Anything to Rent Lease Wholesale, Inc. et al v. Hughesville Borough et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 2/24/2017. (jn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANYTHING TO RENT LEASE
:
WHOLESALE, INC., CARL SCHULTZ :
and CARL SCHULTZ d/b/a
:
VALLEY BEVERAGE,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
HUGHESVILLE BOROUGH and
:
HUGHESVILLE BOROUGH
:
AUTHORITY,
:
:
Defendants.
:

No. 4:16-cv-00895
(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM
February 24, 2017
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carl Schultz owns and operates the retail establishment known as

Valley Beverage, located at 4919 Route 220 Highway in Hughesville, Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania. Pl.’s Amd. Compl., ECF No. 5, at ¶ 3. Plaintiff Anything
To Rent Lease Wholesale, Inc., is a Pennsylvania business headquartered at 4919
Route 220 Highway. Id. at ¶ 1. It also owns the parcel of land located at 5054–
5058 Route 220 Highway, Hughesville. Id. at ¶ 4.
During the fall of 2013, Schultz observed erosion and sink holes on the
property located at 4919 Route 220 Highway. Id. at ¶ 7. He immediately contacted

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the Defendants and advised them of the apparent problems. Id. at ¶ 8. Schultz also
informed the Defendants that he believed certain of the Borough’s water lines were
leaking and causing erosion on the property. Id. In addition, he requested that the
Borough investigate the cause of the erosion. Id. at ¶ 10.
According to Schultz, his requests were intentionally ignored. Id. at ¶ 11.
Shortly after July 2014, the Borough discovered a substantial leak in their water
carriage system, which leak was later traced in part to the subject property. Id. at
¶¶ 18–20. When he confronted a Borough representative about their inaction,
Schultz was allegedly told “that the Defendants ignored his complaint because it
was him making it.” Id. at ¶ 23. Schultz suspected that this was retaliation for
another lawsuit he had previously filed against the Borough. Id. at ¶ 27.
The affected property served as the site of a warehouse that held stock for
the Valley Beverage business. Id. at ¶ 9. According to Schultz, as a result of the
water main leak, the ground beneath the warehouse was undermined, the building
lost its structural integrity, and it has since been deemed uninsurable or a high
insurance risk. Id. at ¶¶ 31–35.
II.

LAW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may file a

motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Such a motion “tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading,” In re Hydrogen Peroxide

2

Litigation, 552 F.3d 305, 316 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) (Scirica, C.J.) (quoting Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.)),
and “streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1989). “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a
court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 326 (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 73 (1984)). This is
true of any claim, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal
theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Beginning in 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States initiated what
some scholars have termed the Roberts Court’s “civil procedure revival” by
significantly tightening the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6)
motions. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure
Revival, 31 Rev. Litig. 313 (2012). In two landmark decisions, Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009), the Roberts Court “changed . . . the pleading landscape” by
“signal[ing] to lower-court judges that the stricter approach some had been taking
was appropriate under the Federal Rules.” Wasserman, supra, at 319–20. More
specifically, the Court in these two decisions “retired” the lenient “no-set-of-facts
test” set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting
“plausibility” standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 670 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

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41 (1957)) (“[a]cknowledging that Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts
test”).
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Although the
plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a
pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016)
(Jordan, J.) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “[a]sking for
plausible grounds . . . calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. No matter the context, however, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotations omitted)).

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When disposing of a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts alleged
in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff].” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (Nygaard, J.). However, “the tenet that a court must
accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted). “After Iqbal,
it is clear that conclusory or ‘bare-bones’ allegations will no longer survive a
motion to dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(Nygaard, J.). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it
must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state a
claim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

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III.

ANALYSIS
A.

The Motion To Dismiss Is Denied As To Plaintiffs’ Negligence
Claims.

The thrust of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims is that the Defendants failed to
investigate and remedy the subject leak, despite having been on notice of
symptoms of such leaking as early as the fall of 2013. Plaintiffs offer the following
factual averments in support:
7.
On or about fall of 2013, Plaintiff Carl Schultz observed
erosion/sink holes on his property located at 4919 Route 220
Highway, Hughesville, Pennsylvania.
8.
Plaintiff Schultz immediately contacted the Hughesville
Borough Authority and advised them of the water erosion/sink holes
on his property and that he believed Defendants’ waterlines were
leaking thus causing erosion to the ground beneath Plaintiffs’
warehouse located on the property
...
10. Plaintiff Schultz requested Defendants to investigate the water
erosion/sink holes on his property as he believed it was a direct result
of a leak in the Defendants’ water main located along Route 220
Highway.
11. Defendants intentionally disregarded Plaintiff Schultz’s
warnings and did not investigate the possible leak in their water main.
...
13. The Defendants had a duty to Plaintiff to investigate the
warning as it was reasonably foreseeable that a leak in the water main
could cause a dangerous condition and damage to the Plaintiff’s
property in and around such a leak.

