MCASSEY v. DISCOVERY MACHINE INC. et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 24 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by James Mcassey and granting 28 MOTION to Stay Discovery filed by Todd Griffith, Discovery Machine Inc., Anna Griffith, Howard Lewis, Vanessa Chapla, Molly Lusk. Further discovery is STAYED pending the resolution of any dispositive motions. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 13, 2016. (kjn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES MCASSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DISCOVERY MACHINE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 4:16-CV-705
(Judge Kane)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
This workplace discrimination lawsuit was recently transferred to this court,
and referred to the undersigned. At the time of this case transfer there was a motion
to dismiss pending, and unresolved, in the case. (Doc. 13.) There are now two more
motions filed in this matter, which relate to this motion to dismiss: (1) a motion to
compel discovery filed by the plaintiff (Doc. 24); and (2) a motion to stay discovery
pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, filed by the defendants. (Doc. 28.)
Given this constellation of pleadings, for the reasons set forth below we will:
(1) STAY further discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss filed in this
case; and (2) DENY the motion to compel without prejudice to renewal of that
motion, if necessary, following resolution of the motion to dismiss.
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery

issues. At the outset, the scope of discovery is defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This
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far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic Capital
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Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). This discretion is guided, however, by certain
basic principles. One of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion
in this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it
considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court
concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g.,
James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ.
Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such
a case, while the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has
sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file
motions which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses to
civil actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual discovery
until after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court. In such instances,
it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation,
2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting Chrysler
Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) ( citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
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Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that further discovery should be
briefly stayed at this time until after the court resolves the pending motion to dismiss.
We reach this conclusion in accordance with settled case law, finding that: “[A] stay
of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion
where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way,
‘do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.’” Johnson v. New York Univ.
School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
An appropriate order follows:
Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:
1.

The plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 24), is DENIED without
prejudice to renewal of that motion, if necessary, following resolution of
the motion to dismiss.

2.

The Motion to Stay (Doc. 28), is GRANTED and further discovery is
STAYED pending the resolution of any dispositive motions.

So ordered this 13th day of June, 2016.
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S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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