MCASSEY v. DISCOVERY MACHINE INC. et al
Filing
76
MEMORANDUM ORDER denying 71 MOTION to renew motion to compel discovery filed by James Mcassey. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 23, 2018. (kjn) (Main Document 76 replaced on 8/23/2018) (kjn).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES McASSEY,
Plaintiff
v.
DISCOVERY MACHINE, INC., et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 4:16-CV-705
(Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.
Factual background
This is a pro se employment discrimination and retaliation action brought by
James McAssey against his former employer, Discovery Machine, Inc., (DMI) and
several of its individual supervisory officers and employees. Currently, the status
of this case is as follows: The discovery deadline set by the court has passed and
there is a potentially dispositive summary judgment motion pending before the
court. Shortly after the defendants filed this summary judgment motion and the
discovery deadline came to a close, McAssey filed a motion to compel further
discovery. (Doc. 71.) The motion was not accompanied by a brief, as required by
the local rules, was filed after the discovery deadline had passed, and did not
identify the deficiencies in the prior discovery disclosures made by the defense in
any way which permits a meaningful evaluation of this motion. The defendants
have opposed this motion as untimely, and improper. (Doc. 72.)
For the reasons set forth below, this motion will be denied.
II.
Discussion
Issues relating to the proper scope and nature of discovery rest in the sound
discretion of the Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d
Cir. 1987). A court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, therefore, will
be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez
v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to
rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs.
Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572,
585 (D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United
States, 943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a
magistrate judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc'ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also
Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45
(N.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under
abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a
magistrate judge's resolution of discovery disputes deserves
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substantial deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse
of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
In this case, McAssey seeks to compel discovery after the discovery
deadline has elapsed, and has failed to support his motion to compel with a brief
which explains the basis for the motion. This failure to file a brief has
consequences for McAssey since we are entitled to deem the plaintiff to have
withdrawn a motion when he fails to properly support that motion by filing a brief
in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Salkeld v. Tennis, 248 F. App'x 341 (3d Cir.2007)
(affirming dismissal of motion under Local Rule 7.5); Booze v. Wetzel, 1:12-CV1307, 2012 WL 6137561 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2012) report and recommendation
adopted, 1:CV-12-1307, 2012 WL 6138315 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2012); Breslin v.
Dickinson Twp., 1:09BCVB1396, 2011 WL 1577840 (M.D.Pa. Apr.26, 2011)
Prinkey v. Tennis, No. 09B52, 2010 WL 4683757 (M.D.Pa. Nov.10, 2010)
(dismissal under Local Rule 7.5); Griffin v. Lackawanna County Prison Board, No.
07B1683, 2008 WL 4533685 (M.D.Pa.Oct.6, 2008) (dismissal under Local Rule
7.6).
Second, this discovery request, which was made one week after the
discovery deadline in this case had lapsed, is untimely. Where a party submits an
untimely discovery request, the court can, and in the exercise of its discretion often
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should, refuse to compel compliance with that request. See, e.g., Maslanka v.
Johnson & Johnson, 305 F.App=x 848 (3d Cir. 2008)(affirming denial of pro se
litigant motion to compel where discovery demands were untimely); Oriakhi v.
United States, 165 F.App=x 991 (3d Cir. 2006)(same); Bull v. United States, 143
F.App=x 468 (3d Cir. 2005)(same). This principle applies here and compels denial
of this particular request.
Finally, we note that there is a potentially dispositive motion pending in this
case. The district court may properly defer, delay or deny discovery while it
considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court
concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See,
e.g., James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005);
Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New
York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring or
denying discovery in such a case, while the court determines the threshold issue of
whether a complaint has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple,
fundamental truth: Parties who file motions which may present potentially
meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil actions should not be put to the
time, expense and burden of additional factual discovery until after these claimed
legal defenses are addressed by the court.
In such instances, it is clearly established that:
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“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a
potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have
substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be
without foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 20910 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) ( citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
203 F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001);
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that this motion to compel should
be denied and consideration of any further discovery should be stayed at this time
until after the court resolves the pending summary judgment motion or any other
dispositive motion which the court may direct the parties to file. We reach this
conclusion in accordance with settled case law, finding that: “[A] stay of discovery
is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the
motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not
appear to be without foundation in law.’” Johnson v. New York Univ. School of
Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
An appropriate order follows.
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III.
Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED, that the plaintiff’s
motion to compel, (Doc. 71), is DENIED
So ordered, this 23d day of August, 2018.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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