Holmes v. American Home Patient/Lincare

Filing 164

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 106 First MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Patricia Holmes and 154 Supplemental MOTION for Attorney Fees Plaintiff's Supplement to Petition for Attorneys Fees and Costs filed by Patricia Holmes. Signed by Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann on 1/28/2025. (jr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA HOLMES,

No. 4:21-CV-01683

Plaintiff,

(Chief Judge Brann)

v.
AMERICAN HOMEPATIENT, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JANUARY 28, 2025
“The determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee for a prevailing party under
a fee shifting statute generally is a disagreeable and tedious task, especially where
the fee petition is vigorously contested ….”1 The laborious nature of the Court’s
review has been compounded by the overzealous, and frequently unhelpful,
arguments put forth by the parties. Plaintiff is entitled to neither a king’s ransom nor
a paltry sum; she may recover her reasonable attorneys’ fees. After expending
considerable effort to review the entire record, I grant Patricia Holmes’ First Motion
for Attorneys’ Fees and Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in part.

1

Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 182 (3d Cir. 2001).

I.

DISCUSSION
A.

Summary of the Fees and Costs Requested

Plaintiff seeks to recover her attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. As
Defendant correctly notes, Holmes’ requested hours do not align with the
documentation submitted. After a painstaking, line-by-line review of these materials,
I summarize Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees and costs in the tables below.
Plaintiff’s Requested Attorneys’ and Paralegals’ Fees
Name
Thomas B. Anderson
(Initial Request)
Thomas B. Anderson
(Supplemental Request)
James G. Bordas, III
(Initial Request)
James G. Bordas, III
(Supplemental Request)
Donneshia Johnson
(Initial Request)
Jessica Karadeema
(Initial Request)
Jessica Karadeema
(Supplemental Request)
Richard Monahan
(Supplemental Request)
Michael Prascik
(Supplemental Request)
2

Hours2
462.6

Hourly Rate
$600.00

Total Fees
$277,560.00

110.0

$600.00

$66,000.00

30.75

$600.00

$18,450.00

5.3

$600.00

$3,180.00

37

$175.00

$6,475.00

72.7

$175.00

$12,722.50

0.2

$175.00

$35.00

186.3

$500.00

$93,150.00

47.6

$300.00

$14,280.00

The hours sought have been adjusted as follows: Anderson’s requested hours were reduced by
14.4 hours in his initial request and by 5.5 hours in his supplemental request; Bordas’ hours
were reduced by 2.25 hours in his initial request; Karadeema’s hours were reduced by 14.75
hours in her initial request; and Prasick’s hours were increased by 0.2 hours in his sole request.
2

In total, Plaintiff has requested $491,852.50 in attorneys’ fees. Holmes then
seeks to enhance this award by a factor of five to reach a staggering $2,459,262.50.
Plaintiff’s counsel appear to have forgotten that Holmes is entitled to recover only
her reasonable attorneys’ fees. Nothing more, nothing less.
Additionally, Holmes seeks to recover costs associated with this case. Given
the discussion above, it is no surprise that issues arose as the Court reviewed
Holmes’ requested costs. In her First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiff’s
breakdown of costs falls $1,094.30 short of what she requested.3 Holmes
miscalculated the following categories in her brief: Depositions (undercounted by
$414.004); Inside copying (undercounted by $441.35); and Computer Legal
Research (undercounted by $2.80).5 I modified the categories to reflect the amounts
contained in the Expense Report submitted in support of the First Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees.6 But there are issues with the following two entries:
Date
Description
3/21/2024 Medical Records, Bills
and Reports
Thomas B. Anderson
Bordas & Bordas
Attorneys, PLLC
3
4

5
6

Invoice No.
Component Price
[Left Blank in
MedRec
$186.15
Documentation]

Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees) at 3-4.
I note that this $414.00 is attributable to the cost of receiving the Trial Transcripts from the
Court Reporter. As this is a cost that can be recovered from Defendant, I simply keep it in the
“Depositions” category.
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees) at 3-4.
Id., Ex. B (Expense Reports).
3

Date

Description
Invoice No.
Component Price
Travel Reimbursement
3/21/2024 Filing Fees
[Left Blank in
FF
$50.00
Chase Card Services 0124 Documentation]
This $236.15 is unaccounted for in Plaintiff’s categorization of her costs.
Despite receiving no indication from Holmes as to how to label these costs, I
identified the $50.00 filing fee as the charge associated with Bordas’ Special
Admission to this Court.7 But it is unclear how Medical Records and Travel
Reimbursement are combined for the $186.15 or what relevance medical records
had to her counsel’s preparation of this case. As such, I exclude that cost.
Plaintiff’s costs in her Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees contained a
single issue: double counting a travel charge for $2,090.73.8 Accordingly, I construe
Plaintiff’s Motions as asking for a combined total of $25,702.37 in costs, as
summarized in the table below.
Plaintiff’s Requested Costs
Initial or Supplemental
Request
Initial Request
Initial Request
Initial Request
7
8

9

Description of Cost

Cost Amount

Depositions9
Mediation
Court Costs

$1,119.75
$4,800.00
$452.00

Id. (Filing Fee date of March 21, 2024); Doc. 73 (Petition for Special Admission).
This April 24, 2024 charge was submitted in both the First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and the
Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. B (Expense Reports); Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’
Fees), Ex. B (Expense Report).
Again, the “Depositions” category contains $414.00 in costs attributable to receiving the
transcript from the Court Reporter.
4

Initial or Supplemental
Request
Initial Request
Initial Request
Initial Request
Initial Request
Supplemental Request
Supplemental Request
Supplemental Request
Supplemental Request
B.

Description of Cost

Cost Amount

Computer Legal Research
Inside Copying
Postage and Delivery
Travel
Computer Legal Research
Inside Copying
Court Reporter/Transcript
Travel/Lodging10

$2,517.61
$2,676.75
$142.90
$4,285.58
$8,160.98
$1,148.10
$210.00
$188.70

A Prevailing Party

Title 42 U.S.C. §1988 allows the Court to award the “‘prevailing party’ in a
civil rights action ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”11 “[T]o be
considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be
able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship
between itself and the defendant.”12 It is undisputed that Holmes is a prevailing party
under § 1988, but AHOM challenges what exactly post-trial issues she prevailed on.
This objection is dealt with separately below. Given her status as a prevailing party,
I must now determine what to award Plaintiff.

10

11
12

The supplemental request duplicates a travel charge for $2,090.73 that was accounted for in
the travel category of the First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Consequently, I limit the
Supplemental Request to the sole remaining travel expense.
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 195 F. App’x 93, 95 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)).
Tx. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 103
L. Ed. 2d 866 (1989).
5

C.

The Lodestar

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s lodestar method
has become “the guiding light of fee shifting-jurisprudence.”13 “Under the lodestar
method, an[] attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is multiplied by the number of hours
the attorney reasonably spent working on a matter.”14 “Once the court determines
the reasonable hourly rate, it multiplies that rate by the reasonable hours expended
to obtain the lodestar.”15 “The lodestar is presumed to be the reasonable fee.”16 When
completing this analysis, I am to go “line-by-line” through the billing statement and
must conduct “a thorough and searching analysis” to ensure meaningful appellate
review is possible.17
At the December 16, 2024 evidentiary hearing, the parties seemed unfamiliar
with the “burden shifting” procedure I am to employ when evaluating a fee
petition.18 Under this procedure, the prevailing party first “‘bears the burden’ of
establishing the prima facie case by ‘producing sufficient evidence of what
constitutes a reasonable market rate[.]’”19 “If the plaintiff fails to meet her prima
facie case, the district court has the discretion to determine what award is

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010).
D.O. ex rel. M.O. v. Jackson Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. CV 17-1581 (TJB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72875, 2019 WL 1923388, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019).
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).
Id.
Interfaith Cmty, Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005).
Carey v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 496 F. App’x 234, 236 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. (quoting Evans v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001)).
6

reasonable.”20 “Otherwise, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for
the requested hourly rate, the district court does not have the discretion to question
or change the rate absent record evidence” from the opposing party.21 But “[o]nce
the adverse party raises objections to the fee request, the district court has a great
deal of discretion to adjust the fee award in light of those objections.”22
I emphasize that this limitation on my discretion comes into effect only after
the Court concludes the prevailing party has met its initial burden. To adopt
Plaintiff’s position would result in rubberstamped fee petitions where, for whatever
reason, inadequately supported aspects of the petition are not challenged. Of course,
it cannot be that the Court lacks an independent obligation to ensure that the
requesting party’s evidence meets this initial burden. Otherwise, for example, there
would be no reason for courts to independently review fee petitions in default
judgment cases.23

20
21
22
23

Id. at 237. See also Washington v. Phila. Cnty. Ct. of Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir.
1996).
Id.
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.
E.g., Winn v. Hermani Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 18-4240, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216248 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 17, 2019) (“Counsel has filed a detailed and well-documented petition, to which there
has been no response. Having independently reviewed the petition and its attachments,
including affidavits as to the appropriate market rate, I conclude that the petition should be
granted in its entirety”). See also Wilson v. Advanced Urgent Care, P.C., No. 4:16-CV-00214,
2018 WL 1315663, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41664, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2018) (“Even in
a default judgment case, therefore, Plaintiff must establish the threshold reasonable lodestar to
the Court’s satisfaction.”).
7

1.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

First, I compare the reasonableness of an attorney’s hourly rate to the relevant
market rate. “A reasonable market rate is established ‘with reference to the
community billing rate charged by attorneys of equivalent skill and experience
performing work of similar complexity.’”24 Therefore, it is Holmes’ burden to
establish a reasonable market rate “for the essential character and complexity of the
legal services rendered.”25 The Third Circuit has instructed district courts to look to
the vicinage in which the Court sits as the relevant community.26 I therefore tailor
my analysis to the market rates in the Williamsport vicinage. Although I previously
set the reasonable market rates in this vicinage for experienced attorneys at a range
of $180 to $325,27 sufficient time has passed that these rates must be revisited.
“An attorney’s usual billing rate is a good starting point for assessing
reasonableness, though it is not dispositive.”28 To establish the reasonable market
rate, Holmes must produce evidence beyond affidavits from her own attorneys.29
This “evidence often comes in the form of affidavits from other attorneys.”30 I am to
also consider “the relative simplicity of the case, the quality of the counsel’s moving

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Carey, 496 F. App’x at 236 (quoting Evans, 273 F.3d at 361).
Smith v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir. 1997).
E.g., Interfaith, 426 F.3d at 699.
Beattie v. Line Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-cv-02655, 2014 WL 3400975 (M.D. Pa. July 10,
2014).
Potence v. Hazleton Area Sch. Dist., 357 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2004).
Souryavong v. Lackawanna Cnty., 159 F. Supp. 3d 514, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
Carey, 496 F. App’x at 236.
8

papers, and my ‘perception of counsel’s skill and experience during the trial of the
underlying matter.’”31 Although certainly tempting, the Court cannot simply rely on
rates awarded to Plaintiff’s attorneys in prior cases unless the work was
contemporaneously performed and of a similar nature.32
2.

