. v. Coons, 860 F. Supp. 236,
239 (E.D. Pa. 1994). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. The standard seeks to eliminate those
claims that do not present “enough” factual matter, assumed to be true, “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” in support of the
claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Where a plaintiff fails to nudge his “claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.”
Id., 550 U.S. at 570.
To determine the adequacy of a complaint under this standard, a court
should: (1) identify the elements of the claim(s); (2) review the complaint to strike
conclusory allegations; and the, (3) consider whether the well-plead components of
the complaint and evaluate whether all elements previously identified are
sufficiently alleged. Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). All
well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true at this juncture. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009).
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Is Granted
In her Answer, Defendant Wolfe included a counterclaim against Plaintiff
Mifflinburg Telegraph alleging tortious interference with a contract. Wolfe assets
5
that Plaintiff “knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, negligently interfered with
Defendant’s employment contract with RICOH when it identified Defendant in the
instant litigation, and communications to RICOH preceding the same, as
participating in the events forming the basis for Plaintiff’s claims in its
Complaint.” Def.’s Answer, Crossclaim, Counterclaim 223, June 2, 2014, ECF 35
[hereinafter Def.’s Ans.].
In order to plead a viable cause of action for tortious interference with a
contract under Pennsylvania law, a party must plead: “(1) the existence of a
contractual, or prospective contractual relation between the complainant and a third
party; (2) purposeful action on the part of the defendant, specifically intended to
harm the existing relation, or to prevent a prospective relation from occurring; (3)
the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the
occasioning of actual legal damage as a result of the defendant’s conduct.”
Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The primary flashpoint of contention between the Parties
concerns Wolfe’s pleading of the first element: the nature of contractual
relationship between Wolfe and her employer.
Wolfe alleges that she “was employed by Defendant RICOH, USA, Inc. . . .
from 2006 and 2014 pursuant to an employment contract between Defendant and
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RICOH for the exchange of Defendant’s services for remuneration from RICOH.”
Def.’s Ans., ¶ 222. Wolfe did not allege what type of “employment contract”
existed between RICOH and herself. While there exist several grounds for dissent,
it is widely held that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a claim for tortious
interference with an employment contract that is an at-will arrangement.
In a recent opinion, Ransom v. Carbondale Area School District, 982 F.
Supp. 2d 397 (M.D. Pa. 2013), my colleague, the Honorable Judge Robert D.
Mariani, cogently summarized the current state of Pennsylvania law regarding
whether an at-will employment contract may serve as the basis for a tortious
interference claim. Judge Mariani identified Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 126
(Pa. Super. 1998), as the lead case holding that “an at-will employee cannot allege
the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations unless his or her
employment is prospective.” Ransom v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp.
2d 397, 404 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (Mariani, J.) (citing Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d
1269, 1278–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
however, has not had occasion to rule on this issue and either expressly adopt or
overrule Hennessy. Because precedent contrary to Hennessy does exist, as Judge
Mariani notes, “[t]he decision rests on shaky ground.” Ransom, 982 F. Supp. 2d at
405; see also White v. Brommer, 747 F. Supp. 2d 447, 468–72 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
7
(summarizing the debate over Hennessy’s status and collecting district court
predictions on how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule).
For example, in Yaindl v. Ingersoll–Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980), the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated in a footnote that “[o]f course, an
action for intentional interference with the performance of a contract lies even
though the contract interfered with it terminable at the will of the parties.” Yaindl,
422 A.2d at 618 n.6; see also Curran v. Children’s Serv. Ctr. of Wyoming Cnty.,
Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“A cause of action for intentional
interference with a contractual relationship may be sustained even though the
employment relationship is at-will.”) (citing Yaindl, 422 A.2d at 618 n.6). While
the Hennessy court dismissed that statement as dicta, Hennessy, 708 A.2d at 1278,
the statement is based on comment g of section 766 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS.
See Yaindl, 422 A.2d at 618 n.6. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has expressly incorporated section 766 into its substantive law. See Adler, Barish,
Daniels, Levin and Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1181–1182 ( 1978) (citing
Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1961)).
Section 766 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) defines the tort of intentional
8
interference with contractual relations.3 Comment g to section 766 implies that atwill contracts are covered by the Restatement’s definition of this tort, because it
instructs courts on a method of assessing damages for claims of interference with
at-will contracts.4 The Superior Court in Hennessy neither addressed the
implications of this comment, nor directly discredited the reasoning in its own
prior precedent contrary to Hennessy’s holding. See generally Hennessy, 708 A.2d
126 (Pa. Super. Ct.1998).
As Judge Mariani wrote, however, “regardless of whether this or any other
federal court considers Hennessy to be well-reasoned, the fact remains that it is the
Superior Court’s most recent word on the issue, and therefore is currently the law
3
The text of section 766 reads:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from
the failure of the third person to perform the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766.
4
The comment reads:
Contracts terminable at will. A similar situation exists with a contract that, by its
terms or otherwise, permits the third person to terminate the agreement at will.