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14. The Defendants failed to take action in sufficient time to
prevent such a dangerous condition and damage to Plaintiff’s
property.
15. After the request was ignored for several months, on July 17,
2014 Plaintiff Schultz sent a letter to Defendant Authority requesting
an investigation of the water mains at or near his property.
16. The Defendants had knowledge of verbal and written
complaints indicating the line may be leaking and none of the
officials, officers or employees of the Defendant Authority took action
to rectify or investigate the verbal and written complaints, and such
failure represents negligence as set forth more specifically below.
17. Plaintiff Carl Schultz was notified and advised by Defendants
that there was no leak of the water main line.
18. Months later, Defendant Hughesville Borough Authority began
to realize a significant water loss in their water system.
19. A leak in the main water line was then discovered at or near
Plaintiffs’ property located along Route 220 Highway.
...
31. As a direct result of Defendants disregard of Plaintiffs’
warnings severe damage has been done to Plaintiffs’ land and
warehouse from Defendants’ water main leak.
32. As a result of the water main leak, the ground beneath Plaintiff
Valley Beverage’s warehouse has been undermined resulting in severe
damage to the structural integrity of the building.
33. Had the Defendants investigated when Plaintiff Schultz first
warned Defendants that there was a leak, the damage to Plaintiffs’
land and warehouse could have been avoided.
34. Further, Plaintiff’s warehouse has been deemed uninsurable
and/or a high risk as a result of the loss of structural integrity of the
building.

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35. Plaintiff Schultz has incurred a staggering increase in his
insurance rates as a direct result.
“Under Pennsylvania law, a Plaintiff bringing a cause of action for
negligence must allege ‘the four basic elements of duty, breach, causation, and
damages.’” Perez v. Great Wolf Lodge of the Poconos LLC, 200 F. Supp. 3d 471
(M.D. Pa. 2016) (Mariani, J.) (quoting Loughran v. The Phillies, 888 A.2d 872,
874 (Pa.Super.2005)). The factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
state a plausible claim to relief under this framework. According to Plaintiffs, they
were owed a duty by the Defendants to be allowed to operate the subject property
free of underground seepage. Moreover, Plaintiffs suggest that the Defendants
were on notice of suspected problems but nevertheless failed to act. But for this
inaction, the Plaintiffs suggest that they would not have sustained as extensive
property and pecuniary damages.
The prime counterargument is that the Defendants are entitled to immunity
under Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 8541 et. seq. Although that act typically insulates municipalities from tort
liability, sufficient factual matter has been offered to plausibly suggest that a
statutory exemption applies. Specifically, under § 8542(b) of that act,
municipalities may still be held liable for “utility services facilities”:
(5) Utility service facilities.—A dangerous condition of the facilities
of steam, sewer, water, gas or electric systems owned by the local
agency and located within rights-of-way, except that the claimant to
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recover must establish that the dangerous condition created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred
and that the local agency had actual notice or could reasonably be
charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous
condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures
to protect against the dangerous condition.
Applying this example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has
permitted a municipality to face suit where a faulty water meter caused excessive
leaking in the basement of a commercial establishment, Primiano v. City of
Philadelphia, 739 A.2d 1172, 1173 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999), and where ground
water from a broken sewer pipe caused a gravel landslide. Allegheny Cty. v.
Dominijanni, 531 A.2d 562, 563 (1987). See also Bergdoll v. York Water Co., No.
2169 C.D. 2006, 2008 WL 9403180, at *6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (quoting
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. City of Philadelphia, 333 A.2d 497, 498
(1975) (“The plaintiff may, for instance, recover if damages have resulted from the
defendant’s faulty or negligent construction of the line, from the defendant’s
failure to repair a leaking line after actual or constructive notice, or from the
defendant’s failure to conduct reasonably careful inspections from time to time.”)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient factual matter to permit his negligence
claim to survive the motion to dismiss stage.

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B.

The Motion To Dismiss Is Denied As To Plaintiffs’ Trespass
Claims.