Reasonable Hours

The Court must also evaluate the evidence supporting the hours claimed.
Typically, the prevailing party can meet its burden through the submission of
detailed time records.
D.

Requested Hourly Rates

As described in the tables above, the attorneys in this case have requested to
be compensated at the following hourly rates: $600 per hour for Anderson and
Bordas; $500 per hour for Monahan; and $300 per hour for Prasick. Johnson and
Karadeema both requested to be compensated at an hourly rate of $175. These rates
are notably higher than the rates I previously set for the Williamsport vicinage in
Beattie v. Line Mountain School District.33

31
32

33

Gillespie v. Dring, No. 3:15-CV-00950, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180019, at *29 (M.D. Pa. Oct.
17, 2019) (quoting Mantz v. Steven Singer Jewelers, 100 F. App’x 78, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Carey, 496 F. App’x at 237 (“Notably, hourly rates that were set for a specific attorney in
previous court decisions do not generally constitute record evidence … unless those rates were
set for the same attorney and for the same type of work over a contemporaneous time period.”)
(citing Smith, 107 F.3d at 226 and Black Grievance Comm. V. Phila. Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648,
652 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1015, 107 S. Ct. 3255, 97 L. Ed. 2d
754 (1987)).
Beattie v. Line Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 4:13-cv-02655, 2014 WL 3400975 (M.D. Pa. July 10,
2014).
9

1.

Use of a Current Hourly Rate

Before I reach whether Plaintiff has met her burden regarding her requested
hourly rates, I will address AHOM’s objection to the use of a current hourly rate. To
support its contention that this is an improper fee enhancement, Defendant relies
solely on Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,34 a 2010 decision from the Supreme Court
of the United States. In that decision, Justice Alito clearly differentiated these two
issues. Writing for the Supreme Court, he stated:
Third, there may be extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s
performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees. An
attorney who expects to be compensated under § 1988 presumably
understands that payment of fees will generally not come until the end
of the case, if at all. See ibid. Compensation for this delay is generally
made “either by basing the award on current rates or by adjusting the
fee based on historical rates to reflect its present value.” Missouri v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 282, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But we do not rule out the
possibility that an enhancement may be appropriate where an attorney
assumes these costs in the face of unanticipated delay, particularly
where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense. In such a case,
however, the enhancement should be calculated by applying a method
similar to that described above in connection with exceptional delay in
obtaining reimbursement for expenses.35
This definitively precludes AHOM’s objection, and the Third Circuit’s
treatment of this issue reinforces this conclusion.36 Given Defendant’s extensive

34
35
36

559 U.S. 542, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 176 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2010).
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554.
E.g., Lanni v. N.J., 259 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) (“When attorney’s fees are awarded, the
current market rate must be used.”) and Simring v. Rutgers, 634 F. App’x 853 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citing Lanni). See also L.J. v. Audubon Bd. of Educ., 373 F. App’x 294, 297 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“To the extent the District relied on the market rate during the period in which the majority
10

discussion of Perdue elsewhere,37 I find it perplexing that I must address this issue
at all. Without any citation for this proposition beyond Perdue itself, I will calculate
Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees with a current hourly rate.38
2.

Reasonable Hourly Rates

As previously noted, Holmes bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove
the reasonableness of her attorneys’ hourly rates. In support of her requested rates,
Holmes provided records from cases litigated in West Virginia and affidavits from
her own attorneys, Attorney Clifford A. Rieders, and Attorney Colleen E. Ramage.
Much of this evidence provides no insight into the market rate for comparable work
in the Williamsport vicinage.
a.

Qualifications of Holmes’ Attorneys
i.

Anderson

Thomas B. Anderson has been practicing law for approximately 28 years, with
a focus on employment law for the past 18 years.39 He counts amongst his
professional achievements two, recent multi-million verdicts in employment cases

37
38

39

billing occurred rather than the ‘current market rate’ at the time of the fee petition, this was
error.”).
Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 12.
Challenging every aspect of Plaintiff’s fees petition is an ineffective strategy when doing so
requires arguments that are clearly precluded by binding precedent. Perhaps Defendant and its
counsel would benefit from guidance found in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War: “So in war, the way
is to avoid what is strong, and strike at what is weak.” SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR, VI Weak
Points and Strong, para. 30 (trans., Lionel Giles, Fingerprint! Publishing, 2018).
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. C (Anderson Affidavit)
¶¶ 3; 8.
11

and membership of the Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County and the
Western Pennsylvania Employment Lawyers Association.40 In the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, Anderson has litigated eight employment and civil rights cases.41
According to Anderson, his and Bordas’ hourly rate of $600 and the hourly paralegal
rate of $175 are “fair and reasonable for the complexity of the issues involved in this
case and [are] comparable to the rates typically charged in the Middle District and
Western District” of Pennsylvania.42
ii.

Bordas

James G. Bordas III has been practicing law for approximately 24 years, and
he is the managing partner at his firm.43 He is frequently the firm’s “chief settlement
negotiator,” and he has obtained verdicts “of $16.9 million and $10 million on behalf
of individual plaintiffs ….”44 Other examples of his professional achievements
include: membership on the Board of Governors for the West Virginia Association
for Justice; receiving the Super Lawyer designation for ten years; serving as lead
counsel in complex litigation; and speaking at continuing legal education seminars.45
As to the present case, Bordas participated in the mediation, assisted with the
development of Plaintiff’s trial strategy, and reviewed all of the depositions in this

40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. ¶¶ 5-7.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id., Ex. D (Bordas Affidavit) ¶¶ 2, 6.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-9.
12

case.46 Bordas “understand[s]” his hourly rate of $600 is “either commensurate with
[his] specialty, experience, background, and qualifications, or perhaps even slightly
low.”47
iii.

Monahan

Richard Monahan has approximately 31 years of experience, and he
completed a three-year federal judicial clerkship.48 He has obtained multi-milliondollar verdicts in West Virginia in non-employment cases and has been involved in
complex litigation.49 More notably, Monahan has “briefed and argued a case before
the Supreme Court of the United States, resulting in a unanimous decision in favor
of West Virginia class action plaintiffs in Smith v. Bayer Corp.”50 Further, he is a
member of the American Association for Justice and the West Virginia Association
for Justice, for which he serves on the Board of Governors.51 Finally, Monahan
asserts that he follows Bordas and Bordas’ “standard practice to contemporaneously
record billable time in 1/10-hour increments ….”52

46
47
48
49
50
51

52

Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 16.
Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. C (Monahan Affidavit) ¶ 6.
Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 5. Monahan also notes that he has received an AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell since
2015; he has been a West Virginia Super Lawyer for the last four years; he has previously been
named a Top 100 Trial Attorney for plaintiff civil litigation and a Top 25 Attorney in Class
Actions and Product Liability by the National Trial Lawyers. Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 14.
13

iv.

Prasick

Michael Prasick has been practicing law for 23 years, and he has litigated
complex products liability cases for over 13 years.53 Prasick has prior experience as
the supervising attorney of a regional office of a large nonprofit public interest law
firm, and he is a member of the American Association for Justice and the West
Virginia Association for Justice.54 He indicated that his hourly rate of $300 “is fair
and reasonable for the complexity of the issues involved in this case.”55 He notes
that this is half the rate sought by Anderson and Bordas and has recently been
approved by a state court in West Virginia.56 Finally, he notes that he too followed
Bordas and Bordas standard practice “to contemporaneously record billable time in
1/10 hour increments ….”57
b.

The Other Evidence Provided

While these affidavits speak to Holmes’ attorneys’ qualifications and
experience, our Court of Appeals has clearly instructed that these affidavits alone
cannot satisfy a prevailing party’s burden.58 Accordingly, I turn to the remaining
evidence in the record.
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id., Ex. D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶¶ 3-4, 6.
Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.
Id. ¶ 8.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
E.g., Chaaban v. Criscito, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58051, 2013 WL 1737689, at *10 (D.N.J.
Apr. 3, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57300, 2013 WL
1730733 (D.N.J. Apr. 22, 2013) (“In satisfying a prima facie case of reasonable fees, attorneys
may not rest on their own affidavits.”). See also Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183.
14

i.

The West Virginia Documents

In this Circuit, district courts cannot simply rely on what fees an attorney has
been awarded in the past unless the work was similar and contemporaneously
performed.59 Here, the Court received two documents that were filed in federal and
state court, respectively, in West Virginia. Judicial approval of hourly rates in West
Virginia tells the Court nothing about the market rate in the Williamsport vicinage.60
For that reason, I set aside these documents. To consider them would require baseless
speculation. With no way to meaningfully compare the approval of those rates to the
relevant market rate here, I proceed to the next piece of evidence in the record.
ii.

Ramage’s Affidavit

Much like the West Virginia court documents, Colleen Ramage’s declaration
provides no direction to the Court. First, I acknowledge that she has indicated she is
“generally familiar with hourly rates normally charged by experienced attorneys in
[the] Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania who handle employment
matters,”61 but aspects of her affidavit cause the Court to question her familiarity
with the rates charged in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In a rather telling

59
60

61

Pocono Mt. Sch. Dist. v. T.D., No. 22-1787, 2023 WL 2983501, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 9162,
at *11 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2023).
E.g., Shane T. v. Carbondale Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:16-00964, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188850,
2021 WL 4478237, at *19 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Third, the opinions and orders from
other cases plaintiffs submit are unpersuasive because they are from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.”) (Mannion, J.).
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. F (Ramage Affidavit) ¶
6.
15

oversight, Ramage omitted her 2021 admission to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania from her affidavit.62 Ramage’s accolades and professional
memberships in this affidavit also trend towards the Pittsburgh area, if they are not
national in nature.63
Even more critically, she simply declares that “Anderson’s requested hourly
rate of $600 is eminently reasonable given his level [of] experience, knowledge, and
ability compared to attorneys of his caliber in the Western and Middle Districts of
Pennsylvania, in addition to the complexity of the case at issue.”64 Reasonableness
is not considered in a vacuum; it must be in reference to the market rate of the
relevant community. Nothing in this averment, or indeed the remainder of the
affidavit, allows the Court to conclude that Anderson’s proposed hourly rate is
reflective of a reasonable market rate in this vicinage. Ramage never evaluates
Anderson’s rate solely in reference to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, let alone
the Williamsport vicinage. Given these issues, I conclude that Holmes cannot rely
on Ramage’s Affidavit to meet her initial burden.

62

63
64

Id. ¶ 1 (“I am an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Pennsylvania since 1992 and before
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.”).
Id. ¶¶ 1-4.
Id. ¶ 7.
16

iii.

