Briggs v. Potter County et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 6 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Potter County, Susan Kefover, Angela Milford, Douglas Morley, Kenneth Sauley, Glenn Drake, II, Paul Heimel. Signed by Honorable Matthew W. Brann on 11/13/2017. (jn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RALPH BRIGGS, SR.,

No. 4:17-CV-00419

Plaintiff.

(Judge Brann)

v.
POTTER COUNTY, GLENN DRAKE,
II, SUSAN KEFOVER, PAUL
HEIMEL, DOUGLAS MORLEY,
ANGELA MILFORD, KENNETH
SAULEY,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
NOVEMBER 13, 2017
Defendants – Potter County, Glenn Drake, II, Susan Kefover, Paul Heimel,
Douglas Morley, Angela Milford, and Kenneth Sauley – filed a motion to dismiss
Plaintiff Ralph Briggs, Sr.’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, that motion is
denied in part and granted in part.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations1

The Potter County Sheriff is an elected official who also serves as the Warden
of the Potter County Jail. 2 Immediately prior and up to the 2015 election, this
position was held by Mr. Sauley. 3

Sheriff Sauley, however, did not run for

reelection that year, 4 and, as a result, three individuals – Mr. Briggs, Mr. Drake, and
Roy Hunt – campaigned for the position.5 At the time, Mr. Briggs and Mr. Hunt
were employed as corrections officers at the Potter County Jail, and Mr. Drake was
a deputy sheriff of the county. 6
Mr. Briggs alleges that, during the campaign, Mr. Drake conducted election
activities on County property, while in uniform, and during work time. 7 Because he
felt that this conduct was a violation of campaign laws, Mr. Briggs reported it to the

1

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court assumes the truth of
all allegations made in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
material in this section, then, is taken entirely from Mr. Briggs’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, and is
presumed true for present purposes.

2

ECF No. 1 ¶ 13.

3

Id. ¶ 14.

4

Id. ¶ 14.

5

Id.

6

Id. ¶¶ 11, 15-16.

7

Id. ¶ 18.

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Potter County Commissioners – Ms. Kefover, Mr. Heimel, and Mr. Morley – and
“voiced concerns publicly.” 8
Mr. Briggs also alleges that, prior to this campaign, “it had seemingly become
the custom and practice of the Potter County political and law enforcement
establishment to have a retired State Police Officer to run as the favored candidate
of the establishment and law enforcement” for the Potter County Sheriff position.9
He alleges, in fact, that Sheriff Sauley was “angered” about Mr. Briggs’s campaign
against Sheriff Sauley’s “favored candidate, [Mr. Drake],” 10 which campaign
“included explicit and overt criticism of the fact that [the position] had seemed to
become a Pennsylvania State Police retirement job.”11 As a result, Mr. Briggs
alleges that Sheriff Sauley improperly terminated Mr. Briggs in retaliation for Mr.
Briggs’s campaign.12 Sheriff Sauley eventually “rescinded” this termination, and
placed Mr. Briggs on probation instead.13
Mr. Drake ultimately won the election and became Sheriff Drake on January
4, 2016. 14 Less than ten days later, on January 13, 2016, Mr. Briggs was terminated

8

Id. ¶ 17, 19.

9

Id. ¶ 20.

10

Mr. Drake was a retired State Police Officer. Id. ¶ 21.

11

Id. ¶ 21-22.

12

Id. ¶ 24-25

13

Id. ¶ 26-27.

14

Id. ¶28.

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by Sheriff Drake and Ms. Milford, the deputy warden of the Potter County Jail.15
This termination was later “ratified” by the County Commissioners.16
B.

Procedural History

Mr. Briggs filed a two-count complaint against Defendants on March 6, 2017.
Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Mr. Briggs’s statements
during and relating to the campaign were protected by the First Amendment, and
alleges that Defendants’ actions – including Mr. Briggs’s two terminations and his
placement on probation status – were unconstitutional retaliation for his protected
speech. 17 Count II, also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Mr. Briggs’s
campaign was conduct protected by the First Amendment, and similarly alleges that
Defendants unconstitutionally retaliated against him for that conduct.18
On May 8, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Briggs’s complaint for
lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 19
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, 20 a court assumes the truth of all factual allegations in a
15

Id. ¶ 29-30.

