Hansen v. Clark et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry). Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 8/23/17. (lg)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PAUL NELSON HANSEN,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL CLARK,
Respondent.
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No.: 4:16-CV-2223
(Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 23, 2017
I.
BACKGROUND
Paul Nelson Hansen, an inmate presently confined at the State Correctional
Institution, Albion, Pennsylvania (SCI-Albion), filed this pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Named as Respondent is SCI-Albion
Superintendent Michael Clark. Service of the Petition was previously ordered.
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and related charges on July
13, 2011 following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Pennsylvania. He was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on
August 24, 2011. Petitioner’s pending action claims entitlement to federal habeas
corpus relief on the grounds that trial counsel and post conviction counsel both
provided ineffective assistance and there was insufficient evidence to support the
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verdict.
Following the denial of a post-sentence motion, Hansen filed a timely direct
appeal asserting that there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict in
that the Commonwealth failed to prove specific intent to kill. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence by decision dated August 17, 2012.
A petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania on February 4, 2013. Hansen did not seek further review from the
Supreme Court of the United States.
On April 19, 2014, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Hansen’s petition alleged that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief
on August 8, 2014. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA
relief on October 19, 2016. A request for allocator was denied by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on October 19, 2016.
Presently pending before this Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss
Petitioner’s action as untimely filed. See Doc. 13. The opposed motion is now
ripe for consideration.
1
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. The PCRA “permits motions for post-conviction
collateral relief for allegations of error, including ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully
induced guilty pleas, improper obstruction of rights to appeal by Commonwealth officials, and
violation of constitutional provisions." Hankins v. Fulcomer, 941 F.2d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 1991).
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II.
DISCUSSION
Respondent’s supporting brief initially notes that Petitioner’s pending action
was initiated on November 3, 2016. See Doc. 15, p. 3. Confusingly, the
Respondent later asserts that this matter should be deemed filed as of October 27,
2016. See id. at p. 6.
Hansen’s action was clearly docketed with this Court on November 3, 2016.
His petition and accompanying supporting memorandum are both dated October
24, 2016. See Doc. 1, p.15.2 A copy of a letter submitted by Petitioner indicates
that he mailed out his habeas petition on October 27, 2016. See Doc. 14, p. 15.
However, other documents provided by Hansen which are both file stamped
October 24, 2016 by a prison official support a finding that his habeas corpus
petition was given to prison officials for the purpose of mailing on that day. See
id. at pp. 11-12.
It is well settled that a prisoner’s action is deemed filed at the time it is given
to prison officials for mailing to the Court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988). Since Hansen submitted supporting documents which support a
determination that his petition was given to prison officials for mailing on October
24, 2016, the Court will accept the pro se Petitioner’s multiple contentions that his
2
A supporting memorandum filed by Petitioner is likewise dated October 24, 2016. See Doc. 3,
p. 54.
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action was submitted to prison officials for mailing on that day; this matter will be
deemed filed as of October 24, 2016.
Section 2244(d) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration for seeking such review . . .
(d)(2) The time during which a properly filed application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending
shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
See generally, Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d. 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1999).
Under the plain terms of § 2244(d)(1)(A), the period of time for filing a
habeas corpus petition begins to run when the period for direct review expired. See
Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000)(“upon conclusion of direct
review of a judgment of conviction, the one year period within which to file a
federal habeas corpus petition commences, but the running of the period is
suspended for the period when state post-conviction proceedings are pending in
any state court.”)(emphasis in original).
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The running of the limitations period is suspended for the period when
properly-filed state post-conviction proceedings are pending in any state court. See
Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2001)(an untimely PCRA petition does
not toll the statute of limitations for a federal habeas corpus petition); Merritt v.
Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 165-66 & n. 6 (3d Cir. 2003)(federal courts are bound by
state court’s determination that PCRA petition was untimely and thus not “properly
filed”).
However, the period during which a Section 2254 applicant could have filed
a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States from
denial of an application for state post conviction or other collateral relief does not
defer the commencement of the limitations period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549
U.S. 327, 333-36 (2007). It is additionally noted that the “one-year filing
requirement is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional rule, and thus a habeas
petition should not be dismissed as untimely filed if the petitioner can establish an
equitable basis for tolling the limitations period.” Jones, 195 F.3d at 159, citing
Miller v. New Jersey State Department of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616 (3d Cir.
1998).
“[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his claims diligently; and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,
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418 (2005). A habeas petitioner may establish grounds for equitable tolling by
showing that “(a) the government has actively misled the petitioner; (b) the rights
in question were timely asserted, but in the wrong forum; or (c) the petitioner has
in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights.” Jones, 195
F.3d at 159. “In non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate
research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary’
circumstances for equitable tolling.” Fahy , 240 F.3d at 244. Nor does equitable
tolling extend to claims of excusable neglect. Irwin, Dept. Of Veterans’ Affairs,
498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
As acknowledged by the Respondent, Petitioner’s conviction became final
for statute of limitation purposes on May 6, 2013, when the ninety (90) day period
during which Hansen could seek certiorari review from the Supreme Court of the
United States expired. 3 See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir.
1999).
Furthermore, the running of the limitations period was thereafter tolled
during the period when Petitioner’s subsequent, properly filed PCRA action was
pending before the Pennsylvania state courts. Respondent contends that the filing
date of the PCRA action was April 30, 2014 while Hansen maintains the date was
April 19, 2014.
3
See Doc. 15, p. 4.
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If the April 19, 2014 date suggested by Petitioner is employed, then the one
year limitations period ran from May 6, 2013 until April 19, 2014 (11 months, 13
days or 348 days) and then from October 19, 2016 until the filing of this action on
October 24, 2016 (5 days). As such, the pending petition is timely filed.
If the April 30, 2014 date is used, as argued by Respondent, the one year
limitations period ran from May 6, 2013 until April 30, 2014 (approximately 11
months, 24 days or 359 days) and then from October 19, 2016 until the filing of
this action on October 24, 2016 (approximately 5 days). As such, the petition is
still timely filed.
Since Hansen’s pending federal petition was initiated just within the
§ 2244(d) one year limitations period, the request for dismissal on the basis of
untimeliness will be denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
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