Rieders’ Affidavit

Consequently, I turn now to the remaining evidence before the Court: Clifford
Rieders’ Affidavit. In this affidavit, Rieders first describes his own professional
career. He has been admitted to practice in New York, Pennsylvania, and the District
of Columbia.65 As to his caseload, Rieders notes that he typically “represents clients
in personal injury and medical malpractice” but he “also handle[s] one or two civil
rights cases per year, the most recent one with litigation completed in early 2024 …”
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.66
Relevant to this analysis, Rieders contends that he has “knowledge about the
hourly rates charged by lawyers in the Middle District” of Pennsylvania due to: fee
petitions from his firm; his “examination of fee petitions filed by lawyers in other
cases;” his “role as an expert witness in several fee cases;” his “participation at Third
Circuit Judicial Conferences, in particular, the 1985 conference which focused on
the issue of court-awarded attorney fees;” his involvement with professional
organizations “such as the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association (“PaTLA”)
where the issue of fees has been the subject of discussion;” and “speaking with other
attorneys who refer civil rights cases to me or who do such work.”67

65
66
67

Id., Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶¶ 1-3. Other aspects of Rieders’ professional career are also
described.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 28.
17

Much of this background does little to credibly bolster Rieders’ ability to
speak to attorney’s fees in civil rights cases in this vicinage. The 1985 Third Circuit
Judicial Conference is certainly on a relevant topic, but it is now stale given the fourdecade passage of time. Further, there is no indication that Rieders’ has a familiarity
with civil rights cases beyond “speaking with other attorneys who refer civil rights
cases to me or who do such work” and his handling of “one or two civil rights cases
per year” in unknown forums.68 These vague statements fail to demonstrate that he
is familiar with the market rate for civil rights cases in the Williamsport vicinage.
Serving as “an expert witness in several fee cases” and examining fee petitions from
his own firm and other lawyers similarly fails for a lack of specificity.
Next, Rieders correctly notes that a district-wide rate will result in attorneys
being over-or-undercompensated depending on their location.69 That is undoubtedly
true since the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg vicinages of this Court contain
larger legal markets. Yet he fails to appreciate that the Third Circuit has instructed
this Court to look to the vicinage in which it sits, not the entire district, as the relevant
community. Instead, he indicates his background, as described above, makes him
“knowledgeable about the hourly rates charged by lawyers in the Middle District”
and that “it is preferable, in a fee petition, to review the results of the case, the

68

69

Id. ¶¶ 19, 28. The Rieders Affidavit indicates that the most recent civil rights case he
participated in occurred in the Eastern District of Virginia. Id. This does not support a
familiarity with the prevailing rates in the Williamsport vicinage.
Id. ¶ 47.
18

background and capability of counsel, the experience of counsel, and the rates
charged by other lawyers in the case, including the defense.”70 These averments
simultaneously make the very mistake he urges the Court to avoid and disregards
the Third Circuit’s instructions on evaluating the requested rates in the relevant
vicinage.
Turning then to the rate Anderson has requested, Rieders contends that
Anderson’s proposed hourly rate of $600 “is extremely reasonable.”71 As to his own
rates, Rieders provides the Court with a somewhat confusing description of his
billing practices. First, he notes that he bills at an hourly rate of $750.00 “when
billing hourly.”72 Ordinarily, this may serve as sufficient evidence to support
Anderson’s hourly rate.73 But he qualifies the relevance of this hourly rate in a way
that undermines its evidentiary value; “much of [his] work is contingent fee, but not
all. Sometimes [Rieders] will take cases on a fee basis, neither hourly nor contingent
fee. Other times, [Rieders] will charge less than $750.00 per hour, under special
circumstances.”74 While only “a minority of [Rieders’] work is billed on an hourly
basis, [Rieders] has charged $750.00 per hour and will do so when appropriate.”75
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. ¶¶ 28, 46.
Id. ¶ 37. Reasonableness alone is not the standard. The question is whether the rate is
reasonable compared the relevant community’s market rate for similar services.
Id. ¶ 39.
E.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07-CV-585, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44478, 2014 WL 1321116, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2014).
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶
40.
Id. ¶ 41.
19

These averments are insufficient to meet Holmes’ burden. By his own
admission, Rieders practices in several federal courts; yet there is no indication that
he has billed at a rate of $750.00 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, much less
the Williamsport vicinage, for a civil rights case.76 The fact most of his practice is
comprised of medical malpractice and personal injury work reinforces this
conclusion. Further, the fact that only a “minority” of his work is billed on an hourly
basis, with some charged at less than $750.00 due to unknown “special
circumstances,” leads the Court to doubt the viability of this rate in the Williamsport
vicinage.77
Finally, I take a moment to discuss Rieders’ final averment: that “[t]here are
no attorneys, that [he] is aware of, who have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement
in a civil rights case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly
Williamsport, or who even have his degree of success in such cases and trial
experience on a regular basis in civil rights cases.”78 While certainly relevant to an
enhancement, this statement provides no evidentiary support to the validity of
Anderson’s rate in the Williamsport vicinage.

76
77
78

Evidence that the rate claimed has been awarded in the vicinage is sufficient to support a fee
petition. Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 207 F. Supp. 3d 454, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (Caputo, J.).
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶¶
40-41.
Id. ¶ 49.
20

iv.

The Evidentiary Hearing

Given these concerns, I naturally concluded that an evidentiary hearing should
be held; this hearing was meant to provide Holmes with the opportunity to address
and supplement these deficiencies. In fact, the Scheduling Order for that hearing
clearly articulated this very concern:
Here, Defendant has not challenged the hourly rates of Plaintiff’s
attorneys beyond contending that the use of a current hourly rate is
improper. But the Court has an independent obligation to evaluate
whether Holmes has met her initial burden regarding the
reasonableness of her desired hourly rates in the Williamsport vicinage.
My review has raised questions as to whether the evidence
submitted is sufficient to establish her prima facie case. Consequently,
I must hold an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the
requested hourly rates.79
Despite providing this guidance and opportunity, Plaintiff declined to submit
any further evidence. Instead, her counsel continued to argue it was inappropriate
for the Court to evaluate whether she had met her initial burden. For the reasons
discussed above, I therefore conclude that Holmes failed to meet her initial burden
as to the hourly rates requested by her attorneys.
c.

The Court’s Discretion

I now must set reasonable hourly rates for Holmes’ attorneys using my
discretion. To do so, two options emerge: rely on the fee schedule set out by the
Community Legal Services in Philadelphia or perform an in-depth review of recent

79

Doc. 160 (Scheduling Order for December 16, 2024 Evidentiary Hearing).
21

fee petition caselaw in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Rates set for attorneys
in Philadelphia provide little, if any, guidance as to the market rates in North Central
Pennsylvania. After all, I set aside Ramage’s declaration and the West Virginia
documents for a similar reason. Instead, I performed a review of fee petition cases
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania from the last five years.80
Between 2019 and 2024, attorneys in this District were regularly awarded
rates from $100 to $375 depending on the skill and experience of the attorney and
the complexity of the case, barring circumstances such as specialized expertise.81
The upper end of this range is $50 above the rates I established in 2014 for the
Williamsport vicinage. I find it now appropriate to increase this range by $50. As
such, the new range of hourly rates in the Williamsport vicinage is $230 to $375 for
experienced attorneys, with associates at a slightly lesser rate. While this seemingly
brings Williamsport in line with the Harrisburg and Scranton/Wilkes-Barre market
rates, it is nonetheless an appropriate range for this vicinage. The upper end of this
range has been in use since at least 2019 elsewhere in the Middle District; at this

80

81

As I previously set the appropriate range for attorney’s fees in the Williamsport vicinage, I
shall focus this review on the Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg divisions. In doing so, I
remain cognizant of the differences between those locations and Williamsport, in particular the
size of the cities and their respective legal markets.
E.g., A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-02311, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469
(M.D. Pa. June 28, 2019); Katona v. Asure, No. 1:11-CV-1817, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24062
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2019); Finnegan v. Smith, No. 3:16-CV-1416, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35114 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2019) and Beard v. Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-01162,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4753 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2024).
22

juncture, it is an underrepresentation of the rates in the larger markets in
Scranton/Wilkes-Barre and Harrisburg.
Looking at the skillsets and backgrounds of the various attorneys, Anderson
has the most specialized knowledge relevant to this case through his employment
law experience. As the lead attorney, he was also primarily responsible for
advancing the case forward. Bordas’ involvement in the mediation likely drew upon
his unique role as chief settlement negotiator for their law firm. Both he and Bordas
are also seasoned attorneys, with 28 years and 24 years of experience respectively.
Although this was a straightforward employment discrimination case, I adjust their
hourly rates downwards to the maximum in this vicinage: $375.
While Prasick is certainly an experienced attorney with 22 years of
experience, he lacks any specialized knowledge relevant to this case. His practice
has primarily focused on complex products liability work; before that he worked “as
the supervising attorney for the regional office of a large nonprofit public interest
law firm.”82 My review of the work he performed, as documented in the timetables
submitted by Holmes, reveals many simple and straightforward tasks. Consequently,
I adjust his requested hourly rate of $300 downwards to $250.
Monahan’s 31 years of experience has seemingly allowed him to develop
specialized expertise in appellate work. His time entries demonstrate he drew upon

82

Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶¶ 6-7.
23

this expertise in this case during its post-trial stage. But still many of his assigned
tasks involved straightforward issues. Given this, I find it appropriate to adjust his
requested rate downwards from $500 to $300 an hour.
No documentation has been provided regarding reasonable paralegal fees in
the Williamsport vicinage. Other cases in this district have established a range of
$75 to $170 per hour for paralegals depending on their experience and the
complexity of the work performed.83 Holmes’ requested rate falls slightly outside
this range. At the hearing, Anderson indicated that he could not state with specificity
how much experience Jessica Karadeema has, but the information he provided
suggests she has more than a decade of experience.84 Consequently, I slightly reduce
Karadeema’s hourly rate from $175 to $150. Although the tasks she performed were
relatively simple, I find it appropriate to award her this rate given her level of
experience. As to Donneshia Johnson’s hourly rate, I reduce it from $175 to $115.
This is approximately the midpoint of the range, which is appropriate given the
rather straightforward tasks she performed.85

83
84
85

E.g., A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-CV-02311, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469
(M.D. Pa. June 28, 2019).
Doc. 163 (Evidentiary Hearing Transcript) ¶¶ 22:4-22.
At the hearing, the Court asked Plaintiff’s counsel what level of experience Johnson has. The
transcript reveals that confusion arose as to whom the Court was inquiring about, as Anderson
responded with Ramage’s professional background. Id. at 22:1-3. Given this confusion, I am
guided solely by the nature of the work performed by Johnson. This work involved trial
assistance and technology preparation. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of Motion for Attorneys’
Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records).
24

Under these rates, Plaintiff has requested $311,223.75 in attorney’s fees.
Applying her desired enhancement brings her requested attorney’s fees up to
$1,556,118.75.
3.

