Hendrickes v. Warden of SCI-Muncy et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable Julia K Munley on 5/9/24. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 4:23-cv-0797

DOLLY HENDRICKES,
Petitioner

(Judge Munley)
v.
WARDEN, SCI-MUNCY,
Respondent

....................................................................................................
...................................................................... ............................. .
MEMORANDUM

On May 15, 2023, Petitioner, Dolly Hendrickes, an inmate confined in
the State Correctional Institution , Muncy Pennsylvania , filed the above
captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254.
(Doc. 1). She challenges a July 14, 2021 , conviction imposed by the Court
of Common Pleas of Dauphin County , Pennsylvania. (~) A response (Doc.
10) and traverse (Doc. 13) having been filed ; the petition is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons outlined below, the petition will be denied.

I.

Background

The factual and procedural background of this case has been extracted
from the Pennsylvania Superior Court's July 15, 2022, Memorandum
Opinion , granting counsel's motion to withdraw and affirming the judgment
of sentence, and is as follows:

We need not recite the underlying facts at length . In sum , a jury
convicted Hendrickes after hearing evidence, including
testimony from three eyewitnesses , which established that she
had killed her boyfriend by running him over with her car. See
Trial Court Opinion , filed December 22 , 2021 , at 2-6. The court
sentenced her to life without the possibility of parole and denied
her post-sentence motion.
Hendrickes filed a notice of appeal. The court ordered her to file
a concise statement of errors. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b ). In her
statement, Hendrickes raised (1) a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support first degree murder, alleging the
evidence supported a heat of passion defense, and (2) the
constitutionality of her sentence, alleging that a life sentence
without the possibility of parole violates the Pennsylvania
Constitution 's prohibition against cruel punishments by
presum ing an offender is incapable of rehabilitation .
(Doc. 10-5, Commonwea lth v. Hendrickes, No. 1431 MDA 2021 , slip op. at
1-2).
By Memorandum Opinion dated July 15, 2022 , the Pennsylvania
Superior Court granted counsel 's Motion to Withdraw and affirmed
Petitioner's judgment of sentence.

19.:

Petitioner failed to timely file a petition for allowance of appeal in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and on December 22 , 2022, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Hendrickes' petition for leave to file a Petition for
Allowance of Ap peal Nunc Pro Tune . See Commonwealth v. Hendrickes, 91
MM 2022, (Pa . 2022 ). Thus, Petitioner's judgment of sentence became fina l
on August 15, 2022, at the expiration of the th irty-day period for fili ng a
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Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 42
Pa.C .S. §9545(b )(3). The one-year period for the federal statute of limitations
commenced running as of that date. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1 ).
Petitioner timely filed the instant federal habeas corpus petition on May
15, 2023. (Doc. 1). She ra ises the fo ll owing grounds for relief:
1. The Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence of
first-degree murder.
2. A life sentence without the possibility of parole violates the
Pennsylvania Constitution's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments by presuming an offender is incapable of
rehabilitation.
3. Petitioner "would like to have added [her] heresay [sic]
statements and rema rks by [her] personally."
(Doc. 1 at 5-8 ).
II. Legal Standards
A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")
grants to persons in state or federa l custody the right to fi le a petition in a
federal court seeking the issua nce of a writ of habeas corpus . See 28 U.S.C.
§2254. Pursuant to AEDPA:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that-3-

(A) the appl icant has exhausted the remedies ava ilable in the
courts of the State; or
(B )(i ) there is an absence of ava ilable State co rrective process ;
or (i i) circumstances exist th at rende r such process ineffective to
protect the rights of appli ca nt.
28 U.S .C.

