Snyder v. Larson Design Group, Inc.

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 15 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Signed by Honorable Julia K Munley on 3/26/24. (sm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
No. 4:23cv1132

LUCIEN SNYDER,
Plaintiff

(Judge Munley)
V.

LARSON DESIGN GROUP, INC,
Defendant

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.. ..........................................................................................................
MEMORANDUM

Before the court is Defendant Larson Design Group, lnc.'s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(6). (Doc. 15). This
matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

1

Background

Plaintiff Lucien Snyder filed this action against his former employer
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.
("FMLA") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. § 951, et
seq., ("PHRA"). As alleged in the operative amended complaint, plaintiff started

working for defendant as a temporary worker in November 2011 before being

1

The Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson transferred this matter to the undersigned on November 7,
2023 .

hired as an engineering technician in March 2012. 2 (Doc. 12 1l1l 11, 13). In
March 2020, defendant promoted plaintiff to senior engineering technician . (kl 1l
15). His job duties included performing surveys of existing buildings, researching
construction methods and materials, and generating applicable drawing sets. (kl

1l 14).
Plaintiff previously treated for thyroid cancer and underwent a
thyroidectomy followed by surgery for an aggressive meningioma brain tumor in
2010. (kl 1l 10). In October 2013, while employed by defendant, plaintiff
underwent a second surgery for a similar brain tumor. (kl 1J 12). Plaintiff
currently has been diagnosed with six (6) meningioma brain tumors, two (2) of
which are growing near the optic nerve of his right eye. (kl 1J 16). Between
March 4, 2020 and April 10, 2020 and during the time he was promoted, plaintiff
received six (6) weeks of radiation treatment to address the tumors in an attempt
to avoid vision loss or the loss of his eye. (kl 1J 17). Plaintiff also alleges that
during this radiation treatment, COVID-19 related closures caused the defendant
to move all employees to work-from-home status. (kl 1J 18).

2

These brief background facts are derived from plaintiff's amended complaint. At this stage of
the proceedings, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Phillips
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The court makes no determination,
however, as to the ultimate veracity of these assertions.

2

In January 2022, plaintiff underwent gamma knife radiation surgery. (kl ,i
19). He developed vision issues, eye pain and swelling, and constant headaches
around this time. (kl ,i 20). Treatment with a neuro-ophthalmologist revealed
retinal scarring and hemorrhaging caused by the related radiation treatments.

(kl) Plaintiff also experienced ongoing issues from radiation treatment, including
extreme photosensitivity, eye pain and fatigue, blurred vision, hypothalamic
dysfunction , brain fog, memory and focus issues, vision issues, confusion ,
disorientation, debilitating headaches, and seizures. (kl ,i 21 ).
In February 2022, plaintiff returned to work after radiation treatment and
continued to work remotely like most of his other coworkers. (kl ,i 22). He
alleges that defendant was converting to Office 365 software at this time and
planned to remove employee's personal folders, so plaintiff backed up this folder
to a personal thumb drive. (kl) Plaintiff alleges he did so to prevent the loss of
design calculations needed for his position. (kl ,i 23). He avers an unawareness
that using a personal thumb drive violated company policies. (kl)
In June or July 2022, plaintiff began working on a new CVS client project,
which required new specific standards and layouts that were unfamiliar to him.

(kl ,i 25). Plaintiff avers that, although he received an email with basic
instructions from the project lead and a supervisor, he did not receive further
direction from the supervisor or notification that there were design changes. (kl
3

,m 26-27). Per plaintiff, the supervisor placed him on the project shortly before
the supervisor took a two-week vacation and medical leave knowing that plaintiff
was unfamiliar with CVS standards. (kl

,m 28-29).