Reasonable Hours

Unlike the hourly rates, Plaintiff has met her burden of production regarding
her requested hours by providing detailed timesheets. Defendant has challenged
many aspects of the submitted time entries; I address each of these separately below.
a.

Vague Time Entries

The Third Circuit has directed that “[a]ny hours to be used in calculating
attorneys’ fees … [must] be detailed with sufficient specificity.”86 “In other words,
the fee application must ‘be specific enough to allow the district court to determine
if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the work.’”87
AHOM draws the Court’s attention to the following entries: 1.7 hours and 5
hours for “Analyze evidentiary issues regarding trial” on July 25, and July 26, 2023;
9 hours for “Prepare for mediation” spread over September 26, September 29, and
October 3, 2023; 4 hours for “Review article from Plaintiff regarding racial lynching
of black women that she thought about due to McCoy and trial preparation” on

86
87

Gelis v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 49 F.4th 371, 379 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
Id. at 379-380 (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190).
25

October 5, 2023;88 74 hours89 described as “Trial preparation” spread over March
14, March 15, March 21, March 22, March 28, 2024, April 1, April 2, April 4, April
5, April 6, and April 7, 2024; 11 hours billed for “Technology preparation, trial” on
April 8, 2024 and 18 hours for “Attend trial” on April 9 and April 10, 2024.90
Although the structure of Defendant’s brief suggests that it views vagueness as an
overarching issue, AHOM only specifically challenged 122.7 hours. As such, I limit
my vagueness analysis to the entries identified in Defendant’s papers.
Defendant is correct that the “fee application must ‘be specific enough to
allow the district court to determine if the hours claimed are unreasonable for the
work performed.’”91 But all of Plaintiff’s records “included the date, a description

88

89

90
91

I reject Defendant’s argument that this is not billable time simply because Plaintiff thought
about this article. Holmes testified at trial to how the slur Coon “still carries the same
connotation. It still carries the same pain … And the word coon is dehumanizing. It’s telling
me or anybody of a person of color that you’re not an equal human as I am. I have to put these
labels on you to degrade you.” Doc. 104 (Apr. 9, 2024 Trial Transcript) at 68:23-69:6. She
further testified about how there is “[s]o much death and blood tied to that [Ku Klux Klan]
hood, so much death and blood tied to that ‘N’ word. The – the hood, what I understood, KKK
and how people were savagely treated at one point in time.” Id. at 97:6-9. It was reasonable for
Anderson to review an article regarding lynchings as it undoubtedly provided insight into the
emotional turmoil his client was facing.
In Defendant’s brief, it challenges 69.5 hours labeled as “Trial preparation” on these dates.
However, the Court’s review of the annotated spreadsheet indicates that there are in fact 74
hours related to “Trial preparation” that are challenged as vague. Presumably the missing entry
is from April 6, 2024 for 4.5 hours that is labeled as “Trial preparation with Plaintiff and
Eichelberger.” While this is slightly more detailed than the other entries, I include it here to
ease my analysis. Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. 2
(Annotated Spreadsheet).
Defendant also takes issue with whether this category reflects clerical work. I address that
separately below.
Gelis, 49 F.4th at 379-380 (quoting Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190).
26

of the activity, and the time expended.”92 Despite having generic descriptions, I
conclude that the challenged hours are reasonable. Spending 9 hours to prepare for
a mediation and 6.7 hours to analyze evidentiary issues is certainly reasonable. The
4 hours spent on the lynching article is similarly reasonable as it goes to counsel’s
ability to understand and articulate the emotional distress experienced by Holmes.
While 74 hours for trial preparation is borderline excessive in this case, it does not
cross the line from diligence to inordinance. Many tasks go into trial preparation:
voir dire preparation; witness preparation; preparation of the opening argument; and
anticipation of the various arguments and defenses likely to be put forth by one’s
opponent. Similarly, the 29 hours spent by Johnson with “Technology preparation,
trial” and “Attend Trial” are similarly reasonable for these broad tasks.
The Third Circuit has explained that a fee petition only needs to include “some
fairly definite information as to the hours devoted to various general activities, e.g.
pretrial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various classes of
attorneys ….”93 In fact, courts in this Circuit “have held that simple entries such as
‘research,’ ‘review’ and ‘prepare’ are sufficiently specific, so long as they explain

92
93

Brown v. Nutrition Mgmt. Servs. Co., Nos. 08-3840 and 09-1779, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5535,
at *13 (3d Cir. Mar. 17, 2020).
Gelis, 49 F.4th at 380.
27

who performed those activities and for how long.”94 Consequently, I decline to strike
the identified hours for vagueness.95
b.

Clerical Work

Next, AHOM identifies what it contends is clerical work performed by
Karadeema and Johnson.96 “[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed
at a paralegal rate regardless of who performs them.”97 Clerical tasks include “filing
documents, preparing service packets, and completing or reviewing pro hac vice
paperwork.”98 These types of tasks are “usually absorbed in the attorney’s fee as
overhead … throughout Pennsylvania.”99
Upon a review of the challenged time entries, I conclude that many are in fact
clerical. As such, I reduce Plaintiff’s requested fee by 48.75 hours for clerical work

94
95
96
97
98

99

A.B. v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108469, at *8.
The separate challenge to the hours also described as clerical is dealt with below.
Defendant identified time entries that it contends are “clerical” and “likely clerical.” Doc. 127
(Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. 2 (Annotated Spreadsheet).
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 105 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1989).
Klein v. Colvin, No. 1:14-CV-1496, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88515, at *10 (M.D. Pa. July 8,
2016). Further examples of clerical tasks include “packaging attachments,” “scanning and
numbering exhibits,” “File maintenance,” “File management,” “Document management,”
“coordinating a conference call,” “Created binder of all documents in possession,” “Prepared
binder for expert,” “Telephone call to [individual] to schedule early neutral evaluation,”
“Various email correspondence … regarding scheduling of [] mediation,” “opening a file in a
database,” “entering case updates in a management system,” “mailing letters,” “calendaring
deadlines,” “confirming contact information,” and “talking with a process server or court
clerk.” See Elashi v. Sabol, No. 4:09-CV-2201, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116443 (M.D. Pa. Nov.
2, 2010); Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 903 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2018); Slantis v.
Capozzie & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:09-CV-049, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67977 (M.D. Pa. June
24, 2011); and McGuire v. Neidig, No. 14-1531, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53488 (W.D. Pa. Apr.
7, 2017).
Moffitt v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-1519, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7948, at *19
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2017).
28

performed by Karadeema, billed at a total of $7,312.50. Attached as Appendix A to
this Memorandum Opinion are the time entries that my review has deemed clerical.
They bear a remarkable similarity to entries identified by other courts in this Circuit
as clerical.
As to remaining entries, my reasoning is as follows. AHOM contends that
time spent by Karadeema on work related to the preparation of subpoenas is
clerical.100 Courts in this Circuit have regularly allowed the recovery of time spent
on subpoenas;101 therefore, I will not strike these hours. In a similar vein, I decline
to excise hours related to the notices of depositions,102 work on Plaintiff’s discovery

100

These challenged entries are found on the following dates: 0.5 hours on October 25, 2022; 0.8
hours on October 27, 2022; 1.0 hours on November 9, 2022; 0.4 hours on November 14, 2022;
1.2 hours on November 16, 2022; 0.2 hours on November 22, 2022; 0.4 hours on November
30, 2022; two entries for 0.25 and 0.5 hours, respectively, on February 16, 2024; 1.25 hours
on March 13, 2024; 0.5 hours on March 20, 2024; and 0.25 hours on April 4, 2024. Doc. 107
(Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records). Although some
of these hours may in fact be clerical, it was AHOM’s burden to put forth that argument. With
no references to caselaw, Defendant has made no effort to aid the Court in its evaluation of the
hours it has deemed clerical. Consequently, I decline to excise these hours given AHOM’s
failure to provide any caselaw that would cast doubt on the non-clerical nature of the
preparation and submission of the subpoenas and general correspondence concerning this task.
I have only excised hours related to subpoenas where the nature of the task is clearly clerical,
as identified in the chart in Appendix A.
101
E.g., Poff v. Prime Care Med., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-03066, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77271 (M.D.
Pa. June 14, 2016).
102
This consists of the following entries: 0.6 hours on November 1, 2022; and two entries for 0.4
hours on November 17, 2022. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorneys’ Fees),
Ex. A (Billing Records).
29

responses,103 mediation preparation,104 and trial preparation.105 These tasks are
comparable to Karadeema’s work on the subpoenas. Finally, AHOM has challenged
time spent updating Holmes on the status of her case.106 I do not find the hours
requested on this task to be excessive, and I decline to conclude that updating a client
on the status of their case is a clerical task.
c.

Travel Time and Expenses

Our Court of Appeals has previously clarified that the recovery of travel time
under § 1988 is limited to local counsel.107 For “counsel from outside of the forum
of the litigation,” the Third Circuit “prohibits” the recovery of “travel expenses”108
unless it can be shown that local counsel would have been unwilling to represent
Holmes. This has not been shown as Holmes has only pointed to a vague statement
from Rieders regarding the attractiveness of civil rights cases in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania.

