Brown v. Rivello et al

Filing 71

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re: 58 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Correctional Officer Greg Hicks. Signed by Chief Judge Matthew W. Brann on 8/30/2024. (jr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TODD ALAN BROWN,

No. 4:22-CV-01155

Plaintiff,

(Chief Judge Brann)

v.
SUPERINTENDENT RIVELLO, et
al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 30, 2024
Plaintiff Todd Alan Brown filed the instant pro se Section 19831 action in
July 2022, alleging constitutional violations by various SCI Huntingdon officials
and medical staff. Brown’s claims have been winnowed to a single Fourteenth
Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against one
SCI Huntingdon corrections officer. That officer now moves for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Genuine disputes of
material facts remain in this case, so the Court must deny Defendant’s Rule 56
motion.

1

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional
wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves
as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.
v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002).

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

During all times relevant to the claims underlying this lawsuit, Brown was a

pretrial detainee at SCI Huntingdon.3 In his amended complaint—the operative
pleading in this action—he asserted Section 1983 claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.4 Specifically,
Brown averred that he suffers from a mood disorder, depression, anxiety,
restlessness, hyperactivity, impulsivity, and poor reasoning,5 and tried to take his
own life on April 29, 2022.6 Brown alleged that he raised concerns to prison

2

3
4

5
6

Local Rule of Court 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment be supported “by a
separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” LOCAL RULE OF COURT
56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s statement
and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. “Statements of material facts in support of, or
in opposition to, a motion [for summary judgment] shall include references to the parts of the
record that support the statements.” Id. Defendant filed a properly supported statement of
material facts. See Doc. 59. Brown eventually responded to this statement. See Doc. 65. Most
of Brown’s responses, however, are not supported by citations to the record and instead contain
nothing more than argument or allegations. See id. This directly contravenes Local Rule 56.1.
See Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that Local
Rule 56.1 “is essential to the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion due to its role
in organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each
side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.” (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted)). Defendant’s material facts, therefore, are deemed
admitted unless properly countered by Brown or contradicted by the record. See LOCAL RULE
OF COURT 56.1.
Doc. 59 ¶ 1; Doc. 1 at 2.
Because Brown was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events, his claims implicate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments. See Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 19394 (3d Cir. 2021); Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).
Doc. 22 at 5, 12. Brown’s amended complaint appears at CM/ECF Document Nos. 16-1 and
22. The Court will cite to Document 22 herein.
Doc. 22 at 2, 8.

2

officials the day before he actually attempted suicide, but no one took any
preventive action.7 According to Brown, following his suicide attempt, he had to
be life-flighted to a hospital, was on life support for 24 hours, and lost feeling on
the left side of his face for a month, among other injuries.8
Following this Court’s screening of the amended complaint as required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), Brown’s Section 1983 medical indifference claims were
permitted to proceed against four defendants: corrections officer Greg Hicks and
“CB officers” Sheeley, Stevens, and Singer.9 These four Defendants then moved
for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.10
The Court issued an order informing Brown that it would “‘consider
exhaustion in its role as a fact finder under Small[ v. Camden County, 728 F.3d
265 (3d Cir. 2013)]’ and . . . provide him an ‘opportunity to respond.’”11 Brown
was given 21 days to supplement his briefing with any additional argument or
evidence in support of his position that he exhausted administrative remedies.12
Brown failed to provide any response beyond his previous brief in opposition. The
Court, however, sua sponte ordered Defendants to supplement their Rule 56
motion with the full administrative record for several grievances for which

7
8
9
10
11
12

Id. at 5-9.
See id. at 2, 4; Doc. 1 at 5.
See Doc. 20 at 11-13.
Doc. 26.
Doc. 34 (citing Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2018)).
See id. at 2.

