Kirce v. Mammoth, Inc.
Filing
25
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 23 MOTION for Monetary Sanctions is denied; Motion to Dismiss is granted; this case is DISMISSED and the Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann on 5/6/2022. (Case closed.) (lg)
Case 4:20-cv-01971-MWB Document 25 Filed 05/06/22 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RYAN KIRCE,
No. 4:20-CV-01971
Plaintiff,
(Chief Judge Brann)
v.
MAMMOTH, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MAY 6, 2022
In October 2020, Ryan Kirce sued his former employer, Mammoth, Inc., for
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 Mammoth answered, and
the case proceeded to discovery.2 But during this period, a dispute emerged about
Kirce’s medical records. In short, he was unwilling to allow Mammoth to review his
session notes with doctors—information essential both to his claim that the
Company’s had discriminated against him because he suffered from posttraumatic
stress disorder, and his entitlement to damages for emotional and mental distress.3
After a telephone conference, I ordered Kirce to release this information within 14
1
2
3
Doc. 1.
Doc. 16.
Id.
Case 4:20-cv-01971-MWB Document 25 Filed 05/06/22 Page 2 of 4
days.4 And Mammoth in turn entered into a protective order to safeguard Kirce’s
private medical information.5
But despite these Orders, Kirce did not sign the release for one of his doctor’s
records.6 As a result, Mammoth moved for dismissal and monetary sanctions—to be
paid by Kirce, not his counsel—under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37.7 Kirce
filed no response. That motion is now ripe for disposition.
In assessing motions for punitive dismissals, the first of Mammoth’s claims,
courts use the Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. balancing test. Under this
standard, no one factor is dispositive, and not all must be satisfied for a dismissal to
be warranted.8 Those factors are:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice of
the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and
respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness, (4) whether the
conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the
claim or defense.9
On the other hand, in assessing motions for monetary sanctions, the second of
Mammoth’s claims, courts look to whether the failure to adhere to the court order
“was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses
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9
Doc. 19.
Doc. 22.
Doc. 24 at 4.
Doc. 23; Doc. 24.
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d
1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
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Case 4:20-cv-01971-MWB Document 25 Filed 05/06/22 Page 3 of 4
unjust.”10 Without this showing, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that “court[s] must order
the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure.”11
By these standards, I find that Kirce’s unwillingness to give access to his
medical records warrants dismissal, but not a personal monetary sanction. To start,
the Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. There is simply no other way
to proceed: Kirce’s case hangs on his medical records; he is responsible for signing
off on their release; he has refused to do so; and his attorneys offer neither a defense,
nor a response.12
This latter characteristic, however, is at the root of this Court’s finding that
requiring Kirce to pay expenses would be unjust. There are many reasons why a
person might refuse to sign off on the release of their session notes. Some are
legitimate—the notes may include information so personal that no potential jury
award could justify their disclosure. Others are not. And there are also many reasons
why a plaintiff’s attorneys would elect not to respond to a motion seeking only to
hold the plaintiff financially responsible. Some of these too are legitimate. Still
others are not. As I see it, awarding costs would be simple enough if, for instance,
Mammoth sought them from Kirce’s attorneys for failing to voluntarily dismiss a
10
11
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
Id.
See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868; See Saillant v. Trusle, 2021 WL 4948083, at *1–2 (M.D. Pa.
Oct. 25, 2021) (Connor, J.).
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Case 4:20-cv-01971-MWB Document 25 Filed 05/06/22 Page 4 of 4
case they knew could not proceed, or if Kirce’s attorneys had instead withdrawn and
Mammoth offered evidence that Kirce brought the case in bad faith. But here, the
Court has only Mammoth’s assertion that it “seeks no monetary sanctions against
Plaintiff’s counsel as, based on information and belief, the decision not to sign the
release for Dr. Pittington’s records was solely that of Plaintiff.”13
Against this clouded backdrop, it would be unjust to pin financial
responsibility on a represented plaintiff, whose attorneys have provided no
defense—and indeed lacked any incentive to do so.
AND NOW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.
Defendant Mammoth, Inc’s Motion for Monetary Sanctions under Rule
37 is DENIED.
2.
Defendant Mammoth, Inc’s Motion to Dismiss this case under Rule 37
is GRANTED.
3.
This case is therefore DISMISSED, and the Clerk is directed to close
the case.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
13
Doc. 24 at 8, n.2.
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