103

This category is comprised of the following entries: 0.2 hours on July 21, 2022; 0.8 hours on
July 22, 2022; 0.4 hours on July 26, 2022; 0.5 hours on July 27, 2022; 1.5 hours on July 28,
2022; 0.2 hours on August 1, 2022; 1 hour on August 3, 2022; and 0.5 hours on August 4,
2022. Id.
104
This consists of a single entry on October 3, 2023 for 0.5 hours. Id.
105
This consists of 0.5 hours on November 8, 2023; 1 hour on February 13, 2024; two 0.25 entries
on March 20, 2024; 0.25 hours on March 26, 2024; 11 hours on April 8, 2024; 9 hours on April
9, 2024; and 9 hours on April 10, 2024. Id.
106
This category is comprised of the following entries: 0.25 hours on April 26, 2023; 0.25 hours
on June 19, 2023; 0.25 hours on November 16, 2023; 0.2 hours on January 23, 2024; and 0.5
hours on February 23, 2024. Id.
107
United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128, 136 n.8 (3d Cir. 2018).
108
Id.
30

Perhaps due to this restriction, Anderson contends that “he does not simply
hail from a legal community other than the Williamsport vicinage”109 because he
“practices primarily in the Western and Middle Districts of Pennsylvania.”110 A
cursory review of Anderson’s professional history undercuts the veracity of this
statement.111 He was admitted to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania in 1997; he was not admitted to the Middle District of
Pennsylvania for another 21 years.112 Further, his practice is centered in the state and
federal courts located in the counties that comprise the Western District of
Pennsylvania.113 Consequently, it is more accurate to state that Anderson “practices
primarily in the Western District of Pennsylvania, with occasional appearances in
the Middle District of Pennsylvania.” Under these circumstances, I conclude that
Anderson is not local counsel, and Plaintiff’s attempt to bill his travel time is
inappropriate.114

109

Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 9.
Id.
111
See Thomas B. Anderson, Litigation Analytics, Thomson Reuters – WestLaw Edge,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Analytics/Profiler?docGUID=I1846081E1DD211B2AD58AC00
D20223FE&contentType=attorney&view=profile&dataOrchGUID=8c86eccaf23f47bfbc806f
f01576be8d&transitionType=LegalLitigation&contextData=(sc.Default)#/attorney/I1846081
E1DD211B2AD58AC00D20223FE/profile (last accessed January 15, 2025).
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
The travel time for the other attorneys and paralegals will similarly be excised from Holmes’
attorney’s fees. These individuals did not include any averment that they should be considered
local to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, let alone the Williamsport vicinage.
110

31

Even if Plaintiff was correct in her position, she has failed to meet her burden
to prove that “travel time should be compensated at the full rate.”115 She “has not
presented any evidence regarding the customary practice for the billing of travel time
in the local community.”116 Since Defendant challenged both Holmes’ billing of her
attorneys’ travel time and travel expenses, I also address the costs here as the same
analysis applies. Accordingly, I excise 59.4 hours from Holmes’ requested
attorney’s fees.117 Her recoverable amount has been reduced by $20,195.00 in fees
and $4,474.28 in costs, as identified in the tables in Appendix B.
d.

Unsuccessful Claims

“It is true that when ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success,’
a district court may reduce a fee award below the lodestar amount.”118 “However,
‘[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.’”119 “Indeed,
where, as here, a plaintiff’s successful and unsuccessful claims arise out of a
common core of facts … ‘[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the

115

United States ex rel. Palmer, 897 F.3d at 136 n.8.
Id. Holmes raised an interesting argument concerning the recovery of travel expenses for the
mediation as it occurred outside of the forum of the litigation. I disregard this argument given
the lack of proof pertaining to the customary practice of billing for travel time in the
Williamsport vicinage of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
117
This reduces the recoverable amounts as follows: Anderson’s initial request has been reduced
to 427.15 hours; Anderson’s supplemental request has been reduced to 101.05 hours; Bordas’
initial request has been reduced to 23.75 hours; and Johnson’s sole request has been reduced
to 29 hours.
116

118

Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 358 F. App’x 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley, 461
U.S. at 436).
119
Id.
32

litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-byclaim basis.’”120 The Third Circuit has “recognize[d] that a district court may reduce
the lodestar amount ‘even where the plaintiff’s claims were interrelated,
nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith.’”121 But at the same time I retain “discretion
in determining the actual fee[] award” so long as I “appl[y] the correct legal standard
….”122
Here, Defendant suggests reducing the lodestar amount by ten percent.
AHOM arrives at this figure by estimating that one-fourth of the time spent by
Plaintiff’s counsel occurred before this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and
Order disposing of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. However, I do not
find it appropriate to do so. AHOM is correct that I dismissed Holmes’ retaliation
and constructive discharge claims, but Defendant fails to recognize that most of the
facts supporting Plaintiff’s retaliation and constructive discharge claims remained
relevant to her hostile work environment claim. Therefore, I decline to impose a
percentage reduction for time spent on these unsuccessful claims.
e.

Post-Trial Motions Prevailing Party

Related to this argument is AHOM’s contention that Holmes has largely not
prevailed on the post-trial motions filed by the parties. While there is certainly

120

Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).
Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).
122
Id. (citing Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995)).
121

33

precedential support for removing time related to independent claims, it is unclear
whether this logic extends to individual motions. But, from the Court’s perspective,
Holmes has largely prevailed on the critical motion filed by AHOM. I declined to
overturn the jury’s finding of liability, the amount of compensatory damages, and
the imposition of punitive damages. As the research supporting the preservation of
any award of punitive damages naturally overlapped with the size of that award, I
do not find it appropriate to deem the time spent researching this issue irrelevant.
Therefore, I remove the time I definitively related to the isolated issues Holmes has
not prevailed on: the fee enhancement; the demonstrative slides; and the time spent
on appellate work.123 Unlike many of the other post-trial motions, these aspects
contained no overlap with areas that Holmes prevailed on. These tasks accounted for
36.44 hours as identified in the table in Appendix C.124
f.

Excessive Hours in the Supplemental Motion

The Court similarly finds that AHOM’s contention that the hours spent on the
post-trial filings are excessive has some merit. Defendant is correct that “[t]he
suggestion that post-judgment filings would reasonably require nearly 75% of the
time required from the filing of the case through trial is dubious.”125 Many of the
123

It is premature to award Holmes fees for any appellate work as she has not yet prevailed at the
Third Circuit.
124
This reduces the recoverable amount of hours in the Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees
as follows: Anderson’s request has been reduced to 92.75 hours; Monahan’s request has been
reduced to 169.135 hours; Prasick’s request has been reduced to 36.925 hours; and Bordas’
request has been reduced to 5 hours.
125
Doc. 156 (Brief in Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 5-6.
34

post-trial motions were not complex. Even in the most complicated motion, the
Court found it appropriate to only hold oral argument on two discrete issues. The
remaining aspects of that motion did not pose novel questions. I therefore find it
appropriate to impose a 10% reduction to each individual’s requested hours in the
Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees. This reduces the total amount of
compensable hours in the Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees to 273.609
hours.126
g.

Quarter- and Half-Hour Billing

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s fees should be reduced by five percent
due to her counsel’s apparent use of quarter hour and half hour increments for billing.
Defendant acknowledges that there is “no prohibition on quarter hour billing in our
Circuit.”127 Although the practice is not banned, it clearly inflates fees. AHOM has
identified patterns that raise serious questions concerning the billing practices of the
attorneys and paralegals in this case.128 The Court sets aside the potential issues
concerning Monahan’s and Prasick’s billing as they both averred to follow a tenthhour billing system.129 Despite being suspect, I do not find the issues sufficient to
126

The recoverable amounts for each individual are as follows after applying this 10% reduction:
83.475 hours for Anderson; 4.5 hours for Bordas; 152.2215 hours for Monahan; 33.2325 hours
for Prasick; and 0.18 hours for Karadeema.
127
Rougvie v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., No. 15-724, 2016 WL 4784121, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 12,
2016).
128
Doc. 127 (Brief in Opposition to First Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 7-8; Doc. 156 (Brief in
Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees) at 6-8.
129
Doc. 154 (Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. C (Monahan Affidavit) ¶ 14 and Ex.
D (Prasick Affidavit) ¶ 11.
35

overcome the sworn statements made by both attorneys concerning their billing
practices. While they indicate that this is the standard billing practice at Bordas &
Bordas, Anderson’s and Bordas’ affidavits are conspicuously silent on this issue.130
Given the patterns identified by Defendant, I find it appropriate to reduce the hours
requested by Anderson and Bordas by 5% in both the First Motion for Attorneys’
Fees and Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Anderson is now requesting a
total of 485.09375 hours while Bordas is now requesting a total of 26.8375 hours.131
In reaching this decision, I decline to extend a similar reduction to Karadeema given
that the Court has already excised many of the suspect time entries identified by
Defendant.
4.

Calculation of the Lodestar

As I have now resolved all of the challenges to Plaintiff’s hours, I am able to
calculate the lodestar. To do so, I multiple the appropriate hourly rates for each
attorney and paralegal by the number of hours that remain, as displayed in the table
below. This leads to a total award of $252,906.30 in attorney’s fees.

130

The absence of any sworn statements on this topic from Anderson and Bordas in the
Supplemental Motion is also noteworthy.
131
For Anderson, the breakdown is 405.7925 hours in the First Motion and 79.30125 hours in the
Supplemental Motion. Bordas has a breakdown of 22.5625 hours in the First Motion and 4.275
hours in the Supplemental Motion.
36

The Lodestar Calculation
Timekeeper
Anderson
Bordas
Monahan
Prasick
Johnson
Karadeema
E.

Hourly Rate
$375
$375
$300
$250
$115
$150

Hours
485.09375
26.8375
152.2215
33.2325
29
24.15

Amount of Fees132
$181,910.16
$10,064.06
$45,666.45
$8,308.13
$3,335.00
$3,622.50

Enhancement of the Lodestar

Finally, I turn to Holmes’ requested enhancement. Even with the reduced
award this Court is prepared to provide her, this requested enhancement would result
in $1,264,531.50 fees. In spite of her best efforts to argue otherwise, this case does
not present the “rare” or “exceptional” circumstances that justify any enhancement,
let alone one of this magnitude.
There is “a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar represents the ‘reasonable’
fee” for Plaintiff’s counsel.133 The Third Circuit has summarized the main
circumstances identified by the United States Supreme Court when an upward
adjustment of the lodestar calculation may be appropriate:
These circumstances include: (1) “where the method used in
determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar calculation does
not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value”; (2) “if the
attorney’s performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses
and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; or (3) where there was

132
133

The Amount of Fees is rounded up to the nearest cent.
Dungee v. Davison Design & Dev., Inc., 674 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2017).
37

an “exceptional delay in the payment of fees … particularly where the
delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense.”134
When “presented with a ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ case, a district court must
tailor the method of enhancing the lodestar to that specific case.”135 “For instance, if
an attorney’s hourly rate is ‘determined by a formula that takes into account only a
single factor (such as years since admission to the bar),’ the district court may adjust
the hourly rate ‘in accordance with specific proof linking the attorney’s ability to a
prevailing market rate.’136
“The party requesting an enhancement to the lodestar carries the burden to
show that a multiplier is necessary to reach a fair and reasonable fee award.”137 “That
party must produce ‘specific evidence on the record’ supporting the
enhancement.”138 “Further, to ensure that the calculation ‘is objective and capable of
being reviewed on appeal,’ a district court must provide detailed findings justifying
any enhancement to the lodestar.”139
Here, Holmes has failed to carry her burden. She has argued that the lodestar
fails to capture her attorneys’ true market value. First, her argument focuses
exclusively on Anderson’s performance, yet she applies her enhancement to the

134

Id. at 156-57 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554-56).
Id. at 157.
136
Id. (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 555).
137
Id. (citing Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553).
138
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565,
106 S. Ct. 3088, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986)).
139
Id. (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553, 557-59).
135