Defendants contend that each of Plaintiffs’ claims for trespass must be
dismissed because none of their employees or agents intentionally entered the
subject premises without permission. That is too restrictive a view of trespass law.
“At common law the owner of the surface owned downward to the center of the
earth and upward to the heavens, a principle expressed by the maxim ‘cujus est
solum ejus est usque ad coelom.’” Reynolds v. Wilson, 67 Pa. D. & C. 286, 289–90
(Com. Pl. 1949). As such, courts in this Commonwealth have recognized that
“[a]ny physical entry upon the surface of the land is a trespass, whether it be by
walking upon it, flooding it with water, casting objects upon it, or otherwise,”
Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 169 (1993) (quoting Prosser, TORTS (5th ed.,
1984)). State courts have even debated whether such flooding constitutes a
“continuing” trespass. See Graybill v. Providence Twp., 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 509,
593 A.2d 1314, 1316 (1991), aff’d, 533 Pa. 61, 618 A.2d 392 (1993).
A prime example of a trespass of this character was recounted in Deibert v.
Pennsylvania Turnpike Com’n, 2010 WL 6610724, 18 Pa.D.&C.5th 177, 215
(Com. Pl. 2010). In Deibert, the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County found
that a township could be held liable for flooding damages that resulted from its
water management system. It wrote as follows:

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As to the two-part analysis of § 8542(a), first, it is clear that, under the
facts presented by this case, damages would be recoverable under a
trespass theory if the injury were caused by a person not having a
defense under § 8541. And second, the injury was caused by the
negligent acts of LMT, namely the storm water management system it
owns and possesses is causing water to unlawfully trespass onto the
Plaintiffs’ property. As the real estate exception under §542(b)(3) of
the PSTCA applies to LMT under the circumstances presented by this
case, LMT is not immune from suit in this case on the Plaintiffs’
action in trespass.
Id.
As Plaintiff argues, not only does this analysis apply to its claim for trespass,
but it also suggests that a second statutory exception to the Pennsylvania’s Political
Subdivisions Tort Claims Act may be triggered. In particular, § 8542(b)(3)(ii)
exempts from immunity tortious conduct arising out of “[t]he care, custody or
control of real property in the possession of the local agency,” including “facilities
of steam, sewer, water, gas and electric systems owned by the local agency and
located within rights-of-way.” That exception also appears to apply, and therefore,
Plaintiffs’ trespass claims will survive the motion to dismiss stage.
C.

The Motion To Dismiss Is Granted Without Prejudice As To
Plaintiffs’ Punitive Damages Claims.

The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims should be
dismissed because the Defendants are governmental entities. As such, those claims
are dismissed with leave to refile in the event that any individual defendants are
added later.

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D.

The Motion To Dismiss Is Granted With Prejudice As To
Plaintiff’s Federal Equal Protection Claims.

Plaintiffs bring a series of federal equal protection claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “Setting aside the availability of immunity, the basic cause of
action requires that a § 1983 plaintiff prove two essential elements: (1) that the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law;
and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653
F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.).
Moreover, under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), “a local government may not be sued under §
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” “Instead, it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. “Proof
of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability
under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an
existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a
municipal policymaker.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24
(1985). “Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional policy, and its origin, must
be separately proved.” Id.
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Plaintiffs’ constitutional counts thus fail on two distinct grounds: they do not
allege an official policy under Monell, and they do not state a viable claim to relief
under the equal protection clause. As to the first deficiency, the policy requirement
set forth in Monell stems from the fact that a governmental entity “is not liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior” for constitutional claims. Beck v. City
of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (Rosenn, J.). As the Beck court
elaborated, a government policy or custom under Monell must be proven in one of
two ways:
Policy is made when a decisionmaker possessing final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action” issues an official
proclamation, policy, or edict. A course of conduct is considered to be
a custom when, though not authorized by law, such practices of state
officials are so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute
law.
Id. at 1480 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to satisfy this standard. Instead, the
amended complaint merely avers that the decision to forego an inspection of the
subject water lines may have been a one-off dispute between the players in this
litigation. Singular disputes between parties who may have shared a rocky
relationship in the past is not enough to satisfy the Monell’s policy requirement,
which serves “as a means of determining which acts by municipal employees are
properly attributed to the municipality.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 139 n.3 (1988). See, e.g., Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 824 (“But where the policy relied
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upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident
will be necessary in every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of
the municipality, and the causal connection between the ‘policy’ and the
constitutional deprivation.”) (internal footnote omitted). Neither are inferences or
suspicions of a governmental policy sufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”)). As such, because they failed
to plead sufficient facts, Plaintiffs have not plausibly shown the existence of a
policy or custom that could entitle them to relief under Monell.
Second, as a substantive matter, Plaintiffs’ “class of one” equal protection
theory is also faulty. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Its purpose is “to secure every
person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through duly constituted agents.” Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield
Twp., 247 U.S. 350, 352, (1918). Where a litigant advances a “class of one” theory,
as Plaintiffs do here, they must prove they were “intentionally treated differently