3

Defendants had only provided piecemeal documentation.13 On that more fulsome
record, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Rule 56 motion.14
The Court found that Brown had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his
Section 1983 claims against Sheeley, Stevens, and Singer, but that prison officials
had rendered administrative remedies unavailable (and therefore exhausted) as to
Hicks.15
Following discovery, Hicks now moves for summary judgment on the merits
of Brown’s remaining Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claim.16 He
alternatively challenges the availability of compensatory and punitive damages.
Hicks’ Rule 56 motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.”17 Summary judgment is
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”18 Material
facts are those “that could alter the outcome” of the litigation, and “disputes are

13
14
15
16
17
18

See Doc. 35.
See generally Docs. 38, 39.
See Doc. 38 at 8-15.
Doc. 58.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

4

‘genuine’ if evidence exists from which a rational person could conclude that the
position of the person with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”19
At the Rule 56 stage, the Court’s function is not to “weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter” but rather “to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.”20 The Court must view the facts and evidence presented
“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and must “draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”21 This evidence, however, must be
adequate—as a matter of law—to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving
party on the claim or claims at issue.22 A “scintilla of evidence” supporting the
nonmovant’s position is insufficient; “there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].”23 Succinctly stated, summary
judgment is “put up or shut up time” for the nonmoving party.24
III.

DISCUSSION
Brown’s remaining Section 1983 claim asserts that Hicks was deliberately

indifferent to Brown’s serious mental health needs. Specifically, Brown alleges

19
20
21
22
23
24

EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Clark v. Modern
Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250-57; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986).
Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. at 252) (alteration in original).
Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Berkeley Inv. Grp.
v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006)).

5

that Hicks “grew up with” him and knows that he has mental health problems.25
Brown avers that, on April 28, 2022, Hicks witnessed him tying a bedside noose in
his cell and responded by telling Brown, “Take that down before you get in
trouble.”26 Brown further claims that Hicks then stated that if the unit counselor or
other prison officials “don’t help you, wait till tomorrow to act a fool OK not on
my shift.”27 Brown maintains that Hicks failed to inform anyone at SCI
Huntingdon that he had made a noose and was attempting to commit suicide or
take any other precautionary action.28 The following day—April 29—Brown
attempted to commit suicide and was nearly successful.29
In his Rule 56 motion, Hicks contends that Brown cannot adduce evidence
that Hicks acted with deliberate indifference.30 He also challenges the availability
of compensatory and punitive damages.31 After careful consideration, the Court
finds that Brown has proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Hicks acted with deliberate indifference toward
Brown’s serious medical needs, so summary judgment on this claim must be
denied. Moreover, the Rule 56 record demonstrates that both compensatory and
punitive damages remain available to Brown.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Doc. 22 at 6.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 2, 4.
Doc. 60 at 4-12.
Id. at 12-15.

6

A.

Fourteenth Amendment Medical Indifference

As noted above, Brown was a pretrial detainee during the events underlying
the instant lawsuit. Thus, his claims implicate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment’s cruel-and-unusualpunishments provision. However, it does not appear that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established or adhered to a different standard
with respect to Fourteenth Amendment pretrial detainee medical care claims versus
those raised by incarcerated individuals under the Eighth Amendment.32 Thus, the
Court will apply existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to the instant
Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claim.
In the context of prison medical care, the Eighth Amendment “requires
prison officials to provide basic medical treatment to those whom it has
incarcerated.”33 To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
regarding inadequate medical care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he had

32

33

This remains so even following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Kingsley
v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), which established a different standard for pretrial
detainee excessive force claims. See Thomas v. City of Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 & n.23
(3d Cir. 2023) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee’s medical care
claim); see also Parker v. Butler County, 832 F. App’x 777, 780 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2020)
(nonprecedential) (applying Eighth Amendment standard to pretrial detainee medical care
claim while acknowledging Fourteenth Amendment is source of right); Miller v. Steele-Smith,
713 F. App’x 74, 76 n.1, 78 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (same); Goode v. Giorla, 643 F.
App’x 127, 129 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (same); Edwards v. Northampton
County, 663 F. App’x 132, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential) (citing Natale v. Camden
Cnty Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003)).
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

7

a serious medical need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that
need; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.”34 A serious
medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment
or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for
a doctor’s attention.”35
Deliberate indifference by prison officials may be evidenced by intentional
refusal to provide care known to be medically necessary, delayed provision of
medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment,
or denial of reasonable requests for treatment resulting in suffering or risk of
injury.36 Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is an exacting standard,
requiring a showing of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”37 Claims
sounding in mere medical negligence will not suffice.38
Hicks first argues that qualified immunity bars Section 1983 liability
because Brown cannot establish that Hicks’ conduct violated the constitution.39
The Court disagrees.