38

entirety of the lodestar figure. More importantly, I conclude that Holmes has failed
to put forth sufficient evidence that would allow the Court to grant this enhancement.
The only evidence in the record that Holmes identified is the Rieders affidavit.
In relevant part, Rieders states:
Lawyers who handle primarily contingent fee cases face the
inevitable fact that they will win cases, settle cases, and lose cases. In
North Central Pennsylvania, unless the attorney can balance out losses
or negative results with very good results, it would be impossible to
handle contingent fee cases at all in the Middle District [of
Pennsylvania].
Significant costs must be laid out in contingency fee cases.
The overheard costs of operating a contingent fee practice in the
Wilkes-Barre, Harrisburg, and Williamsport areas are quite significant.
A verdict in federal court, Middle District of Pennsylvania, and
the amount set forth, and based on the facts related by the Court in its
Memorandum Opinion of July 3, 2023, is a notable accomplishment.
While the undersigned does not know Attorney Anderson
personally, the undersigned was impressed with Attorney Anderson’s
presentation, the results he obtained, and the information imparted by
him concerning the nature of his practice and other results.
The rate charged by Mr. Anderson, who presents himself as a
fine, accomplished, and responsible attorney, is extremely reasonable.
The lawyers in the Middle District of Pennsylvania are reluctant
to take civil rights cases at all because of the population in the veneer
and the exacting requirements of federal court.
The billing of $600.00 per hour for someone of Mr. Anderson’s
obvious ability and the results in this case seems modest, given the costs
associated with practicing law in the current environment, the
challenges of public opinion, and the conservativeness of the
jurisdiction.
39

There are no attorneys, that the undersigned is aware of, who
have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement in a civil rights case in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly Williamsport, or who
even have his degree of success in such cases and trial experience on a
regular basis in civil rights cases.140
Much of this affidavit fails to provide any evidence at all regarding the
inadequacy of the lodestar. The first three paragraphs of the quoted sections concern
the logistics of operating on a contingency fee basis in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court has indicated that a contingency enhancement
“would likely duplicate in substantial part factors already subsumed in the lodestar”
method.141 It is therefore inappropriate to accept this argument in support of an
enhancement.
Next, the Court considers Rieders’ statements concerning the rate sought by
Anderson. Rieders first describes Anderson’s desired rate as “extremely reasonable”
and then notes that it is “modest” “given the costs associated with practicing law in
the current environment, the challenges of public opinion, and the conservativeness
of the jurisdiction.”142 Although the Court reduced Anderson’s hourly rate to an
amount in line with that charged by attorneys in the Williamsport vicinage, I have
already concluded that this is an appropriate rate given his qualifications, specialized

140

Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit).
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 120 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1992).
142
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶
42.
141

40

expertise, and the uncomplicated nature of this case. Rieders’ observations do not
move the needle on this analysis.
Finally, I consider the results Anderson achieved at trial. Rieders describes
the outcome of this case as “a notable accomplishment” and notes that he was
“impressed” with Anderson’s “presentation,” the “results he obtained,” and other
information concerning his practice.143 Further, Rieders asserts that “[t]here are no
attorneys, that [he] is aware of, who have equaled Mr. Anderson’s achievement in a
civil rights case in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, particularly Williamsport, or
who even have his degree of success … on a regular basis in civil rights cases.”144
These observations appear to be premised, at least in part, on the assumption
that “lawyers in the Middle District of Pennsylvania are reluctant to take civil rights
cases at all because of the population in the veneer and the exacting requirements of
federal court.”145 As civil rights cases regularly appear on my docket and the docket
of my colleagues in this Court, I set aside this observation.
Rieders’ discussion of the result Anderson achieved in this case is also
unpersuasive. The finding of liability in this case was not an unexpected outcome,
except perhaps to AHOM; as the Court has already explained at length elsewhere, a
jury easily could conclude that AHOM committed clear wrongdoing and fumbled

143

Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 39.
145
Id. ¶ 38.
144

41

its response to Holmes’ complaints. Under these circumstances, achieving a verdict
in Plaintiff’s favor was the extremely likely outcome. While the size of the verdict
was large, that alone is not a reason to enhance Plaintiff’s fees, especially once the
award the Court deemed constitutionally reasonable is considered.
Even if the Court were to expand its analysis to include the twelve factors
identified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v.
Georgia,146 the outcome would remain unchanged. Many of these factors have
already been adequately accounted for in the lodestar;147 as to the nearly all of
remaining factors, Holmes has provided no evidence that would allow the Court to
evaluate them.148
As I have presided over this case for its entire duration, I am intimately
familiar with the performance of all counsel. This prompts me to simply observe that
I find it much more probable that the result in this case came down to “inferior
146

These factors were identified in Hensley. They are: “(1) the time and labor required; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10); the “undesirability” of the case; (11)
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.
147
My review concludes that the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, eighth, and ninth factors were
already accounted for, either directly or indirectly, by the Court when calculating the lodestar.
Id.
148
Plaintiff provided no information concerning the fourth, seventh, tenth, eleventh, or twelfth
factors in this fee petition. Id. I do not consider Rieders’ assessment of the “reluctan[c]e” of
attorneys “to take civil rights cases” in this District to be persuasive given the frequency with
which these cases are brought before this Court. Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for
Attorney’s Fees), Ex. E (Rieders Affidavit) ¶ 38.
42

performance by defense counsel, … an unexpectedly sympathetic jury, or simple
luck” rather than such a superior performance by Plaintiff’s counsel that the lodestar
is an inaccurate measure of their true market value.149
F.

Requested Costs

As I have calculated the lodestar, I now turn to Plaintiff’s requested costs.
AHOM has only attacked Holmes’ request for travel costs, an issue resolved above,
and her legal research costs. But our Court of Appeals has indicated that “the same
standards apply to [my] review of costs as to [my] review of attorneys’ fees.”150
Accordingly, I must review Plaintiff’s submissions to ensure that she has met her
initial burden of production. Unlike her submitted time entries, all the Court has been
provided is a series of expense reports that merely list the date, description, and price
of each cost. The Third Circuit has reversed a district court that approved a prevailing
party’s costs based solely on a “one-page statement [that] contain[ed] dates and
descriptions, but [did] not include supporting data explaining the relevant purpose
of the expenditures.”151 The Court is faced with essentially an identical situation
here. Under these circumstances, I conclude that Holmes has failed to meet her initial
burden of production as she has “failed to provide the District Court with any
reasonable basis justifying the expenditures in this case.”152

149

Perdue, 559 U.S. at 554.
Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2001).
151
Id.
152
Id.
150

43

But that is not the end of my analysis. District courts in this Circuit have
compared the dates and descriptions from the expense reports to the submitted time
entries to ascertain whether the submitted costs are reasonable.153 Despite the
incredibly tedious nature of this task, I will do so now.
1.

Legal Research Costs

As AHOM has challenged Holmes’ ability to recover any legal research costs,
I must first discern whether they are recoverable at all. In its Brief in Opposition to
the Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, AHOM correctly notes that courts
have declined to award legal research costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In making this
argument, Defendant fails to consider whether these expenses can be awarded under
42 U.S.C. § 1988. This silence seems peculiar given that one of the Defendant’s
cases specifically acknowledged “civil rights legislation … encompasses a broader
concept of expenses than the enumerated costs allowed under § 1920.”154 As some
courts in this Circuit have deemed legal research costs recoverable under § 1988, I
conclude that it is proper to award Holmes these expenses should they prove to be
properly documented after a comparison to the submitted time entries.155 This review
has indicated that some of these research costs cannot be aligned with the time spent

153

E.g., United States ex rel. Ibew Local Union No. 98v. The Fairfield Co., No. 09-4230, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63169 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2020).
154
Nugget Distrib. Coop. v. Mr. Nugget, 145 F.R.D. 54, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
155
Courts in this Circuit have awarded legal research expenses to attorneys under 42 U.S.C. §
1988. E.g., Stadler v. Abrams, No. 13-2741, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126499 (D.N.J. July 27,
2018).
44

by her attorneys to determine their reasonableness.156 Consequently, I remove the
costs contained in Appendix D from Holmes’ petition.
The remaining research costs appear to have been a monthly legal research
bill from Westlaw. This allowed me to connect the appropriate hours spent by
Holmes’ attorneys to the associated legal research costs, as identified in Appendix
E.
2.

All Other Costs

Since I have an independent obligation to ensure that Plaintiff has met her
burden of production, I do so regarding the remaining costs she has requested despite
AHOM’s failure to challenge these expenses. Again, all that Holmes provided to the
Court in support of these costs were various expense reports. I completed the
unenviable task of matching the costs to the appropriate time entries, as presented in
Appendix F.
The only costs I was unable to match to any time entries were photocopying
charges requested by Holmes and $33.95 in postal services incurred on April 30,
2024. While these photocopying costs would also be recoverable under § 1920, I
would have to conclude that “the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.”

156

Holmes incurred online research expenses on a seemingly random basis that make it impossible
for the Court to discern which, if any, of her time entries are connected to the expenses in her
Supplemental Motion.
45

Plaintiff has provided no information that would allow me to do so.157 Therefore, I
decline to award her the requested reimbursement for her photocopies and scans.
Instead, I will award Holmes $9,074.16 in total for her costs in this case, as reflected
in Appendices E and F.
II.

CONCLUSION
The Court has finally determined the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

Holmes is entitled to recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This amount is adequately
supported by the record provided to the Court and represents a reasonable fee
given the complexity of the case, the experience of the attorneys, and the services
provided.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

157

I have no way to discern how many pages were copied and scanned. Thus, I have no ability to
discern the per page cost to determine if it is reasonable. Nor can I evaluate whether the amount
of copying performed was necessary.
46

Appendix A: Excised Clerical Hours
Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

07/29/2022 Karadeema 1.1

10/12/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/13/2022 Karadeema 0.5

10/14/2022 Karadeema 0.7

10/17/2022 Karadeema 0.2

Clerical
Reason
Bates Stamping Analogous to
document
documents for
management
First Set of
Interrogatories and exhibit
and Request for preparation
Production
Correspondence Scheduling
with counsel
regarding
scheduling of
depositions
Correspondence Analogous to
filing
with counsel
and defendant’s documents and
scheduling
counsel
regarding filing correspondence
extension to
extend
discovery
Correspondence Scheduling
with counsel
regarding
scheduling of
depositions (.2),
extending
discovery
deadlines (.3),
correspondence
with Holmes
regarding
scheduling
deposition (.2)
Correspondence Analogous to
with opposing
filing
counsel
documents and
47

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $165.00

$150.00 $60.00

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $105.00

$150.00 $30.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

10/21/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/21/2022 Karadeema 0.5

10/24/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/25/2022 Karadeema 0.4

regarding filing
of discovery
extension
Analyze issues
regarding
change re
scheduled
depositions and
related matters
Analyze
matters
regarding
scheduling
depositions of
additional
witnesses and
communication
with
defendant’s
counsel re same
Correspondence
with Holmes
and counsel
regarding
scheduling
depositions
Correspondence
with opposing
counsel
regarding
scheduling of
depositions,
locations of
depositions,
contact
information for
deposition