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from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference
in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
In particular, Plaintiffs in this case do not allege the existence of any other
similarly situated individuals who were treated more favorably. See Hill v.
Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Hill’s claim must fail
because he does not allege the existence of similarly situated individuals.”). In fact,
no averments in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint indicate that this litigation stems
from anything other than a discrete incident. That incident sounds in negligence
and perhaps in trespass, but not in that of a constitutional violation.
Along those same lines, Plaintiffs provide no factual basis to believe that any
difference in treatment, even if it existed, was irrational in the constitutional sense.
Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 776 (7th Cir. 2005) (Wood, J.) (“After the
plaintiff shows the differential treatment, he must then prove that it flows from an
illegitimate animus, not from inadvertence or some kind of permissible
governmental classification.”). Accordingly, for this second, independent reason,
Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims will be dismissed.
Leave to amend will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15 sets forth the mechanisms for amending a pleading
prior to trial. Section 15(a)(1) applies to amendments as a matter of course.
Amendment as a matter of course is inapplicable here, because Plaintiff elected not

15

to make such an amendment within the two time periods provided for in that
section. Section 15(a)(2), entitled “Other Amendments,” explains that “[i]n all
other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written
consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.”
The Third Circuit has “previously discussed when a court may deny leave to
amend under Rule 15(a)(2).” Holst v. Oxman, 290 F. App’x 508, 510 (3d Cir.
2008). In Shane v. Faver, for example, then Circuit Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
stated that “[a]mong the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.” 213 F.3d 113, 115
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1434 (3d Cir.1997) (Alito, J.). “‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended,
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane, 213 F.3d at
115. “In assessing futility, the District Court applies the same standard of legal
sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.
“Moreover, substantial or undue prejudice to the non-moving party is a
sufficient ground for denial of leave to amend.” Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). “The issue of prejudice requires
that we focus on the hardship to the defendants if the amendment were permitted.”
Id. “Specifically, we have considered whether allowing an amendment would

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result in additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or
new theories.” Id.
“The decision to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court.” Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d
514, 518 (3d Cir. 1988). “Factors the trial court may appropriately consider in
denying a motion to amend include undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing
party, and futility of amendment.” Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 879 F.2d 1196,
1203 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). For instance, “if the
proposed change clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally
insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to amend.” Ross v. Jolly, 151
F.R.D. 562, 565 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing 6 Wright, Miller, & Kane, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 1487).
It is clear that subsequent amendment here would be futile. In fact, Plaintiffs
have already taken advantage of the opportunity to amend their complaint once in
response to those same arguments advanced in Defendants’ first motion to dismiss.
Consequently, I agree with the Defendants that the amended complaint does little if
anything to address these arguments. As a result, I also recognize that the
Defendants would face substantial prejudice were they required to brief yet another
motion to dismiss involving the dismissed constitutional claims. Thus, Plaintiffs
will not be granted leave to amend those averments.

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In my view, pleading the above constitutional claims accomplished little
more than delaying Plaintiffs’ access to justice, if such justice is even due. Over
the pendency of this motion to dismiss, this Court gave just as thorough review to
each and every one of Plaintiffs’ claims as it would in any other federal matter with
legitimate federal claims that have rightly appeared before this Court—for
instance, complaints seeking constitutional relief for Syrian students facing
expulsion from public universities and deportation from this country without
adequate due process. With all due respect to the Plaintiffs here, their claims as
pled are concerning and may even be meritorious, but they do not rise to the level
of a constitutional affliction. For the above reasons, the claims are dismissed with
prejudice.
E.

The Matter Is Remanded To State Court.

The issue of remand of state law claims is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), which provides that “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim if . . . the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” “Where the claim over
which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the
district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative
justification for doing so.” Beckinger v. Twp. of Elizabeth, 434 F. App’x 164, 170

18

(3d Cir. 2011) (Vanaskie, J.) (quoting Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45
F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.1995).
Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, no federal anchor claims
remain. Moreover, diversity of citizenship is not present. Therefore, no
independent basis for original jurisdiction exists. Moreover, concerns about
judicial economy and expertise also militate for remand. I note that the Court of
Common Pleas is uniquely positioned to interpret and apply state law negligence
and trespass principles—a body of law with which that court is undoubtedly more
familiar than a federal tribunal. Moreover, given their accountability to the
electorate, state court judges are well suited to interpret the limits of sovereign
immunity in this Commonwealth. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the Court
of Common Pleas of Lycoming County.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing reasoning, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

granted in part and denied in part. The matter is remanded to state court.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

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