Until he has so terminated it, the contract is valid and subsisting and the
defendant may not improperly interfere with it. The fact that the contract is
terminable at will, however, is to be taken into account in determining the
damages that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of its breach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, cmt. g.
9
of Pennsylvania.” Ransom, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 405. “As long as [a Superior
Court] decision has not been overturned by [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania],
it remains binding precedent.” Sorber v. Am. Mortorists Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 881,
882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Furthermore, the Superior Court explicitly reaffirmed
Hennessy in a more recent decision, Huan v. Community Health Systems, 14 A.3d
120, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), thirteen years after Hennessy and over a strong
dissent. The Huan court concluded that “[u]nless or until Hennessy is overturned
by an en banc panel of this Court, or by a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, it continues to be viable precedent for this Court and for the courts of
common pleas.” Huan v. Cmty. Health Sys., 14 A.3d 120, 125 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2011).
It is this Court’s duty to apply the substantive law of Pennsylvania to this
issue. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrote:
[When there is] no reported decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme
court or any other Pennsylvania court addressing the precise issue
before it, it [is] the duty of the District Court to predict how the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret [the relevant issue] if
presented with this case. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1167 (3d Cir. 1981). In so
doing, a federal court can also give due regard, but not conclusive
effect, to the decisional law of lower state courts. See, e.g., Burke v.
Maasen, 904 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1990). The opinions of
intermediate appellate state courts are “not to be disregarded by a
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federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the
highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” West v. AT &T
Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000).
In light of this standard, Judge Mariani’s reasoning reflects that of this
Court:
This Court is not convinced that the Supreme Court would decide to
overrule
Hennessy or Haun. Indeed, in the fifteen years since
Hennessy was decided, no such effort has been made. Accordingly,
the “predictions” that the Supreme Court will overturn Hennessy
appear more like opinions that the Court should overturn it. But it is
not the purview of this Court to determine how Pennsylvania should
structure its common law. Therefore, until there is some convincing
evidence that Pennsylvania law will in fact change, the Court cannot
give the opinions of the parties or of various other non-precedential
federal court decisions binding effect.
Moreover, despite the uncertainty surrounding the Hennessy decision,
this Court is not an outlier in refraining to predict its demise. It joins
several other district courts that have had occasion to rule on the issue,
and that have also held that there is insufficient evidence to conclude
that Hennessy does not bind them. See Davis v. Alcoa Mill Products,
Inc., 2004 WL 2063124, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Carter v. Philadelphia
Stock Exch., 1999 WL 715205, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 1999);
Parvensky–Barwell v. Cnty. Of Chester, 1999 WL 213371, at *8
(E.D. Pa. 1999); Buckwalter v. Parker, 1999 WL 195701, at *1–2
(E.D. Pa. 1998).
Ransom, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 406. Consequently, it is the considered view of
this Court that the current state of Pennsylvania law does not allow tortious
interference claims based on at-will employment contracts. See id.
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In the case at bar, however, the Court cannot determine that Wolfe’s
claim must fail as a matter of law, because her pleading does not specify
what type of employee she was or what kind of contract she had with
RICOH. Wolfe’s pleading states only that she had an “employment contract
with RICOH,” without any further specificity. Def.’s Ans., ¶ 222.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss, dismiss
Wolfe’s claim without prejudice, and allow her leave to amend in order to
specify the precise nature of her contractual relationship with RICOH and
address any other shortcomings with the pleading because there is no
certainty amendment would be futile.
B.
Motion to Strike
Mifflinburg Telegraph also seeks to strike certain affirmative defenses in
Defendant Wolfe’s Answer for failing to meet the pleading standards under the
Federal Rules. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (f) provides: “[t]he court may
strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike
generally are viewed with disfavor and rarely are granted.” Am. Std. Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. U.R.L., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 527, 531 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
(Caldwell, J.). This very Court has previously recognized that, “there appears to be
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general judicial agreement, as reflected in the extensive case law on the subject,
that they should be denied unless the challenged allegations have no possible
relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may
cause some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the
action.” Trivedi v. Slawecki, No. 11-cv-2390, 2013 WL 1767593 *2 (M.D. Pa.
Apr. 24, 2013) (Brann, J.) (quoting 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1382 (3d ed.)).
While “[m]otions to strike are generally viewed with disfavor . . . a motion
to strike under Rule 12(f) is the ‘primary procedure’ for objecting to an insufficient
affirmative defense.” United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 836 (M.D.
Pa. 1989). These motions may “serve a useful purpose by eliminating insufficient
defenses and saving the time and expense which would otherwise be spent in
litigating issues which would not affect the outcome of the case.” Id. at 837.