48

Clerical
Rate
Reason
scheduling
correspondence

Amount

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $75.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

10/25/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/26/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/27/2022 Karadeema 0.2

10/28/2022 Karadeema 0.5

10/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4

Analyze issues
regarding
scheduling
depositions of
Beverly
Hibbert,
Tammy
Dunmire, Haley
Furros, Ron
Houtz, Tim
McCoy, Ms.
Dodson, and
Mr. Cattone
Correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel re:
scheduling
depositions
Correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel
regarding
scheduling
depositions (.2)
Correspondence
with former
employees
regarding
depositions
Correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel
regarding
scheduling
depositions and
49

Clerical
Reason
Scheduling

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $30.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $75.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.5

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.4

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.5

10/31/2022 Karadeema 0.7

contact
information for
previous
employees
Identify and
secure lodging
for plaintiff’s
counsel re
depositions
Correspondence
with Beverly
Hibbert,
Tammy
Dunmire, Haley
Furros
regarding
taking
depositions
Correspondence
with Hyatt and
Centre County
Bar Association
regarding
reserving
conference
room
Correspondence
with Attorney
Anderson and
defendant’s
counsel and
Holmes
regarding
Notices of
Deposition,
reserving
conference
room
50

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

Analogous to
scheduling and
related
logistics

$150.00 $75.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00
related
logistics

Scheduling and $150.00 $105.00
related
logistics

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.5

11/01/2022 Karadeema 0.2

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.4

Clerical
Reason
Correspondence Scheduling
with Hal[e]y
Furrow and
counsel
regarding
scheduling
deposition for
evening hours
Correspondence Scheduling and
related
with
logistics
defendant’s
counsel
regarding
notices of
deposition,
room contract
Correspondence Analogous to
scheduling,
with Plaintiff
related
regarding
logistics, and
verifying
receipt of notice file and
document
of deposition
management
Analogous to
Compile and
packaging
deliver to
attachments
Holmes
and preparing
materials for
exhibits
review in
preparation for
deposition
Correspondence Scheduling and
related
with
logistics
defendant’s
counsel re:
plaintiff’s half
of fee for
conference

51

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $60.00

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $30.00

$150.00 $60.00

$150.00 $60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/02/2022 Karadeema 0.5

11/03/2022 Karadeema 0.5

11/03/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/04/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/04/2022 Karadeema 0.4

room and
related matters
Correspondence
with Holmes re:
scheduled day
for deposition,
scheduling
deposition
preparation
with attorney
Anderson
Correspondence
with Golkow
Litigation
Services
regarding
scheduling
reporter of
depositions
Review and
process
correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel
regarding
discovery
documents
Upload and
save documents
provided by
defendant’s
counsel
Correspondence
with Golkow
Litigation
Services
regarding
52

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

Scheduling

$150.00 $75.00

Analogous to
$150.00 $75.00
communication
with a process
server or court
clerk

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $60.00

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $60.00

$150.00 $60.00
Analogous to
communication
with process
server or court
clerk

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/07/2022 Karadeema 0.2

11/07/2022 Karadeema 0.5

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.5

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/09/2022 Karadeema 0.4

scheduling
reporter for
depositions
Correspondence
with court
reporter
regarding verify
use of their
services for
depositions
Prepare travel
arrangement for
Attorney
Anderson for
depositions in
State College
Correspondence
with J&M
Reporting re
scheduling
reporter for
deposition for
November 14
Research re
additional
contact
information for
Beverly Hibbert
and Tammy
Dunmire [0.50]
Correspondence
with Haley
Furrow
regarding date
and time of
deposition
Communication
with counsel
53

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $30.00
Analogous to
communication
with process
server or court
clerk
Scheduling and $150.00 $75.00
related
logistics

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Confirming
contact
information

$150.00 $75.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/11/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/21/2022 Karadeema 0.4

regarding
scheduling
deposition of
Haley Furrow
and related
matters
Correspondence
with J&M
Reporting
regarding
scheduled zoom
deposition for
November 14,
2022
Correspondence
with defendants
regarding
scheduling
depositions for
Mark Cattron
and Lois
Dodson and
related matters
Correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel and
Haley
Eichelberger
regarding Zoom
link for
deposition and
exhibits
Process and
save deposition
transcripts and
documents for
Timothy
54

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00
related
logistics

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/23/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/28/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.2

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.2

11/29/2022 Karadeema 0.4

McCoy and
Ronald Houtz
Making
arrangements
with Hyatt State
College
regarding room
for depositions
Correspondence
with
defendant’s
counsel
regarding
scheduling
depositions
Review and
save deposition
transcripts for
Haley
Eichelberger
Correspondence
with J&M
Court
Reporting re
scheduling
reporter for
depositions
Process invoice
Johnson and
Mimless for
deposition of
Haley
Eichelberger
Reserving hotel
room for
depositions on
December 5 &
6
55

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00
related
logistics

Scheduling

$150.00 $60.00

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $60.00

Scheduling

$150.00 $30.00

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $30.00

Scheduling and $150.00 $60.00
related
logistics

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

11/30/2022 Karadeema 0.4

11/30/2022 Karadeema 0.4

12/02/2022 Karadeema 0.2

12/06/2022 Karadeema 0.5

12/12/2022 Karadeema 0.2

12/14/2022 Karadeema 0.4

Clerical
Rate
Reason
$150.00
Analyze issues Analogous to
re confirming
scheduling,
receipt of
related
subpoena by
logistics, and
Beverly Hibbert file and
document
management
Prepare check
Scheduling and $150.00
request for
related
travel to State
logistics
College for
depositions
Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00
with J&M re
related
Zoom link for
logistics
depositions
Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00
related
with Beverly
logistics
Hibbert
regarding
receipt of
subpoena,
scheduling
deposition, and
no longer
needing
deposition
Review and
Analogous to
$150.00
save AHOM’s document
Amended Rule management
26 Disclosures
$150.00
Correspondence Analogous to
correspondence
with court
with process
reporter and
related matters server or court
clerk
regarding
exhibit from

56

Amount
$60.00

$60.00

$30.00

$75.00

$30.00

$60.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

12/19/2022 Karadeema 0.4

01/03/2023 Karadeema 0.2

02/03/2023 Karadeema 0.4

02/08/2023 Karadeema 0.4

03/14/2023 Karadeema 0.25
03/22/2023 Karadeema 0.5

Mark Cattron
deposition
Review and
process
deposition
transcripts for
Lois Dodson
and Mark
Cattron and
invoice from
J&M
Reviewed and
process Errata
pages for
deponents Mark
Cattron and
Lois Dodson
Review and
save invoices
from Golkow
Litigation
Services, check
request for
Golkow
invoices
Review and
process J&M
invoices

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $60.00

Analogous to
document
management

$150.00 $30.00

Analogous to
document and
file
management

$150.00 $60.00

Analogous to
document and
file
management
Filing
documents

$150.00 $60.00

File Notice of
Change of Law
Firm
Review and file Filing
Plaintiff’s Brief documents
in Opposition
to MSJ

57

Amount

$150.00 $37.50
$150.00 $75.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

06/12/2023 Karadeema 0.25

07/03/2023 Karadeema 0.25

07/05/2023 Karadeema 0.25

09/07/2023 Karadeema 0.25

09/26/2023 Karadeema 0.25

09/28/2023 Karadeema 0.25

10/02/2023 Karadeema 0.5

10/02/2023 Karadeema 0.25

Clerical
Reason
Correspondence Analogous to
document
with Plaintiff
management
regarding
requested
documents for
review
Review and
Analogous to
save Opinion
document and
from Judge to
file
file
management
Review and
Analogous to
save Order
document and
dated 7/5/2023 file
to file
management
Process
Analogous to
deposition
document and
invoice
file
management
Correspondence Updating
contact
with Plaintiff
information
regarding her
new address
and phone
number,
updating file
Correspondence Scheduling
with Plaintiff
regarding
mediation
preparation
with TBA
Booking hotel
Scheduling and
room for
related
Plaintiff for
logistics
mediation
Correspondence Scheduling and
with Plaintiff
related
regarding hotel logistics
58

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $37.50

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

10/04/2023 Karadeema 0.7

10/04/2023 Karadeema 0.2

10/20/2023 Karadeema 0.2

11/06/2023 Karadeema 0.2

11/09/2023 Karadeema 0.5

11/17/2023 Karadeema 0.5

01/02/2024 Karadeema 0.5

reservations,
parking,
directions for
mediation
Prepare and file
Letter from
Plaintiff to
Court
Diary
conference call
with Judge to
TBA, JGBIII
calendars
Review and
diary
Scheduling
Order

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Filing
documents

$150.00 $105.00

Analogous to
file
management
and
calendaring
Analogous to
file
management
and
calendaring
Correspondence Analogous to
with JAMS
document and
regarding
file
invoice
management
Review and file Filing
Motion to
documents
Reschedule
Pretrial
Conference
Correspondence Analogous to
communication
with Judge’s
with process
chambers
server or court
requesting
clerk
Word version
of Exhibit List
Reviewing and Filing
filing Motions
documents
in Limine

59

Amount

$150.00 $30.00

$150.00 $30.00

$150.00 $30.00

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $75.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

01/02/2024 Karadeema 1
01/16/2024 Karadeema 0.5
01/29/2024 Karadeema 0.5

01/30/2024 Karadeema 0.5
02/09/2024 Karadeema 0.5

03/12/2024 Karadeema 2

03/13/2024 Karadeema 4

03/21/2024 Karadeema 0.5

Preparing
exhibits for
brief
Acquire and
process brief
exhibits
Discussion with
TBA regarding
Filing of Reply
Brief and
exhibits
Refiling Brief
in Support
Correspondence
with JAMS
regarding
mediation
payment and
refund
Prepare exhibits
for uploading
into Trial
Director
program with
Bates numbers,
putting in
binder for TBA
for use at trial
Gathering and
preparing trial
documents for
trial binders
Matters
regarding
attorney Jamie
Bordas
admission to
district cour
60

Clerical
Reason
Preparing
exhibits

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $150.00

Preparing
exhibits

$150.00 $75.00

Filing
documents

$150.00 $75.00

Filing
documents
Analogous to
document and
file
management

$150.00 $75.00

Preparing
exhibits

$150.00 $300.00

Preparing
binders and
documents

$150.00 $600.00

Attorney
admissions

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $75.00

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

03/21/2024 Karadeema 2.5
03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.25