Plaintiff also alleges he was

not included in team emails regarding the project and brought the issue up with
the supervisor. (kl ,I 31 ). When the project was about to go over budget, plaintiff
alleges that the project lead contacted him and claimed plaintiff "went 'rogue' and
continued to belittle and bully him via email and messages the following
morning." (kl ,I 32).
On or about July 25, 2022, plaintiff was placed on defendant's performance
initiative program ("PIP"), which would require plaintiff's return to the office. (kl ,I
35). Plaintiff alleges he raised concerns about the project lead's behavior toward
him during the related meeting and defendant's representative "responded with
'oh , we already handled it. ' " (kl ,I 36). Additionally at this meeting , plaintiff
expressed concern that he would not be able to work in an office setting due to
fluorescent lighting and his photosensitivity. (kl ,I 37). During the meeting, a
representative from defendant's human resources department ("HR") told plaintiff
that, "Pennsylvania is an at will state and if he did not go on PIP and work in
[defendant's] office building then he would be fired. " (kl ,I 38). Plaintiff agreed to
return to the office believing he had no other option despite his symptoms. (~

4

,m

38-39). Plaintiff alleges that defendant never made any accommodations for his
disabilities. (kl ,I 39).
Toward the end of PIP review, plaintiff experienced a severe headache,
which made him dizzy and disoriented and caused his knees to buckle while he
was walking down a hallway. (kl ,I 40). That evening , plaintiff emailed his
oncologist and asked for a letter explaining his diagnoses and symptoms. (kl ,I
41 ). Plaintiff also completed short-term disability paperwork. (kl ,I 42).
At the conclusion of his PIP review, during a follow up meeting on or about
August 29, 2022, plaintiff's supervisor and an HR employee told plaintiff that he
was "doing great" with his performance, meeting deadlines, and getting projects
accomplished under budget. (kl ,I 43). At that meeting, plaintiff revisited the
issue of remote working. (kl ,I 44 ). Per plaintiff, his supervisor and the HR
representative were hesitant. (kl) Plaintiff provided these individuals with the
letter from his oncologist and the short-term disability paperwork and told them
that "if he was not able to go back to working remotely that he would need to go
on short term disability that would eventually become long term disability" due to
his indefinite prognosis and "he could not continue to work in the office
environment. " (kl ,I 45).
As alleged, defendant's HR representative reacted by stating: "well, if you
go on short term disability you will not be working any longer," and "you won't be
5

able to finish the projects you are currently working on." (.kl 1146). Per the
amended complaint, defendant "aggressively" advanced intermittent FMLA leave
and a hybrid work schedule instead of short-term disability. (.kl at 111146-47).
Defendant advised plaintiff that, if he used FMLA leave, he could continue to
work and take off any time as needed due to illness. (.kl ,I 47). Defendant also
advised plaintiff that it would send a safety team to place ultraviolet light screens
on windows, blue light covers on laptop screens, and dimmable lights at both
defendant's office location and in plaintiff's home office. (,kl). As a result,
plaintiff returned to working remotely using FMLA leave, however, "after about a
month" plaintiff did not hear back from the HR department about the safety team
making these accommodations. (.kl ,I 48). Further, plaintiff avers that, on or
about August 30, 2022, plaintiff followed up with a superior by email regarding
the PIP meeting, his medical issues, and the possible need for short-term
disability. (.kl ,I 54).
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated on or about September 23, 2022.3

(.kl ,I 55). Per plaintiff, defendant cited violations of company policy, including
the use of a thumb drive to back up information and the use of unsupported web
browsers. (.kl) Plaintiff alleges these reasons are pretext. (_kl).

3

Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that he was terminated "[o]n or around September
23 , 2002, " which appears to be a typographical error.

6

Based on the foregoing facts, plaintiff's amended complaint asserts the
following causes of action: Count I - ADA discrimination claim; Count II - ADA
failure to accommodate claim; Count Ill - ADA retaliation claim ; Count IV PHRA discrimination claim; Count V - PHRA retaliation claim; and Count VI FMLA retaliation claim. Defendant responded with a motion to dismiss Counts
11I-V and plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages under Count VI. (Doc. 15).
The parties have briefed their respective positions, bringing the case to its
present posture.
Jurisdiction

Based on the alleged violations of federal law, this court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."). Additionally, the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3),
which confers jurisdiction of any action commenced to redress the deprivation of
any right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law providing for the equal
rights of citizens. The court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). ("In any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within