34
35
36
37
38
39

Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Natale v.
Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
at 346).
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).
Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff
[can show] (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right
was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 735 (2011) (citation omitted).

8

Brown avers in an affidavit that on April 28, 2022, he spoke with Hicks at
his cell.40 Brown attests that he was crying and showed Hicks the bedsheet-turnednoose, and that he informed Hicks that he had attempted to hang himself but had
been unsuccessful.41 Brown maintains that Hicks took no preventive action
whatsoever in response to Brown’s serious mental health crisis.42 Instead, Hicks
responded by telling Brown to take down the makeshift noose and warned him not
to “do nothing [sic] on [his] shift” because he wanted “to go home at shift change,”
and that if Brown was going to do something “stupid” that he should wait until the
next day.43
It appears that this is exactly what Brown did. On April 29, Brown
attempted to hang himself with a similar makeshift noose fashioned from a second
bedsheet.44 Brown did not respond to the deployment of pepper spray and had to
be physically cut down with a “911 tool.”45 He was immediately taken by
ambulance to Penn Highlands Hospital and then transferred to UPMC Altoona.46
In his verified amended complaint, Brown attests that he had to be “li[fe-]flighted”
to UPMC Altoona, and that medical staff did not believe he was going to survive.47

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Doc. 64-1 at 1-2.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
See Doc. 64-2 at 3; Doc. 59-7 at 7.
See Doc. 64-2 at 3.
See id. at 2, 3.
Doc. 22 at 4.

9

He further averred that he had to be put on life support, suffered loss of feeling in
the left side of his face for a month, had temporary difficulty ambulating and
blurred vision, and continues to suffer from high blood pressure.48
For his part, Hicks denies making the alleged statements to Brown on April
28 and likewise denies that Brown exhibited signs of emotional distress and
suicidal intent.49 But such denials are quintessential disputes of material fact that
cannot be resolved by the Court at summary judgment.
Additionally, to the extent that Hicks argues that the law surrounding
deliberate indifference to serious mental health needs with respect to a suicidal
pretrial detainee is not “clearly established,”50 he is incorrect. In Palakovic v.
Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed a similar situation involving a suicidal pretrial detainee and
found such a Fourteenth Amendment claim to be viable.51 Moreover, a particular
vulnerability to suicide has long been held to be a serious medical need.52 “[I]f
[custodial] officials know or should have known of the particular vulnerability to
suicide of a [detainee], then the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on them an
obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.”53

48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
See Doc. 59-6 at 9, 10, 11.
See Doc. 60 at 9.
See Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227-29.
See id. at 227 (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 945 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Colburn, 945 F.2d at 1023 (citations omitted) (second alteration in original).

10

Hicks cannot satisfy either prong of the qualified immunity analysis when
the disputed facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Brown. So qualified
immunity, at least at this stage of the litigation, does not apply to preclude Section
1983 liability.
B.

Monetary Damages

Hicks alternatively argues that, because Brown did not sustain any physical
injury that was more than de minimis, he cannot recover compensatory damages.54
The Court is perplexed as to how Hicks deems a self-inflicted hanging attempt that
required emergency life-flight to a hospital and which resulted in short-term and
possibly permanent injuries to be less than de minimis physical injury. In any
event, such an argument has no basis in fact or law. And although Hicks contends
that “[i]t is undisputed” that Brown did not suffer “any physical injury” from the
events of April 28,55 that issue is very much in dispute, as noted above.
Hicks’ argument that punitive damages are unavailable fares no better.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Brown, Hicks’ conduct can easily be
said to involve “reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others.”56 Telling a suicidal pretrial detainee, who is in emotional distress and has
very recently attempted suicide, to wait until the officer’s shift is over before

54
55
56

See Doc. 60 at 12-13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)).
Id. at 13.
Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491,
1497 (3d Cir. 1996)).

11

attempting suicide again, is the type of conscience-shocking behavior that—if
believed by a jury—would permit recovery of punitive damages.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will deny Hicks’ motion for summary

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. An appropriate Order
follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

12