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.5

03/28/2024 Karadeema 1.5

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.5

03/28/2024 Karadeema 0.75
04/01/2024 Karadeema 0.25

Clerical
Reason
Prepare 24
Preparing
exhibits and file exhibits
same
Correspondence Analogous to
document and
with Billing
file
associate at
management
Thomson
Rhodes and
Cowie
regarding
expense report
Preparing
Editing trial
exhibits
exhibits by
adding
additional
exhibit and
separating one
into two
documents
Preparing
Printing
exhibits and
exhibits and
putting together binders
three binders
for attorney and
court
Preparing
Preparing
exhibit binders exhibits and
for mailing to
binders
court, putting in
mail
Update trial
Preparing
exhibits list
exhibits
Correspondence Analogous to
document and
with Billing
file
associate at
management
Thomson
Rhodes and
Cowie
61

Rate

Amount

$150.00 $375.00
$150.00 $37.50

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $225.00

$150.00 $75.00

$150.00 $112.50
$150.00 $37.50

Date

Timekeeper Hours Description

04/01/2024 Karadeema 0.25

04/04/2024 Karadeema 0.75

04/19/2024 Karadeema 4

regarding
expense report
Review and
diary
Scheduling
Order

Clerical
Reason

Rate

Amount

Analogous to
$150.00 $37.50
file
management
and
calendaring
Correspondence Scheduling and $150.00 $112.50
related
with IT to get
Zoom meeting logistics
set up,
correspondence
with Plaintiff to
schedule time
for Zoom,
added Zoom
meeting to TBA
calendar
Prepare billing Preparing
$150.00 $600.00
entry exhibit for exhibits
Fee Petition

62

Appendix B: Excised Travel Time and Costs
Removed Travel Time
Date
11/07/2022

11/08/2022

12/06/2022

12/06/2022

10/02/2023
10/02/2023
10/03/2023

10/03/2023

158

Timekeeper Hours Description
Anderson
3
Travel to deposition
of Patricia Holmes
in State College
Anderson
3
Travel from
depositions of
plaintiff and defense
witnesses in State
College
Anderson
2.6
Travel to depositions
of defense witnesses
in State College
Anderson
2.6
Travel from
depositions of
defense witnesses in
State College
Anderson
5.5
Travel to mediation
in Philadelphia
Bordas
1
Travel to Pittsburgh
airport for mediation
Anderson
4
Travel from
mediation in
Philadelphia
Bordas
6
Travel to
Philadelphia (3) and
travel back (3)158

Rate
Amount
$375.00 $1,125.00

$375.00 $1,125.00

$375.00 $975.00

$375.00 $975.00

$375.00 $2,062.50
$375.00 $375.00
$375.00 $1,500.00

$375.00 $2,250.00

This entry also contains six hours attributable to the mediation itself. This time is recoverable.
Doc. 107 (Brief in Support of First Motion for Attorney’s Fees), Ex. A (Billing Records).
63

Date
03/18/2023

04/07/2024

04/07/2024

04/10/2024
04/10/2024
07/25/2024

Timekeeper Hours Description
Anderson
7.75
Attend pretrial
conference (includes
travel time)159
Anderson
3.5
Travel to
Williamsport for
trial
Johnson
4
Travel to
Williamsport for
trial
Anderson
3.5
Travel from
Williamsport
Johnson
4
Travel home from
Williamsport
Anderson
8.95
Attend argument on
post-trial motions,
includes travel
time160

Rate
Amount
$375.00 $2,906.25

$375.00 $1,312.50

$115.00 $460.00

$375.00 $1,312.50
$115.00 $460.00
$375.00 $3,356.25

Removed Travel Costs
Date
10/31/2022

11/07/2022

Description
Travel Expense TBA
11/7/22 Hotel
Reservation … Re:
Deposition
Travel Expense Parking
Fee at Hyatt Place

159

Amount
$148.86

$12.00

The Court removed the time it took to conduct the pretrial conference from the 10 hours listed
in this entry to arrive at the 7.75 hours in travel time. The length of the pretrial conference was
discerned from the Court’s internal Minute Sheet memorializing the pretrial conference.
160
The travel time is ascertained by subtracting the length of the oral argument, as noted in the
transcript of the oral argument, from the total hours listed for this entry. Doc. 150 (Oral
Argument Transcript).
64

Date
12/06/2022

10/02/2023

10/03/2023

10/03/2023

10/03/2023

10/03/2023

10/17/2023

04/11/2024

04/11/2024

Description
Travel Expense 12-26-22
Mileage (240 Miles x
0.625)
Travel
Chase Card Services
0124
Travel
First National Bank of
Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)
5535
Travel
First National Bank of
Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)
5535
Travel
Chase Card Services
0124
Travel
First National Bank of
Omaha FNBO (JGBIII)
5535
Travel
Thomas B. Anderson
Bordas & Bordas
Attorneys, PLLC Travel
Reimbursement
Travel
Thomas B. Anderson
Bordas & Bordas
Attorneys, PLLC Travel
& Trial Expenses
Travel Donneshia
Johnson Bordas &

65

Amount
$150.00

$219.94

$6.75

$231.45

$272.67

$32.00

$362.66

$419.67

$338.85

Date

04/24/2024

07/25/2024

161

Description
Bordas Attorneys, PLLC
Travel & Trial Expenses
Travel
Chase Card Services
0124
Travel
Thomas B. Anderson,
Esq. Bordas & Bordas
Attorneys, PLLC Travel
Reimbursement

Amount

$2,090.73161

$188.70

Again, I note that this request has been duplicated in the expense reports submitted to the Court.
66

Appendix C: Excised Hours Related to Isolated Issues
Date
04/18/2024

Timekeeper
Monahan

04/19/2024

Monahan

05/01/2024

Anderson

Hours
2.5 (original entry
reduced by onethird to account
for block billing)
3.33 (original
entry reduced by
one-third to
account for block
billing)
0.5

05/06/2024

Prasick

1

05/06/2024

Anderson

4.1

05/06/2024

Monahan

05/07/2024

Prasick

6 (original entry
reduced by twothirds to account
for block billing)
5.5

05/09/2024

Prasick

05/09/2024

Monahan

05/16/2024
05/30/2024

Prasick
Anderson

0.575 (original
entry reduced by
one-fourth to
account for block
billing)
2.125 (original
entry reduced by
one-fourth to
account for block
billing)
3.3
0.4

67

Reason
Fee Enhancement

Fee Enhancement

Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides

Demonstrative
Slides

Fee Enhancement
Demonstrative
Slides

Date
05/30/2024

Timekeeper
Monahan

06/14/2024

Prasick

Hours
0.66 (original
entry reduced by
one-third to
account for block
billing)
0.3

06/14/2024

Anderson

0.7

06/14/2024

Bordas

0.3

06/14/2024

Monahan

1

06/19/2024

Anderson

0.5

09/11/2024
09/17/2024
09/17/2024

Anderson
Anderson
Monahan

1.5
0.6
1.55 (original
entry reduced by
one-fourth to
account for block
billing)

68

Reason
Demonstrative
Slides

Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Demonstrative
Slides
Appellate Issues
Appellate Issues
Appellate Issues

Appendix D: Excised Legal Research Costs
Date
04/04/2023

08/07/2023

08/11/2023
04/15/2024
05/22/2024

05/22/2024

06/18/2024

06/18/2024

06/18/2024

07/17/2024

Description
Online Research
Pacer Service Center Inv
# 5633158-Q12023
Online Research
Thomson Reuters – West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#1000141823
Online Research
Pacer Service Center Inv
# 566-158-Q32023
Online Research
Pacer Service Center
Acct #5633158
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Pacer Service Center Inv
#5633158-Q22024
69

Amount
$3.60

$65.85

$11.90
$2.80
$1,488.66

$1,606.49

$1,016.70

$1,169.67

$1,873.43

$61.30

Date
07/22/2024

07/24/2024

Description
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomas Reuters-West
Publishing Corp. Acct
#100141823

70

Amount
$866.80

$77.93

Appendix E: Recoverable Legal Research Costs
Date

Description

Amount

04/01/2023

Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct #
1000141823
Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct
#1000141823
Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct
#1000141823
Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct
#100141823
Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct
#1000141823
Online Research
Pacer Service
Center Inv# 5633158-Q42023

$302.21

05/01/2023

09/01/2023

10/01/2023

11/01/2023

11/07/2023

$75.57

Entries on April 5,
2023

$82.25

Entries on August
10 and August 11,
2023

$47.42

Entries on
September 25,
September 26, and
September 27,
2023
Entries on October
3 and October 11,
2023

$329.63

$0.60

71

Relevant Time
Entries
Entries on March
7, March 9, March
10, March 15, and
March 20, 2023

Entry on
November 7, 2023

Date

Description

Amount

12/01/2023

Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct
#1000141823
Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct#
1000141823

$89.33

02/01/2024

Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct #
1000141823

$283.51

04/01/2024

Online Research
Thomson Reuters
– West Publishing
Corp. Acct #
1000141823

$1,127.79

01/01/2024

$95.15

72

Relevant Time
Entries
Entry on
November 10,
2023

Entries on
December 18,
December 19,
December 20, and
December 21,
2023
Entries on January
2, January 3,
January 4, January
8, January 9,
January 25,
January 27, and
January 29, 2024
Entries on March
14, March 15,
March 21, and
March 25, 2024

Appendix F: Remaining Recoverable Costs
Date
Description
09/30/2021 Filing Fees – Pennsylvania
Middle District Court –
Complaint
11/02/2022 Schnader Harrison Segal &
Lewis, LLP; Invoice #
20185 11-2-22; Conference
Room
11/28/2022 Court Reporter
Johnson & Mimless
Transcript Services
12/19/2022 Court Reporter
Johnson & Mimless
Transcript Service
09/05/2023 Mediation Costs
JAMS, Inc. Mediation
04/01/2024 Federal Express
Federal Express Acct No.
6420-6533-5
04/01/2024 Federal Express
Federal Express Acct No.
6420-6533-5
04/22/2024 Court Reporter
Colleen V. Wentz Trial
Transcripts
08/06/2024 Court Reporter
Colleen V. Wentz
Transcript Services

73

Amount
$402.00

Relevant Time Entries
Entries on September 9, and
September 30, 2021

$150.00

Entries on November 2 and
November 7, 2022

$224.75

Entries on November 28 and
November 29, 2022

$331.00

Entries on December 14 and
December 19, 2022

$4,800.00 Entries on August 18, 24, 28,
and 30, 2023 and September 7,
2023
$43.62
There is no time entry for this
cost, but the Court is aware this
was incurred due to the Court’s
procedures regarding trial
exhibits.
$65.33
There is no time entry for this
cost, but the Court is aware this
was incurred due to the Court’s
procedures regarding trial
exhibits
$414.00
There is no time entry for this
cost, but the Court is aware that
this was incurred to purchase
the transcript from the trial.
$210.00
There is no time entry for this
cost, but the Court is aware that
this was incurred to purchase
the transcript from the oral
argument the Court held.