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such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article Ill of the United States Constitution.").
Legal Standard
Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations when
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
To suNive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when factual content is pied
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.

lit (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). "Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice." lit (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 555).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, district courts accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (3d
(citations omitted).
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Analysis
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim based on a
failure to plead causation and his PHRA claims based on a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The court will address plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim
before turning to his PHRA claims. 4

1. Count Ill - ADA Retaliation Claim
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claim for retaliation under the ADA.5
The ADA's anti-retaliation provision provides, in relevant part, "[n]o person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by" the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove: "(1)
protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or
contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's
adverse action." Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir.
2002)(citation omitted).

4

Regarding defendant's motion to dismiss the request for compensatory damages in Count VI,
that is plaintiffs FMLA retaliation claim, plaintiff concurs that FMLA does not provide for that
recovery. (kl, ECF p. 12). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted as to
that request for relief without further discussion .
5

Regarding Count Ill, plaintiff concedes that his sole remedy for ADA retaliation claims is
equitable relief and that his demand for compensatory damages should be dismissed. (Doc.
18-1 , ECF p. 11). As such, this portion of defendant's motion to dismiss will be granted.

9

Defendant challenges whether plaintiff has pied a causal connection
between protected activity, that is, his requests for accommodation, and the
adverse action , his termination . Specifically, defendant argues that the threeweek period between the alleged request for accommodations and termination is
insufficient to show a causal connection as a matter of law. (Doc. 7, p. 7).
Plaintiff counters that the causation analysis is inherently fact-based and that he
sufficiently alleged a causal connection in the amended complaint. (Doc. 18-1 ,
ECF 9-10). The court agrees with plaintiff.
"[l]n cases where a plaintiff must illustrate a 'causal link' for purposes of
establishing retaliation, or show that certain conduct was 'used' as a basis for
employment decisions, a plaintiff may rely upon a broad array of evidence to do
so." Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2000). "To
establish the requisite causal connection a plaintiff usually must prove either (1)
an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and
the allegedly retaliatory action , or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing
to establish a causal link." Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d
259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)(emphasis added). Where the tempora l proximity is not
so close as to be unduly suggestive, timing plus other evidence may be an
appropriate test for causation. Thomas v. Town of Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108,

10

114 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 513 (3d
Cir. 2003)).
In the amended complaint, plaintiff has alleged timing plus other facts to
state a prima facie ADA retaliation case. Plaintiff alleges that he made a request
for accommodation on August 29, 2022 when he asked to return to remote work.
(Doc. 12

,m 43-44 ).

During that same meeting, defendant's representatives

discussed plaintiff's performance in a positive manner. (kl 1143). Per plaintiff,
however, his supervisor and the HR representative were hesitant regarding
remote work. (kl ,r 44 ). During this meeting, plaintiff discussed taking short-term
disability leave if he would be required to remain working at the office. (kl ,r,r 4445). Defendant's HR representative allegedly responded rudely and
unprofessionally, "aggressively" promoting intermittent FMLA leave and a hybrid
work schedule instead. (kl ,r 46). Per the allegations, defendant's
representatives also promised plaintiff that it would install ultraviolet light screens
on windows, blue light covers on laptop screens, and dimmable lights at both
defendant's office location and in plaintiff's home office. (kl ,r 47). Additionally,
plaintiff avers that he followed up with a higher-level employee regarding his
medical issues and the possible need for short-term disability after this meeting.

(kl ,r 54 ). Plaintiff also alleges the defendant never followed through on the
promised accessibility accommodations. (kl ,r 48). Rather, defendant terminated
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plaintiff based on an alleged violation of defendant's computer policies
approximately three weeks after the meeting. (kl ,i 56). In light of the facts pied,
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged causation. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count
Ill of the amended complaint will thus be denied.