§ 2254(b)(1 ). The exhaustion

requirement is rooted

in

considerations of comity, to ensure that state courts have the initial
opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions.
See Castille v. Peoples , 489 U.S. 346 , 349 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S .
509 , 518 (1982) ; Leyva v. Williams , 504 F.3d 357 , 365 (3d Cir. 2007); Werts
v. Vaughn , 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
Respect for the state court system requires that the habeas petitioner
demonstrate that the claims in question have been "fairly presented to the
state courts ." Castille , 489 U.S. at 351 . To "fairly present" a claim , a petition
must present its "factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner
that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted ." McCandless
v. Vaughn , 172 F.3d 225, 261 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Nara v. Frank, 488
F .3d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a claim is fairly presented
when a petitioner presents the same factual and legal basis to the state
courts). A state prisoner exhausted state remedies by giving the "state courts
one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one
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complete round of the State's established appellate review process."
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel , 526 U.S. 838 , 845 (1999). In Pennsylvania , one
complete round includes presenting the federal claim through the Superior
Court on direct or collateral review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210,
233-34 (3d Cir. 2004 ). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving
exhaustion of all state remedies. Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330 , 367
(2009).
If a habeas petition contains unexhausted claims, the federal district
court must ordinarily dismiss the petition without prejudice so that the
petitioner can return to state court to exhaust his remedies. Slutzker v.
Johnson , 393 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2004). However, if state law would
clearly foreclose review of the claims, the exhaustion requirement is
technically satisfied because there is an absence of state corrective process.
See Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) ; Lines v. Larkin,
208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). The failure to properly present claims to
the state court generally results in a procedural default. Lines , 208 F.3d at
159-60. The doctrine of procedural default bars federal habeas relief when a
state court relies upon , or would rely upon, "'a state law ground that is
independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment"'
to foreclose review of the federal claim. Nolan v. Wynder, 363 F. App'x 868,
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871 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53,
53 (2009)); see also Taylor v. Horn , 504 F.3d 416 , 427-28 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S . 722 , 730 (1991 )).
The requirements of "independence" and "adequacy" are distinct.
Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551 , 557-59 (3d Cir. 2004). State procedural
grounds are not independent, and will not bar federal habeas relief, if the
state law ground is so "interwoven with federal law" that it cannot be said to
be independent of the merits of a petitioner's federal claims. Coleman , 501
U.S. at 739-40. A state rule is "adequate" for procedural default purposes if
it is "firmly established and regularly followed. " Johnson v. Lee, 578 U.S. 605,
606 (2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted). These requirements ensure that
"federal review is not barred unless a habeas petitioner had fair notice of the
need to follow the state procedural rule ," Bronshtein v. Horn , 404 F.3d 700,
707 (3d Cir. 2005), and that "review is foreclosed by what may honestly be
called 'rules' ... of general applicability[,] rather than by whim or prejudice
against a claim or claimant."~ at 708 .
Like the exhaustion requirement, the doctrine of procedural default is
grounded in principles of comity and federalism . As the Supreme Court has
explained :

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In the absence of the independent and adequate state ground
doctrine in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to
avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal
claims in state court. The independent and adequate state
ground doctrine ensures that the States' interest in correcting
their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.
Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 , 452-53 (2000).
Federal habeas review is not available to a petitioner whose
constitutional claims have not been addressed on the merits by the state
courts due to procedural default, unless such petitioner can demonstrate: (1)
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation
of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. !.g. at 451; Coleman , 501 U.S. at 750 . To
demonstrate cause and prejudice, the petitioner must show some objective
factor external to the defense that impeded counsel 's efforts to comply with
some state procedural rule. Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 381 (quoting Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 , 488 (1986)) . To demonstrate a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must typically demonstrate actual
innocence. Schlup v. Delo , 513 U.S. 298 , 324-26 (1995).
B. Merits Review