Mifflinburg argues that Wolfe’s affirmative defenses should be stricken
because she fails to satisfy the plausibility standard applied to federal pleadings
pursuant to Rule 8 and the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Iqbal and
Twombly. While the Third Circuit has not yet definitively addressed the issue, the
overwhelming majority of the district courts in this Circuit have held, after cogent
analysis, that this plausibility standard does not apply to the pleading of affirmative
13
defenses. See, e.g., Weed v. Ally Fin. Inc., 11-cv-2808, 2012 WL 2469544, *3–5
(E.D. Pa. Jun. 28, 2012) (proving a collection of cases holding the plausibility
standard does not apply to affirmative defenses); Vurimindi v. Fuqua Sch. of Bus.,
10-cv-234, 2011 WL 3803668, *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2011) (“[T]he majority of
district courts in this Circuit addressing the issue have held that Twombly and
Iqbal do not apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses).
A textual analysis of Rule 8's different terms and requirements for pleading
claims and asserting affirmative defenses demonstrates why different standards
apply. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states: “[a] pleading that states a claim
for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). In its Iqbal and
Twombly decisions, the Supreme Court focused on this “showing” requirement
when establishing the plausibility standard for pleading claims. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3; see also Phillips v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“‘Plausibility’ is related to the
requirement of a Rule 8 ‘showing.’”).
In contrast, Rule 8(c) applies to affirmative defenses and requires a party
only to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(c) (emphasis added). Therefore, the plausibility standard applicable to pleading
14
claims based on a “showing” does not apply to affirmative defenses that a party
must merely “state.” Courts that do not apply the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses often decline to do so on these grounds. See, e.g., Tyco v.
Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900–902 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
While affirmative defenses need not rise to the level of plausibility, their
pleading must still provide plaintiffs with “fair notice” of the grounds for those
defenses. Prior to Iqbal and Twombly, parties were required to plead affirmative
defenses in a manner that provided fair notice of the nature of the defense. See,
e.g., Dann v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145–46 (E.D. Pa. 2011); United
States v. Consol. Coal Co., No. 89-2121, 1991 WL 333694, *4 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 5,
1991) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1274 at 455–56 (1990)). Generally, “[a]ffirmative
defenses were not to be struck unless there was no set of facts which could be
inferred from the pleadings in support of the defenses, but it was also the case that
bare bones conclusory allegations could be stricken.” Dann, 274 F.R.D. at 145–45
(citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Modular Homes, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 117, 120–21
(D.N.J. 1993) (“Motions to strike . . . will only be granted when a defense is legally
insufficient under any set of facts which may be inferred from the allegations of the
pleading . . . . Defenses that are nothing but bare bones conclusory allegations can
15
be stricken.”).
Although some courts argue that applying the fair notice standard to
affirmative defenses in a fact specific manner is effectively applying the Twombly
standard by another name, see Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 899–900,
pleading facts that are sufficient to “show” a “plausible” claim for relief requires
pleading plausible facts for each inference necessary to satisfy every element of a
claim. In contrast, “stating” an affirmative defense provides “fair notice” without
specific factual allegations for each element of the defense as long as the defense is
logically within the ambit of the general factual allegations in the litigation. Stated
otherwise, the plaintiff must be able to infer why an affirmative defense may be
germane to the litigation based on some general allegations in the pleadings. The
facts may be threadbare, but they must be there.
A party may satisfy the fair notice requirement by including a short and
plain statement of the grounds for asserting an affirmative defense that
demonstrates a logical relationship to the lawsuit or refer to general facts elsewhere
in any parties’ pleadings. The statement need not rise to the level of plausibility,
but allegations must exist somewhere in the pleadings such that parties and the
court may draw a logical inference from the asserted defenses to the events
underlying litigation. See 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
16
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1382 (3d ed.).
In her Answer, Defendant Wolfe simply lists many of the eighteen
affirmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c)(1), along with numerous other defenses
seemingly unrelated to this litigation. She does not elaborate on these defenses or
in any way indicate how they may be logically related to the claims against her.
Pleadings of this nature may prejudice parties who must spend time and resources
preparing to respond to defenses that have no logical relation to the actual
litigation. While Defendant Wolfe need not meet the plausibility standard to plead
effective affirmative defenses, fair notice requires more than a mere rote recitation
of generally available affirmative defenses without citation to any other fact or
premise from which an inference may arise that the stated defense is logically
related to the case in any way. See id.; Peoples State Bank of Wyalusing, PA v.
Wellsburg Truck Auto Sales, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-433, 2010 WL 4922877, *3 (M.D.
Pa. Nov. 29, 2010) (Caputo, J.). Accordingly, the Court strikes Defendant Wolfe’s
affirmative defenses without prejudice and grants leave to amend the pleadings,
because there is little indication that amendment is futile.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Mifflinburg Telegraph’s Motion to
Dismiss Defendant Margaret Wolfe’s Counterclaim and to Strike Certain
17
Affirmative Defenses is granted in part. Defendant Wolfe’s counterclaim is
dismissed without prejudice, her affirmative defenses are stricken without
prejudice, and she is granted leave to amend her pleadings.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
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