Bey v. United States Of America et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry).Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 2/7/2017. (jn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEON GREEN BEY,
Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ET AL.,
Defendants
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CIVIL NO. 4:17-CV-141
(Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM
February 7, 2017
Background
Leon Green Bey, a federal pre-trial detainee presently confined in the
Dauphin County Prison, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, instituted this pro se civil
rights action. Plaintiff has also submitted an in forma pauperis application.1 For
the reasons set forth below, Green Bey’s action will be dismissed, without
prejudice, as legally frivolous pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1915.
Green Bey has completed this Court's form application to proceed in
forma pauperis and authorization to have funds deducted from his prison account.
The Clerk of Court is directed to issue the Administrative Order to the Warden
noting that he should begin to deduct money from the inmate’s account in the
manner described in the Administrative Order.
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Named as Defendants in the Complaint are the United States of America;
Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner of this district; Assistant United States
Attorney (AUSA) Daryl Bloom; and Plaintiff’s court appointed criminal defense
counsel, Elisabeth Pasqualini, Esq. This is the third action filed by Green Bey
challenging the legality of his ongoing federal criminal prosecution, United States
v. Green, Case No. 1:13-CR-210, before Chief Judge Conner.2
Plaintiff states that his “Human Moorish body” has been detained by the
United States since November 7, 2013, without trial. Doc. 1, ¶ IV. He asserts that
his ongoing federal criminal jurisdiction should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because he is a member of the Moorish Nation and, as such, is entitled
to protection under the 1787 treaty between the Moorish nation and the U. S.
Government.3 As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal
damages, as well as injunctive relief.
Discussion
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 imposes obligations on prisoners who file civil
actions in federal court and wish to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
In two earlier habeas corpus actions filed by the Plaintiff, this Court
determined that it was not appropriate for Green Bey to challenge the legality of
his ongoing federal criminal prosecution via a federal habeas corpus petition.
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A review of the docket from Petitioner’s federal criminal prosecution
indicates that a proposed plea agreement was recently filed.
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1915, e.g., that the full filing fee ultimately must be paid (at least in a non-habeas
suit). Section 1915(e)(2)provides:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B)
the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A district court may rule that process should not be issued if the complaint
is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on
clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28
(1989); Douris v. Middleton Township, 293 Fed. Appx. 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2008).
Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which either it is readily
apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the
defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit ... ." Roman v. Jeffes, 904
F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278
(11th Cir. 1990)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has added that "the
plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the dismissal of in forma pauperis claims
that . . . are of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious
consideration, or trivial." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.
1995). It also has been determined that "the frivolousness determination is a
discretionary one," and trial courts "are in the best position" to determine when an
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indigent litigant's complaint is appropriate for summary dismissal. Denton, 504
U.S. at 33.
Prosecutor Immunity
It is well-established that a prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from
liability for damages for acts such as the initiation of the prosecution and
presentation of the state's case which are intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976);
Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1996).
However, only qualified immunity is available to prosecutors with regard to
allegations based on their administrative and/or investigative duties. See Hawk v.
Brosha, 590 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Pursuant to the above standards, any allegation that AUSA Bloom has acted
unlawfully with respect to Plaintiff’s ongoing federal criminal prosecution is a
claim which is "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process." See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Therefore, AUSA Bloom is absolutely
immune from damages with respect to any such malicious prosecution claim.
Judicial Immunity
It is also a well-established principle of law that judges are absolutely
immune from suit for damages for conduct performed in the course of their
official duties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Oatess v.
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Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a court may
dismiss an allegation against a judge based on an exercise of judicial power).
Since the claims against Chief Judge Conner appear to be solely premised upon
rulings made during the course of Plaintiff’s ongoing federal criminal prosecution,
Chief Judge Conner is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to any claim for
monetary relief.
Defense Counsel
It is additionally well-settled that public defenders and court appointed
counsel are not subject to civil rights liability when performing a traditional
lawyer’s functions to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 n. 7 (1981); Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). Rankine v. Server, 2001 WL 322517
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2001); Figueroa v. Clark, 1992 WL 122872 (E.D. Pa. June 1,
1992). The claims raised against Attorney Pasqualini appear to be based upon
actions that she took while acting as Plaintiff’s court appointed criminal defense
counsel. Under the standards announced in Groman, Polk and Black, there is no
basis for any claim for monetary relief against Ms. Pasqualini regarding her
ongoing performance as Plaintiff’s criminal defense counsel.
Heck
Based upon a review of the Complaint together with the docket from his
criminal case, Plaintiff has not yet been convicted of the federal criminal charges
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which are the basis for his pending claims. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking
an award of monetary damages, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a constitutional cause of action for
damages does not accrue "for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid", until the Plaintiff proves that the
"conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Id. at 486-87. There is no assertion in the Complaint that the criminal
prosecution underlying the pending claims has been rendered invalid.
Considering the nature of Green Bey’s allegations, a finding in his favor
would imply the invalidity and/or comprise the criminal prosecution at issue
herein. Thus, any request by Plaintiff for monetary damages against any anyone
involved with his ongoing federal criminal prosecution is premature because
Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for unlawful imprisonment until the
basis for that imprisonment, his federal criminal prosecution, is rendered invalid.
See Gibson v. Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 449 (3d Cir. 2005); Sanchez v.
Gonzalez, No. 05-2552, 2005 WL 2007008 *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2005). Any
request by Green Bey for compensatory damages is premature and must be
deferred under Gibson and Sanchez until his underlying federal criminal
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prosecution is rendered invalid, should that ever occur. If Plaintiff is able to
successfully challenge his federal criminal charges under Heck, he may then
reassert a claim for damages in a properly filed civil rights complaint.
Injunctive/Declaratory Relief
Finally, inmates may not use civil rights actions to challenge the fact or
duration of their confinement or to seek earlier or speedier release. Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1975). The Third Circuit has similarly recognized that
civil rights claims seeking release from confinement sounded in habeas corpus.
See Georgevich v. Strauss, 772 F.2d 1078, 1086 (3d Cir. 1985).
As noted above, Green Bey indicates that he is being subjected to an illegal
federal prosecution. The United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997), concluded that a civil rights claim for relief “based on
allegations ... that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is
not cognizable” in a § 1983 civil rights action. Id. at 646. Pursuant to Preiser and
Edwards, Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief, especially his request that his
criminal prosecution be declared invalid cannot be entertained via a civil rights
complaint. As noted by the Third Circuit, “simply being indicted and forced to
stand trial is not generally an injury for constitutional purposes but is rather one of
the painful obligations of citizenship.” Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442
F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). In Stolt-Nielsen, the
Third Circuit refused to grant an injunction against an anticipated indictment and
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stated:
the adversary system “afford[s] defendants, after
indictment, a federal forum in which to assert their
defenses-including those based on the Constitution.
Because these defendants are already guaranteed access
to a federal court, it is not surprising that subjects of
federal investigation have never gained injunctive relief
against federal prosecutors.”
Id. at 185 (quoting Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 69-70 (D.C. Cir. 1987). It is
also noted that a “‘suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law . . . [that is] as complete, practical and efficient as that
which equity could afford.’” Id. at 187 (quoting Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197, 214 (1923)). Plaintiff clearly has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at
law in that he can pursue any objections to the legality of his criminal charges and
his pre-trial detention in his ongoing federal criminal proceedings.
Conclusion
Since Plaintiff's pending civil rights claims are"based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory" they will be dismissed, without prejudice, as legally
frivolous. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 774. An appropriate Order will enter.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge
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