The AEDPA increased the deference federal courts must give to the
factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts. Woodford v.
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Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); Werts, 228 F.3d at 196. Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §2254(d), as amended by AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus may
be granted only if: (1) the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a
decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States;" or (2) the adjudication resulted in a decision that was "based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1 )-(2). Factual issues
determined by a state court are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner
bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. Werts, 228 F.3d at 196 (citing 28 U.S.C . §2254(e)(1 )).
The Supreme Court has explained that, "[u]nder the 'contrary to'
clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at
a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d
226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000). "Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct
legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably
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applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. " Williams , 529 U.S.
at 413. The "unreasonable appl ication" inquiry requires the habeas court to
"ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law
was objectively unreasonable. " Hameen , 212 F.3d at 235 (citing Williams,
529 U.S. at 388-89). "In further delineating the 'unreasonable application'
component, the Supreme Court stressed that an unreasonable application
of federal law is different from an incorrect application of such law and that a
federal habeas court may not grant relief unless that court determines that a
state court's incorrect or erroneous application of clearly established federal
law was also unreasonable. " Werts, 228 F.3d at 196 (citation omitted).
Ill. Discussion
Respondent moves to dismiss Petitioner's asserted grounds for relief
as procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 10 at 2-4 ). The Court agrees.
The record reveals that Petitioner has never presented Claim Three,
regarding Petitioner's hearsay statements, to any state court. Claims One
and Two were also not presented to the state courts, as her counsel did not
file an advocate's brief, but rather filed an Anders brief pursuant to Anders v.
California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), claiming that the issues Petitioner sought to
raise on appeal lacked merit and for that reason, counsel moved to withdraw.
Accordingly , Petitioner's grounds for relief are unexhausted and procedurally
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defaulted as Petitioner wou ld now be precluded from ra ising them under the
PCRA statute of li mitations and Pennsylvania's PCRA waiver ru le, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9544(b) .1 The waiver rule codified at §9544(b) is an
independent and adequate state ru le which bars federal habeas review.
Patton v. Sup't Graterford SCI , 2017 WL 5624266 , at *1 (3d Cir. 2017) ("[T]he
state court's re li ance on 42 Pa . Cons . Stat. §9544(b) provides an
independent and adequate ground to support the judgment. "). There is no
question that the Pennsylvania courts would not entertain Petitioner's claims
at this juncture. Therefore, the Court cannot review the merits of the instant
cla ims absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or that a miscarriage of
justice will result absent such review.
Petitioner does not assert any cause for her fa il ure to present her
claims to the state courts. In fact, Petitioner did not even oppose counsel's
Anders brief, nor did she address Respondent's procedural default argument
in her reply. In the absence of cause, the Court does not need to address
the issue of prejudice. Nevertheless, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that she

1

42 Pa. Cons . Stat. §9544(b) provides: "For purposes of this subchapter, an
issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before
trial , at trial , during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction
proceeding. "
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was prejudiced by the default of her claims and her complaints about the
state court's procedure under Anders , lack merit. Recognizing that an
attorney is "under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous
appeal, " the Supreme Court has held that an attorney may withdraw from
representing a client on appeal , so long as the attorney follows a procedure
that "affords adequate and effective appellate review to [the] indigent
defendant[]" and , therefore, "reasonably ensures that an indigent appeal will
be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. " Smith v.
Robbins , 528 U.S. 259 , 272 , 276-77 (2000) . In Anders, the United States
Supreme Court articulated a procedure designed to protect an indigent
appellant's constitutional rights when his attorney moves to withdraw.
Pursuant to Anders , appellate counsel must conduct a "conscientious
examination" of the case before seeking to withdraw from the case, and then
file an appellate brief "referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. "

kl

at 744. The defendant must be given a copy of

counsel 's brief and be provided an opportunity to raise any points he wishes.

kl

Then , the appellate court must conduct a "full examination of all the

proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous ."

kl "If the

court

is satisfied that counsel has diligently investigated the possible grounds of
appeal , and agrees with counsel's evaluation of the case , then leave to