2. Counts IV and V - PHRA Disability Discrimination and Retaliation
Claims
Next, defendant moves to dismiss both of plaintiff's PHRA claims arguing
that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 17, p. 9-10). In
this matter, plaintiff filed a dual charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission ("PHRC") on November 16, 2022. 6 (Doc. 17, Exh. 1). He
then initiated this action asserting PHRA claims on July 7, 2023, approximately
seven months later. (Doc. 1).
The PHRA requires that a discrimination complaint must be first brought to
the PHRC , which has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for one year. See
Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.
2001 ); 43 PA.

STAT. §

962(b). A PHRA complainant may not file an action in

6

A court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an
exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document. Pension Ben.
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc. , 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff does
not contest the authenticity of the charge of discrimination that he dual-filed . The court will
thus consider this document.

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court during this period . kl A complainant, however, may bring a court action
regardless of whether or not he has received a letter from the PHRC after that
one-year period . kl
"The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explicitly held that a discharged
employee cannot file a PHRA claim in the judicial system without first exhausting
administrative remedies." Tlush v. Mfrs. Res. Ctr., 315 F. Supp. 2d 650, 656
(E.D. Pa. 2002)(citing Clay v. Advanced Comput. Applications, Inc. , 559 A.2d
917, 920 (Pa . 1989)). Some federal courts have dismissed PHRA claims with
prejudice where plaintiffs filed suit before the one-year period has passed. kl at
656-657 (collecting cases); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572,
588 (E.D . Pa. 2010)(rejecting arguments on summary judgment that an amended
complaint filed after the PHRA's one-year time period cures any exhaustion
defects). At the motion to dismiss stage, courts in this district have dismissed
PHRA claims without prejudice with leave to amend on the issue of
administrative exhaustion. Rife v. Borough of Dauphin, 625 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217
(M.D. Pa. 2008).

As noted above, plaintiff dual-filed his complaint with the EEOC and the
PHRC. The law provides that:
Through a dual-filing agreement, the PHRC and the EEOC
enter into an arrangement through which they apportion
initial jurisdiction over discrimination complaints in order to
avoid unnecessary duplication of investigatory time and
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effort. Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d
Cir. 1997). Under a dual-filing agreement, each agency
waives its right to initially review claims that are first filed
with the other agency. kl at 926. As such, a claim that is
filed first with the EEOC can be processed by the EEOC,
without being investigated as an initial matter by the PHRC.
kl Therefore, Pennsylvania waives its statutory right to
initially process discrimination claims, and hence the
agreement operates to "terminate" the PHRC proceedings
with respect to those complaints that are filed first with the
EEOC. kl Dual-filing an EEOC charge of discrimination
satisfies the PHRA's prerequisites. See Remp v. Alcon
Labs., Inc., 701 Fed.Appx. 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2017).
Simon v. !PS-Integrated Project Servs., LLC, No. CV 17-03474, 2018 WL
3585137, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2018)(Jones, J).
Plaintiff attached his EEOC right-to-sue letter dated May 26, 2023 to the
amended complaint. (Doc 12-1 ). The notice attached advised plaintiff that he
had ninety (90) days to pursue his ADA claims against defendant.

(kl at p.

2).

Plaintiff filed suit in this action raising ADA and PHRA claims on July 7, 2023.
(Doc. 1). Although the PHRA claims were filed within the one-year period where
the PHRC would have jurisdiction under Pennsylvania law, the court cannot rule
out that the PHRC waived its right to process plaintiff's claim and terminated the
proceedings. Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, a court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

14

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's PHRA claims (Count
IV-V) will be granted, but these claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint alleging any
relevant facts as to the administrative exhaustion issue.
Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to dismiss will be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's

requests for compensatory damages in Count Ill and Count VI will be GRANTED
as unopposed. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Ill regarding plaintiff's claim
for ADA retaliation will otherwise be DENIED. Defendant's motion to dismiss
Counts IV-V regarding plaintiff's PHRA disability discrimination and retaliation
claims will be GRANTED. Plaintiff's PHRA claims in Counts IV-V, however, are
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint
within twenty (20) days of this order asserting any additional facts regarding
administrative exhaustion of his PHRA claims or these claims will be dismissed.
An appropriate order follows.

D

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