16

Id. ¶ 34.

17

Id. ¶¶ 36-40.

18

Id. ¶¶ 41-44

19

ECF No. 6.

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plaintiff’s complaint and draws all inferences in favor of that party; 21 the court does
not, however, assume the truth of any of the complaint’s legal conclusions. 22 If a
complaint’s factual allegations, so treated, state a claim that is plausible – i.e., if
they allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability – the motion is denied; if they
fail to do so, the motion is granted.23
B.

Whether This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Whether
Mr. Briggs Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies; and
Whether Mr. Briggs’s Claims Are Preempted

Defendants argue that this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this case24
because Mr. Briggs has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which governed his employment
with Potter County. Defendants similarly argue that, because of the terms of that
CBA, Mr. Briggs’s claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act 25 and the Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act of 1970.26
Unfortunately, Defendants have failed to attach the CBA to any of their filings.

20

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

21

Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 616 F.3d 224, 228 (3rd Cir. 2008).

22

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). See also Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d
780, 786 (3rd Cir. 2016).

23

Id.

24

See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

25

29 U.S.C. §185.

26

43 P.S. 1101.903.

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Because it is not in the record, the Court cannot determine if these arguments have
merit; therefore, they will not be addressed.

The Court will, however, grant

Defendants leave to raise these claims in response to any amended complaint filed
by Mr. Briggs.
C.

Whether Mr. Briggs Adequately Alleged a § 1983 Claim Against
Potter County

Municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if a plaintiff’s injuries
are caused by an official policy or custom of the municipal entity. 27 Defendants
argue that Mr. Briggs has not alleged that his injuries resulted from an official
policy or custom of Potter County.
It is true that Mr. Briggs alleged that “[p]rior to the 2015 Potter County
election, it had seemingly become the custom and practice of the Potter County
political and law enforcement establishment to have a retired State Police Officer to
run as the favored candidate of the establishment and law enforcement for the
position of County Sheriff.”28 This allegation, however, does not allow the Court to
plausibly conclude that Mr. Briggs’s injuries resulted from any official policy or
custom of Potter County. Even if “the Potter County political and law enforcement
establishment” had a “custom and practice” running a retired state police officer as a
“favored candidate,” and even if the Court assumes that the “establishment” should

27

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978).

28

ECF No. 1 ¶ 20.

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be interpreted to refer to the government of Potter County, this Court cannot
plausibly infer, from this complaint, that Mr. Briggs’s termination was caused by
that policy or custom.
The § 1983 claim against Potter County, then, is dismissed, but the Court will
grant Mr. Briggs leave to amend his complaint to adequately allege that claim.
D.

Whether Mr. Briggs Adequately Alleged a § 1983 Claim Against
Sheriff Sauley

Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs has not adequately alleged a § 1983 claim
against Sheriff Sauley, because liability under that statute “cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” 29

It appears, however, that

Defendants misunderstand Mr. Briggs’s complaint. Mr. Briggs specifically alleges
that Sheriff Sauley himself – not an employee under Sheriff Sauley’s supervision –
improperly terminated Mr. Briggs and then placed Mr. Briggs on probation (after
“rescind[ing]” the termination).30 This argument, then, is misplaced.
E.

Whether Mr. Briggs Adequately Alleged a § 1983 Claim Against
the County Commissioners

Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs has not adequately alleged a § 1983 claim
against the County Commissioners, because they had, under Pennsylvania law,31 no
legal authority to interfere with that termination. Because a “defendant in a civil
29

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3rd Cir. 2005).

30

ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-27.

31

See 16 P.S. § 1620; Troutman v. Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 87
A.3d 954 (Pa. Commw. 2014).

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rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing,”32 and
because Mr. Briggs has pled only that the Commissioners “ratified” his termination,
this Court cannot plausibly infer the Commissioner’s liability under § 1983.
The § 1983 claims against the County Commissioners, then, are dismissed,
but the Court will grant Mr. Briggs leave to amend his complaint to adequately
allege those claims.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Mr. Briggs’s claims against Potter County and

the County Commissioners are dismissed, but his claims against the other
defendants survive. He may amend his complaint as indicated above.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
United States District Judge

32

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (2005).

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