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withdraw may be allowed and leave to appeal may be denied ." 19..: at 741-42;
see also McCoy v. Ct. App. of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S . 429, 442 (1988).
The record in Petitioner's case reveals that appellate counsel followed the
proper procedure for withdrawal as articulated in Anders. Specifically, the
Superior Court addressed counsel 's withdrawal under Anders as follows :
Counsel 's Motion states that he has examined the record and
concluded that the appeal is frivolous. In the Anders brief,
counsel explains his conclusions that the appeal is frivolous and
that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole does not
violate the Pennsylvania Constitutions' prohibition on cruel
punishment. He includes ample citation to relevant authority and
the facts of record. In his letter to Hendrickes, counsel informed
her of her right to obtain new counsel or raise any issues before
this Court in response to his assertion of frivolousness. Counsel
has met all procedural and briefing requirements. See & We
now turn to our own consideration of the case.
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, counsel in the Anders
brief explains that here, the jury was presented with two versions
of events. In the Commonwealth's case, an eyewitness testified
that the victim got out of the car and Hendrickes turned [the]
vehicle towards him and ran him over. Police officers at the
scene testified that Hendrickes was cool, calm , and collected . In
contrast, according to Hendrickes' testimony , there was a
physical altercation in the car during which the victim threatened
to cut her with a box cutter, and when he got out of the car, she
ran him over without thinking . Counsel explains that the jury was
permitted to believe the Commonwealth's witness and not
Hendrickes. He further points out that a heat-of-passion defense,
seeking a voluntary manslaughter verdict, was unavailable
because the altercation had ended , the victim had gotten out of
the car and was walking away when struck, and Hendrickes had
time to cool off. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943,
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979-80 (Pa. 2013). We agree that there is no basis in law or fact
on which to challenge the verdict here.
Hendrickes' sentencing issue is also frivolous. The legislature
has mandated that a court shall sentence an adult convicted of
first-degree murder to death or life imprisonment without parole.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §1102(a)(1). A mandatory sentence of life
without parole, when imposed on an adult defendant, does not
violate the Eighth Amendment on the basis that it precludes
consideration of mitigating circumstances . See Commonwealth
v. Yount, 615 A.2d 1316, 1321 (Pa.Super. 1992); see also
Commonwealth v. Waters , 483 A.2d 855, 861 (Pa.Super. 1984)
("A mandatory life sentence , as established by the legislature, is
clearly not cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of firstdegree murder"). The Pennsylvania Constitution is coextensive
with the federal Constitution on the point of cruel and unusual
punishment. See Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734 , 743
(Pa .Super. 2008). Therefore, the mandatory sentence also does
not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Hendrickes has not responded to counsel's Anders brief and
withdrawal motion. Our independent review discloses no nonfrivolous issues that would require an appeal. We therefore grant
counsel 's Motion to Withdraw and affirm the judgment of
sentence.
(Doc. 10-5 at 3-4 ).
Given these circumstances , Petitioner cannot demonstrate that she
suffered prejudice by failing to challenge the Anders procedure followed by
Pennsylvania state court. Finally , the miscarriage of justice exception to the
procedural default doctrine does not excuse Petitioner's default, because
Petitioner has not provided new reliable evidence of actual innocence.

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Accordingly , the Court will deny Petitioner's claims as procedurally barred
from habeas review.
IV. Certificate of Appealability

When a district court issues a final order denying a §2254 petition , the
court must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d
Cir. L.A. R. 22.2 (2011 ). A certificate of appealability is appropriate when a
petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"
by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. " 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). If a federal court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
underlying constitutional claims , the court is not required to issue a certificate
of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason
would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its
procedural ruling.

kt

The Court has concluded that the instant petition fails to warrant
federal habeas relief and is persuaded that reasonable jurists would not find
this conclusion to be debatable. Therefore, the Court will not issue a
certificate of appealability.
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V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above , the instant petition for habeas relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254 is denied without an evidentiary hearing or the
issuance of a certificate of appealability.
A separate Order will be entered.

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